Refugee Watch Online

Refugees in Nepal: Challenges Ahead

2011-12-28T14:13:00.000+05:30

Sahana Basavapatna and Ishita Dey

As we wind up 2011 edition of Refugee Watch Online (RWO), we at RWO realize that this year, like the years before this, has been instructive in more ways than one. While some developments, such as the Australia-Malaysia swap arrangement made us realize how precarious not only the lives of the refugees but also the laws that we dearly hold on to. Closer home, the challenges are equally intimidating; while mechanisms exist, its history, politics and society provide as much of a challenge as it may be conducive for a better deal for refugees in South Asia.

In this last edition of RWO, we want to bring to the forefront some of the challenges facing Nepal, a country that has witnessed prolonged internal conflict. Nepal, a non- signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Refugee Protocol has played the host and transit point to refugee groups, primarily Bhutanese and Tibetans. While the history of Bhutanese refugees in and Tibetans in Nepal is not unknown to us, the challenges these communities face needs some deeper introspection. After 27 years of living in camps in Nepal, the Bhutanese refugee crisis could not be resolved although this period witnessed fifteen rounds of ministerial-level negotiations between Bhutan and Nepal. Thus, finding themselves unwanted in Nepal and losing the right to return, the Bhutanese refugees were offered the Third Country Resettlement option. In 2006, the aggravating Bhutanese Refugee crisis suddenly saw an unexpected turn in the form of the United States of America offering to resettle 60,000 refugees. Similar promises followed from other countries such as Norway, Denmark, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – known as Core Working Group – to take a small share of refugees to their country. The resettlement process began in 2008. Sreeja Balarajan, in her article gives a critical insight to the life of Bhutanese refugees resettled in US. Is third country resettlement a viable solution to those who had dreamed of returning back to their homelands in Bhutan? What does it take to rebuild lives as younger generation gear up for the American dream and the older generation struggle to adapt themselves in a new environment where they find it difficult to adapt as they lack adequate communication skills?

One of the largest communities who have been forced to live a life of exile in South Asian states are the Tibetan refugees. Tibetans have lived in Nepal for decades while some transit through Nepal to travel further south towards India. In the recent times, there have been reports of closure of Reception Centre and Welfare Office of Tibetan refugees as well as arbitrary arrests of Tibetans. In a recent remark, Congressman Mr. Frank Wolf threatened to cut off aid to Nepal if it does not allow Tibetan Refugees to transit to safer places. Tashi Dhundup responds and cautions us that this statement presents Nepal the tough choice to either articulate an independent position on the Tibetan issue or succumb to the pressures of neighbours for other political reasons. Drawing from Nepal’s history of treating Tibetan refugees, it is evident that Nepal has been forced to resort to violent measures to safeguard its diplomatic position in the region.

Both these articles remind us of the challenges that confront of refugee rights practitioners. In what ways can we strengthen legal protection of refugees? While some have been advocating that South Asian states should sign the 1951 Refugee Convention; international and humanitarian agencies working in non-signatory states should also lobby for National legislation to protect and safeguard the rights of the refugees. The concern raised in both these articles need a deeper introspection on the way to respond to people affected by forced displacement in South Asia and beyond.

The editorial collective of 2011 has attempted to bring such concerns. We take this opportunity to thank our readers for their comments and look forward to more engaging contributions and comments from refugee activists, researchers and lawyers in the areas of forced migration in South Asia and beyond in 2012 as well. Please feel free to get in touch with us refugeewatchonline@gmail.com for any clarifications.

UNHCR Reports Indicate Resettlement Programme from Bhutanese Refugees Crosses 50,000 Marks

2011-12-28T14:01:00.002+05:30

Jai Prasad Sunuwar flew to South Dakota in the United States earlier this month, becoming the 50,000th refugee originating from Bhutan to be resettled from Nepal under a programme launched four years ago by UNHCR and its partners.

Under one of UNHCR's largest resettlement programmes, more than 42,000 of the refugees have begun new lives in the United States. Others have left camps in eastern Nepal for resettlement in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. They had come to Nepal during the early 1990s, fleeing ethnic tensions in Bhutan.

When the resettlement programme began in November 2007 there were almost 110,000 refugees from Bhutan residing in seven camps in eastern Nepal, three of which have since been closed. Of those remaining in the camps, some 47,000 have expressed an interest in resettlement.

The UN refugee agency is responsible for interviewing refugees and referring their files to resettlement countries, while the International Organization for Migration conducts health assessments, organizes cultural orientation courses and transports the refugees from Nepal to their countries of resettlement.

For details see http://www.unhcr.org/4e4bea789.html; Accessed on 19 September 2011

US Lawmaker Warns Nepal of Aid Cut over Tibetans

2011-12-28T13:57:00.002+05:30

Agence France Presse: 2011-11-05
Washington: A US lawmaker has threatened to strip Nepal of its millions of dollars in US aid unless it permits refugees fleeing Chinese rule in Tibet to transit through the country.

Nepal is the main route for Tibetans who seek to go into exile, but the country has increasingly cracked down on Tibetans’ movement and activities out of fear of upsetting its giant neighbour to the north.

Representative Frank Wolf, who sits on the House Appropriations Committee that determines US funding, said yesterday he would try to block funding to Nepal unless it grants exit visas to Tibetans who seek refuge in the United States. “We’re not just going to cut them, we’re going to zero them out,” said Wolf, a Republican from Virginia and outspoken critic of China. “If they’re not willing to do it, then they don’t share our values and if they don’t share our values, we do not want to share our dollars,” he told a congressional hearing on Tibet.

Wolf said he would propose the aid cutoff if Nepal’s record does not improve by the time the United States looks at foreign aid funding next year. Human rights groups have frequently accused Nepal of arbitrary arrests and harassment of Tibetans. In July, Nepal prevented its 20,000-strong Tibetan community from celebrating the birthday of spiritual leader the Dalai Lama. The United States has supported Nepal as it recovers from a decade-long civil war.

The US Agency for International Development says it sought $57.7 million for Nepal in the 2010 fiscal year and that its efforts to provide children in Nepal with Vitamin A have averted some 15,000 deaths a year.

( Tashi Dhundup responds to this comment in the section on Views)

Short Course on Forced Migration

2011-12-28T13:52:00.002+05:30

The Center for Migration and Refugee Studies (CMRS) at the American University in Cairo (AUC) is offering the following four short courses during the month of January and February 2012

1. Demographics Measures of Migration (January 29- February 2, 2012):

Course Description: The course will provide post-graduate students, international agency staff, NGO workers, government officials and others working in the field of migration data systems or interested in working in this field with an introduction to the demography of migration, including data sources, data collection, and analysis of international migration data. By the end of the course, and through presentations, case studies and real country data from developing and developed countries, participants will be able to identify migration data sources, read and understand the meanings of migration statistics, rates, and indicators, and be able to calculate main migration indicators. A very basic knowledge of mathematics, use of handheld calculators or Excel is required.

2. Migration and Refugee Movements in the Middle East and North Africa (February 5-9, 2012):

Course Description: For decades, the Middle East and North Africa region has been plagued by a multitude of political and socio-economic challenges. Population displacement has featured prominently among these challenges, and is firmly embedded in the geo-political realities of inter-State conflict and internal civil strife, as well as predominantly undemocratic systems of governance, yet it does not feature as prominently as it should in the study of the region. MENA hosts the world’s largest and longest-standing refugee problem: that of Palestinian refugees, in addition to millions of displaced Iraqis, and thousands of other displaced groups. This course will analyze the trends, causes, and consequences of asylum and migration for individuals and societies in MENA, while highlighting the political and historic context. This practice-oriented course will rely on a basic understanding of international human rights and refugee law in its analysis of asylum and migration patterns in the Levant, North Africa, Horn of Africa, and the Gulf.

3. Palestinian Refugees (February 12-16, 2012)

Course Description: The Palestinian refugee problem is perhaps the most sensitive issue in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and one of the most vexing continuing challenges to international refugee policy. This inter-disciplinary course will be an opportunity for students to engage directly with the major practical and theoretical issues connected with Palestinian refugees, critically assessing the historical, political, legal and ideological forces that have shaped their turbulent circumstances. The course will consider perspectives from both Israeli and Palestinian viewpoints, including fields of history, law, and the social sciences, and will analyze a number of primary texts.

4. Training Skills for Trainers of Psychosocial and Mental Health Workers in Countries Affected by Emergencies (February 18-25, 2012)

Course Description: Refugees and migrants struggle with the mental health and psychosocial consequences of their experiences in the aftermath of wars, conflict, natural disasters and other emergencies. Efforts for mental health and psychosocial supportive services span the globe and are often part of aid operations. Professionals commonly need to prepare the teams to provide these services.

Eligibility for all Courses:

The courses are offered for graduate level students, researchers and practitioners in the field of migration and refugees. The maximum number of participants in each course is between 25-30.

All courses are conducted in English and no translation facilities are provided. Participants should have a sufficient command of the English language.

Application Procedure for all Courses:

To apply for the courses, please fill out the application below and attach your most recent CV and send to cmrscourses@aucegypt.edu: Att. Ms. Naseem Hashim

Visit the CMRS Short Course web page for more information: http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/cmrs/outreach/Pages/ShortCourses.aspx

Applicants may apply and be accepted to more than one course. Please do not hesitate to contact cmrscourses@aucegypt.edu if you have any difficulty with the application process.

The deadline for submitting course applications is January 10, 2012.

Wolf’s Warning, will the ‘Sheep’ Listen or Kowtow again to ‘Dragon’

2011-12-28T13:49:00.001+05:30

Tashi Dhundup

(Tashi is a Tibetan in exile, and an independent researcher.)

Keeping in mind the increasingly kowtowing behavior of the Nepalese polity in terms of its treatment towards the Tibetans in Nepal, the recent remark by the US lawmaker Frank Wolf ( For Details refer to the press release in the News Section of this edition) to cut off aid to Nepal will surely be welcomed by the Tibetans and their supporters with great hoopla. But even though it is an encouraging remark nonetheless, it might prove imperative to greet it with guarded enthusiasm. It is urgent to understand or to question in that regard, what outcome such a caveat will receive.

If we were to look back, beginning 2008, despite intense pressure from the International diplomatic communities and media outcry, the Nepalese Government went on nonchalantly to break the skulls of the Tibetan protestors and in between orchestrated the closure of two important and indispensible Tibetan community related offices vis-à-vis Tibetan Reception Center and the Tibetan Welfare Office that has been in existence for the last several decades. Not to mention the spree of clandestine and arbitrary house arrest that followed. These were already in addition to the deportation of around fifteen Tibetans in 2003 which was another milestone of easing up to the Chinese by the Nepalese Government. Despite such an outpour of public brick batting, if the Nepalese Government had wittingly continued to do the status quo, to what consequence this latest ultimatum of Representative Wolf will bear fruit remains fanciful.

The important thing to consider would be what such an ultimatum would do to the already deteriorating situations of the Tibetans in Nepal, both the residents and the ones fleeing through Nepal for that matter. For one, instead of easing up the situation it might prove otherwise, resulting in the already emaciated but now provoked law enforcers of Nepal to wield their batons upon the Tibetan recipients more forcefully. Another point to consider would be what effect it will have on the general psyche of the ordinary Nepalese citizens who are either ill-informed or unaware of the Tibetan issue in general. There is a possibility that their lackadaisical understanding of the Tibetan situation might simply turn into hate. Add to that the reaction of the Nepalese officials, who even though might portray a benign face officially, but in private might simply make the procurement of any kind of official documents by the Tibetans even more harder.

Let’s now turn to Representative Frank Wolf. Is the congressman serious or is it just a lone man’s cry with the rest of the legislators shrugging their shoulders in non-commitment, for unlike the Chinese where there are no two opinions in dealing with the Tibet situation, the American policy does not enjoy such a unified stand. And even if Congressman Wolf is serious, keeping in mind the divided opinions among the American Congressmen regarding the Tibet situation, this warning might not amount to much. In such disparity, wouldn’t it be more effective if the pressure were induced from the Indian front, keeping in mind the ‘erstwhile unacknowledged influential sway’ the Indian polity has on the Nepalese domestic politics. And wouldn’t it make even more sense, if the purpose is to aid the Tibetans in Nepal, to play the hardballs with the Chinese directly by employing the age old diplomatic card of ‘carrot and stick’.

But all these might not necessarily call for Nepal to be complacent. Even though the Nepalese Government has quickly forgotten the role Tibet as a country played in their admission into the United Nations, it is high time that Nepal should for their own good begin to stand upon their own mettle. It should begin to resist the bullying from both from the Chinese and the Indian side. Even though maintaining friendly diplomatic relation is important, it doesn’t call for the Nepalese Government’s complete prostration to the Chinese. Even though this warning might not prove in the flow of the funds from the U.S. to be deficient, the Nepalese Government should not take this warning on face value nonetheless. With the declining image of Nepal in their treatment of the Tibetans, it is a bad news already that such an ultimatum came from the US and it might do good for the Nepalese Government to stop their tomfoolery and straighten up their act, especially, when so much of a hullabaloo has been created for the attainment of a Republic, where freedom of speech, assembly and expression are the guiding principles.

Attaining Trishanku’s Heaven: Bhutanese Refugee Resettlement in the United States

2011-12-28T13:44:00.002+05:30

Sreeja Balarajan

‘Bhutanese refugees’ will elicit you a result, unimaginable, a couple of decades ago. Even in the late 1990s, Bhutanese refugees did not generate the kind of results, they do today. This explosion of ‘knowledge’ regarding the Bhutanese refugees has coincided with one of the largest refugee resettlement process in recent years. It is unlike any focus and attention that the Bhutanese refugees have faced since their flight from Southern Bhutan.

Initially, the issue of Bhutanese refugees was to be resolved by a joint verification process between Nepal and Bhutan. This long drawn-out process ended in a stalemate but repatriation to Bhutan was never achieved. While technically contained within the camps, the Nepali-speaking Bhutanese refugees had the dubious distinction of being refugees in a region ethnically similar to their own community and in many senses, moved freely in the larger sub-continent. Refugees travelled to India and throughout Nepal to meet their relatives, for education, employment, business, and some visited southern Bhutan clandestinely.

Within its uneasy birth and legacy, the Bhutanese refugee activism went through several phases, ranging from peaceful advocacy for repatriation, militancy, political front groups, and parties of all shades, splintering, coalescing, disappearing and coming together. The refugees were not immune to the larger socio-political movement in Nepal and the surrounding region of India. Not allowed access to legal employment and higher education, frustrated at their situation and lack of will by the international community, they were easy targets as recruits for political movements in the region.1

South Asian states, with their cross-cutting ethnic communities, have a history of internal conflict and intra-state conflict and tension as well. The increasing militancy among the refugee youth, Bhutan’s refusal to accept them back, coincided with the interests of the Core Working Group2 of countries, and pushed the third country resettlement concept as a ‘durable solution’ the Bhutanese refugee issue. Many refugees look back to the defining incident of 9/11 a decade ago.3They point towards the international community and the west, which felt compelled to choose one refugee population over another.4 Hence the advocacy of the resettlement process, which gradually came to the forefront, was dogged with a lack of transparency, secrecy, and misinformation.5

The first batch of refugees started coming to the United States in early 2008. By end of June 2011, there were around 47,843 Bhutanese refugees resettled into the United States.6 Nearly 50,000 refugees have been resettled abroad to all the countries; with a Bhutanese refugee who was resettled into the United States in South Dakota.7

In an age, where the South Asian youth aspires to go abroad, the educated and savvy Bhutanese refugee finds his/her golden opportunity in the third country resettlement process. Many such refugees will follow the expected path of other immigrants in the US. For others, it is less than robust. The refugees face the hard realities of the ‘American Dream’ in the time of economic stress and overburdened resettlement system. The Bhutanese refugees have the highest suicide rate among the re-settled refugees in the United States. A study done by the IOM, finds that suicide rate in the camps has increased from 20.3 percent per 100,000 to 27.3, post-resettlement, to 31 per 100,000 among those resettled in the US.8 An IOM study reported 12 cases of Bhutanese refugee suicides upon resettlement to a third country from 2007 until present, but it is acknowledged that this information is incomplete and, moreover, that there is no information on suicide attempts.9

The well intentioned but inherently asymmetrical power relations in the resettlement process has been debilitating for the refugees. The prospects of unemployment, stress on the traditional family and gender roles, isolation, and culture shock has affected the refugee population. Everything is not ‘as close to heaven as possible’ and ‘the necessity to adapt in a very short period to a new cultural and socioeconomic context can threaten the refugees’ self-concepts and creates disorientation’.10

In most cases, the younger refugees, with middle-aged parents are the primary wage earners for their families. The resettlement process has put majority of the Bhutanese refugees in the traditional employment path of newly arrived refugees in the US. These are predominantly entry level jobs. The younger age group and women (from all age levels) have been largely absorbed into the hospitality and retail industry. Food processing sectors like meat-packing factories have has absorbed the low skilled refugees from all age groups.11 Middle-aged and elderly refugees, forced to supplement their incomes, find work in less–than-desirable scenarios. Though the resettlement agencies are not ‘employment agencies’; they do facilitate employment opportunities. These agencies usually provide orientation services, follow-up and support services for employment.12 However, preliminary surveys and media reports indicate that there is no process to verify the effectiveness of such support services. Mostly, Bhutanese refugees (particularly new-arrivals) have to rely on kin-networks for employment opportunities.

The elderly refugees tend to be isolated due to language, and employment barriers and the changing family hierarchies. This generation has resigned themselves to the reality of never regaining what they lost. Parents with inadequate English language abilities are compelled to seek employment and are often held ransom by their school-going children as they can adapt to the language and other skills in the new environment.

An important question, often left unaddressed in this discourse is the role evangelical and proselytizing groups in the resettlement process. These groups often work alongside the resettlement agencies, stepping in to fill the gaps in the system, which the resettlement agencies are unable to meet. The unequal power relations of culture, social and economic status and perceptions of religion, combined with the burden of obligation, also contributes to the process of racial stereotyping.

During the initial phase, the reality of ‘the business of living’ has overshadowed the political aspects of their cause. A plethora of community organizations have mushroomed in the U.S.A. Many are cautious about the perception of any political activity/allegiance. For those who were born in Bhutan and were young adults in the camps, the frustrations, downward mobility and rigors of life in the U.S. are more real. Given the reality of geo-political interests in the region, these aspirants might well find themselves as pawns in the larger power politics of South Asia.

The Bhutanese refugee networks, by way of online forums, news agencies and communication have also given rise to a vibrant discourse on the issues that concern the refugees. Increasingly these networks have allowed the Bhutanese refugees to take ownership, and become active participants on the questions and narratives of their identity, belonging and citizenship.

The unequal power structures in the resettlement system, will offer complex challenges for the Bhutanese refugees straddling the thin line between ‘orientation’ and ‘assimilation’. For the Nepali-Bhutanese, the flight from southern Bhutan challenging the State’s ‘invisible’ and ‘unwritten’ legacy might seem to end in a distant geographical arc with this resettlement process. However, the important question would be, whether this would quench their quest for a stable and undisputed identity or not? Or will it remain as Trishanku’s heaven?

Notes and References

1 Interviews with refugee youth in Beldangi I, II, III and Goldhap, April-May 2001. Follow up interviews from 2009 till the present. See also, Sreeja C T, Ethnicity in South Asia: A Study of the Nepali-Bhutanese Refugees, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis submitted to the University of Hyderabad, India, 2006.
2 The Core Working Group was formed in 2005. It consisted of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and U.S.A. The European Commission was an observer. The aim, was to ensure that Bhutan and Nepal work together towards a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem. http://www.international.gc.ca/genev/new-nouveau/20070516.aspx?view=d
3 Interviews with Balaram Poudel, R K Dorji, 23 July 2011, Kathmandu. Interview with Tek Nath Rizal, 25 July 2011, Kathmandu and Dr. Bhampa Rai, 6 August 2011, Damak. Interview with a cross-section of refugees from the Camps of Beldangi-I,II, nd III, Timai, Sanischare, and refugees from the Goldhap The camp was relocated into Beldangi in July-August, 2011 Nepal.
4 In the wake of 9/11, the US and the western countries were reluctant to accept refugees from the Middle East. In order to fulfill their refugee quotas, these countries focused on the largely Hindu, Buddhist (and increasingly Christian) Bhutanese refugees. See also, Susan Banki’s analysis, Resettlement of the Bhutanese from Nepal: The Durable Solution Discourse, in Howard Adelman, ed., Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home [Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2008], p.49. Apart from that this is based on interviews with Bhutanese Refugees since 2006, Nepalese journalists from July to August 2011 and refugee leaders on July 2011 in Kathmandu.
5 From the standpoint of the refugees, the less-than-straightforward process of advocacy for re-settlement encompassed various incidents in the camps that brought the re-settlement option to the forefront, to serve the ‘vested interests’ in the refugee community, the relief agencies themselves, the governments of Bhutan and Nepal, and the Core Working Group. This is based on series of interviews with Bhutanese Refugees since 2006. Apart from that I have also interviewed Nepalese journalists (July –August 2011, Nepal), and refugee leaders in Kathmandu (July 2011). Interview with Beldangi-I, II and III refugees, July 2011. See also Susan Banki, pp.48-49. See also Shiva Dhungana, Refugee Watch.
6 UNHCR figures provided by the UNHCR Office, Kathmandu Nepal. July 2011.
7 http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/media/press-briefing-notes/pbnAS/cache/offonce/cache/offonce?entryId=30386
8 Guglielmo Schininà, Sonali Sharma, Olga Gorbacheva, Anit Kumar Mishra, Who am I? : Assessment Of Psychosocial Needs And Suicide Risk Factors Among Bhutanese Refugees In Nepal And After Third Country Resettlement, IOM Migration Health Division Mental Health, Psychosocial Response and Intercultural Communication Section and Mission in Nepal, 201. Accessed at:
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/studies_and_reports/Bhutanese-Mental-Health-Assessment-Nepal-23-March.pdf
9 Ibid, p.7
10 R.K. Papdopoulos (2002) Refugees, home and trauma. In 'Therapeutic Care for Refugees.
No Place Like Home', edited by author. London: Karnac. Tavistock Clinic Series quoted in Ibid, p.5 http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/studies_and_reports/Bhutanese-Mental-Health-Assessment-Nepal-23-March.pdf
11 For example Bhutanese refugees re-settled in Pennsylvania and North Carolina work in these factories. Bhutanese refugees also travel from Virginia to work in these factories. For example in Central VA, semi-skilled refugees (different age groups) have also been employed in wood factories, farms and seasonal jobs.
12 List of National Volunteer Agencies, known as VOLAGs and their affiliated agencies which work with the State. Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration’s, Reception and Placement Program, are given here: http://www.unrefugees.org/site/c.lfIQKSOwFqG/b.5067997/k.25D5/National_Resettlement_Agencies.htm

Reflections on Protection Strategies- South Asia and Beyond

2011-09-30T15:00:00.002+05:30

Sahana Basavapatna and Ishita Dey

[Sahana Basavapatna is a lawyer, practicing in the Delhi High Court in the areas of intellectual property law and has been associated with the Calcutta Research Group for the last 3 years
Ishita Dey is a research Scholar of Department of Sociology, University of Delhi and Member, Calcutta Research Group]

This edition of Refugee Watch Online includes articles and contributions that indicate that the meta-narrative of migration can be written and re-written, especially in the South Asian context. These contributions, contrasting and located in its specificities indicate the various ways in which the “migrant” has been conceptualized and how these compartmentalizations affect the socio-juridical discourses in each specific context.

The various regimes of protection of migrant populations and/or refugees is central in understanding the way state and non-state actors have responded to situations of forced migration. On the one hand, the age old debate of whether or not the ratification of 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees will help resolve the arbitrariness of the state responses towards refugee crisis and on the other, the need for national legislations to ensure state responsibility towards migrant populations, are some of the key ways of looking at the protection and care of people in situations of forced migration. If this is the yardstick, then clearly the Australia-Malaysia Refugee Swap arrangement, concluded by the Australian and Malaysian governments – as this joint edition, among others, focuses on - is a clear indicator that ratification of the most important instrument of refugee protection is not a guarantee of protection.

On the other, the decision of the trial court in Delhi to turn down the Government of India's plea to deport a Tamil refugee who has been in India for the past twenty years reveals that the arbitrary nature of the host states towards refugee communities prevail and India is no exception. Thus, the conflation of a refugee/migrant in legal discourse becomes obvious when “refugee/s” issue/s in court of law have to be resolved through the Foreigner’s Act, 1946. Thus the case of the Sri Lankan refugee who the Government of India sought to deport on the ground that he did not carry valid travel documents is not uncommon, but the trial court's decision to disagree with the submissions of the Government in holding that a refugee should be protected precisely because he cannot be sent back to his native country where he is likely to face persecution is. Additionally, a significant point that the court has raised in its decision is the need to distinguish between a migrant and a refugee and the lack of any legal avenue for the refugees as the Refugees Asylum Seekers,(Protection) Bill 2006 is yet to see the light of the day.

In the section on News, we provide a brief summary of the court proceedings as reported by J. Venkatesan in an article titled “Magistrate: How Can court become party to persecution of refugee?”, The Hindu, dated 21 September 2011 followed by another news on the recent decision by the Indonesian government to regulate the migration of domestic workers to Saudi Arabia. This came in the heels of the beheading of a domestic worker of Indonesian nationality after the latter was convicted of murdering her employer because she was not allowed to return to her native land. Lastly, in the section on news is a report in the Guardian titled More than 30 million climate migrants in Asia in 2010, report finds by Fiona Harvey, its environment correspondent. According to the Asian Development Bank, as this Guardian article reports, more than 30 million people were said to have been displaced by environment and weather related disasters across Asia in 2010 and this is predicted to get worse in the years to come. This last article is yet another example of how the neat categories of displacement we are conversant with, need to be rethought and reframed.

In the section on Views, RWO brings an article by Savitri Taylor, on the Australia-Malaysia refugee swap arrangement. In recent times, several reports of refugees from Srilanka, Bangladesh and other countries in South and South East Asia taking to the high seas for passage to Australia and other European nations have been reported. These also included reports of the arbitrary manner in which the Australian Government responded to refugees who had taken to the high seas. It is a well known fact that Canary Islands, Malta and Christmas Islands continue to remain the transit points for the “boat people” who are often mixed. For instance they could be economic migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and trafficked victims as well.

In this background, it is worth recalling that the member states of the United Nations are expected to abide by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, particularly the principle of non-refoulement and the right to seek asylum. Additionally, the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue also have to be taken into account by member states.

In its attempt to secure its maritime borders, the Australian Government entered into a swap deal with Malaysia on 25 July 2011, which has attracted severe criticism. Despite being a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Australia has been facing severe criticism for the recent “interceptions” and controversies relating to the arbitrariness of asylum procedures. The main aim of the policy, in the words of the Prime Minister of Australia, Ms. Julia Gilliard, and reported in the news piece, “Australia firm on Refugee Swap deal” is ostensibly to “smash people smugglers’ business model…”, She continues by adding that, “…our aim is not to see people put themselves in boats and be at the risk of losing lives”. According to an article published in the Bangkok Post, “Australia plans to send up to 800 asylum seekers to Malaysia in return for accepting 4,000 registered refugees from that country over four years under a deal designed to stop boatpeople from landing in Australia”. Incidentally Malaysia is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

Following this deal, on 31 August 2011, the High Court of Australia held invalid and unconstitutional the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship's declaration of Malaysia as a country to which asylum seekers who entered Australia at Christmas Island can be taken for processing of their asylum claims and also decided that any unaccompanied asylum seeker under 18 years of age cannot be taken from Australia without a written consent under the Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act, 1946. Subsequently, the High Court of Australia prevented the government from sending the first batch of asylum seekers. Though the present Government is adamant on resolving the plight of boat people through an amendment to the Migration Act, 1958 to go ahead with the transfers, they are yet to receive the opposition’s support to the amendments. In a joint media release, issued on 12 September 2011, the Minister of Immigration and Citizenship, Chris Bowen and Prime Minister Julia Gillard have stated that amendments relating to third country provisions in the Migration Act, 1958 will ensure smooth transfers under the arrangement with Malaysia and Memorandum of Understanding with Papua New Guinea
(http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/cb/2011/cb171699.htm).

Dr. Savitri Taylor’s article in the section on views brings to the forefront the legal and human rights dimension of the Refugee Swap deal but as the recent statement noted above shows, we will need to wait and watch if at all the Australian Government manages succeed with the amendments.

We have three contributions in the section on Reports including a review of the Women's Refugee Commission's Report published in July 2011, following a fortnight long study of the livelihood issues and survival strategies of refugees living in Delhi, a photo-essay by a young photo-journalist, Rohit Jain, who has spent time with the Burmese refugees in West Delhi in order to understand the living conditions of the community and an in-depth report by Javed Khan on one of the flaming fields of battle within India and the rising IDPs in Khamman district of Andhra Pradesh.

To conclude, we have flagged issues concerning the mixed nature of migration through seemingly unrelated and apparently contrasting situations of migration/forced migration. In doing so, the aim is to identify and highlight the complexities inherent in freezing identities, providing convenient (legal) labels and in the ambivalent way of addressing forced migration in absence of a coherent framework that would make sense of the reality of migration in its various forms in South Asia.

References

“Australia firm on Malaysia Refugee Deal” in
http://www.bangkokpost.com/lite/breakingnews/250628/australia-firm-on-malaysia-refugee-deal; Accessed on 11 September 2011
“Australia’s Malaysia Refugee Swap under Fire” in
http://www.bangkokpost.com/lite/breakingnews/257035/australia-malaysia-refugee-swap-under-fire; Accessed on 15 September 2011
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2471121.ece; Accessed on 21 September 2011

2011-09-30T14:52:00.003+05:30

The trial court in Dwarka, NCT of Delhi, in a recent verdict relating a Sri Lankan refugee, has stated that the court cannot be party to the persecution of a refugee. J. Venkatesan in an article in The Hindu reported the legal proceedings of the Magistrate’s Court which make for interesting and relevant observations. The Magistrate, while holding in favour of the accused refugee has also noted that there is a need to distinguish and address the needs of a migrant and a refugee in the legal discourse through two separate laws. In this context he pointed out that the absence of a legal framework to address the specific needs of a refugee in India despite several deliberations on a Model National Law: The Refugee and Asylum Seekers (Protection) Bill, 2006 is. Under the given circumstances refugee protection has to be met within the framework that is available under Foreigner's Act, 1946. In the reported case, Mr Chandra Kumar (a resident since 1990, in the refugee camp Tiruvallur in Tamil Nadu) was accused of non-possession of travel documents by the Indian immigration authorities. He was then charged with cheating, impersonation and forgery and other offences under of the Foreigners Act, 1946. “He moved an application for plea bargaining. An order on sentence ought to have been passed forthwith. However, the Additional Public Prosecutor, on instructions from the government, contended that an order of deportation should form part of the order on sentence”. Responding to these, the court rejected the plea for deportation on the grounds that it goes against the premise of natural justice that should be available to citizens and non-citizens.

For details visit
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2471121.ece; (accessed on 23 September 2011)

Protection of Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia- Distant Dream by Shamim

After Saudi Arabia beheaded a 54-year old Indonesian grandmother in June for stabbing her Saudi employer to death, Indonesia declared a moratorium on the migration of its nationals for domestic employment in the desert kingdom, effective August 1.

Although the two countries were to adopt a bilateral agreement for protection of Indonesian domestic workers in Saudi Arabia this year, no such document has been signed.

Ruyati Binti Satubi, a household worker from West Java was executed for murder after she confessed slaying the man who had contracted her. The Indonesian migrant, who has three children, said she killed her employer because she was denied permission to return to her native land.

Media in Indonesia and elsewhere indicated that Ruyati Binti Satubi had been subjected to other forms of abuse while working in the Saudi home, located in Mecca, Islam's holiest city. Neither the Indonesian authorities nor her family was informed of the death sentence until after it was carried out, an action for which the Saudi regime apologized to Jakarta. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono wrote in protest to Saudi King Abdullah after the execution, and the Indonesian authorities followed up with the moratorium on exporting labourers, enforced visibly at airports and through contracting agencies.

The beheading of Ruyati Binti Satubi was only the most recent in a series of shocking cases involving Indonesian domestic workers in Saudi Arabia.

In April, Saudi authorities overturned a three-year prison sentence against a 53-year old Saudi woman in Medina, for "torture" in the beating and burning of her 23-year old maid, Sumiati Binti Salan Mustapa.

That incident, like the execution of Ruyati Binti Satubi, caused widespread protest in Indonesia, as well as increased reluctance to undergo the risks of working in Saudi Arabia, which Indonesian workers described as "horror stories." Indonesian media report that the flow of migrant workers to the kingdom had already decreased by 30 percent in the first quarter of this year.

With imposition of the August labour embargo, Indonesia was expected to lose $350 million worth of income. Some 20 Indonesians, mainly women, are said to face capital punishment in Saudi Arabia. Indonesian officials say that 370,000 of their citizens went to work in Saudi Arabia in 2010. Of these, more than 90 percent are employed in the so-called "informal sector," that is, paid in cash, without record-keeping or government oversight. The British media states, however, that 1.5 million Indonesians are working in Saudi Arabia.

Complaints of physical abuse and murder of Indonesian domestic servants by Saudis have produced hundreds of cases, but like other emigrant labourers in Saudi Arabia, Indonesians have no rights.
Indonesia had imposed new regulations on the employment of emigrants to Saudi Arabia, under which the Saudi employee would be required to earn at least $2,800 per month, and the number of family members and layout of the residence would be registered.

Because of the rigid oversight of relations between family and non-family members as dictated by Wahhabism, the Saudi state form of Islam, the kingdom has one of the highest proportions of immigrant laborers in the world; they currently account for 5.5 million out of 26 million people, or 20 percent. Foreign observers describe the Saudi demand for foreign housemaids, drivers, and similar employees as inexhaustible. Saudi subjects are discouraged from such work.

Millions of Pakistanis, Afghans, Indians, Bangladeshis, Indonesians, Filipinos, South Koreans, and Sri Lankans receive low wages, when not subjected to outright slavery and extreme abuse while toiling for Saudi masters. Domestic and other low-skill workers live apart from the Anglo-American, other European, and similar foreign technicians, who serve the petrochemical and other advanced industries, and who reside in segregated, protected communities that seek to reproduce the conditions in their advanced countries of origin.

While no religion other than Islam is permitted in public observance in Saudi Arabia, foreign petrochemical and defence professionals are allowed to hold Christian and other services within their homes. But Christians, Buddhists, and Hindus from the Philippines, South Korea, and Sri Lanka are prohibited from practicing their faiths; even Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indonesian Muslims, who work in Saudi Arabia face religious discrimination. For example, preaching in South and Southeast Asian mosques and similar activities are forbidden, as are Sufi observances, popular in Pakistan and Indonesia alike. No other Muslim state imposes such restrictions. Nevertheless, many Muslims are lured to work in the kingdom because of its religious prestige.

With 86 percent of its population of 245 million counted as Muslims, Indonesia has the largest Islamic population of any country in the world. Indonesian domestic workers earn about $200 per month in Saudi Arabia, a wage superior to those an Indonesian migrant villager with a primary-school education would be paid in the east Asian industrialized nations, such as Japan or Taiwan.

At the beginning of August, the official Saudi Arab News announced that two Indonesian women sentenced to beheading would be reprieved and repatriated. Identified only by their first names, Emi was convicted of killing her employer's child, and Nesi of using "black magic" against her employer. Executions for the alleged "witchcraft" are common in the kingdom, which has experienced recurrent panic over "sorcery."

Climate Induced Migration is Expected to Increase in Asia

In an article titled “More than 30 million climate migrants in Asia in 2010” Fiona Harvey reports, based on information and analysis by the Asian Development Bank that while climate change resulted in creating 30 million migrants in 2010 in Asia, the problem will only get worse in the years to come. A conference held in Manila, Philippines, on 13 September 2011 on Climate induced migration has concluded that climate change will be one of major reasons for migration across Asia in the years to come; “socio-economic transformations” and “a high degree of exposure to environmental risks” are some of the key reasons for making Asia and the Pacific vulnerable to the effects of climate change.

Asia, including South Asia is not new to migration that can be linked to phenomenon such as droughts, or flooding. The story of migration of Bangladeshi's across the border into India is one of deprivation coupled with declining agricultural productivity, and drought. What would be pertinent, from a migration point of view, is the way states in Asia understand and address migration. Among the possible policy recommendations that the ADB is expected to make, as is clear from the Philippines conference are to include “measures to improve vital infrastructure, such as energy provision, transport systems and communication networks, in order to make such infrastructure more resilient to the effects of climate change.” (Background note to the Conference is available at
http://beta.adb.org/news/events/philippines-country-workshop-climate-induced-migration).

From the perspective of countries that naturally allow for easy migration but the political systems that does not encourage the same, it would be pertinent to note that climate change induced migration provides another important vantage point from which to undo the received wisdom of what is acceptable migration and who are acceptable migrants.

The news article can be accessed at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/sep/19/climate-migrants-asia-2010 (accessed 16 September 2011) and information about the Conference held at Manila, Philippines at
http://beta.adb.org/news/events/philippines-country-workshop-climate-induced-migration. (accessed on 20 September 2011)

The Demise of the Malaysian Solution

2011-09-30T14:49:00.003+05:30

Savitri Taylor

[Associate Professor in the School of Law at La Trobe University]

(This article has been reproduced from La Trobe University News, posted 7 September 2011,
http://www.latrobe.edu.au/news/articles/2011/opinion/the-demise-of-the-malaysian-solution)

On 25 July 2011, Australia and Malaysia entered into a legally non-binding Arrangement, which provided for the transfer to Malaysia of up to 800 people arriving irregularly in Australia by boat after the date of signing. The Gillard government attempted to implement this arrangement by using the legal machinery which the Howard government had inserted into the Migration Act to enable execution of the Pacific Strategy. The High Court of Australia has just ruled by a six to one majority that the legal machinery does not work in the way that the Gillard government (and the Howard government before it) thought it did.

Section 198A(3) of the Migration Act gives the Minister for Immigration the power to declare in writing that a specified country provides asylum seekers with access “to effective procedures for assessing their need for protection” and protection pending determination of their refugee status; that it provides protection to refugees pending their voluntary repatriation or resettlement; and that it “meets relevant human rights standards in providing that protection.” Section 198A(1) provides that the class of persons into which most unauthorized boat arrivals fall may be taken to such a declared country. On 25 July 2011, Minister Bowen made a declaration in respect of Malaysia just as Minister Ruddock before him had made declarations in respect of Nauru and PNG. The government’s understanding of the law was that what the Minister declares does not have to be true as long as the Minister believes it to be true. The High Court found to the contrary. Moreover, according to the majority, what has to be true, at a minimum, in order for a section 198A(3) declaration to be valid is that the country in respect of which the declaration is made is bound under international law or its own national law to provide the protections specified to asylum seekers and refugees. The government conceded (as it had to) that Malaysia did not meet this minimum. It followed that the 25 July 2011 declaration was invalid.

Short of a change to Malaysian law, which the Gillard government has said it will not seek, or to Australian law, which the Gillard government is impotent to achieve on its own, the Malaysian arrangement no longer offers a solution to its border control problem. So what happens now? The government might choose to test whether the existing declaration or a new one in respect of PNG would stand up to High Court scrutiny. The outcome is by no means certain, because in the case just decided the High Court left open the answers to some key questions bearing on the matter. If the government were prepared to accept the political humiliation of a return to Nauru in order to avoid the greater political damage of continuing boat arrivals, it could perhaps convince the opposition to support passage of legislation which would put beyond doubt the domestic legal validity of transfers to that country. Depending on the moral depths to which the government is prepared to sink in its fight for political survival, the deterrence options available to it are many and varied. If implemented, they may even result in a significant reduction of boat arrivals in Australia at least until the next election. But here is what they will not do. They will not resolve the underlying problem, which is human insecurity in the countries which asylum seekers flee from and in most of the countries they flee through.

Between 2007 and 2009, Professor Sandra Gifford and I led a research project which involved, among other things, interviewing asylum seekers and refugees living in Indonesia. Indonesia is the last country of departure of most arriving here by boat. What we discovered was this. Asylum seekers and refugees do not necessarily want to make Australia their home. They just want to have a home: a place where they can live in safety, support themselves with dignity, give their children a future through education, and belong. If these basic human needs could be fulfilled in Indonesia, they would have been happy to remain there. If they knew that they had a realistic prospect of obtaining a resettlement place in another country which would fulfill these needs, the assurance of future security would have been enough to enable them to bear present insecurity. Unfortunately, neither a home in its true meaning nor the hope of one in the future is to be found in Indonesia or most other countries in our region. Australia acting alone cannot turn this situation around. Regional cooperation is needed.

In his press conference on 31 August, 2011, the Minister said he was proud of the regional cooperation framework that the government had achieved at the Bali Process Ministerial Conference in March this year. And so he should be. The regional cooperation framework was a first step towards the possibility of improved refugee protection throughout our region. The Malaysia deal, though purportedly a practical implementation of that framework, had at the heart of it a backward step which has now been undone. However, there is another element of the Arrangement which is protection enhancing and can still be implemented. That element is the promise made by Australia to resettle over 4,000 of the over 80,000 UNHCR recognized refugees living in Malaysia at the time of signing. These 4,000 resettlement places were to be made available over four years and to be additional to Australia’s regular humanitarian resettlement program. If the government follows through on this promise, it may be able to convince its regional neighbours that when it talks about regional cooperation it does not just mean that the rest of the region should cooperate to help Australia avoid its own protection obligations. Disappointingly, it appears that the government might now decide to provide the 4,000 resettlement places promised to Malaysia within the regular resettlement program. In other words, it might rob Peter to pay Paul. This would, of course, enable the government counter the opposition charge that the Malaysian solution is not just a policy failure, but a very expensive one. However, it would also reveal to the region that Australia’s protection talk is no more than talk and, if that happens, the regional cooperation framework of which the government is so proud will never become more than words on paper.

The Implementation of Urban Refugee Policy in Delhi

2011-09-30T14:41:00.002+05:30

Sahana Basavapatna

“Operationalizing UNHCR’s policy document, however, requires a broader, more in-depth understanding of the issues and challenges facing urban refugees. This report attempts to contribute to the development of that knowledge.” page 5.

The Women's Refugee Commission, in collaboration with UNHCR published a report titled, Bright Lights, Big City: Refugees Struggle to Make a Living in Delhi in July 2011 with the objective of contributing to the way in which the Urban Refugee Policy of UNHCR may be implemented in its letter and spirit.

This short note, is at once a review and an introduction to the report, which, in restating some of the conclusions made before in the context of refugees in Delhi, nevertheless makes a worthy attempt in comprehending the Urban Refugee Policy and its implications for Delhi.

The study, conducted over a fortnight in March 2011, focuses on the economic coping strategies of refugees, the protection risks associated with the coping strategies and potential market opportunities that may be exploited, given Delhi's unqiue context.

A number of conclusions in the Report are familiar and may be said to be a restatement and reiteration of existing knowledge. The report talks about refugees in the social and economic context of Delhi, including the hostility of the local communities, or the competition for jobs in the informal sector. It also does a comparison of the financial needs of refugees and the livelihood options currently before them. The report published by The Other Media, an organization that has had a long association with Burmese refugees, published a report in 2010, titled “Battling to Survive: A Study of Burmese Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Delhi” also touches upon these aspects, although the focus on the Urban Refugee Policy is not prominent in the latter.

One of the highlights of the Report is the articulation of UNHCR'S policy towards refugees in Delhi, althought not very clearly. The report states, “ UNHCR is piloting new approaches to working with urban refugees in New Delhi that demonstrate a progressive, rational way of addressing the growing urban population. These approaches include both broad coverage for access to basic services and attempts to address the specific needs of the most vulnerable”. The Report goes on to suggest to UNHCR that “...These efforts should be ratcheted up to the next level focusing on continuing to reduce the number of refugees receiving subsistence allowance by expanding employment opportunities and channeling available resources to job placement and job creation programs as referenced in the recommendations below.”

The Urban Refugee Policy is an important instrument, although it has taken more than a decade for UNHCR to arrive at the terms on which it would approach the issues facing refugees in urban areas. While the Report provides some window to the current policy of UNHCR in India (for instance, the provision of subsistence allowance to refugees being targeted towards on the most needy, the expansion of health care and other services to even those that are not recognized by UNHCR as refugees, the emphasis on government services for education and health care and discouraging private services etc), the implementation of the policy would require on one hand that refugees utilize the Urban Refugee policy to push for better protection and for UNHCR to realize that not all of its policy formulations would work adequately in the current context. Although India appears to provide a rich base of legal mechanisms and institutions on which refugee rights may be built, the actual implementation is full of hurdles, as the Report clearly points out. For instance, the Report talks about UNHCR's policy of encouraging refugees to access government schools and refers to the Right to Children of Compulsory Education Act, 2009, under which it is mandatory for the state to provide compulsory education for every child between 6-14 years; however, the experience of children with government schools, has not been as positive as UNHCR or its implementing partners would want refugees to believe.

To conclude, this Report is a useful addition to the existing knowledge of the status of refugees in Delhi. However, both the refugees as well as the implementors of the Policy would have to strive to make the policy work for them.

The Report can be accessed at
http://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/component/docman/cat_view/68-reports/80-livelihoods?orderby=dmdate_publishedHYPERLINK
http://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/component/docman/cat_view/68-reports/80-livelihoods?orderby=dmdate_published&ascdesc=DESC"&HYPERLINK
http://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/component/docman/cat_view/68-reports/80-livelihoods?orderby=dmdate_published&ascdesc=DESC"ascdesc=DESC
last accessed September 21, 2011)

Javid Iqbal Documents the Conditions of IDP Settlements in Andhra Pradesh and Chattisgarh

2011-09-30T14:34:00.001+05:30

Javid Iqbal

[Has worked as an investigative reporter for The New Indian Express from November 2009 to April 2011. We thank him for allowing us to re-publish excerpts from his articles. His articles and photo essays can be accessed on http://moonchasing.wordpress.com]

Flaming Forests of Warrangal, IDP Settlements

Javid Iqbal in his article “The Migrating forests of Warrangal” highlights the the conditions of the IDPs who constantly face the threat of losing their make shift home and livelihood. Reports regarding the IDP population on the borders of Andhra Pradesh and Chattisgarh have always varied. While some activists report that around 50,000 people have been affected by this conflict; people undertaking survey would argue 213 settlements in Khammam district itself have been affected. While the reports of floating populations is true Javid Iqbal also draws our attention to the fact that the fear and threat from Salwa Judum and the Maoists is not the only reason of forced movement of population; but also lack of land, as many Murias had small holdings of land in their villages in Dantewada or Bijapur. The control over resources, particularly rights of communities over forests has become a contentious issue. While land is being used for industrial purposes in Chattisgarh, mining is rampant in Khammam, and finally, over 276 villages in Khammam, East and West Godavari districts, would be submerged due to Polavaram dam along with over 10,000 acres of reserve forest land. These concerns has its far reaching implications and as Javid Iqbal in his photo essays and articles ( links given below) on the IDP situation in Andhra Pradesh and Chattishgarh shows that the rising number of floating population has also led to starvation deaths due to drought in the region. While the Government continues to see this geographical region as the site of internal conflict people are forced to flee homes. It is time that the state should take a note at the larger issue/s over access and control over community resources in these regions instead of guising problems under the umbrella of internal conflict.
For details see
Iqbal, J. 2011. The Migrating Forests of Warangal”.
http://moonchasing.wordpress.com/2011/09/14/the-migrating-forests-of-warangal/

IDP children refused treatment by Nutrition and Rehabilitation Center in Badrachalam, Khammam District in Andhra Pradesh

Javid Iqbal in his article “Internally Displaced Hunger” reports of an incident in 2010 when 8 malnurioushed children were refused treatment by the Nutrition and Rehabilitation Center in Badrachalam, Khammam District in Andhra Pradesh. All eight were children of Internally Displaced Persons from Dantewada/Bijapur District of Chhattisgarh. Apparently the parents of the children failed to provide documentation that were from Tribal and BPL families. As Javed (2010) emphasises, “The Internally displaced persons from Chhattisgarh are in perpetual limbo. They’re occasionally pitted against the local adivasi tribes of Andhra Pradesh over minimal resources and no state government whether Andhra Pradesh, nor Chhattisgarh is willing to take responsibility for them. At the same time, no civil government department is capable of undermining the arm-twisting policies of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Department that wishes to send them back to Chhattisgarh, who would probably dump them in mismanaged Salwa Judum camps”.
For details see
Iqbal, J. 2010. “Internally displaced Hunger”
http://moonchasing.wordpress.com/2010/11/14/internally-displaced-hunger/

I Miss my Motherland

2011-09-30T14:17:00.010+05:30

This photo essay is work of Rohit Jain

[He is a freelancer photographer based in New Delhi. He has done photo essays on the plight of Burmese and Somali refugees living in New Delhi and a photo essay on advises of Central India.]

“With the slightest promise of good governance and protection, the natural pull to return home is overwhelming within us” says a refugee. The decade long repressive military government in Burma (Myanmar) forced millions of Burmese people to take shelter in other countries. In the west of Burma, border to India, Burmese people come to Indian border. They move to New Delhi to seek refugee status from UNHCR. Hapless, they find shelter in stingy by-lanes of New Delhi too far away from their open house and self sustaining lives in Burma. Refugees lives on margins of society. They do not have the right to work as a refugee, and survive on limited resources. Still their hope for their rights and peace in Burma is alive.

Refugees are on a demonstration in New Delhi, against a dehumanized and repressive military dominant government in Burma.

Refugees are on demonstration in New Delhi, against a dehumanized and repressive military dominant government in Burma

A Rohingya refugee from Arakan state of Burma, outside UNHCR office in New Delhi. Rohingya refugees live in New Delhi, Jaipur, Muzzafarnagar. A majority, it is reported, live in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. They have to come time and again to UNHCR, New Delhi, to seek refugee status. Most of them are given 5 months time for result of interview. But they don't get any result after the passing of given period.

A placard at the gate of UNHCR office. Rohingya refugees from Arakan state of Burma, appeal to UNHCR in New Delhi to accept them as registered refugee and give them protection under UNHCR. Some of the refugees are seeking refugee status from UNHCR for last 2-3 years, but without success.

A child living in Delhi collecting leftover and rotten vegetables at 12:00 am midnight in the vegetable market at the time of closing. Refugees have no right to work and few options by way of jobs. Employment in the unorganized sector adds troubles to their survival.

A child living in Delhi collecting leftover and rotten vegetables at 12:00 am midnight in the vegetable market at the time of closing. Refugees have no right to work and few options by way of jobs. Employment in the unorganized sector adds troubles to their survival.

Lily, 29, runs a temporary betel nut stall during the annual Burmese sports festival. “Many refugees prefer to earn some money like this rather than do a permanent work in local factories where they face exploitation. Often the employer entices them with extra pay to come for night duty but they face sexual exploitation.

"In Burma we used to have our own big and airy homes in the hills and mountains with mild and chilly weather and self sustained life, and here we live in dingy, confined rooms, paltry wages in spite of working overtime in factories – is the new norm of life for us" said Thui Lawn, a refugee living in New Delhi.

Lack of resources, no education, and orphaned; teenagers’ future is falling in a dark spell. It may force them into alcoholism or drug addiction. Probably, they have become a victim of circumstances.

2011-09-03T15:01:00.001+05:30

July 2011
(This edition has been compiled by Anuradha Gunarathne)
Introduction

Ishita Dey

In the July edition of Refugee Watch Online we have tried to flag issues and concerns of the reconciliation and peace-building efforts in Sri Lanka. Studies have shown that in situations of protracted displacement, the vulnerable population (ie, women, children and youth) are the worst affected. Members of youth, in particular are not only participants of conflict by taking up arms for state or non-state but also victims of war. Their situation is much more complex, and the effects of witnessing war in the growing up years have psychological implications as well.

In other words, during peace-building efforts special attention should be given to address the members of the youth as the case study in Allaipiddy Village of Jaffna Peninsula shows. Allaipiddy in Velani DS Division in Jaffna is situated in the High Security Zone spreading across 144 sq.km. Considering its strategic location, villagers suffered multiple displacements which affected their livelihoods and also their children’s education. Now most of the younger members are unable to apply for jobs because they have not been able to complete their education. In this article, “Youth: Participants and Victims of War” Chulanee Attanayake brings to the forefront the issues and concerns of youth that need to be addressed in the peace-building efforts. While there have been various studies on the reconciliation efforts in SriLanka; Anuradha Gunarathne and Azmiya Badurdeen in the article “Internally Displaced Persons in the Process of Reconciliation: Implications for Durable Solutions” flags off the issues concerning internally displaced people. One of the important and pressing issues is how do you renew trust among returnees?

In the section on Reports we present to you one of the background papers commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2011, “The hidden crisis: Armed conflict and education”. J.R.A Williams(2010) in this extensive report on “The impact of conflict and displacement (2006-2010) in SriLanka” shows the various methods introduced during conflict and post conflict to improve educational standards. What is significant and commendable is the way in which this report includes both the state and non-state initiatives. For instance in camps, “donors funded learning and child-friendly spaces, and teachers were recruited from the inmates, but facilities were never adequate to provide for the numbers of displaced children, and there was no access for teacher training or monitoring”. Even during war times ceasefire was respected during “national exams”. Temporary learning spaces (TLS) with the help of humanitarian agencies have been successful in maintaining displaced families commitment to education. Even when people were on the move tractors with school material accompanied them. Post war, agencies like UNICEF, Plan International and Save the Children have been developing educational materials for catch up education programmes to reintegrate the war affected children with the mainstream education. Catch up programmes are common in North and East SriLanka and have been successful so far. Another initiative taken by UNICEF has been Child Friendly School (CFS) approaches. According to this report, “the critical need is for attention and resources to return to the development priorities, such as child-friendly schooling, vocational education, and national Early Childhood Education and Development (ECED) standards, which were overwhelmed by the emergency response”.

We have tried to bring to the forefront some of the issues that need special attention in the reconstruction efforts in SriLanka. We welcome your comments and suggestions on the same.

We also invite you to contribute articles for the upcoming editions of Refugeewatchonline

News: Brief Summaries (within 200 words) of news items concerning forced migration.
Views: Any original piece of article within 1500 words on refugees, IDPs in South Asia.
Reports: Reports of any study on forced migration (refuges and IDPs), conferences or any other. Review articles on reports, books are also welcome. (Word limit: 1000)
Please email your entries and queries to refugeewatchonline@gmail.com

Short Course on Refugee Law

2011-09-03T14:56:00.001+05:30

Location: Bangkok, Thailand
Start Date: 2011-09-12
End Date: 2011-09-16
The Centre for Applied Human Rights (University of York, UK) is offering a 5 day short-course on International Refugee Law and Advocacy in Bangkok in September 2011. The course is offered in partnership with the Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network, a growing network of over 116 civil society groups and individuals committed to advancing the rights of refugees in the Asia Pacific Region.

The short course will cover the topics of Understanding the legal and policy framework of the international refugee protection regime, Developing national NGO networks for advocacy, Conducting regional and transnational impact litigation of refugee rights, Implementing refugee rights in domestic law, Engaging elected officials and the development of national legislative caucuses, Using national human rights institutions (NHRIs) to monitor and protect the rights of refugees and Using UNHCR processes to protect the rights of refugees.

For further details http://refugeerightsasiapacific.org/2011/07/26/short-course-on-refugee-law/

Poor Countries Host 80 per cent of World’s Refugees, UN Report Shows

2011-09-03T14:53:00.001+05:30

An estimated 80 per cent of the world’s refugees now live in developing countries and yet anti-refugee sentiment is growing in many industrialized nations, the United Nations said in a report unveiled on 20th June 2011, urging the richer States to address the deep imbalance.

In relation to the size of their economies, poor countries shoulder a disproportionate refugee burden, according to the 2010 Global Trends report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), released on World Refugee Day.

Pakistan, Iran, and Syria have the largest refugee populations at 1.9 million, 1.07 million, and 1.005 million respectively.

According to the statement of Antonio Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees fears about supposed floods of refugees in industrialized countries are being vastly overblown or mistakenly conflated with issues of migration. Meanwhile it’s poorer countries that are left having to pick up the burden.

For further details; http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38767&Cr=refugees&Cr1

Longer- Term Disaster Displaced: A Forgotten Group – Nepal

2011-09-03T14:47:00.003+05:30

Almost all districts across the Far West face losses of lives and property every year due to natural disasters in Nepal. However, the impact can last well beyond the immediate event. Humanitarian actors have observed that the duration of displacement varies depending on the intensity and type of disaster: displacement following inundation of rivers is generally short term, while displacement resulting from floods and erosion is generally longer term.

Kailali and Kanchanpur were severely affected by floods in 2008 and 2009 that caused life and property losses as well as displacement in both districts. Determining the exact number of displaced in Kailali and the duration of their displacement is difficult however, as the District Administration Office (DAO) has no concrete figures. The Kailali Red Cross Society (NRCS) estimates that some 950 families are displaced among four different settlements. The Kanchanpur DAO reports there are 308 displaced families currently sheltering in four locations.

Potentially hundreds of families remain displaced and vulnerable years after natural disasters struck them. District authorities have yet to grasp the full extent of the needs; only Kanchanpur district has made concrete progress to systematically assess and record the number and location of disaster displaced. No districts have developed concrete rehabilitation strategies to date. The 2008 Government decision is yet to be implemented and there are questions about the determination and capacity of local officials to do so. In addition, the basic needs of these displaced groups become increasingly blurred with broader issues of acute poverty or landlessness shared by many communities. This complicates both needs assessment and assistance provision, and creates an atmosphere of confusion that can easily be taken advantage of.

All districts are developing Disaster Preparedness and Response Plans to reduce the risk of natural disasters and improve response across humanitarian clusters. However, these plans are focused on future disasters and do not necessarily examine the needs of those displaced previously. District Disaster Response Committees can be encouraged to and assisted in assessing the rehabilitation needs of already affected groups. Such assessments are important not only to advocate for rehabilitation support but also to draw a line between those directly impacted by disaster and other groups seeking support, thereby reducing confusion. Further advocacy is also needed to increase the resources available for rehabilitation assistance generally. While real progress is being made in disaster prevention, the need to assist those already impacted cannot be forgotten.

For full report:
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1759.pdf

Youths; Participants and Victims of War

2011-09-03T14:41:00.002+05:30

Chulanee Attanayake

[Programme Officer, National Protection and Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons Project, HRCSL]

In this article I examine the impact of conflict on youth in Allaipiddy, a return village in Jaffna. Considering a significant section of Srilanka’s population has grown up witnessing war and conflict, it is important to look into the problems younger generation has faced as victims and participants of war and the ways in which their grievances could be incorporated in peace building efforts.

Background: Allaippiddy

Allaipiddy in Velani DS Division in Jaffna is situated in the High Security Zone(HSZ) spreading across 144 sq.km. The villagers of Allaipiddy were the first victims of displacement in 1990. Many of the villagers are fishermen from coastal areas such as Kankesanthurai, Keerimalai while others are interior farmers of Tellipalai. The Sri Lankan security forces moved into Allaipiddy in 1990 in order to establish a camp to facilitate troop movement and supply lines to the Jaffna Fort, which was at that time under the control of the Sri Lanka government. The villagers were forced to vacate the village. By the time of displacement, there had been more than 400 families with approximately 1400 persons. It is reported that 22 people have disappeared during the cause of military campaign.

Allaipiddy remained a contentious spot because of its strategic location. As long as the LTTE retained its base at Pooneryan, the navy needed Allaipiddy to control LTTE sea movements between its base and the government facilities at Kankensanthurai. Secondly the place also served as a supply line for troops in Jaffna.

After Sri Lankan Army established its rule in Jaffna district on 12th April 1996, the displaced community in the district was resettled, yet, villagers of Allaipiddy were prevented to go back to their residences as it was situated in the HSZ. After 2002 following the Ceasefire Agreement between the Government and LTTE; they were resettled.

On 19th May 2006, Allaipiddy villagers faced the Second major displacement following a series of security threats, including the murder of 13 Tamil civilians. They were forced and threatened to leave the village immediately. The posters threatening their lives have been supposedly distributed by a group called “Makkal Padai” (People’s Force), which was doubted to be affiliated with LTTE. By the time of this Second Displacement, there had been 450 families and 250 houses constructed by the World Bank Housing Development Project.

However, majority of the villagers returned to Allaipiddy during the period of 20th May 2006 and 11th August 2006 until they were warned to vacate the area immediately. On 11th August 2006, Voice of Tigers; the official radio station of LTTE, issued an announcement warning the residents of Gurunagar, Passaiyoor, St. Rocks and Columbuthurai of imminent attacks and telling them to vacate the area. With the fear of been caught amidst hostilities between Sri Lanka Army and LTTE, villagers who returned from previous displacement left.

Under the Government’s resettlement programmes, 182 families returned in 2008 and another 160 families returned in June 2009. Currently, there are 350 families in the village.

There are different stories about the incident which caused the displacement in May 2006. 13 Tamil civilians were killed including two women and two children. Whilst the Government accused LTTE for the massacre, many reports have mentioned that the massacre was done by “personnel in civilians alleged to be from the Sri Lanka Navy and carders from Ealam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP).

Youth: Participants and Victims

Participation of youth in conflict situations is critical to understand the impact of conflict as they play a dominant role either as a rebel or as a victim. The participation of youth in conflict is inevitable when they are increasing in numbers and the opportunities for education and employment are limited.

SriLanka has been witness to youth involvement in conflicts throughout the recent history. The two armed youth insurrections in the South led by Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in 1971 and 1988-89, and violence in North and East which lasted for nearly three decades stand as the best evidence for youth involvement in the rebellious movements in the country.

As per available evidences it is said that, in the Sinhalese segment of the population, active participants in each of the insurgencies of 1971 and 1986-89 never exceeded 20,000 young men and women. Whereas participation of Tamil youth in LTTE insurrection in the North and East was about 3000 youths by the time of the arrival of Indian Peace-Keeping Army in 1987, and it increased to about 10,000 at the time of their retreat from Jaffna in 1995. Considering reports of large scale recruitment occurred during the past few years, this number might have increased at the time of end of the conflict.

Youth involvement in conflicts is influenced by several factors; lack of economic opportunities, increase in grievances, deprivation of development and blocked transition to adulthood. Of all, lack of economic opportunities, deprivation of development and increase in grievances acted as driving forces of violent insurrection in North and East. Though certain conflict resolution theories highlights the fact that youth being the “drivers of conflict” it is to be noted that they are the most vulnerable victims of a conflict. They play a role as offenders or perpetrators, yet, at the same time, opportunities available for development are not accessible to them as a result of the conflict. The large proportion of combatant group is aged between 15 and 30 years, on the other hand majority of the youth population in the country has grown up only witnessing war throughout their life time.

Having taken part as combatants in the conflict, youth have become direct victims. Researchers have proved that the majority in both government military troops and LTTE carders had been between the ages of 15-30 years. Though the Government military group recruited those who are above 18 years of age, LTTE carders consisted of adolescents of 14 years of age. Their recruitment may be either voluntary or forced. Speaking of LTTE, youths were compelled to join the conflict through conscription or abduction.

Findings of the Study

The study conducted in Allaipiddy, Jaffna revealed that, whether or not the youth was directly involved in conflict, they have become direct victims of social, economic, political, psychological and cultural dimensions of conflict. Either victims or perpetrators, it is the future generation of the country who have been most victimized.

The conflict has affected education, social welfare, economic development and as a result it has aggravated unemployment. Concerning the age group of the youths interviewed in Allaipiddy, most of them have dropped out of school due to poverty. Their parents have lost means of income each time they fled home. Allaipiddy is a Fisheries Community and with the increase in hostilities, the fishermen faced restrictions on fishing by Sri Lanka Navy due to security reasons. They were forced to work as day-labourers. They largely depended on dry ration and supports from NGOs.

In most of the families, the children’s education was affected. They dropped out of school and engaged in odd jobs to support their families. There were instances where the elder brothers had to quit school to educate his younger siblings. This situation has a direct impact on today’s youth unemployment. Lack of proper education at their adolescence, lost of family property due to displacement and in certain circumstances, loss of caretakers at young age have affected their current status to find themselves jobs post conflict.

A young mother, speaking of her economic condition explained that she sometimes has to sell dry ration in order to fulfill the daily needs. There are young women who suffer due to lack of a dowry as no man is willing to take their hand without a presentable dowry. Lack of sound educational background prevents them from enjoying available employment opportunities. Though private and public sector offers employment for qualified youth, since most of them could not complete their education they lose a chance in this job sector.

Most of the male members in Allaipiddy were forced to take family responsibilities at a very young age. They could not afford to enjoy the freedom of youth. There are reports where young groups have become victims of substance abuse during (addicted to drug and alcohol).

Subsequently, female youths have sometimes been forced to early marriages and bare children. One girl who spoke to the interviewer regarding her current situation said that she is 21 years old and a widow with two children.

Lack of guardian/caretakers is one of the major social issues seen among the youth groups interviewed. Most of them have lost either both or one of their parents.

Youth is the transition period from childhood to adulthood. It is also a period where young people come across many physical and psychological changes. Therefore, advices and guidance of a responsible adult at this age is mandatory. When parents are killed or disappear due to war, the youth does not have anyone to guide them during their transition.

There are young girls in marriageable age in Allaipiddy who are unable to marry because of lack of the dowry. At the same time, their lack of education prevents them from finding employment with substantial salary.

Lack of shelter is another social issue identified at Allaipiddy. A young woman who explained her experiences mentioned that although she has a piece of land she does not have a house. She is living with her brother. There were few others who lived with friends or relatives due to lack of shelter. They are forced to depend on others.

Young widows and mothers of young children who do not have their own houses are highly vulnerable. Their personal security is at a threat. They could become victims of sexual abuses. Even though they live with friends or relatives, they are still vulnerable to such exploitations.

Those who have been injured due to bombing and shelling are permanently disabled. Some who have been treated for a long time, still face side effects of shelling as the metal pieces cannot be completely removed from their bodies. Permanent disabilities interrupt the economic activities and further, there are some who need the help of a third party to conduct day to day activities.

Having lived in Welfare Centers for a long time, they have not had proper health and sanitary facilities. Hence, they have been victims of epidemic diseases. Unavailability of nutritious food too is a threat to the health of these people. There is a high risk of being a prey of sexual assaults and such victims may encounter social diseases.

Youth of Allaipiddy, as many other youths in North and East, has often been victims of political issues which came about with the conflict. They were often forced to join the LTTE in one hand and on the other they were often looked upon as suspects by the Sri Lanka military forces. One young person, participating in our discussion said that his sister was arrested as a suspect of LTTE and was released after a month’s detention. Yet, the effect of the experience did not fade away even after she was declared her as non-LTTE by Courts. Further, there are incidents where young persons were abducted or where they disappeared.

Of all, the serious damage caused to youth through war is experiences of horror they witnessed since their childhood. It is obvious; the youth have experienced violence and horror than any other aspect in their lives. Post traumatic stress disorders, depression, phobias, personality disorders, illusions and delusions, and abnormal behavior are seen among the youth.

Conclusion

While the government and non-government actors have been taken initiatives to re-build people’s livelihoods, housing etc there remains a question whether the state and non-state actors are giving adequate attention to the youth victims as the findings of the young generation in Allaipiddy indicate. The war has had effect on the youth and this is despite their direct involvement as participants or as indirect victims of physical and emotional violence they have faced in the ongoing years. To add to that experience of forced political involvement during the conflict period and witnessing abduction and disappearances have resulted in lack of trust of society. Therefore there is an urgent need to look into the needs of the youth.

Bibliography

Hettige, S.T/Markus Mayer (July 2002): Sri Lankan Youth: Challenges and Response, Fedrich Ebert Sriftung, Colombo.
Hettige, S.T/ Markus Mayer (October 2004), Ed, Youth Peace and Sustainable Development, Center for Poverty Analysis, Colombo.
Fernando, Laksiri/ Shermal Wijewardene (2006), Ed, Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict in the Global context, Faculty of Graduate Studies University of Colombo.
The Economic Outcomes of the War, http://www.international-alert.org/pdfs/costwarxsum.pdf, [12th January 2010]
Joint Humanitarian Update North East Sri Lanka, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Vavuniya and Trincomalee Districts Report # 13 | 6-20 November 2009 http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/srilanka_hpsl/Files/Situation%20Reports/Joint%20Humanitarian%20Update/LKRN034_091106-091120-SL-IA-Sitreps-External-Joint_Humanitarian_Update-13.pdf,, [12th January 2010]
A Sri Lankan Perspective of Systematic Conflict Transformation, http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/dialogue6/s.pdf, [20th January 2010]
Reconciliation After Violent conflict: A Handbook, http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_full.pdf, [25th January 2010]
Promoting Social Reconciliation in Post conflict Societies: Selected Lessons from USAID’s Experiences, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/9/35112635.pdf [10th February 2010]
Rethinking the Nexus between youth, unemployment and Conflict-Perspective from Sri Lanka, http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/LEO_Sri_Lanka.pdf, [10th February 2010]
Youth exclusion, violence, conflict and fragile states: Report prepared for DFID‟s Equity and Rights Team. http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/GSDRC_YouthExclusionViol
enceConflictAndFragileStates.pdf [10th February 2010]

Internally Displaced Persons in the Process of Reconciliation: Implications for Durable Solutions

2011-09-03T14:34:00.002+05:30

Anuradha Gunarathne and Azmiya Badurdeen

[Anuradha Gunarathna is the National Coordinator of the Project, ‘National Protection and Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons’ – A Project under the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka. Azmiya Badurdeen is an Independent Consultant for projects on Conflict Transformation and Peace-building]

Introduction

The war in Sri Lanka has resulted in several waves of displacement. This displacement has resulted in complex and often politically sensitive issues around land and property. In some cases, IDPs have occupied land abandoned by those who fled the conflict. Some IDPs have settled in state owned land, while others on private lands. Further, over the years, the IDP sites have grown into village like settlements, where the IDPs have integrated themselves with the local community (Brun 2008 and Shanmugarathnam 2000 and Hasbulla 2001). The statuses of the IDPs on these properties remain unclear and this has led to conflicts with original owners. Usually, returnees face the issue of no land, mainly because it is occupied by the military or other IDPs (Fonseka and Raheem 2010).The challenges concerning the provision of durable solutions for the IDPs are inextricably linked to the reconciliation of the IDPs in the North and the North East of the country.

In this article, a distinction is made between national reconciliation and a reconciliation process aimed exclusively for the IDPs. This distinction remains crucial as processes aimed exclusively at IDPs’ need to look at IDPs as a community with special needs, such as, displacement-specific special needs. In many of these aspects, the focus also falls on individual reconciliation. In this context, individual reconciliation is considered as the ability of each human being to conduct/restore without hate or fear, his/her life to a similar status, which had existed prior to the conflict. This distinction needs to be considered because it is not possible to achieve the national reconciliation without achieving individual reconciliation. This is mainly because, national reconciliation can come at the individual level – although political processes may proceed and progress at an individual level, the individual may find it difficult to deal with the experiences of trauma (Mobekk 2005).

Even though both issues are intertwined, investigating the reconciliation processes on the IDP community as a separate entity is crucial. Usually, it is considered that the national reconciliation is achieved when societal and political processes function and develop without reverting to the previously existing pattern or framework that led to the conflict (Mobbek 2005). Reconciliation processes aimed at IDPs intend to facilitate IDPs’ reintegration into the society.

The Internally Displaced Persons in the Process of Reconciliation

As a durable solution for the displacees, return, relocation or reintegration with minimum standards of living, was proposed. The Government so far, has been able to settle a considerable number of IDPs who lived in Welfare Centres for decades. In this process, facilitating to fulfil their basic needs, they have been provided with minimum standards of living. The Government and other facilitating authorities have succeeded in fulfilling basic needs of the IDPs, yet, the grievances of the IDPs’ remain unchanged. These grievances are personal or common to the community. Studies have shown that the IDPs who have settled in permanent residences with minimum facilities have not resumed their normal lives. They are clouded with varied types of grievances. Unless these grievances are handled properly, a durable solution for their displacement cannot be provided. Hence, it is strongly felt that “reconciliation” should be a compulsory component in the check-list of durable solution for the displaced community.

At this point, many authors identify political renewal as the most important pre-requisite to resolve the conflicts of interests that were partially responsible for the outbreak of the war. At this point, it becomes a necessity to create public and legal institutions that safeguard legal certainty and democratic participation (good governance), investigate human rights violations as well as help to dismantle the apparatus of violence. This also entails construction of housing, infrastructure development and health system facilities. The focus of social renewal should incorporate the establishment of social structures, promotion of social reintegration of the former combatants (the LTTE), and facilitating for the return of the displaced persons.

Legal Framework

The legal framework for the IDPs should be based on the universally recognized principles of international law and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID). The GPID states that IDPs are "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border" (United Nations, 2004).

The responsibility of the IDPs lies with the national governments. As IDPs reside within the borders of their own countries, and are under the jurisdiction of their governments, primary responsibility for meeting their protection and assistance needs rests with their national boundaries (Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility, 2005). Further, people are displaced because of the context of the state, and it is a moral obligation of the state to provide for the necessities of the IDPs.

IDPs are particularly vulnerable and need protection because: they may be transits from one place to another, may be in hiding, may be forced toward unhealthy or inhospitable environments, the social organization of displaced communities may have been destroyed or damaged by the act of physical displacement, psychosocial distress related to displacement, removal from sources of income and livelihood, schooling disrupted, the conditions of internal displacement may raise the suspicions of or lead to abuse by armed combatants or other parties to the conflict and also IDPs may lack identity documents essential to receive benefits or legal recognition(IDMC 2009 and Kalin 2008).

According to Article 3 of GPID, “National authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to IDPs within their jurisdiction”. It expresses that the rights of IDPs have to be guaranteed by the stakeholders who make policies in return, and takes measures pertaining to relocation and integration. Moreover, it also encourages the IDPs to take part in decision-making activities and empowers them to take steps that lead to durable solutions which would be sustainable. The state is responsible to provide equal protection to all IDPs, yet the persons displaced due to the disasters are unable to enjoy certain rights and certain benefits that have been assigned under the existing laws, and they are also subjected to certain impediments and disadvantages as a result of their inability to comply with certain existing legal requirements. The laws, norms and regulations that have been enacted by the Parliament of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka are sufficient to ensure the protection and safeguarding of the IDPs rights and privileges. By the 3rd and 4th Chapters of the Constitution of Sri Lanka, respectively, the Fundamental Rights and Language Rights have been guaranteed. Moreover, the Resettlement Authority Act, No. 09 of 2007 of Sri Lanka, which was established with the objective of Resettlement or Relocation of IDPs in a safe and dignified manner. The act also had the objective of facilitating resettlement/ relocation of IDPs and refugees in order to rehabilitate and assist them to enter the development process (Article 13, Resettlement Authority act No. 09 of 2007 of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka).

Durable solutions for returnees depend not only on the improvement of the security situation, but also on better livelihoods opportunities. This is true as in the case of integration or relocation. This puts forth the view of reconstruction as being a priority after conflict, for return or integration of the IDPs. Nevertheless, the end of a war has created a platform for many IDPs to return to their origins. A series of issues are to be confronted in this context regarding the return to their origins, or relocating them in another place or whether it is to integrate them in their present location of displacement.

The Role of the Government in the Reconciliation Process

The national and regional structure of the Government facilitates the protection of conflict victims. For instance, the National Child Protection Authority has Psychosocial Officers and the District Coordinators for the purpose of protecting children in every district. For the IDPs it has Ministries such as Disaster Management, Resettlement, Relief and reintegration. All the Divisional Secretariats have Women Development Officers, Youth Service Officers, Social Service Officers, and Child Rights Promotion Officers. They are responsible for the protection and development of the vulnerable populations. Women and Children Desk/s of the Police stations are especially established for the protection of women and children. In the IDP areas, the District Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Secretary is the focal point for all IDP related issues and activities. Moreover, the service providing agencies such as; Vocational Training Authority, Coconut Board, Palmyra Board and etc are the agencies which belong to the government for the purpose of providing services specially aimed at livelihood. The Independent Human Rights Commission investigates and inquires complains on violation of fundamental rights. Through this potential structure, it is easy to rebuild the lives of victims of conflicts. The need is for the proper implementation of these government systems. That will address the civil, political, social, cultural and economical rights of the IDPs.

The Role of NGOs in the Reconciliation Process

NGOs play a vital role in the development context of the country and have the immense potential in the aspect of reintegration and reconciliation for the IDPs. The role of NGOs as unofficial intermediaries is highlighted in their role as mediators, facilitators and in empowering, advocacy and economic and social activities (Rouhana 1995).

The Need of the Reconciliation Process to Take a Religious and Cultural Perspective

The role played by religion can be vital in the process of reconciliation. The core values of all religions can help in bringing out values of; truth, forgiveness, equality, kindness and etc, can foster relationships and facilitate the reconciliation process (Montville 2001). Studies like H. Assefa (2001) have shown the impact religion can have in reconciliation process where people could find a spiritual connection to enter into a dialogue. This spiritual dimension allows them to move beyond the competitive and legalistic discussions and get to the core of the problems.

Conclusion

The key conditions for the sustainability of returnees are creation of employment opportunities, housing, access to public and social services, and education. If access to basic necessities is not available, this might lead to a resultant failure of the reintegration process (Black and Gent 2006). Rebuilding trust between communities is essential to reintegrate the displaced who had fled from their homes during the peak of the war. Some of the returnees say that the main problem confronting them is the adaptation to their new environment. The returnees get struck with the feeling that their surrounding is not what it used to be as they experienced it years ago. However, this is a natural context related to adaptations after war, which occurs when there has been severe destruction and when new neighbours have occupied the neighbouring lands. Hence, reintegration and reconciliation must be accompanied by better living standards for everyone - this includes both the returnees and the other communities living in their locality.

Bibliography

Adelman, H. (2008),’Protracted Displacement’, in: Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home, Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp. 1-21.
Assefa, H. (2001), ‘Coexistence and reconciliation in the Northern Region of Ghana’, in: Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence: Theory and Practice, Lexington Books, USA.
Black and Gent, (2006), ‘Sustainable Returns in Post-conflict Contexts’, International Migration, Vol.44, Issue 3, pp. 16-36.
Bradley, M. (2007), ‘Return in dignity: a neglected protection challenge’, RSC Working Paper No. 40, University of Oxford.
Brookings Institution – University of Bern (2008), ‘Protecting Internally Displaced persons: A Manual for Law and Policymakers’, Brookings Institution – University of Bern.
Brun, C. (2008), ‘Finding a place: local integration and protracted displacement in SriLanka’, Social Science Association.
Hasbulla, S.H. (2001), ‘Muslim Refugees: The Forgotten People in Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict’, Research and Action forum for Social Development, RAAF.
Kalin, W. (2007),‘Foreword’, When Displacement Ends: A Framework for Durable Solutions, The Brookings Institution – University of Bern: Project on Internal Displacement, pp. 3-6.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2007/09displacementends/2007_durablesolutions.pdf (Accessed on 10th March 2010).
Koser (2007), ‘Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace Agreements and Peace Building’. http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2007/09peaceprocesses.aspx
Mobekk, E. (2005), ‘Transitional Justice in post-conflict societies-approaches to reconciliation in after intervention: public security management in post-conflict societies’, From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership, eds. Ebnother, A. & Fluri, P., Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, pp. 261-292.
Montville, J. V. (2001), ‘Religion and Peacemaking’ in: Forgiveness and Reconciliation (Religion, Public Policy and Conflict Transformation, Templeton Foundation Press, pp. 97 – 116.
Phuong, C. (2000), ‘Freely to return: Reversing ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.13, No.2, pp. 165-183.
Rouhana, N. (1995), ‘Unofficial Third Party Intervention in International Conflict: Between Legitimacy and Disarray’, Negotiation Journal, Vol.11, pp.255-270.
Scherg (2003), ‘Development-oriented Trauma Healing in Post-war Situation’, GTZ, Eschborn
Shanmugaratnam, N. (2000), ‘Forced migration and changing local political economies: a study from North Western Sri Lanka,’ NORAGRIC Working Papers No. 22, Centre for International Environmental and Development Studies.

Highlights from a Study on Impact of Conflict and Displacement on Education in SriLanka

2011-09-03T14:30:00.001+05:30

Ishita Dey

[Research Scholar, Department of Sociology, University of Delhi and Member, Calcutta Research Group]

J.R.A Williams(2010) in this extensive report on “The impact of conflict and displacement (2006-2010) in SriLanka” shows the various methods introduced during conflict and post conflict to improve educational standards. This report is one of the back ground papers commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2011, The Hidden crisis: Armed Conflict and education”. The decade long conflict in SriLanka led to displacements of people from their houses. According to “Common Humanitarian Action Plan for Srilanka 2008” (UN: 2007), around 300,000 school-aged children were affected by the conflict in Northern, Eastern and bordering provinces. This was before the ceasefire agreement of 2002 was annulled in 2008. This led to a second wave of IDPs. So not only the school aged children were displaced but also in this period there was a shortage of qualified teachers in certain provinces. What is interesting and significant to note in this context is that the professionals attached to educational institutions in rebel- LTTE controlled areas received salary throughout conflict. Much more important is that the ceasefires between the two sides were respected during national exams.

The first “shelter” for most of the IDPs in SriLanka was school buildings, which were designated as transit camps. From these transit camps the IDPs were relocated to massive closed camps where local educational authorities took in charge of managing school and participation of community in school management was prohibited. Other than that during conflict the displaced children could be enrolled in “host” schools which could create Temporary Learning Spaces(TLS) for IDP children. The model of TLS has been successful along with catch-up programmes aimed at students taking national examinations. Both these programmes generated a key interest among the displaced.

In fact the author also indicates the way the humanitarian agencies made special efforts to distribute educational materials when they were not allowed access to camps in Vavuniya citing security reasons. The UN and NGO workers trained in INEE (2004) Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Reconstruction: A Commitment to Access, were not allowed to work with camp community. While war has come to an end; and reconstruction work has started in full swing, the problem of lack of educational institutions, lower levels of enrolments, drop-outs due to economic situation persists across SriLanka. For instance, the Northern Province Department of Education states that 115 (35.3%) out of the 326 existing schools in the return areas had resumed activities by 31 March 2010, with 22% (18,561) of the 82,800 student body recorded in 2008 enrolled ( Williams 2010: 6).

Post war agencies like Save the Children, UNICEF, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and local NGOs continue to provide support to the improvement of educational standards through creation of educational material. Catch-up programmes have been most successful so far. In addition to that UNICEF introduced a programme in August 2009 “to provide an accelerated learning programme for displaced children which will lead to the eventual reintegration of these students into the government’s mainstream education system. This project involves the development of materials and training to cover two years of the curriculum in one-year programmes at each of levels 1-5 (the equivalent of Grades 1-9)”. (ibid :9)

“A ‘Home–School programme’ is being developed by the Ministry of Education (MoE) with support from UNICEF to “enable children to continue to follow the school curriculum and to attain the required level of learning achievement despite being unable to attend school on a daily basis”. The Home–School modules are designed to provide learning for children in Grades 1–5” (ibid).

The author recommends child-friendly schooling, vocational education, and national Early Childhood Education and Development (ECED) standards, as ways of improving the educational standards and effective ways of making education accessible to displaced children of school going age.

For the detailed report please visit
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001907/190714e.pdf
(Accessed on 28 August 2011)

We welcome your suggestions, comments and reviews on the report.

2011-06-30T17:26:00.000+05:30

In this issue of the Refugee Watch Online, we decided not to focus on the experience of any particular country. Instead, the accent in this issue is on mixed experiences of forced migration and several causative and resultant factors. We have two articles under the Perspective section. One concerns the environment and politics of displacement; the other displaced women’s adjustments to situations post return.

Dilip Gogoi in his article talks about the way construction of dams has been presented as the national development agendas despite the fact that such an agenda systematically excluded others who did not subscribe to the Nehruvian model. The he takes a glance at how big dams will have serious implication on the cultural bonds that the Arunachali tribes maintain. But, the challenge towards contesting such vehement resource use lies in understanding how marginal landscapes are integrated into a nationalist dream of integrating frontier space. The logic of resource exploration to propel the national economy is linked to the very process of the production of capital. Beyond the ecological consequences of mega projects, question of displacement of local communities, the cultural diversity of the local region presents unique challenge to the production of capital. Thus the latter would have a ruinous effect on the very societal bases of the region.

The second article, by Pakkeer Mohideen Mohamed Feroz, a human rights worker in Sri Lanka, talks about the post return challenges faced by women in the erstwhile conflict zones. The women who were living in camps or return areas, their position in Sri Lankan society is extremely vulnerable because they are dependent on the state and humanitarian agencies, with little ability to determine the course of their own lives. He lists all the different reasons due to which adjustment becomes difficult and shows that the root often lies in the reason of displacement itself. Each new causative factor shapes its victims in a way much different from other factors.

The News section has entries on HIV/AIDS, and armed non state actors in Burma and their roles in society. For the Reports section we have excerpts from reportage by Bhavani Fonseka and Mirak Rahim on settlement of the land question in the eastern province of Sri Lanka.

On our part, we hope the issue is worthwhile. We heartily welcome comments and suggestions.

To Deal with HIV/AIDS

2011-06-30T17:24:00.000+05:30

Sangbida Lahiri

[Calcutta Research Group]

It is often questioned why the risks of HIV transmissions are increasing among the forced migrant communities, especially in the third world countries like India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri-Lanka, Burma or the countries in Central and Southeast Asia? Several scholars and field researchers point out a few significant things which played an important epidemiological role in transmission of HIV among the migrants of these regions. Since the period of decolonization, these countries were the poor victim of partition. After partition they had dealt several civil wars or insurgencies within their territory. The partitions, civil wars, and insurgencies—all such social and political turmoil created a huge number of refugees and internally displaced persons across the region.

According to Nafis Sadik, some types of conflict or displacement have brought much more particular risks of HIV infection. For example, long years of refugee camp life and lack of employment or recreational opportunities have contributed to intravenous drug use in Afghanistan and Pakistan border areas; this is a driving factor in the epidemic in these countries just as it is in Central Asia. The destitution of Burmese refugees in Thailand has led to widespread ‘survival sex’ which has driven the infection in that sub-region. The sexual violence used as a weapon of war in Timor Leste, Central Asia, Sri Lanka and other conflicts has undoubtedly increased HIV risks. And although it is often not considered an armed political conflict, the horrific levels of social and interpersonal violence in Papua New Guinea are also thought to be important factors in the epidemic there.

The Asian region is a natural disaster-prone zone; especially floods and earthquakes occur frequently here. In many places, such as Pakistan, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, populations have suffered both conflict- and disaster-related devastation. In addition to the trauma of the disaster and the difficulties of living in temporary shelter, the loss of livelihoods and assets accompanying natural disasters can affect families and communities for years, leaving them destitute and vulnerable to sexual exploitation or even trafficking. The provision of HIV education and basic prevention measures, including condom distribution, are part of the minimum standards for humanitarian response which cannot be implemented due to resource constraints, or stigmatisation, or both.

Thailand and India were among the first countries to recognise the need to provide comprehensive HIV prevention programmes within the security sector (national militaries, police and other uniformed services). The Thais, as in so many other aspects of HIV prevention, pioneered peer education and condom distribution programmes for uniformed services. The MAITRI programme in India was one of the first programmes established to support military families and dependents, not just individual members of the military, with comprehensive health and HIV education and counselling as well as other social support.

With the support of UNAIDs, UNFPA and others over recent years, there has been good progress in the region among national uniformed services, groups. Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1308 on HIV/AIDS in 2000, the UN has established HIV prevention programmes in all peacekeeping missions. Pakistan, India and Bangladesh have taken a major role in the HIV prevention programmes of peacekeeping missions.

For further information refer to http://www.fmreview.org/AIDS/Sadik.htm

Armed Non-State Actors, Conflict and Displacement

2011-06-30T17:20:00.000+05:30

Sangbida Lahiri

It is well known to us that Burma has been a ground for conflicts and insurgencies since the intervention of British into it. Once started, the situation in Burma never became completely peaceful even after the country attained independence. Conflict remained among the myriad ethnic tribes and it produced a huge displacement of people. A large number of people displaced internally, many sought refuge in the neighbouring countries. Experts believe the government of Burma is not at all concerned about the affected civilians.

As a result, Burma’s ethnic non-state armed groups (NSAGs) – believed to hold territory covering a quarter of the country’s landmass – play a crucial role as protectors and providers of humanitarian aid. The approach to governance taken by different NSAGs varies greatly, as does the level of willing support given to them by their respective populations. In these traditional cultures, hierarchical leadership structures have evolved over time, often based largely on loyalty to those who provide support and protection.

Areas under the governance of NSAGs in Burma can be divided into what are known as the ‘black areas’ of active armed groups and the ‘ceasefire territories’ of those who made agreements with the national government over 15 years ago. These areas are collectively home to millions of civilians, many of whom fled areas of conflict or martial law to find refuge and humanitarian support. In many of these areas, education, healthcare, support for youth and women as well as emergency relief are provided by the NSAGs’ civil sectors, in most cases to a much higher standard than that provided by the state in nearby regions. Community workers supporting these projects, however, are heavily restricted and regularly attacked and arrested by Burma Army soldiers. Internally Displaced Persons who have fled to the ‘black areas’ are typically considered by the state to be supporters of the rebels and are under continuous threat of violence.

The elections held in November 2010 were as corrupt as most people expected and set continued military rule in stone. However, parallel to this, many foreign donors and governments have noted the military loosening its grip on civil society, opening up an unprecedented amount of space for humanitarian support and development. Parallel to this, however, all NSAGs have been ordered to incorporate their members into the Burma Army as ‘border-guard forces’, triggering a new series of threats to civilian communities and little hope for reconciliation between the military and NSAGs or their civil sectors.

There is a glimmer of hope in that there are some NSAG civil society groups that have been able to operate in government territory in recent years. The education branch of at least one of the more responsible ceasefire groups now provides support for primary schools in government-controlled areas through the monasteries. Ominously, offices of the Kachin Independence Organisation and the New Mon State Party have already been shut down in government territory and in early 2010 numerous youth workers of the former organisation were arrested, supposedly as part of a search for terrorist bombers.

NSAGs will remain critical to the provision of support to considerable numbers of IDPs in Burma, unless the government changes its approach to governance in these regions. Most IDPs and other civilians will continue to choose to live under the governance of NSAGs; and will remain dependent on international support. Steps to encourage a convergence of ideas and resources among legitimate civil society and groups linked to NSAGs should be, and could become, critical to the future peace and development of these regions, yet offer few solutions to the current displacement crisis.

For further information, refer to http://www.fmreview.org/non-state/Jolliffe.html

A Deportee I am, should I DREAM?

2011-06-30T17:17:00.000+05:30

Geetisha Dasgupta

[Binghamton University]

Along the bundles of international borders that surround us, a wave of fear is ceaselessly circulated. It is called the fear of deportation. Not all people are able to remain in their own countries. Not all people that migrate have papers that prove their credentials to check posts. Not all papers are equal.

Every year a few hundred thousand people of South American origin are deported from the United States of America. Of them, many are children, termed in the immigration registers as alien minors. Needless to mention, to steer clear of being deported, countless numbers stay in anonymity, change their addresses several times over, and most dangerously, live inside the territory of the USA without any substantial social security papers, which means not having access to any security, health, education and financial services.

In 2001 a legislative proposal was introduced in the US Senate in order to address the issue of so called illegal minor aliens kept away from the basic provisions of life required for attaining adulthood; and not getting absorbed into the allies of darkness that underline the colour boundaries within the territory of a country. This proposal is called the DREAM Act. DREAM is the acronym for Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors. This bill would provide conditional permanent residency to certain illegal alien students who graduate from US high schools, who are of good moral character, arrived in the U.S. legally or illegally as minors, and have been in the country continuously for at least five years prior to the bill's enactment. If they were to complete two years in the military or two years at a four year institution of higher learning, the students would obtain temporary residency for a six year period.

Questions do arise from the way the proposal has been defined. But what becomes most interesting is that, the proposal has been revived again in 2011 after being repeatedly silenced for a decade. This needs to be contextualized, and the big economic crisis becomes the necessary pinch of salt. Under pressure to find out ways of augmenting the state revenue the illegal now look like a resource hitherto untapped by taxation. In a December 2010 report, the Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the November 30th, 2010 version of the DREAM act would "reduce deficits by about $1.4 billion over the 2011-2020 period and increase government revenues by $2.3 billion over the next 10 years." The same report, however, stresses that the Act '"would increase projected deficits by more than $5 billion in at least one of the four consecutive 10-year periods starting in 2021.”

Potential deportees were hopeful till the Act was defeated in the Senate in December 2010. Several felt that their dreams have been upended. In an interview to the New York Times, Isabel Castillo says, “At least now, I can mention my full name to a reporter and not ask her to pardon my anonymity…I can afford to publish a full frontal photograph and not plead to be photographed only from a certain angle that does not reveal my identity….” She has stood face to face with several Virginia politicians who want to see an immigration crackdown and told them her status, and yet no one has turned her in. Indeed, they’ve been respectful and friendly. Last summer, at a town-hall-style meeting, she had a long exchange with the governor of Virginia, Bob McDonnell, and a Republican pushing for tougher deportation policies. In January 2011, she testified before a House of Delegates subcommittee full of legislators who wanted to expand police power to round up illegal immigrants. Castillo was brought to Virginia at the age of six years and then went on to attend college. She says she cried when the motion was defeated. She graduated with very high grades, yet must work as a waitress because the absence of social security papers disallow her from applying to jobs that she thinks herself better suited for. She, like thousands of her comrades, keeps pushing the envelope, trying to bring about a big change by stringing together small twists and turns and can be possible every day.

She has reason to be hopeful again: the act has been reintroduced in May 2011.
For further reading, refer to http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/education/21winerip.html?_r=1&ref=politics

Political Ecology of Big Dams in India’s North-East Frontier: Emerging Critical Issues and Environmental Concerns

2011-06-30T17:05:00.000+05:30

Dilip Gogoi

[Is an Assistant Professor in Political Science, Cotton College, Guwahati]

Dams, development and nationalism have historically evolved as potential agendas for nation building since 1950. The Nehruvian modernization dream was to transform agrarian India into a powerful industrialised nation based on scientific temperament. In the post 1990, these dreams have been more enthusiastically pursued to engulf our frontiers and borderlands as potential sites for the experimentation of modernity. Sanjib Baruah in one of his papers terms this as a process of ‘nationalizing frontier space’. The era of protected regime till the 1980 had a strong policy towards restricting mega structures to the core or mainland. The obvious reflection can be seen in Punjab, J&K and the North Eastern part of the country where big dams and heavy industries were not planned because of the regions proximity to hostile neighbours. In the post 1990 period one of the single determinant of India’s growth has been dragged by an acute power shortage. The growth of Indian economy is dependent on harnessing power from all potential sources. Hydro-power in this regards has emerged as a viable compliment to hydrocarbons, Coal, as a clean energy source and the Brahmaputra River basin its largest repository. Before the liberalization era power prospecting and harnessing was monopolised by public sector companies, however with the deregulation of this sector private players have conglomerated to harness more and more power. There is a spate of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with different hill states. In the North East India, Arunachal Pradesh has the most vibrant potential to generate hydro power. However, the innumerable network of dams that are proposed for the different river basins in Arunachal Pradesh, do not only threaten displacement that are projected to be small as compared to their counterparts in Narmada and Tehri, but will have more complex outcomes as the communities in the states are innumerable, small in size and heterogeneous.

Big dams will have serious implication on the cultural bonds that the Arunachali tribes maintain. But, the challenge towards contesting such vehement resource use lies in understanding how marginal landscapes are integrated into a nationalist dream of integrating frontier space. The logic of resource exploration to propel the national economy is linked to the very process of the production of capital. Beyond the ecological consequences of mega projects, question of displacement of local communities, the cultural diversity of the local region presents unique challenge to the production of capital. Dam construction in recent years has invited lot of controversy. Lack of comprehensive EIA and project planning threatens local biodiversity and has tremendous downstream and upstream upheaval affecting livelihood and aquatic life. Poor EIA appraisal has already led to unwanted deluge in the lower riparian areas of Assam. Beyond these obvious imperatives of damming fast flowing Himalayan tributaries, the location of these dams in highly sensitive seismic zone hinges the danger of flash floods in the event of a dam burst triggered by earthquake tremors. Underscoring the geo-ecological sensitiveness of the region, dam building is promoted as the most important developmental goal for the Himalayan state and the north-eastern region in particular. The Power Grid Corporation of India is one power sector player that has integrated the regions power potential with the nation. This mean the power produced here will be transmitted to other parts of the country to server the deficit regions. It strongly permeates the philosophy, the Nehruvian idea of development that marginal communities should pay for the development of a nation. Big Dams do not only represent states resourcefulness they also generate a sense of nationalism. This paper looks into not only the traditional challenges posed by big dams and but also tries to look into the other challenges, posed by ideas of modernization, developmentalities and privatization of resource use. What are the stakes of the local community? Here it will also be interesting to see how the neo-Nehruvian dream of calling to duty the marginalised people of the periphery are negotiated by local elites who act as brokers in bridging nexus with corporate interest in power projects.

State of Northeast Today

The north eastern region, which comprises eight Indian states , is connected with mainland India through a narrow corridor of land and , it has some unique features which sets it apart from the rest of the Indian landmass. The geo-strategic location of the North east region is also unique as it is surrounded by China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. The contemporary NE India is witnessing grave challenges: from within – contested ethnicities and complex historicity, from external environment – especially from Bangladesh, China and Myanmar and finally from the Indian state in context of not granting sufficient autonomy, regional underdevelopment and disparity which is responsible for the instability in present day NE India. There is a growing tension between the center and the people of the periphery regions due to the predominance of the center in certain matters and also due to the negligence towards the region which resulted in widespread unrest and insurgency and people’s discontent in the region.

The area has a rich natural resource base and the potential to emerge as a developed region. However due to the lack of effective strategies and will on the part of the Indian state and the on-going armed insurgency, the region has lagged behind the rest of the developed areas of the country. among the people there is a perceived notion that New Delhi is treating NE India as a “neo-colony” within India the way the British did with the region. There are several popular uprisings against this attitude of the center the most recent being in the context of the anti-dam uprisings hugely protesting against the construction of mega dams in ecologically and seismologically sensitive zone.

Projecting NE as India’s Future Power House

As India has a highly centralized planning process which is a conventional top down model, it identifies north east India as future power house considering its vast potential of hydroelectricity generation. India in order to keep up the development pace and growth India needs power. As India is witnessing several resistance movements against dams in various parts of India, northeastern region is an easy catch because of its —strategic location, vast potential for power generation and relatively low level of population density in comparison to other parts of India. In 2001 the Central Electricity Authority has done a preliminary study of the hydroelectric potential of the various Indian rivers. It has identified 168 prospective projects in the Brahmaputra Basin alone, which could generate more than 60,000 mw of hydel power.

On the basis of this report, GOI and Arunachal Pradesh Govt decided to initiate both medium and large dams through memorandums with the both Public Sector Power Company as well as private sector power companies. Accordingly, large dams are being constructed in many parts of ecologically sensitive zones of Arunachal Pradesh including 2000 MW Lower Subansiri Dam without addressing the serious people’s concerns and proper downstream impact assessment. It generate considerable debates and invites popular resistance movement from the local people and the civil society specially in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh by the students bodies Such as AASU and KMSS. The expert committee, consist of IIT, Guwahati, Gauhati University and Dibrugarh University , in its reports raised serious concerns and faulty design of the lower Subansiri project .The Assam Assembly House committee report also showed similar view and suggested without comprehensive downstream impact assessment study and addressing the genuine grievances of people , there should not be construction of large dam , particularly lower Subansiri dam.

However, GOI is continuing the same stand without addressing the genuine apprehensions and risks involved in the mega dam construction in the region in the name of national interest. Recent debates and reports also suggest that while initiating the project, the concerned authorities have overlooked the probable impacts and did not conduct any comprehensive study including that on the downstream impacts as well on the ecological consequences. This raises the serious flaw of mega-project execution and brings to the forefront the ulterior motives behind the construction of mega dams, which goes against the people and the environment.

Social and Environmental Cost

In India, construction of hydroelectric projects needs mandatory environmental clearances from the Ministry of Environment and the Forest, GOI, to review the feasibility on environmental and social grounds. Based on their specific locations they could also require other permissions such as – forest clearance from MoEF and approval from the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL) if protected areas (PAs) are involved. An important part of the clearance process is Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Report which is a very crucial document in terms of decision making. However, EIA reports revealed insufficient and faulty study in the context of mega hydel projects specially – Kameng. Lower Subansiri, Middle Siang, Tipaimukh and Dibang. All of them without exception, very poorly highlighted the area of conservation of wildlife and critical ecology of the region .This is particularly very important as two out of three bio-diversity hotspots of India pass through the north east – the Himalayas and the Indo- Burma region. However quite interestingly this area is poorly documented and in the recent years biologists have discovered many new species as well as range extension of existing ones in the region.

In specific context of the Lower Subansiri Hydel Project it needs to be realized that it is situated at a highly susceptible environmental location, which has an extremely sensitive ecosystem and above all this it is a part of the Tally Valley Wildlife Sanctuary, known for inter-border diversity. It is also one of the 25 richest bio-diversity hotspots of the world. The region is also affluent in terms of ornithology as the Bird Life International has identified two Endemic Bird Areas in this region.

The region is immensely rich in terms of forest cover as it experiences a very high average rainfall rate which is conducive for the growth of thick vegetation. Besides sporting thick forest and a wide range of bird this area also houses an assortment of animals which are endangered. Examples of such species would be – Great Pied Hornbill, Himalayan Black Bear, Golden Cat, Hill Mayna, Flying Squirrels, and Wild Hog etc. certain varieties of flora and fauna have already been marked as risk species. The National Forest Policy of the country also states that forest which clothes steep slopes, catchments of rivers, lakes and reservoirs and geologically unstable terrain and other such ecologically sensitive areas should be severely restricted. Tropical rain/moist forests particularly in areas such as Arunachal Pradesh, Kerela, and Andaman & Nicobar Islands should be totally safeguarded.

Field survey has revealed that the large scale mining and construction work has had a serious impact on the river flow by increasing the sedimentation. Muddy water and wide-ranging deforestation has resulted in acute land, water and air pollution in this ecologically sensitive zone located at the foothills of the Himalayas in the backdrop of an inadequate knowledge base. Critical concerns such as land degradation, forest land acquisition, generation of muck, increase in turbidity of water, water pollution due to various project activities and sewage disposal, cutting of trees, destruction of wildlife habitat, increased air pollution and most importantly displacement of local village people are witnessed from the project area. Besides all this one most imperative feature which totally goes against the construction of dams in this part of the country is that, this area is a seismic zone as it falls in Seismic Zone – V and thus is highly prone to destructive earthquakes like that of 1950 and periodic occurrence of earthquake in the region. Environmentalists, experts stressed on this vulnerability of the region and its devastative consequences. High pressure of water or a massive earthquake or even a major landslide could increase the flow of the river during monsoon and thus cause a havoc in the lower part of the project area which has thickly populated towns and villages. And this might also have adverse effects on the world heritage site Kaziranga and the much prized possession of the region, the largest river island of the world, Majuli.

Another serious concern is the displacement of the indigenous people, in the downstream area, the violation of their community rights and their livelihood and the issue of their resettlement and rehabilitation. These issues are perceived as grave because community rights are linked to the sources of livelihood of these people living in the lap of nature, specially the Mising community in Assam. The river and its resources are an integral part of the lives of these people living in and around the river; hence inaccessibility to the river and its resources poses as a hindrance in the running of their daily lives. Apart from the downstream people’s livelihood is also at stake, because they primarily rely on natural ecology for their agriculture and other livelihood sources. Hence, probable apprehensions such as large-scale displacement as well as sense of insecurity and environmental consequences cannot be ignored.

Politics behind the Mega Dams in the North East

There is a lot going on in as far as the construction of dams is concerned. The issue is not just one, but many matters entangled with one another. Within this major issue there are many sub-issues which are a matter of concern. The Government of India had adopted a neo liberal policy which is capital intensive and people insensitive. Thus this development through dams is regarded by many as anti-people which is solely focused on benefiting the government. The issue becomes further more crucial because it deals with the northeastern part of India. The northeast is projected as potential power house due to the fact that the GOI is offered strong counter resistance for its development projects in other parts of the country. It has also a strategic dimension as China frequently claims Arunachal as a part of Chinese territory and also China is building a dam in the upstream area. The origin of the Brahmaputra and most other rivers is in the Chinese territory and they flow through Arunachal and Assam of India and finally touch Bangladesh. Hence three countries are involved, thus the strategic importance of the rivers is by large enhanced. Inside India again these rivers by and large pass through two or more states and hence can be characterised as inter-state rivers. And thus unfortunately, the downstream states like Assam are completely ignored in the context of both policy making and shared benefits.

In the context of the proposed mega power project, the plans are also perceived by the local people as essentially neo-colonial in nature because GOI is not addressing local genuine concerns and is bypassing the people’s interests in the name of national growth. Hence critics argue that it ignores the very foundation of equitable justice. The proposed power distribution centre for the project has been fixed outside the region which also causes centre-periphery dilemma as the people at the periphery perceive that the GOI is pursuing a neo-colonial policy bypassing local interests. Also, because of the popular resistance movements spear headed by AASU and KMSS, are fully supported by the civil society including eminent activists like Medha Patkar, the movement is gaining momentum but GOI seems adamant and is sticking to it neo-liberal agenda.

Towards Environmental Security and Sustainable Development

To come to a solution on this issue is a rather critical exercise, as it would require a reconciliation of many critical dimensions of the issue. What is required as of now, that is in the immediate context of mega dam construction is --- identifying the critical environmental concerns through a comprehensive environmental impact study covering all the proposed dams in the region including the Lower Subansiri Hydel Project. As a mere project specific study does not suffice and does not provide a holistic picture of anticipated impacts, hence a comprehensive study is the need of the hour. Secondly it is equally important to address the people’s concerns in a more apposite manner. The Government should keep in mind that development is definitely a priority; we need development for sure, but development for whom? Are the people right? Hence if a development project itself becomes the cause of anxiety for a people that what good is such development?

Thirdly, there should be Permanent Liability Act, back by proper rule of law in order to effectively address the people’s genuine concerns like alternate livelihood, resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaces in case of construction of such big dams. Such an act is imperative because only then will the misery and the woes of the displacees and the sufferers be properly addressed. Projects like mega dams can seriously alter and affect the lives as well as the patterns and sources of livelihood of the indigenous communities who rely to a great extent on community resources like river, land etc. only a Parliamentary legislation can protect their indigenous and human rights and put an end to such grievances of the lot who suffer in the name of such parochial development. Fourthly, there should be initiatives on behalf of the Regional water resource authority for utilizing natural water of north east India with a sustainable approach as these are interstate rivers. This can also provide some kind of a gradual solution to the proper use of water for power generation etc.

What is needed is a coming together of development, sustainability and people’s progress. In brief we need development which is sustainable and people sensitive. An approach which brings development parallel to environment and which also does not overlook the convenience of the people concerned. Therefore the linking of local needs with nation building needs a more amicable cooperative federal approach rather than absolutist central approach.

We as people of the 21st century should be foresighted. We need to think not only about our survival and development but also about the sustainability and development of the future generations, of the people who are yet to come. Hence our approach should be one which is based on --moving ahead on the pattern of -- thinking globally acting locally and living ecologically. Sustainable development, that is, accessing nature sustainably without destroying the needs of the future generations, should be our goal.

Post Return Vulnerabilities among the Displaced Women in Sri Lanka

2011-06-30T16:54:00.000+05:30

Pakkeer Mohideen Mohamed Feroz

[Works at the Human Rights Centre for Social Justice, Sri Lanka]

Introduction

The protracted armed conflict in Sri Lanka between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ended in May 2009. The massive displacement of the population in the north of the country which took place in the final stages of the war, nearly 684,276 people have experience in displacement as IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers. Significant numbers of the people who were allowed to return to their areas of origin in late 2009 from the IDP camps in north and east. In western Sri Lanka, over 70,000 Muslim IDPs remained in displacement in Puttalam. 20 years after being forced out of the north and north-west by the LTTE in 1990. According to the government between 8,000 and 10,000 have returned; Many still faced poverty and difficult living conditions. With the end of conflict, the older generation of IDPs was keen to return but the younger generation, which had not known life outside the camps and the region, was uncertain about this option. The women who were living in IDP’s camps or return areas, their position in Sri Lankan society is extremely vulnerable because they are dependent on the state and humanitarian agencies, with little ability to determine the course of their own lives.

Causes and Consequences of Vulnerabilities

Armed Conflict: The armed conflict affected women and men differently. Men were the main casualties of the war. Of the survivors, women were the most affected by the loss of family members, death and disappearance of income earners, migration of young men and displacement. All women were affected by the conflict though they experienced different effects based on their ethnicity, location, class and socio-economic status.

Women’s physical mobility was restricted during the conflict. And the war has resulted in large numbers of female-headed households where women have to carry out the farming and fishing activities and support parents and children. Poverty and hardship have been increased among the women.

Displacement: A large majority of the women were living in camps and return villages in Sri Lanka have lived in displacement for 10 years or more under conditions in which basic dignity and fundamental rights are merely ideals. Also the ability of women to freely make decisions about their own best interests has been curtailed nearly completely. Privacy is difficult to obtain even for toileting and bathing even after the return. The Muslims evicted from the North were living as displaced persons in other parts of the country, some on their own and some in welfare camps, some were returned to their place of origin after 20 years. Sinhalese women and their families fled the conflict areas to the South, all of the displaced either having lost their spouses or children or livelihoods; Women’s responsibilities increased in the absence of income sources. Poverty, unemployment, alcoholism, sexual abuse, and domestic violence are widespread in the return areas. Due to cultural and social factors the victims are fear to report it or hide the abuses; it makes them more vulnerable even in post conflict situations. Even though, there are lacks of data available in this regard, it could be observed that more number of victims get treatment from the hospital in case of serious (for instant it could be observed in Batticaloa Teaching Hospital). The Refugees who returned Sri Lanka from India are helpless to rebuild their life after return beyond the end of war. The refugee women are more vulnerable while they lost their spouse, family members during flee by sea.

Loss of Income Source: Rural women’s lives are tied to the natural resource base. Collapse of the agricultural sector during the conflict impoverished rural women and their families.

For instant the people from Keerisuddan return village of Mannar District had half acre land which was provided by the government with land permit, under the settlement programme in 1977/78. It was highland crop lands and the people were engaging in crop cultivation, livestock activities and poultry, home gardening and wage laboring during the harvesting in suburb villages before the displacement. After the return, they lost all the income resources, now depending on dry ration for food for survival. Each family of the 35 families who are presently living in the village were provided Rs. 35,000.00 valuable livelihoods supportive items such as sewing machine, water pump, knife and axe by a NGO function under the Madhu Church. The women headed families mentioned that the dry ration will be stopped in coming end of April 2011, after that they will face difficulties getting food for their survival.

Women have limited livelihood options in return villages. Although their main occupation was home gardening and high land crop cultivation, inadequate profits and risk of crop failure made livestock rearing preferable. Except for preparation of cooked food and a few other income-generating activities such as dress making, women had few skills for self-employment activities. Lack of employment opportunities compel many women to depend on government and nongovernmental relief while Muslim women, especially from the welfare camps, increasingly looked to overseas contract employment as a survival strategy. Further, it could be seen that presently women were engaged in domestic workers for low wage.

The women were paid less than men for equal work and experienced difficulty in rising to supervisory positions. For instant, the women farmers who were engaged in paddy harvesting in Chenkalady and Kiran DS division of Batticaloa district have been paid half of the wage of male workers during the last harvesting. The reason was gender perception. The women farmers were paid 2000 LKR per acre while men received 4000LKR for same work.

On the other hand, it is obvious in print and electronic media about the abuses and hardship faced by the housemaid who went to Middle East for the foreign employment and domestic workers within the country ( there is a need to have a study on this issues).

Domestic violence: Physical and psychological abuse within the home resulted from increased incidences of alcoholism in return villages. There are some individual incidents took place in the return villages in Batticaloa district that the male family head used to have alcohol after selling dry ration given by the state or NGO. It caused to create domestic violence against women in return villages. Due to the cultural and social factors the women family members not interested in reporting to the law enforcement mechanisms. This kind of activities makes women more vulnerable in post return situations.

According to a field study carried out by a university student in Eastern Province, the women are under mental stress due to domestic violence, difficult living conditions and the burden of household management, loss of family members, displacement and loss of assets. In Vavunatheevu Division of Batticaloa district women identified men’s alcoholism as a major issue.

Women Headed Families: Women who became heads of households with the loss of their spouses are the most visible victims of the conflict. Abandonment, separa¬tion and divorce also resulted in female-headed households. The inability of the spouse to engage in income generation pushed women to become principal income earners.

For example there are 10.52% of population is women headed families in Keerisuddan return village of Madhu division of Mannar District. The 04 women headed families consisting 06 members are living in this village. Out of these families 75% of families do not have income resources. Only one young widow (27 years old) engages as a preschool teacher for a sum of 3500.00LKR monthly remuneration, others living with relatives and surviving by getting dry ration. There is no any income generating opportunity in this village. Because they lost their all income generation sources such as live stock, home gardening, poultry due to war and displacement. Also there is no paddy cultivation done due to displacement. Due to cultural / traditional habits no widows got married in second time. 02 young widow families out of 04 widow families (50%) do not have legal document for their land. Also all the widows do not have permanent shelters. But these families were given temporary shelters by a NGO.

Poor Access to the State Mechanism: Gradual subside of public service systems due to conflict and displacement and migration aggravate women’s problems. Government services are limited and there is acute shortage of public servants and medical officers in return areas. Local representatives are ineffective. The women had no legal protection against discrimination in the private sector, where they sometimes were paid less than men for equal work and experienced difficulty in rising to supervisory positions.

According to the returnee women in Mannar District, after the return they do not suffer any attacks, harassment or any other form of punitive actions. And all the returnees who were staying at village were given temporary shelters and they enjoying by getting this without discrimination. An adequate standard of food /dry ration were providing for all the returnees families even for short period after the return. And all the returnee persons have been able to reunite with family members if they choose to do so. They are able to exercise the right to participate fully and equally in public affairs in the villages.

Although, people in remote village do not have full and non discriminatory access to national and divisional protection mechanisms, such as services from Assistant District /Divisional Registrar, Social Service Officers and Medical Officer of Public Health. Further, children who born during the displacement at the security zone which were declared by the government in the LTTE control area in the time last war do not have access to personal documentation, which typically is needed to access public services.

Lack of Commitment of Public servants: The domestic violence, spousal abuses were prohibited by the law but it was not effectively enforced. The systematic violence, discrimination during the public service was also thought to be widespread. However, enforcement of the law was not effective. While the protective measures taken by the State party for women who migrate from Sri Lanka, these women remain vulnerable to illegal employment agencies, and that many work in exploitative situations and experience violence and abuse at the hands of their employers.

Lack of knowledge among the Women : Most of the return areas were under controlled of the LTTE for two to three decades, thus there are bare about available legal protection systems in the country among the women in return area. There is a need to make aware the women & men on gender awareness, rights based approaches, legal protection systems. There is a requirement to work toward women’s participation in local governance and local level representatives to ensure attention by political leaders and government officers.

Conclusion

Overall, the conflict changed women’s circumstances by they have assumed roles in sharp contrast to notions of femininity and cultural values by becoming of the breadwinner of the family. Although, they are negatively affected by the poor condition of access roads, minimal transport facilities, inadequate housing, poor water supply and sanitation and limited access to health care services. The rehabilitation of infrastructure facilities and restoration of services will enable women and their families to improve their quality of life. And all programmes and projects in returnee area should include mandatory provision for a gender responsive strategy to mobilize women, overcome constraints that limit their participation and improve their capacity.

Land in the Eastern Province: Politics, Policies and Conflict

2011-06-30T16:48:00.000+05:30

Excerpts from a Report by Bhavani Fonseka and Mirak Rahim (Centre for Policy Alternatives)

Most individuals in Sri Lanka will identify land as a fundamental element that defines their life. Ownership and control of land, including the location of and the extent of land owned indicate a person’s wealth and social status. The respect that flows from this has a number of other repercussions including access to schools and marriage prospects. Secure land rights imply economic security and provide surety for loans and thereby facilitate income generation and improve livelihoods. In Sri Lanka, land has been a critical factor in the ethnic conflict that intensified and resulted in the outbreak of a war that spanned over two decades. State aided land settlement projects under development and irrigation schemes, the failure in addressing key land and development related issues, violence against particular communities that resulted in the abandonment of properties, and the establishment of ad hoc security restrictions in areas all contributed to the increasing tensions that ultimately led to the outbreak of war in Sri Lanka. Over the course of the war, the land problem was exacerbated by increased displacement of entire communities from their land, occupation of land belonging to private individuals by the military and LTTE, arbitrary seizure of land belonging to Muslims by the LTTE in the North and East, the establishment of High Security Zones (HSZ), Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and the loss of documentation. Although discussions on land and related issues and attempts to resolve disputes at a community level did run concurrent to the conflict and heightened during the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and post-tsunami period, there were no concrete steps taken by the State or any other actor to fully address the root causes of grievances, provide sustainable alternatives and introduce modalities that could have reduced some of the underlying problems and disputes.

In a post-war context, with the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, the Government, political parties, civil society and citizens at large are faced with an unprecedented opportunity to address the root causes of the ethnic conflict and long-term grievances faced by different communities. Although there is an opportunity to address a fundamental issue such as land through looking at both the constitutional, legal and policy framework and the problems on the ground, very few initiatives have been put forward by the different actors. Nearly a year after the end of the war, with two national elections held and the current Government enjoying an overwhelming majority in Parliament, this is clearly the moment to unveil concrete proposals for constitutional and political reform and a roadmap that introduces changes to the current set up. There are, however, unconfirmed reports of impending constitutional reform including changes to the Thirteenth Amendment and the role and powers of the Provincial Councils. Whether such a framework will guarantee the rights of all citizens or only a certain group or none at all, are yet to be seen. What is noteworthy is that though a significant time period has passed since the end of the conflict, there has been little public information, discussion or debate on Government proposals for possible ways forward. In the current post-war climate, there is no information as to whether the numerous HSZs will be dismantled; whether all IDPs will be able to return to their land; and furthermore, whether there would be a restitution and compensation policy. The lack of transparency and due process with regard to Government procedure into the post-war context are issues of grave concern and need to be reversed.

The present report explores the complex web of land issues in the Eastern Province. At the outset, CPA states that this report only highlights key land issues in the Eastern Province in the post war context and is not a historic study of the use, management and control of land in the area. The specific time period in focus spans 2007-2010. It provides an overview of the situation soon after the Eastern Liberation to that of the post war context in Sri Lanka and the status of land within a three year period. The Eastern Province was militarily liberated by government forces in 2007, following which the region has seen a host of developments related to land. The military liberation of the East and the resulting process of normalization have provided the context for the return of the displaced and land reclamation, the provision of resettlement, reconstruction and development assistance by humanitarian agencies, donors and the Government. This has had a dramatic impact on the quality of life for civilians, even while they continue to deal with the long-term repercussions of the war, including the loss of lives, destruction and damage to property, the loss of livelihoods and incomes, and the disruption of community ties. Some of the critical land issues and problems in the Eastern Province and their impact on larger political and governance issues are highlighted in the report. For instance, access to land is a critical aspect to land use and control. In the East, security restrictions and military occupation have somewhat curtailed full enjoyment of land rights. Furthermore, obstacles to accessing land have resulted in disputes and grievances which if left unresolved can lead to a multitude of problems. Another complicating factor is the manner in which the subject of land has been approached by both state and non-state actors to fuel as well as mitigate ethnic tensions, to facilitate development projects and economic growth, to develop particular communities, dispossess and displace others, establish new administrative divisions and settlements and change ethnic demographics - all of which have had long term implications.

Land as a highly politicised and ethnicised issue was an underlying cause of the war. The report examines the post-war context of new land settlements and land grabbing, landlessness, encroachment on state land, illegal land sales and the implications of the loss or destruction of land documentation in the East. These have all aggravated issues of ownership, access and control of land between land users/owners. There have been reports of communal violence breaking out as a result of land disputes. There are also sporadic reports of intimidation and even assaults, indicating the real potential for violence over land disputes. A number of land disputes were reported to CPA some of which were described as land colonization, but these are claims that CPA could not verify, even though there was a significant level of political and military involvement in some of these cases. Nonetheless, CPA repeatedly encountered a strong perception among many of the interviewees at the community, district and administrative levels of State actors being partial to particular ethnic communities when dealing with land. Hence even when the State is acting in good faith in advocating particular policies there is strong mistrust and fear on the ground. Rather than ignoring these fears the Government needs to ensure greater transparency, information and participation in order to address these perceptions.

The present report also explores the constitutional, legal and policy framework that governs land in the region. The issue of land is further compounded by the different levels of government involved - the Centre, province and district and the powers vested in them. Although the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution was introduced with the goal of devolving powers to the Provincial Councils including in the area of land, as discussed in the report, the Central Government overrides provincial council decision-making and policy implementation on land and continues to be the major actor. Even though the number of ministries, including those dealing with land, has been cut in the current cabinet, there continue to be multiple actors at the different levels of administration, especially in the case of the Centre with several departments and authorities overseeing various issues related to land. The lack of progress made in resolving land disputes and the inability to introduce and amend much needed laws and policies demonstrates the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of a bureaucracy and a multiplicity of actors with some overlapping functions. Though CPA has met several government officials who within their limited mandates are attempting to address the grievances of the communities and land conflicts, a common problem documented by the CPA team is the inertia and lack of initiative among some senior political appointees and the disturbing trend of the high levels of politicisation. Though this is not a new phenomenon regarding land and the Eastern Province, the provision of secure land entitlements and development requires that this systematic problem is addressed without delay. A fundamental problem is the lack of political will and political imagination to address the ground realities and grievances of the affected communities and to engage in policy reform. The report recommends possible solutions to the problems and gaps highlighted. It calls for reform at the constitutional, legal and policy levels. While the issue of power sharing and a political solution needs to be addressed and any solution has to grapple with the subject of land, there are areas which the Government can move on without delay, including the strengthening of the powers of the Eastern Provincial Council (EPC) and consulting the EPC on key land related issues. Despite the twenty year lag, it is not too late to constitute the National Land Commission (NLC) which would strengthen the process of establishing a fair land policy. Developing a policy framework on land could be advantageous for long term development provided that it ensures greater transparency and inclusiveness in decision making and formulation of policies. Existing land related legislation has to be amended, including the Land Development Ordinance and Prescription Ordinance. Specific initiatives to provide land for the landless as discussed in this report or compensation and restitution to those whose land and property has been affected by the war, need to be strengthened, taking into consideration the issues on the ground which are set out in the following chapters.

In responding to the problems on the ground, CPA recommends a two-track approach of developing a policy framework and establishing/strengthening community-oriented mechanisms and processes. Land disputes and conflicts which have intensified in the post-war context, probably in relation to an increased feeling of personal security, improved freedom of movement and a greater number of returns, need to be addressed through clarification of the legal status of individual cases. This also requires community-oriented and mediated solutions, be they land kachcheris, land task forces or mediation boards/committees.

The Government, political parties and bureaucrats also need to ensure that governance is made more effective and sensitive to community needs. Existing issues such as the confusion over divisional boundaries for instance need to be clarified so as to improve administration. In dealing with issues of military restrictions such as high security zones and occupation of individual properties that obstruct civilian access, there has to be a commitment to review security requirements in the post-war context, and accordingly provide a time line for withdrawal. There should be rent schemes for continuing occupation and compensation/restitution in the case of permanent occupation which should be kept to a minimum. While the cases and issues discussed in the report are very specific to the Eastern Province, these are not isolated issues and trends peculiar to the East alone. These issues and trends have resonance in other parts of the country, but more so in other conflict affected areas such as the North. The latter is presently going through a phase of rebuilding and development and will face similar as well as unique problems with land. If ‘the Eastern model’ is to be used in the North, best practices and solutions in the East need first to be developed and implemented before they can be replicated elsewhere. For Sri Lanka to move forward in a post war context, where fundamental grievances including land issues are addressed there needs to be larger political and constitutional reform. An underlying theme in the report is that this and the policies and programmes it produces must be underpinned by a people-centric approach – one that is pivotally representative of the needs of the people in the area. Such a shift will not only addresses grievances of the affected communities but could also mitigate conflict and ethnic tensions.

2011-05-30T15:37:00.002+05:30

Sahana Basavapatna

[Lawyer, New Delhi]

The question of a legal framework for refugee care in South Asia has long occupied academics, activists and lawyers in the South Asian sub-continent. While the discussion and debates in the highest circles have lead to very little in terms of a tangible legal framework, a number of developments, within the South Asian sub-continent have equally lead to or is very likely to lead to far reaching changes in the way refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons and “illegal” immigrants are viewed, cared for and managed. Some of these include the UNHCR’s Urban Refugee Policy of 2009 that will have far reaching implications in the possibilities it offers and the limitations in its application in countries in South Asia, the Unique Identity Project, now renamed as “Aadhar” in India, and some other lesser known executive orders that impact refugees on a daily basis.

Yet, the combination of the absence of refugee law, ad-hoc administrative policies and diversity among refugees provides a veritable landscape to understand why such a law is yet to be passed by Parliaments in South Asia, what dictates such an ad-hoc policy, the space available for refugee groups protect themselves by remaining “illegal” and yet deal on a constant basis with the inadequacies in the law.

Towards this end, this edition of Refugee Watch Online brings together diverse contributions, significant news articles and legal developments which reflect the complexities of forced migration in South Asia.

While 2011 was marked by commemorating the 60th anniversary of the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (July 28) and the 50th anniversary of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (August 30), as the contributions in the May edition of Refugee Watch Online show, there was not much by the way to celebrate for refugees. While one appreciates that the international refugee protection regime has withstood the test of time, politics and contexts, for a large number of people on the run, these instruments of protection have not alleviated their situation.

The first contribution in the May edition is a short note written by Somali refugees protesting before UNHCR in Delhi in the second week of May 2011, reiterating their concerns that for a large number of Somalis in India, much has remained the same, in terms of protection. Pertinent to mention in this context, is that the demands of the Somalis is unfortunately not new. The Somali refugees in Delhi continue to face insecurity and lack of protection, despite some of them living in India for over a decade. This protest is yet another reminder that Somalis, like the African refugee community, remains a forgotten people, in India.

The second contribution is an article titled “Untangling Nepal-China ties: The politics of Tibetan refugees in Nepal” written by Boris Markhampa and Susan Appleyard and is an analysis of the treatment of Tibetan nationals seeking asylum in Nepal in the context of Nepal – China relationship. It seeks to show how the Tibetan community in exile in Nepal has been used as a bargaining chip in Nepal’s relations with China and what the ramification of this unstated policy for Tibetan nationals have been.

The third article is a contribution by Prof. Tricia Redeker Hepner, Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University of Tennesee that focuses on how migration from Eritrea in contemporary times needs to be understood in the context of the existing regime of refugee protection. In making clear links between the political situation in Eritria and the exodus of a large number of people who see migration to the “West” as the only way to find a way out of the political turmoil, Prof. Redeker Hepner calls into question the effectiveness of the refugee protection mechanism. RWO has taken permission to re-publish this article, which was initially published in Counter Punch on April 22, 2011. This seemed to us to be an apt article for this edition, given that it makes very pertinent observations about the forced migration policy and its inability to deal with questions relating to protection of refugees. Prof. Redeker Hepner notes in conclusion that through the Eritrean example, she seeks to “illustrate the complexity and global scope of human rights dilemmas that structure refugees’ lives, and the failures of institutions, policies and laws designed to manage them as technical problems rather than protect them as human beings”. It cannot be gainsaid that South Asia offers adequate examples of this complexity and therefore the uniqueness of forced migration in the sub-continent needs to be studied for the answers it may provide for better understanding of the phenomenon.

Followers of developments in forced migration in South Asia would be aware of around 64 Pakistani citizens who protested in Jantar Mantar, in New Delhi in 2008 by burning their passports and claimed refugee status in India for fear of persecution on religious grounds. The Pakistani nationals belong to the Mehdi Foundation International, the followers of which have reportedly been persecuted for their religious beliefs. The Pakistani nationals approached the judicial system in India and filed a Writ Petition seeking directions from the Delhi High Court that their application for asylum be taken up by the Government of India. In November 2009/January 2010, the Government of India rejected their application for refugee status and by an order dated December 2010, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, headed by the Hon’ble Chief Justice Deepak Mishra directed that UNHCR process the applications and until the UNHCR decides the applications, none of the asylum seekers be deported. The Order of the Delhi High Court dated December 2, 2010 is reproduced in this edition and a few remarks may be made in giving a context to this case. The December 2010 order is illustrative of the number of aspects of refugee protection and processes that is significant to India. This case follows many others decisions where the Judiciary has shown consideration to refugees arriving in India, in the absence of which, refugees normally find themselves confronting the government which oftentimes makes arbitrary and ad-hoc decisions. Having been rejected refugee status by the Government of India in November 2009, the Pakistani Nationals sought directions that they be allowed to apply to UNHCR for refugee status. The Court observed that this should be allowed, given that the Government of India rejected refugee status by a non-speaking and general order “passed in violation of principles of natural justice”. Applications were subsequently made to UNHCR, who has granted them refugee status. However, the 64 Pakistani nationals will be resettled in the next three months as they do not have the right to live in India as refugees. While the settlement to a third country is processed, RWO is informed that any assistance for the 19 women, 11 children and the elderly among the 64 individuals would be appreciated.

In the section on News, two news articles are reproduced in keeping with the theme of this edition. The first news clipping is about Assamese of Chinese origin, who face a unique situation in India. Chinese nationals who originally were brought to work in the tea plantations in Assam at the beginning of the 18th century eventually settled down in Assam and married local Assamese residents. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 lead to a large number of these people were arrested and sent off to a camp in Deoli, Rajasthan, from where they were eventually deported to China. One of the few people who has conducted extensive research on this issue is Dr. Rita Chowdhury, an Assamese author and the recipient of the Sahitya Academy Award. RWO intends to follow up on this issue in the forthcoming editions of RWO.

The second news article, in contrast to the first, information that is now too common in the mainstream media and yet, in the context of the law – or the lack of it and the historical connections of India with its neighbours, telling of how borders make people with an identity in law. This news article talks about Ramesh Gayen and many others like him, who “don’t have any sort of recognition even after living in a country for over 40 years are not “qualified enough” to discuss politics”. The context for this news article is the recently concluded Assembly elections in West Bengal. The article states that people like Gayen who migrated from Bangladesh in the 1970s are “yet to be recognized as refugees or granted citizenship”. That India’s obsession with the Bangladeshi immigration and “infiltration” is alive is reflected yet again in the experiences of people like Gayen who continue to be non-citizens in the nations imagination.

The section on Reports includes a summary report of a workshop and a conference held in March 2011.

A workshop on Borders and Forced Migration was jointly organized by the Centre for Refugee Studies, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University and the Calcutta Research Group on March 29, 2011 and focused on statelessness, migration due to resource crisis and the ramifications of forced migration on women. A conference titled “Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons in India and her Neighbours” was organized by The Other Media in Delhi on March 30th and 31st 2011. It sought to examine the status of refugees in India in the context of the existing legal regime – both national and international. Both the forums, interestingly, focused, among other issues, on the question of statelessness and the risks, dangers and dilemmas that people face in falling under the category of “stateless” in India.

The May edition of RWO ends with an announcement of the Koshish contest, currently being organized by UNHCR in Delhi, under the “Do 1 thing for Refugees” as part of the commemoration of World Refugee Day, in June 2011.

We hope you enjoy reading this edition of RWO. Please feel free to send us comments, critiques or get in touch at refugeewatchonline@gmail.com

Somali Refugees Protest before UNHCR Delhi May 2011

2011-05-30T15:34:00.000+05:30

[The following is a note sent by representatives of Somali refugee community in Delhi in the context of their protests before the UNHCR office in Delhi. The note is carried here with minimal grammatical and formatting editing; no changes have been made in the language of the text]

Somalia is a country located in east Africa. It is a country where there is no functioning government for the last two decades .There is 100 thousands of Somali refugees who flee to the neighboring countries like Kenya and Yemen, a fraction of those refugees came to India.

On the other hand Somali refugees living in New Delhi are the third largest community registered from the UNHCR after Afghani’s and Burmese.

Some of the Somali refugees who live here are staying 20 years while some stays 10 years, remaining arrives last five years.

The UNHCR provides for refugees three durable solutions which are as follows.
1.Local Integration
2.Voluntary repatriation
3.Resettlement in third country

The Somali Refugees don’t receive the above solutions.

1.The UNHCR officers told us integration is not possible for us that is why we can’t get resident permits and work permits .All of us are having UNHCR certificates and recognized as refugees but no rights and no benefits. The UNHCR used to give monthly payment to the neediest people of our community and recently they stop it. Those people were elders and widow women with children.

2.There is a lot of people who face difficult situation’s and request from the UNHCR voluntarily repatriation to go back to their country and face persecution there. The UNHCR reply was we didn’t bring you to India so we can’t return you back.

3.The third and the last option is resettlement in a third country. The UNHCR considers few cases of our community compared to the number of Somali refugees living in India. We know resettlement is limited but we were requesting from the UNHCR for the last years to have number of resettlement quota proportionally compared to the number of Somali refugees.

4.The Question we are asking the international community, India, donor countries and UNHCR office in Geneva is.

Since we are living in India for a long period without rights and assistance and now the senior officers of the UNHCR tell us to be prepared to stay here for the coming 15 years without rights and assistance. How it is possible for us to survive in such kind of situation.

Untangling Nepal-China Ties: The politics of Tibetan refugees in Nepal

2011-05-30T15:28:00.002+05:30

Boris Markhampa and Susan Appleyard

The legitimacy of Nepal’s Peoples’ Movement stemmed from the Movement’s demand for the return of democratic rights which had been destroyed by the then-king of Nepal, Gyanendra. For more than one year human rights groups, political parties and a large portion of the general population took to the streets using human rights slogans to demand regime change in Nepal. Memories of their trampled banners reading “Restore Democracy” or “Return Freedom of Expression” left behind as they were brutally detained by the Nepal security forces are easily recalled. By the end of April 2006, their struggle had succeeded and many civil and political rights were soon restored in the country.

On March 10, 2011, Tibetans living in Nepal were once again beaten and arbitrarily detained when they attempted to peacefully gather to mark Uprising Day, the anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan rebellion against China’s rule in Tibet. Some Tibetans were arrested from protests, others from the streets near Boudha; more still were denied freedom of movement as they attempted to reach prayer meetings. Ten days later, the Tibetan community was denied the right to take part in the election of the new Kalon Tripa, Prime Minister of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, with Nepal’s security forces seizing the ballot boxes just hours before the poll was due to close.

This begs the question – was the People’s Movement seeking to restore rights for all in Nepal? Since March 2008, at the behest of the Chinese Government, each of Nepal’s three major political parties, Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the UML, have successively flouted the rights they struggled so hard for by repeatedly cracking down on Nepal’s Tibetan community. These political actors who struggled for a return of democracy and civil and political rights to Nepal during the People’s Movement should question if the Nepal they struggled for is a country that so easily gives up constitutionally protected rights at the request of a powerful neighbor.

The Chinese Government’s interference in Nepal’s treatment of Tibetan refugees can be demonstrated over decades of Nepal’s political history. The last decade has seen a steady escalation in the Chinese Government’s successful attempts to buy Nepal’s suppression of Tibetan’s rights. Since 2008, this has increased, as is demonstrated by the recent visit of China’s Army Chief, General Chen Bingde, to Nepal and the granting of military aid valued at 20 million dollars to the Nepal Army. The Chinese Government is investing heavily in numerous countries around the world, however, in Nepal this investment has unique impacts. The Nepali Government appears to feel obliged to repay the Chinese Government’s aid and investment with the suppression of Tibetans in Nepal and the effective denial of entry to Tibetans attempting to leave China. As the Chinese Government becomes increasingly fearful of even the slightest expression of dissent within Tibet, the Tibetans in Nepal will feel a corresponding squeeze on their rights and freedoms.

Intersections of Tibetan and Nepali History and Culture

As Tibet shares a vast border with Nepal along the greater Himalayan range to the immediate north, it is only natural that the two countries share many cultural practices and traditions. Almost all of Nepal’s ethnic communities along this border practice Tibetan Buddhism, wear traditional Tibetan costumes and speak languages that could be considered Tibetan dialects. Many of their forefathers are from Tibet; for example, the grandfather of one of the author’s relatives currently living in Nepal’s Namche Bazar, Solukhumbu District is from Tibet. Among Nepal’s many World Heritage sites are several holy Buddhist shrines including Boudhanath and Swayambunath Stupas. Kathmandu Valley has hundreds of Buddhist temples and Tibetans believe that great guru Padmasambhava meditated in Pharping, in western Kathmandu. Relations go as far back as the seventh century, when the Tibetan king Songtsen Gampo married Nepali princess Bhrikuti.

The Recent Arrival of Tibetans in Nepal

Due to the entrenched and extensive geographical and cultural ties, many Tibetans chose to travel to Nepal during the 1959 exodus from Tibet in the early years of the Chinese occupation. Many of the 100,000 Tibetans who fled the country, used Nepal as transit point and soon continued their journey on to India, to where His Holiness the Dalai Lama had fled, and where the Indian Government assisted them, granting them permission to stay and political space to establish the Tibetan government-in-exile. However, due to the cultural and historic ties between Nepal and Tibet many of those who fled Tibet decided to stay in Nepal, settling in various parts of the country including foreign assisted settlements such as in Jalsa, Kathmandu, and Pokhara. Donors supported the newly arrived Tibetan communities to establish Tibetan carpet factories in their settlements to sustain their livelihood. The carpet industry has had a significant impact on Nepal’s economy and in the following decades became a top industry.

In parallel to the Tibetan refugee community establishing themselves in Kathmandu and elsewhere, a Tibetan resistance movement comprising of voluntary members of the then Chushi Gangdruk resistance force and other young volunteers, with support from the CIA, established a resistance army force in Mustang District of Nepal and operated for almost 14 years. Around 1974, they were finally dissolved as a result of suppression by the Nepali Government under pressure from the Chinese Government and the sudden cutting of CIA support due to the formal establishment of US-China relations. While many of the resistance force were resettled in parts of Nepal, some refused to surrender to Nepali forces and were imprisoned; others committed suicide and some went to India. This history feeds a misguided fear that Tibetans may return to violent means of resistance against the Chinese Government.

Since the large influx of Tibetans in the 1960s, around 3,000 Tibetans per year seek security from Chinese-dominated Tibet by undertaking the dangerous and expensive journey over the mountains and into Nepal, from where most travel on to Dharamsala. For example, in October 2006, a group of 41 Tibetan refugees including two guides arrived safely at the Tibetan Refugee Transit Center in Kathmandu after escaping shootings by Chinese Border Security forces on the morning of 30th September 2006. According to an eye witness, Kelsang Namtso, a 17 year old nun from Driru County of Tibet was shot dead just before the Nangpa La Pass and Kunsang Namgyal, a 20 year old boy from Kandze was hit by bullets on his leg and he could not escape. He and 30 other Tibetans including 14 boys under the age of 18 were arrested by soldiers wearing camouflage uniforms. In addition to this case, there are hundreds of confirmed reports of arrests, looting, beating and deportation at the border as Tibetans trying to flee Tibet both by Chinese and Nepali Police.

Life for Tibetans in Nepal

The nearly 20,000 Tibetans living in Nepal have suffered decades of state imposed restrictions on some political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights including limits on state-provided education and health care and also employment restrictions. Their freedom of movement within the country is also restricted. Despite many of them being born in Nepal they are constitutionally not entitled to citizenship and cannot vote. They are one of Nepal’s many vulnerable minority communities. Within the 20,000 strong community, approximately 6,000 are not officially recognized and hold no legal papers. As a result their situation is even more precarious, as they are vulnerable to being viewed as illegal immigrants, potentially prosecuted as such and deported to China. This situation is a result of the Nepal Government’s decision in 1989 to stop issuing refugee identify cards to Tibetans, though allowing Tibetans to continue to enter the country and live in Nepal, effectively denying Tibetan asylum seekers a safe refuge. The fear of deportation is not without basis; in May 2003 Nepal deported 18 Tibetans to China without regard for due process on charges of travelling without valid documents.

Fear of confrontation with Nepali authorities and potential deportation is a constant source of trauma underlying the daily lives of Tibetans in Nepal. The Nepal authorities used this to their advantage during protests by Tibetans in March 2008, when they began to threaten even those holding refugee identity cards with deportation. For example, the Kathmandu Chief District Officer summoned and interrogated a Tibetan monk Tenzin Jamphel of Drubthok/Saraswati Monastery in Swayambhu, who was born in Nepal to Tibetan refugee parents and holds a Tibetan refugee identity card. He was forced to sign a paper and threatened that his Refugee Identity Card would be taken away and he would be returned to Tibet if he took part in any future demonstrations.

The Rights of Tibetans in Nepal

Tibetans, like everyone else have the fundamental right to seek asylum from persecution and the corresponding right, to not be returned to a country where they are likely to be persecuted. Furthermore, Tibetans living in Nepal, like all who reside inside Nepal, are guaranteed the rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, among many other rights. Nepal’s own constitution guarantees freedom of expression and peaceful assembly to all persons and these rights are clearly spelled out in internationally agreed laws on civil and political rights and refugee rights and in customary law. Derogation of these rights can only take place under extreme circumstances and where an imminent, specific and serious threat can be linked to the speech that is being restricted. The Nepal Government has never demonstrated such a threat exists and the Supreme Court of Nepal has on more than one occasion found no grounds for restrictions on or arrests of Tibetans. By not guaranteeing safe sanctuary to Tibetans seeking asylum, Nepal is in violation of its own Constitution and its international legal obligations.

Given that the Government of Nepal is unwilling to grant Tibetans in Nepal the usual rights afforded to refugees, it could be viewed as surprising that the Government of Nepal has not allowed the Tibetan community to take advantage of the US Government offer made in September 2005 to resettle 5,000 Tibetan refugees. This denial of settlement in a third country, forces one to question what motivates the Nepal Government to essentially keep the Tibetan community prisoner within Nepal’s boarders?

Nepal-China Ties

Successive Governments of Nepal have always maintained a “pro-China” position, stating that “anti-China” activities would not be carried out on Nepali soil. This position deepened during the rule of former king Gyanendra. For example, immediately preceding king Gyanendra's assumption of direct control of Nepal in February 2005, the Office of the Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama was closed by the Nepal Government. On the following day the Chinese Government welcomed the closure. When the king assumed directly control of the country, the Chinese Government stated that it was an internal matter for Nepal. The king was using Nepal’s Tibetan community as a bargaining chip in the hope that the Chinese Government would protect him from international condemnation. As his regime continued to falter and India’s support swung clearly in the direction of an alliance between Nepal’s political parties and the Community Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M), in October 2005 the king made a further gesture to China by halting the issuing of exit permits to Tibetan refugees, bring a complete halt to the “gentleman’s agreement” that had for decades allowed Tibetans to transit Nepal on their way to Dharamsala and third countries for permanent resettlement. This significant decision by the King of Nepal, immediately followed the United States offer to resettle 5,000 Tibetan refugees from Nepal.

The king’s hope that an alliance with the Chinese Government would help him to maintain a position of direct rule within Nepal was short lived. By May 2006, the Seven Party Alliance was leading an All Party Government, which was broadly accepted as democratic and by the end of the year, Nepal was a republic and the majority of civil and political rights denied under the king’s regime were reinstated. These same rights however, were not to be granted to Nepal’s Tibetan refugees. While the All Party Government did resume the issuing of exit permits, it did not allow the resettlement of the 5,000 refugees proposed by the US. The role of the Chinese Government in this is clear; in July 2006 during a visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister, he stated that some serious thinking needed to be undertaken by the Nepali authorities in regard to their decision to provide travel documents to the 5,000 Tibetan refugees at the same time and indicated that the Chinese Government would increase its aid to Nepal by 50 percent. Despite democratic elections in Nepal in 2008, the 5,000 refugees remain in Nepal, denied their basic rights in a country they are not allowed to leave.

In 2007, the All Party Government took the unprecedented step of deregistering the Bhota Welfare Office, a local organization assisting Tibetans living in Nepal. The organization challenged its deregistration in the Supreme Court of Nepal and during the final hearing on the case in February 2008, the government attorney handed a confidential file to the judge, to which the organization's lawyers were denied access. The Supreme Court then issued an oral judgment that the organization could not be re-registered.

Deepening China-Nepal Ties and Intensified Repression of Tibetan’s in Nepal

In March 2008 as the Olympic torch was greeted globally by protests as it made its way around the world to its final destination in Beijing, the repression of Tibetans in Nepal reach a climax. The dramatic civil unrest across the Tibetan plateau around the same time further inflamed Chinese Government fear and subsequently lead to increased repression of Tibetans in Nepal. Many eye witness accounts of the bloody crackdown that followed the protests in Tibet have been widely reported. It was considered one of the largest uprisings by Tibetans against Chinese occupation since 1959 when His Holiness the Dalai Lama fled Tibet.

In response to the protests in Tibet the Chinese Government has significantly increased its pressure on Nepal to suppress Tibetan dissent. This increase is evidenced by the increase in statements by the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal in 2008, documented evidence of direct behind the scenes pressure of Chinese diplomats for the detention of Tibetans in early 2008, the presence of Chinese security officials operating on along the Nepal side of the border and the restriction on access to areas around Mount Everest base camp prior to the assent of the Olympic torch. As a result the treatment of Tibetans by Nepali authorities has taken a more sinister turn toward what could be described as persecution of a minority. On 10 March 2008, Tibetans around the world exercised their right to freedom of assembly and expression by gathering to mark “Uprising Day”, the anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan rebellion against rule of the Chinese Government in Tibet. In most countries their rights were respected and their protests went off without a hitch. In Nepal over 150 arrests were made, many using unnecessary force, and around 15 Tibetans were beaten inside Boudha Police Station in Kathmandu.

What began as a normal celebration of Uprising Day in Nepal developed in the days that followed into regular mass protests by Tibetans who said they were compelled to continue to speak out for the protection of their brothers and sisters inside Tibet. It is very natural for a human to cry for help when a family member is in danger. Most of the Tibetans living in Nepal have relatives or a family member still inside Tibet, as such via direct links many were receiving firsthand information of the bloody suppression in Tibet. As the Nepal police failed to sufficiently suppress the protests, or perhaps because of their violent attempt to suppress, the protests appeared across the world’s media. The Chinese Government was embarrassed not only by the world attention but also by the protesters “knocking” on the door of the Chinese Embassy in Nepal every day over a month of continuous protests. Despite continuing suggestions by the Chinese Government and even by Tibet analysts, that these protests were part of an organized mass dissent, the authors who observed every protest over a six week period firmly believe they were witnessing an unorganized expression of grief and concern by the many Tibetans living in Nepal who had relatives in Tibet who saw no other way to protect their loved ones. Allegations that Tibetan leaders of the various organizations such as the Tibetan Youth Congress, also known as the Tibetan Youth Club, or the Tibetan Women’s Association were organizing and leading the protests have no basis, except in the case of the two or three specific protests that took place among the dozens of protests in early 2008.

Between 10 March and 18 July 2008 over 8,350 arbitrary arrests of Tibetans were made by the Nepal Police and the Armed Police Force. Many people were arrested on multiple occasions. Excessive and unnecessary use of force during arrest was extremely common. Accompanying these arrests was a pattern of injuries resulting from beatings during arrest by the Nepal Police and Armed Police Force combined with restrictions on medical treatment to detainees, sexual assault of Tibetan women during arrest, various forms of ill treatment in detention and the use of threats, intimidation and harassment to instill fear in the community. Restrictions on movement of Tibetans within Kathmandu were also imposed. The threat of deportation was so widespread during this period that it was difficult to not view it as a state sponsored method of creating fear within the Tibetan community.

Small groups of Tibetans also found themselves detained and facing charges under Nepal’s Public Security Act (PSA) – a law previously used by the former-king to detain many of the political leaders now in power in Nepal. The argument that Nepal’s “one China” policy could be used as grounds for detention has been rejected by the Supreme Court. Nepal’s Supreme Court has ruled that the detention of Tibetans under the PSA was illegal and ordered them released immediately. Thus the continued detention of Tibetan’s by Nepali authorities places the Government in clear breach of the orders of its own Supreme Court.

This pattern of restrictions, arrests and beatings has continued in Nepal since 2008 and has heightened at moments of cultural importance such as the Dalai Lama’s birthday and Tibetan National Uprising Day. For example, during celebrations of the Dalai Lama’s birthday in July 2010, over 250 Tibetans were arrested by the Nepali authorities. The continuing arrests and intimidation of Nepal’s Tibetan community are illegal actions by the Government of Nepal and are in breach of Nepal’s obligations under international law.

Life inside Tibet

Chinese Government suppression of any sort of Tibetan unrest in Tibet goes unabated; news of arrests, detention, torture and deaths of Tibetans appear regularly in media. This direct and aggressive suppression adds to the already complex and difficult situation in which Tibetans live their daily lives under Chinese Government rule. Tibetans reaching Nepal report restrictions on their freedom to practice their own culture, livelihood and religion and to use their own language; the continued destruction of Tibet’s natural environment to extract natural resources; discrimination in education, employment, and labour standards; and restrictions on reproductive rights and health care. As a direct result Tibetans continue to be forced to leave their home and seek a more secure life elsewhere.

The Chinese Government’s significant tightening of Tibet’s border with Nepal and pressure on the Nepali Government to do the same since 2008 has seriously impinged on Tibetans’ right to seek asylum. In March 2008, during a visit to the Zhangmu border one of the author’s directly witnessed several Chinese people in plain clothes on Nepali soil in the presence of uniformed Nepali security officials following their news crew. One of the Chinese people later stood in front of the camera lens when their photographer was trying to take video footage of the Friendship Bridge. A reliable local source from Zhangmu, Tibet has confirmed that the Chinese Government provides financial incentives to local Tibetans on the Tibet side of border for vigilant reporting of fleeing Tibetans and bounties for the capture of a Tibetan attempting to flee. The Chinese Government also reportedly provides bounties to Nepali policemen when they hand over a fleeing Tibetan to Chinese officials. Despite the risk involved in crossing the border, Tibetans continue to attempt to enter Nepal with 770 reaching the safety of the UN-run Tibetan Refugee Transit Center in Kathmandu in 2010.

Untangling China-Nepal Ties

Pressure from the Chinese Government on the Government of Nepal is very clear. In May 2008, amid the protests by Tibetans in Nepal the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal said: “We want the Nepali establishment to take severe penal actions against those involved in anti-China activities in Nepal”. If you consider the financial aid the Chinese Government provides to Nepal, it is difficult to imagine the Government of Nepal not following these clear instructions of their powerful neighbor.

One would be forgiven for thinking the Nepali Government is in a difficult position trying to manage a complex relationship with a hugely powerful neighboring country, this line of thinking may generate some tolerance for the Nepal Government’s suppression of Tibetan’s rights. However, when given the opportunity to begin to rid itself of this problematic refugee population via the US Government’s offer to take 5,000 of the refugees, the Nepal government denied them permission to leave the country. Why would the Nepal Government not take advantage of this offer?

The answer lies in the complex web of political and economic benefits Nepal stands to gain while it can leverage control of Tibetans in Nepal against economic and political support from the Chinese Government. As such, the Chinese Government appears to continue to buy the effective sealing of the Nepal-Tibet border, the effective imprisonment of Tibetans within their encampments on significant Tibetan holidays and the daily uncertainty of a secure life for Tibetans in Nepal. For the Nepal Government, it is profit for minimal investment. Suppression of the Tibetan community economically costs Nepal little. Politically there is also little cost to Nepal as there has been minimal significant protest by either Nepalis or the United Nations and rights respecting countries in regard to the treatment of Tibetans. Thus we are reminded of the old Nepali saying ‘punji nabahe ko bepar’, meaning “Business without investment”.

Moving Forward

In depth monitoring and reports like “Appeasing China: Restricting the rights of Tibetans in Nepal” published in July 2008 by New York based Human Rights Watch details the peaceful nature of all protests by Tibetans in early 2008 in Nepal, finding no evidence of violent activity by the Tibetan protesters. However, Peter Lee’s recent article in Asia Times, “China tests Nepal's loyalty over Tibet” demonstrates the Chinese Government’s fear of Nepal’s Tibetan population. This brings to mind a Tibetan saying, “Gya thogpe phung, bhod rewae phung” meaning “Chinese lose by suspicion and Tibetans lose by hope”. Misguided suspicion within the Chinese Government of a possible Tibetan rebellion, combined with fear of a weakened Beijing resulting from a possible future “Jasmine Revolution” may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Tibetans. If the legitimate leaders of Tibet, including His Holiness the Dalai Lama, play their cards right it may lead to a path of genuine negotiation between the Chinese Government and the de facto holder of the Tibetan snow lion stamp in Dharamsala. The impact of each and every decision made in Dharamsala has often shown that the decibels of the Dharamsala gongs are high enough to reach as far as Taktser in far eastern Tibet, the birthplace of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

Many western voices, including some individuals within the United Nations, and some within the Tibetan community itself have suggested that Tibetans in Nepal should sacrifice some of their rights for the greater good of the Tibetan community. They alleged that peaceful protests, which are often no more than quiet cultural or religious gatherings within temple grounds, should be sacrificed to stop drawing the attention of the Chinese Government to Nepal’s policy in regard to Tibetan’s transiting through Nepal. Once we begin a negotiation of rights, such as whose rights and which rights are more important, we step onto a slippery slope of justifying abuses of human rights. As more world leaders bow down to the Chinese Government for economic and political reasons, sustaining the Tibetan way of life becomes increasingly precarious. The international community should instead actively defend the rights of all Tibetans regardless of where they live and pray. If the international community were to make Nepal’s suppression of Tibetans more costly politically, and even financially, there may be some shift in Nepal’s treatment of Tibetans.

Regardless of the financial and political incentives provided by either the Chinese Government or the international community, the political leaders of Nepal should think back to their own struggle for civil and political rights during the Peoples’ Movement and find within themselves a genuine commitment to democratic principles and values. It is on this basis, that these leaders should then decide if they will protect or persecute Tibetans who seek refuge in Nepal.

Refugees and the Failure of Forced Migration Policy: Human Tsunamis

2011-05-30T15:22:00.002+05:30

Tricia Redeker Hepner

[Anthropology at the University of Tennessee]
(This article first appeared in Counter Punch on April 22, 2011)

The world's attention is understandably fixed on the post-tsunami nuclear disaster unfolding in Japan and the equally seismic political transformations shaking North Africa and the Middle East. Much speculation swirls around the impact of these events regionally and globally. Will fallout reach the shores of Europe and North America? Will more dictatorships be swept aside by swells of democratization? What role should the international community and the United Nations play?

In at least one country, the answer to the first question is clear, if not the second. And the third is another story altogether.

The Northeast African nation of Eritrea marks its 20th year of independence next month. But the festivities will be marred by mourning. President Isayas Afwerki remains firmly entrenched in the seat of power, claiming with alacrity to have foretold the groundswell overtaking his Arab neighbors while banning television coverage of the demonstrations and reorganizing the military to pre-empt a possible coup. Meanwhile, the ripples radiating from the epicenter of his brutal regime are unrelenting, and the fallout has a human face. Tens of thousands of men, women, and children have fled Eritrea in wave after wave of despair. While some of these refugees make it to the shores of Europe and North America, many more do not. Last week, two boats carrying 400 Eritreans and Ethiopians from Libya to Italy disappeared in the Mediterranean Sea. Fishermen and the Coast Guard are still recovering the bodies – evidence of what Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi calls "the human tsunami" battering the walls of Fortress Europe. In the Sinai desert, traffickers of multiple nationalities work in tandem with security forces of Egypt and Eritrea to extort, exploit, abuse, torture and execute refugees seeking to cross into Israel, where they are summarily labeled "infiltrators" in a euphemistic avoidance of international responsibilities to protect asylum seekers.

If refugee flows are a sign of political meltdown, then Eritrea is a level seven nuclear disaster. Figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees indicate that Eritrea, with a population of only about five million, has been among the top ten refugee producing countries in the world for the better part of the decade. In 2006, it ranked second in the world. In 2007 only Somalis and Iraqis lodged more asylum applications than Eritreans, and in 2008 the numbers of claims filed by Eritreans exceeded those of Iraqis.

The reason? Eritrea spends a whopping 20 percent of its national budget maintaining a military comprised of forced conscripts whose virtually unpaid labor is reinvested in further militarization of the society and economy. The Constitution has been on ice since 1997, the promise of multi-party elections remains unfulfilled and even North Korea boasts greater freedom of the press. Civil society institutions and competing political parties exist only in exile. The list of human rights abuses characterizing daily life in Eritrea is longer than the number of international conventions the government has signed. Torture, rape, and execution are commonplace for those who dare put up a fight. The result? Massive flight. "Is there a worse country in the world than this?" mused a Texas lawyer representing one of the hundreds of Eritrean asylum seekers in the U.S. as we reviewed his client's case.

As an anthropologist who has lived in Eritrea and worked with Eritrean communities in Europe, Africa, and the U.S. for years, I dearly want to defend this country. But the best I can do is to help defend its displaced, abused, and often forgotten citizens. Together with lawyers, Eritrean activists, human rights organizations, UNHCR staff, and colleagues like Magnus Treiber and Barbara Harrell-Bond, I struggle to place the people of this small African country on the global crisis radar. It's a tall order in these days of perpetual disasters and mind-numbing statistics.

And the statistics on refugees are indeed numbing. The number of people forcibly displaced by conflict and persecution worldwide stood at 42 million at the end of 2008. The total includes 16 million refugees and asylum seekers and 26 million internally displaced people uprooted within their own countries. These figures, of course, hide lots of things, such as the numbers of people removed by development projects like dam-building, by "natural" disasters, by the structural violence of poverty, environmental destruction, and by the alchemy of desperation and profits that forces people to migrate and often to sell their bodies and lives into servitude of one kind or another. These figures obviate human experience.

But human experience is what anthropologists are always after – how to put life and breath and flesh onto the cold bones of statistics; how to illustrate the concrete meanings of political violence and migration policies and practices as people live them. Among such human experiences are those of nineteen members of the elite Air Force of Eritrea who fled to Sudan a couple of years ago, risking the "shoot-to-kill" policy of the Eritrean government -- as hundreds of others do every month -- seeking to cross the nearest international border.

In Sudan, they registered with the UNHCR and began seeking both refugee protection and resettlement abroad. Their high-ranking and symbolically significant position as the pride of the Eritrean Defense Forces made them more vulnerable to persecution and punishment by the Eritrean government than many of the 100,000+ Eritrean refugees in Khartoum. However, some of these men used to be soldiers with the guerrilla movement that is now the Eritrean government. They have scant hope of ever being accepted by the U.S. or Canada – the two largest refugee receiving countries in the world – because under some very broad terms of the U.S. Patriot Act and a similar Canadian law, they are considered "terrorists." This is because they took up arms in an anticolonial liberation struggle against the Ethiopian government more than thirty years ago.

Others in the group are young men who were conscripted. Despite their elite positions, their fate was hardly better than most others in the military and their exit signaled refusal of the sort of complicity that makes life more bearable in such conditions. However, these men are also in for a long and treacherous series of legal obstacles due to international reluctance to recognize military deserters and a 2002 policy adopted by the UNHCR rendering ex-combatants ineligible for resettlement.

Similarly, clauses that exclude those who may have participated in human rights violations or persecution of others also present stumbling blocks when applied to real conditions. Virtually every soldier in the Eritrean military has been forced to guard, surveil, or repress another soldier or civilian at some point, and the majority of Eritrean refugees have been soldiers. The very structure and social organization of militarization and political repression in Eritrea blur the neat legal distinction between persecuted and persecutor so critical in refugee and asylum determination procedures. Even the U.S. Supreme Court got drawn in, when the asylum claim of a former conscript named Daniel Negusie was denied because his assignment as a prison guard – punishment for his own dissidence by the Eritrean government - suggested he was complicit in the harm of others.

In the meantime, the 19 men wait in Khartoum, where Eritrean security officials operate with impunity. On any given day, they may be attacked by an agent of their own government, kidnapped and taken back to Eritrea, or, at the very least shaken down and extorted by Sudanese police or soldiers, perhaps beaten and jailed for being unwanted migrants. Should the UNHCR take the situation seriously and realize these men need protection – an unlikely showing of concern for individuals by a bureaucracy whose esteemed reputation is outshined only by its impersonality, impenetrability, and unaccountability - they may be taken to a refugee camp, where they will still be subject to many of the same pressures, only in more concentrated form. This is glossed as "protection," even a "solution," though it is hardly that.

While camps in places like Sudan and Ethiopia may comply with UNHCR policy, they are administered by host country agencies and staff, some of whom inevitably participate in the abuse and misuse of refugees, often under the noses of international staff. A trip to the food distribution center may end in rape and a place in the resettlement queue can be bought (or lost) for a hundred thousand birr [Ethiopian currency]. In Shimelba Refugee Camp, in northern Ethiopia, the UNHCR compound is open only a few hours per week, as impervious to refugees' pleas for help as President Isayas Afwerki is to political transition.

If elite air force men cannot gain the attention of UNHCR, then the situation is far worse for the average person. Some refugees get sick of waiting – who wouldn't? - and take their chances. But the routes to escape are toxic. If they make it through the Libyan desert to reach the Mediterranean and finally to Malta or Lampedusa, which only a handful do, new problems arise at the gates of Fortress Europe. Are they really political refugees or just impoverished economic migrants? How will a country like Malta – swamped with tens of thousands of refugees – manage to decide their fate? If they move on to another European country, they face imprisonment and deportation under the Dublin II regulation. Consumer values may tout individual initiative and choice but do not extend to "asylum shopping," thank you very much.

Those who have the connections and money might hire a smuggler, usually for tens of thousands of dollars, who will take them on a risky and tortuous journey to Southern Africa, then Brazil, through Colombia or Venezuela, perhaps Cuba, then Nicaragua, Guatemala, and finally Mexico, where stuffed in the cargo bay of a bus, or in the custody of a coyote, they will cross the border of the US and ask for asylum. For their efforts at being "above board" – that is, presenting themselves to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) - they are welcomed to freedom in America through its prison system. While this may stimulate the privatized prison-industrial economy, it is first and foremost an extension of human rights abuses shouldered by refugees. In detention, they discover legal-dilemma redux: many of the same problems that stalled the refugee process in Sudan follow them to the United States. They are possibly terrorists, or implicated in persecution and human rights abuses; they are cowardly deserters of a sovereign state's military; and of course, they are always criminals for having the audacity to migrate illegally. But had the legal refugee process been responsive to actual human circumstances, such illegality would be far less likely.

I am compelled to shed light on stories such as these not only to highlight the victimization, suffering, and exploitation that runs through them in every direction like capillary veins, that multiply with each person involved, with each new step through "the system" in which legal and illegal intersect all the time; where the life-force that drives people to make such choices in the name of survival and hope can be snuffed out in an instant for profit, power, or sheer indifference. Nor is my primary intention to malign institutions like the UNHCR, or the asylum system in the US and Europe, which are as full of dedicated and committed advocates for refugees' rights as they are of infuriating inefficiency, corruption, and bureaucratic senselessness.

My goal is to illustrate the complexity and global scope of human rights dilemmas that structure refugees' lives, and the failures of institutions, policies and laws designed to manage them as technical problems rather than protect them as human beings. It is not enough to simply address the human rights violations that lead people to become refugees at the source, crucial as that may be. All along the way, refugees face multiple and nested issues that are sometimes endemic and even actively produced or aggravated by the very systems designed to protect them.

While earthquakes, tsunamis, nuclear accidents, and revolutions may be dramatic and momentous events, it is worth remembering that their wrenching daily equivalency plays out in political and humanitarian disasters like that of Eritrea's refugees, more invisible than the radiation seeping into the Pacific but no less poisonous for those affected. As Eritreans mark the 20th anniversary of their revolution, any thoughts of Egypt or Libya will focus on the lives of loved ones lost in the Sinai or Sahara, or those whose fates are yet unknown. Their suffering, and the ripples of despair that radiate throughout the lives of their families and compatriots, is fallout from Isayas Afwerki's dictatorial rule. But it is also fallout from the international community's failed, inadequate, and draconian migration policies and laws. The fallout has not only reached our shores – it also originates there. What comes around goes around. Human lives are the currency we use to pay for the failures of modernity.

2011-05-30T15:14:00.000+05:30

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
W.P.(CRL) 1470/2008

SAIFULLAH BAJWA and ANR. ..... Petitioners
Through: Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Advocate with
Ms. Poli Kataki, Mr. Rahul Narayan,
Mr. Mohit Ram and Ms. Sakshi Chopra,
Advocates.

versus

UOI and ORS .....
Respondents
Through: Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, ASG with
Mr. Neeraj Choudhari and Mr. Khalid
Arshad, Advocates for UOI.
Ms. Meera Bhatia, Advocate with
Mr. Roshan kumar, Advocate for State.
Mr. B.K. Upadhyay, Advocate for Mr. V.
K. Tandon, Advocate for Central Jail Tihar.

CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN

O R D E R

02.12.2010
Invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have prayed for following reliefs:-

A. Issue a writ of mandamus or in the nature thereof or any other writ, order or directions quashing the order dated 28.01.2010 whereby the representation for grant of Asylum of the 65 detainees of Pakistani origin listed in Annexure A-1 has been rejected by the Respondents by a non-speaking, general order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice without giving any hearing to the Pakistani Nationals.

B. Issue a writ of Certiorari or in the nature thereof or any other writ, order or directions directing the Respondents to reconsider the application for Asylum of the 65 detainees of Pakistani origin listed in Annexure A-1 after granting them an opportunity of personal hearing and pass a reasoned and speaking order after such hearing in order to enable the said persons to submit an appropriate representation against the said order passed therein, if so required; or in the alternative;

Issue a writ of Mandamus or in the nature thereof or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction, directing the Respondent No.1 to refer the applications for
asylum of the 65 persons of Pakistani origin presently lodged in Tihar Jail, to
UNHCR with a request to enable the said persons to obtain naturalization in any
willing third country.

C. issue a writ of mandamus or in the nature thereof or any other writ, order or directions restraining the Respondents from deporting the persons listed in Annexure-P1 and five children born in custody while detained by the respondent.

D. Issue a writ of Certiorari or in the nature thereof or any other writ, order or directions directing the Respondents to release the 65 detainees of Pakistani origin listed in Annexure A-1 from detention at Tihar Jail and instead of deporting them to Pakistan, direct the Respondents to hand them over to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees known as UNHCR on the basis of principle of ?non-refoulement.

E. Pass such other and further orders as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

Be it noted, on 17th December, 2008 while dealing with CM No.14764/2008,
the following order came to be passed:-

The applicant has prayed in this application to implead United Nations High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as party respondent to the writ petition. The
case of the applicant is that certain letters have been forwarded by the UNHCR
wherein the issue of the petitioner has been taken up with the Central Government. Secondly, according to the petitioners in case the Indian Government is not inclined to grant asylum to them, the UNHCR can be approached for the purpose of naturalization in any other country, which is prepared to grant them refugees status.

Notice be issued to the Union of India, returnable for 11th February, 2009.
Prior to that an interim protection was granted.

When the matter was taken up today, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that United Nations High Commission for Refugees (in short ? UNHCR?), has communicated to the petitioner vide E-mail dated 12th May, 2009 which we think it apt to reproduce as under:-

65 Pakistani members in Tihar Jail
Tuesday, May 12, 2009 4:10 AM

From:
New Delhi India IINDNE@UNHCR.org View Contact details
To

Delhi Center@yahoo.com

Dear Ms. Parbhoo,

We would like to acknowledge receipt of letter and email dated 11 May, 2009 concerning the 65 MFI followers in Tihar Jail in New Delhi. Based on our discussion with you in the past and our advice to the MFI, please note that we continue to appreciate the timely information that your foundation has been sending UNHCR regarding the development in this case. As we have informed your foundation previously, while we will not be present at the hearing on 13 May 2009, please be assured that UNHCR continues to closely monitor these developments. As stated in our earlier communications and over the telephone, given the complex legal and diplomatic environment in which UN agencies operate in India. UNHCR will await the court?s judgment on this issue.

As always, we assure you that UNHCR remains committed to its mandate. We will continue working with relevant government institutions to ensure respect for the principle of non-re-foulement and the right to seek asylum.

Thank you,

(UNHCR New Delhi)

Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited our attention to the order passed in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition No.2033 of 2005 wherein a letter was issued by the UNHCR and taking the same into account the Division Bench passed the following order:-

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is directed to hear and
dispose of appeal filed by the petitioner, which is pending before it, dated 20/2/2005 within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order by
it. For the said period of one month and two weeks thereafter, the residents shall not deport the petitioner. This order is passed without going into the merits of the petition.

In view of the aforesaid, we only request the United Nations High Commission for Refugees to take a decision within six weeks with regard to a representation to be submitted by the petitioners within a period of one week from today.

The protection order passed by this Court shall remain in force for a period of ten weeks. In the meantime, the petitioners shall not be deported to the country of their origin. Needless to say, we have not addressed to any other issue which has been urged by the learned counsel for the parties.

The writ petition is accordingly disposed of without any order as to costs. Order dasti under signatures of Court Master.

CHIEF JUSTICE

MANMOHAN, J

DECEMBER 02, 2010

js

Assamese of Chinese Origin can Visit State: Gogoi

2011-05-30T15:07:00.003+05:30

[Sushanta Talukdar, November 8, 2010]

Sahitya Akademi Award winning Assamese novelist Rita Chowdhury has urged Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi to allow the “Assamese people of Chinese origin,” who were “deported” to China after the 1962 India-China war, to visit their relatives and friends at Makum, a small town in upper Assam's Tinsukia district.

“The Chief Minister has allowed me to share with the media that he would formally welcome Assamese people of Chinese origin who were deported from India, if they desire to visit their places in Assam. He also told me that he was aware of the facts and could understand their pain,” she told journalists here on Sunday. The novelist called on Mr. Gogoi Friday to discuss the matter.

Dr. Chowdhury's Assamese novel Makam (meaning Golden Horse in Chinese), published in April, deals with the plight of 1,500 “Assamese people of Chinese origin” who were rounded up on November 19, 1962 at Chinapatti in Makum, on the eve of the signing of the India-China treaty, and taken to the Deoli internment camp in Rajasthan on a horrendous seven-day train journey.

These people of Chinese origin were forced migrants, brought by the British to work on tea plantations at the beginning of the 18{+t}{+h} century. Subsequently, they married local Assamese women and assimilated with Assamese society. They never imagined that the war would bring such untold miseries. Before their arrest, they were segregated as Chinese and non-Chinese. This resulted in dislocation of the families and separation of husbands from wives and children from parents. Their property was confiscated.

At the end of the war, when the Chinese army left after declaring a unilateral ceasefire, most of the Deoli camp internees were deported to China, and most of them had to leave their relatives in India. Many Indian women also moved to India with their husbands and children. The families were dislocated once again. Other inmates of the Deoli camp were released after three years. Even as they were trying to overcome the trauma of separation, back home they found that their confiscated property had already been sold as “enemy property.”

Dr. Chowdhury, who teaches political science at Cotton College here, traced some of these displaced “Assamese people of Chinese origin” in Hong Kong.

“Some of them still speak and write Assamese; some speak a mixture of Hindi and Assamese. They do not want to return. But they want to visit Assam to meet their friends and relatives. “We were not Chinese spies. Why were we deported,' they ask. They still remember India as their ‘Janam Jaga (motherland)'.”

Felicited
On May 23, 2010, the Indian Overseas Chinese Organisation of Hong Kong felicitated Dr. Chowdhury for highlighting their plight through her novel.

Dr. Chowdhury also presented a video documentation of her interaction with them in Hong Kong. There were nine families of “Assamese people of Chinese origin” who still lived in fear and isolation in Makum and did not want to speak anything about their ordeal for fear of being subjected to another bout of suffering, she said.

“We cannot undo the harm that has been done to them. But we can at least express solidarity with them for their 48-year-long ordeal. It is time the government of India formally expressed its solidarity with them,” she said.

She also welcomed the government move to amend the Enemy Property Act.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/states/other-states/article872991.ece

Still without an Identity

2011-05-30T15:02:00.001+05:30

[Raktima Bose,Kolkata, April 5, 2011]

Shashadhar Hazra still has his certificate from Mana camp in Chhattisgarh as proof of identity. Photo: Arunangsu Roy Chowdhury

Try bringing up the topic of the Assembly election with 80-year-old Ramesh Gayen, and he retorts angrily that people like him who don't have any sort of recognition even after living in a country for over 40 years are not “qualified enough” to discuss politics.

Mr. Gayen's anger is echoed by Sashadhar Hazra, Kalyani Biswas, Ujjwal Biswas and other residents of Chikunpara village who were forced to cross over from Bangladesh since the 1970s. They are yet to be identified as refugees or granted Indian citizenship.

Chikunpara, which mostly comprises refugees from the erstwhile East Pakistan, falls under the Gaighata (SC) Assembly segment in the Bongaon sub-division of North 24 Parganas district.

Despite being counted during census operations and issued ration cards, a large section of the displaced people in this region are yet to receive Indian citizenship and elector's photo identity cards. They also continue to be branded as “Bangladeshi infiltrators.”

Showing a certificate issued by authorities at a refugee camp in Mana in present-day Chhattisgarh — after he arrived in India in 1975 — Mr. Hazra asks: “This is all I have to prove my claim, but the officials said it is not enough. Tell me what else they ask of people who were forced to leave their home and hearth so many years ago?”
While several parties have claimed that they will push for the scrapping of the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act if voted to power, immigrants feel that the absence of a prospective vote bank makes the parties disinterested in aggressively pursuing the issue.

Pointing out that no amount of promises and assurances could improve the condition of immigrants over the years, Ujjwal Biswas, in his mid-30s, says: “If we could vote, our sole demand would have been that of citizenship rights. But we cannot even afford to talk about politics or take sides as it will only ruffle feathers in the rival camp.”

Although they are followers of the influential Matua Mahasangh, the fact that Manjulkrishna Thakur — son of the sect's godmother Boroma — is contesting on a Trinamool Congress ticket from Gaighata (SC) appears to be a non-factor to the immigrants.

Mr. Gayen's youngest son Palash, who was born in India, received his photo identity card a few days ago.

“The sect leaders are more concerned about financially well-off followers than poor immigrants like us, but I will still cast my vote hoping for a better tomorrow for my family.”

Palash has returned from his workplace in Mumbai just to cast his vote.
Admitting that there are thousands of immigrants living without citizenship rights in districts that share a border with Bangladesh, Bongaon sub-divisional officer Sanjay Mukhopadhyay says that photo identity cards cannot be issued to them because of unavailability of valid documents.

Mr. Biswas' optimism shines through the uncertainty that clouds the future of these immigrants. “I may never get a chance to vote or even get deported, but my wife and daughter can look forward to a promising future as citizens of the country.”

http://www.thehindu.com/news/states/other-states/article1600027.ece

The Students’ Workshop on Borders and Forced Migration

2011-05-30T15:00:00.000+05:30

The Calcutta Research Group (CRG) organized a day-long student workshop at Jadavpur University in collaboration with the Centre for Refugee Studies, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University on March 29, 2011. Issues related to forced migration, refugees and statelessness in South Asia (with special reference to India) were discussed in the sessions of the workshop. A special session was devoted to deal with the International legal regimes related to refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Statelessness.

The inaugural session started with the welcome address delivered by Anindya Jyoti Majumdar, Head, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University. As the Chief Guest of the workshop Nilanjana Gupta, Dean, Faculty of Arts delivered the inaugural address. The session ended with a short introduction of CRG by Samir Kumar Das.

The first session started with a special lecture on Colonialism, Resource crisis and Migration by Subhas Ranjan Chakraborty. Chakraborty described how people were forced to migrate due to various reasons like resource crisis, natural disasters and governmental policies. In this context, he spoke about the impact of colonialism on the Indian sub-continent during late 18th - mid 20th century. With the expansion of colonial administration a large part of the population was forced to migrate involuntarily. According to him, the British colonial power became de jure after 1757. Mughal Empire granted diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa to the East India Company. The company had invested in these three provinces and wanted to maximize the revenues. They started a unit of exchange – sikka and Rupee. Nayeb Razim Reza Khan was appointed to collect revenues. The Company rule was a new kind of despotism, having power without responsibility- looking for absolute profit unencumbered by any welfare or moral obligation towards the ‘native’ subjects. This caused a great famine in Bengal in 1770 known as the ‘Bengal Famine’. This famine compelled the rural population in Bengal to migrate to Calcutta. Chakraborty quoted Hunter, who on the analysis of data said that Calcutta was emerging as a city of palaces. There was a marginal crisis of labour. Thus, there was an inducement to migrate and work in the city. Chakraborty explained that commercialization of agriculture, rural indebtedness, and rayatwari-mahalwari settlements etc. caused depeasantization. According to Chakraborty migration of people from rural to urban places was sometimes controlled by the state.

There was a panel discussion on Migration, Borders and Women in the second session comprising Paula Banerjee and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury. At the very outset of her presentation on Women and Circles of Insecurity: Borders in East and North East India Banerjee said South Asia is a region of unique borders. Borders symbolize the national security of a state. On the one hand, the borders in this region are sites of hatred, disunity and informal connections while on the other borders signify cooperation. Threats of human trafficking, drug peddling and arms smuggling are the few problems that infest these borders constituting a part of non-traditional security discourse. Banerjee mentioned in her presentation that women and children are the most vulnerable group as they are often trafficked through these borders. In this context she narrated a story of a refugee woman who was caught and raped by the Border Security Force (BSF) personnel while illegally crossing the Indo-Bangladesh border. She was later rescued by the villagers. While narrating the story Banerjee opined that the main reasons behind forced migration are endemic poverty and lawlessness. She said that sometimes women have to take care of her families in absence of men, whom they have lost in the course of migration and these women often are trapped by traffickers when they ventured out of their homes to earn livelihood. They usually have nothing to barter except their body. Banerjee mentioned trafficking of women as one of the major causes of HIV/AIDs in this region of South Asia.

Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury in her deliberation on Stateless women in India started with the legal definitions of Statelessness stated in the international legal regimes like 1954 and 1961 conventions. While conceptualizing de jure and de facto statelessness she said that the citizenship is the legal bond between a state and an individual. To give example of de jure statelessness she elaborated the case of Chakmas and Hajongs in Arunachal Pradesh. During her presentation she shared the experiences of her fieldwork in Arunachal Pradesh. She concluded by discussing the risks that stateless people have to bear and the condition of stateless women. As an illustration, she narrated the story of Kamala Devi from Dumpani village in Changlang district of Arunachal Pradesh. The panel discussion ended with interaction between the panelists and the participants.

In the last session on Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) with special reference to Conventions and Protocols, Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury defined ‘refugees’ according to the 1951 convention of refugees, Oriental African United (OAU) convention of 1969, Cartagena convention of 1984 and the protocol of 1967. He described the methods in which the UNHCR deals with the refugee problems in South Asia. He also described the evolution of the concept of refugee from 1951 to 1984. While Samir Kumar Das made a distinction between the refugees and the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). He said the conditions of refugees and IDPs were the same. He defined IDPs according to the international refugee law and highlighted many important points on the definition which are usually ignored by students. In order to explain IDPs Das talked about the causes of displacement like natural or man-made disasters, development programmes and resource crisis among others. In his deliberation he mentioned that United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) remains silent when displacement happens due to development programmes. While explaining the classifications of the IDPs Samir Das gave an example of the situation triggered by river bed erosion of Ganges-Padma in Malda district of West Bengal. The workshop ended with the distribution of certificates among participants.

Workshop on ‘Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons in India and her Neighbours’

2011-05-30T14:03:00.001+05:30

Priyanca Mathur Velath

[CSLG/J.N.U, New Delhi]

A two-day workshop was organised by The Other Media in Delhi on March 30 – 31, 2011 titled ‘Protection of Refugees and Stateless persons in India and her Neighbours’. Ravi Hemadri (TOM) began by remembering how this workshop emerged out of an idea that had come up during an earlier workshop organised by TOM, SAFHR and CRG. The idea was to take up a study on the status of all refugee and stateless communities in India in light of the absence of refugee law.

The objective of the workshop was to bring together representatives of refugee communities, organizations, NGOs, scholars, researchers, other concerned institutions and individuals committed to refugee protection in India, as well as in South Asia, towards examining the current status of the state of refugees and the protection of their rights. The two-day conference focussed on specific issues concerning the Refugee Convention, 1951, Convention Relating to the status of Stateless Persons, 1954, and the 1961 Convention for Reducing Statelessness.

The workshop was a great opportunity of building networks, for refugee communities, both amongst themselves and also between them and the NGO and academic community; at the national and South Asian level and to promote collective action and involvement in removing impediments in protecting the rights of stateless persons and refugees. Since refugees and stateless persons are essentially a regional phenomenon, it was urged that the national governments work out a Regional Framework for solving the problem. However, a proactive role is expected from the Indian state in coming out with a domestic law or the protection of refugees and resolving the outstanding issue of stateless persons.

On the first day the inaugural lecture was delivered by Prof. Partha Ghosh of SIS, J.N.U. titled “Thinking Beyond Security – Migrants and Stateless in South Asia” where he identified various causal categories behind migratory flows. The Chief of Mission, UNHCR, New Delhi Office, Montserrat Fixes Vihe, while chairing the first session appreciated that it was not often that she had the opportunity to be amongst so many people working with refugees and committed towards their cause. It was acknowledged that this workshop would bring together people from diverse backgrounds and different perspectives that can really contribute to enriching our thoughts.

The second session chaired by E. Deenadayalan (TOM), comprised of voices from the refugee community where representatives from the Chin Refugee Committee, Chin Human Rights Organisation (CHRO), Kachin Refugee Committee, Arakan Students Youth Congress, Zomi Refugee Group, Afghani Refugee community, Seemant Lok Sangathan (Pakistan Visthapit Sangha), Somali refugees, Sri Lankan refugees (Jesuit Refugee Service, Chennai) and the Iranian Refugees expressed their concerns regarding their present protection status and living conditions in India. More than ten representatives of refugee/stateless communities expressed their concerns regarding the issues of legal protection and survival, lack of right to work, adequate housing, health care and education, particularly in the urban context. Refugees from Pakistan living in the western state of Rajasthan lamented the climate of suspicion existing in the process of their recognition. Activists working with Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu expressed the need to end the climate of heightened securitization that prevailed during the months of war. Urban refugee communities living in Delhi like those from Myanmar, Afghanistan and Somalia worry about the threats to their lives and safety from violent attacks and deplored the inability of the local police to provide them adequate protection.

Attempts to ‘Overcome the limitations of conventions and protocols and protecting refugee rights way beyond the absence of law or way beyond law’ were sought to be addressed in the next session. Dr. Sudeep Basu (GDIR, Ahmedabad) pointed out that finding a way beyond the absence of law was quite a difficult task as in India while one hand law has always been absent, on the other at best one can say that refugee policy has been present. One needs to thus enquire within this framework how refugees have been able to deal with their existence and lives in the absence of the law. He brought into the discussion some of the work he had done with Tibetan refugees. post 9/11, particularly with the SAARC Convention, there has emerged a notion that there should be a refugee policy for us. There has arisen the need also to have a citizenship law that caters to the needs of Indian state along with the need to ‘securitise’ our borders. This increases the danger of clubbing together migrants of all categories. One thus has to understand and revisit the durable solutions and our intuitive self confidence of thinking that we can do with local integration. It must be realised that for years now India has been host to so many communities, her borders have been very fluid and so local integration as a viable solution is not a easy task. Mr. Ravi Nair (SAHRDC, New Delhi) reiterated that it was clearly evident that the Government of India especially the security establishment, which principally has the last word on migration policy, could do much more then what we give them credit for. They look only at it through the security prism rather than the humanitarian prism and there was little awareness in both government and civil society about the need for a broader policy framework.

Then while discussing ‘Population Movements To and Fro India and Her Neighbours’ it was asked if a ‘South Asian Regional Framework the Answer?’. In this session, the chair, Prof. V.G. Hegde (J.N.U.) spoke of how within this move from specific national legal issues to a more broader South Asian legal framework, if India is located in this context, it must be seen through the lens of the Indian nationality laws, especially in view of the kinds of amendments that have come through. The same have in fact all generally reflected on the cross border population movements because India has borders with all the major south Asian countries. So in that context the nationality laws of other south Asian countries also will have equal impact. There are serious implications resulting in creation of persons of statelessness. Dr Gopal Sivakoti (INHURED, Nepal) humbly stated that being a person from the neighbouring country of Nepal he had a lot to learn from the Indian experience. It’s important to see and assess how the Indian Government has functioned in the field of human rights democracy, in dealing with migration, refugees, and IDPs. He said that as a source country of migration Nepal has learned a lot from India and that it needed to be deliberated if a regional framework could frame a base mark to protect displaced persons in this region.

Next, Hindu Singh Soda (Seemant Lok Sangathan/Pakistan Visthapit Sangha) highlighted the plight of the group of refugees that he worked with i.e., those coming from Pakistan. He explained how the different dimensions of the policies of the Indian government in treating refugee groups can be better understood through the conditions of this group. Anasua Basu Roychowdhury (Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, Kolkata) elaborated on the possibility of formation of regional framework through the lens of Statelessness, it’s meaning and it’s difference from refugee according to international law, illustrating it through her field experience in Arunachal Pradesh.

The participants, that included Dr. Achan Mungleng, highlighted that the plight of refugees in the North East India deserve more attention than they usually get and that the lack of political will of the Indian state must not be forgotten. Participants expressed concern that in such a scenario what would be the role of UNHCR, of refugee committees and of refugee right activities. Unfortunately, not much co ordination is seen when refugees urgently need legal or medical help. Activists usually get so lost that there is no coordination between different NGOs and refugee organizations and no desire to come together and share. Different refugee communities also do not know what is happening with each other. Here the participants expressed their concern at the increasing problems of refugees and stateless persons in the South Asian region and the lack of a legal mechanism for their protection. The participants discussed policy responses to population movements, current position of the refugees and stateless persons and the legal hurdles in the way of their recognition. They resolved to organise themselves into a ‘Refugee & Stateless Persons Rights Network of India’ for better sharing of experiences and to campaign jointly for a better deal.

What has emerged from this workshop is that there are larger issues of state responsibility in ensuring democracy, rule of law, minority protection – both at the national and regional level. Noting that many of the refugee situations are human rights crisis situations, the participants have implored that measures should be taken where all the states ensure better protection of human rights standards and human rights defenders.

The Koshish Contest by UNHCR Delhi, India

2011-05-30T13:51:00.003+05:30

Under the 'Do 1 Thing for Refugees' initiative UNHCR Delhi has announced the Koshish contest as part of the World Refugee Day commemorations on June 20, 2011. As part of the contest, UNHCR invites designs for ladies' kurtas made by refugee women under the KOSHISH label. The winning designs will find a place in KOSHISH's summer line to be launched on World Refugee Day.

KOSHISH is a small initiative supported by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) India which provides livelihood opportunities to more than 100 refugee women and provides skills training to more than 300 asylum seekers living in New Delhi . KOSHISH products include kurtas, kurtis, tops and artificial jewellery for women, kurtas and shirts for men, bedcovers, cushion covers, mobile phone pouches etc.

As some of you might be aware, refugees do not have the right to work in India although many of them do find work in the informal labour market often working in exploitative conditions. KOSHISH provides a safe working environment for refugees, particularly women, from diverse nationalities such as Myanmar, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iran, Iraq etc with heavy family responsibilities and faced with serious employment related protection risks.

Entries may be sent to indne@unhcr.org latest by 10 June 2011.

Bangladesh in Point of View

2011-04-30T15:31:00.000+05:30

Geetisha Dasgupta

[is a graduate student at the SUNY, Binghamton]

A researcher of forced migration is continually plagued by concerns like tracing the roots of people, revisiting their origins through documents, narratives, interviews and lived experiences. We try to go back in history and situate people, persons in a particular cross section of time and space which we would coin as his/her home. Thus we try to initiate a homecoming of all those who have been ousted out, forced to move and move on. This continual struggle to transfix the moment called home often faces a crisis, where the researcher is single handedly constructing the past out of the remains, while forgetting that, it might be a ‘normalizing’ act, taking for granted that the past would be equally re-constructible for everyone. We forget that not everyone would like to visit their ‘roots’ on behalf of others.

From this again follows a second premise which shows that people have often ignored the margins drawn by regulatory forces and thereby taking it on history itself. The idea of nation has been challenged through maintaining porosity of borders on the levels of the community; therefore lending more weight to that level of existence which allows them the necessary freedom to subsist. Thus looking at the forced migration situation of India or Bangladesh can never be completed on an India OR Bangladesh OR Pakistan basis. One has to look at it on a holistic basis, keeping in mind the chain of events, the thread that connects all. This edition of our e journal is committed towards taking a look at forced migration situation of Bangladesh. But as will be evident from each of the articles, this is a forced migration situation of Bangladesh vis a vis India.

Priyanca Mathur Velath and Saba Hussain, in their article write about the informal Bangladeshi workers in and around the suburbs of Delhi. These are often undocumented people about whom there is a silence in the administrative structures of both the States as long as their independent histories go. Thus, people that provide the much needed links in the informal economy are termed as ‘illegal’, ‘poor’ and even ‘terrorists’. From there on, it goes deeper to talk about the problems in such situation of ‘silence’ and invisibility which generates a field work anxiety that a researcher faces in mining out the data base as well as the real people that contribute towards it.

Banjan’s article looks at the other side of the same coin, the influx of illegal immigrants especially from Bangladesh. The economic and environmental problems in their home country propel these migrants to explore the opportunities and resources in India and share the benefits of their labour with their families. Many of them receive patronage from political parties who want to accumulate them as vote banks. Despite the media hype and mass movement against immigration there are no figures available with the Government or any other agencies on the exact number of Bangladeshi migrants in India. This ambiguity in identifying the migrants weakens the government’s position in tackling the issue. She looks into the history that brought about the events like formation of separate nation states in the subcontinent and points out that the abnormality lies there itself. It was not nationalism that brought nation state here but quite the reverse.

Naser’s article talks about climate change and displacement, which we will read in the context of massive and sustained population outflows in the recent past out of Bangladesh due to environmental atrocities. He presents the picture rendered imperfect due to the lack of binding international protocols on controlling assaults on the environment and the debates that lead to inconclusive nature of national rules to govern the same.

Bangladesh’s Climate Displacement Nightmare

2011-04-30T15:24:00.002+05:30

Scott Leckie, Zeke Simperingham and Jordan Bakker

While scientists and the international community endlessly debate and argue, millions of Bangladeshi citizens have already been displaced by climate change - for them the worst-case 'nightmare' climate scenario is already real

Climate displacement has arrived without mercy in Bangladesh. In Khulna district alone, some 60,000 Bangladeshi citizens have fled what has become permanent coastal flooding in the remote southwest of the country. With no option of returning home, and little access to new land thus far, these climate displaced persons (CDPs) are forced to survive on a 25 kilometre long, 2m high and 3-4 m wide embankment.

This desperate community in Dacope sub-district in Khulna has built rudimentary, makeshift shelters along the length of the levee that was originally designed to protect their now destroyed villages, land and homes. The levee failed, and all they now have are insecure and instable shelters perched precariously atop the embankment, surrounded by unruly water on both sides at high tide and at low tide by thousands of hectares of desolate muddy land that was once fertile paddy and farmland.

Living in this isolated and impoverished corner of Bangladesh, which borders on the famous Sundarban National Park, and completely segregated from political life in Dhaka (and the officials that could assist them in finding new land), the people of the delta see all too little hope or viable options for the future. Ninety-per cent of the CDPs are now without livelihoods, forced to live day by day from aid handouts and are unable to return to lives, land and homes that were completely obliterated by coastal erosion and storm surges. Nor do the displaced in Dacope see any solutions coming from the Government of Bangladesh any time soon, with officials seeming thus far resistant to suggestions that they may need to assist this and other climate-affected communities to relocate to safer areas and provide them with new land.

And as bad as things may be for the delta dwellers, this CDP community is only the tip of the displacement iceberg eating away at Bangladesh’s land and populace. Comprehensive surveys carried out in 2010 by over 200 community-based organisations and coordinated by the remarkable efforts of the Association of Climate Refugees, found that a staggering 6.5 million citizens (1.3 million households) of Bangladesh have already been displaced by the effects of climate change.

Uniquely vulnerable to frequent and severe river, rainwater and tidal flooding, Bangladesh today has the sad distinction of being the world’s most vulnerable country to climate displacement. While climate scientists, the international community and academics vigorously debate about the potential for climate change to affect future population displacement, the millions of Bangladeshi citizens already displaced by the effects of climate change are no longer simply waiting for solutions to their plight, and have begun to organise for climate justice and their basic human rights.

For them the worst-case future climate scenarios have already arrived; for them the future is now.

Earth’s Most Climate Vulnerable Communities

Bangladesh is a low lying, largely flat country with two-thirds of the country located less than 5m above sea level. Situated in the delta region of three of the world’s largest rivers - with a combined annual discharge second only to that of the Amazon – it is no surprise that Bangladesh suffers from catastrophic floods every year. According to government statistics, 25 per cent of Bangladesh is inundated every year and 60 per cent of the country suffers from severe flooding every 4-5 years. What makes the situation so dire now is that the flooded land in the delta is seemingly gone for good. In Khulna, the flood will simply not recede.

And yet, this is far from the extent of climate vulnerability in Bangladesh. The country is also hit by a severe tropical cyclone on average once every three years. These storms form in the months before and after the monsoon season and intensify as they move over the warm waters of the Bay of Bengal. They are accompanied by winds of up to 150kph and can result in storm surges of up to several metres. As experienced by the 60,000 people crammed in miserable conditions on the embankments of Khulna, the results for housing, land, property and livelihoods are devastating.

Of the 160 million citizens of Bangladesh, it is the more than 50 million people who live in the most extreme poverty that are and will continue to be most affected by climate change. These are the people who are forced to live in remote, exposed and vulnerable locations – often on river islands and cyclone prone coastal regions - where the land is cheap but the risks are high. Of Bangladesh’s 64 districts, 24 are already severely affected by growing numbers of climate displaced persons.

As sure as the effects of climate change are in devastating lives and communities in Bangladesh today, it is also clear that the devastation is only going to increase in the future. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that floods, tropical cyclones and storm surges will all become more frequent and more severe in the future due to the effects of climate change. The IPCC also forecasts even higher flows in the rivers that flow into Bangladesh from India, Nepal, Bhutan and China – as a direct result of increasing monsoon rainfalls and the melting of the Himalayan glaciers. Sea level rise as a result of global warming will also result in even more severe coastal flooding in Bangladesh as well as saline intrusion into rivers across the entire southern regions of the country.

The Need for Solutions to Climate Displacement

While the full impact of future climate change is notoriously difficult to accurately predict, it is clear that the 6.5 million climate displaced people in Bangladesh in January 2011 will be joined by many millions more in the future. The effects on communities and the devastation of lands and homes will only become more intense. It is clear that the future is not bright for the people of Bangladesh and equally that land-based solutions are required now.

As poor as they may be, under human rights law, these impoverished and marginalised communities are also the people most in need of having their housing, land and property rights respected, protected and fulfilled. Combined efforts to tackle the challenges of climate displacement with a renewed commitment to HLP rights just might hold out the best hope that CDP’s will a secured a future worth living. And this is precisely what the joint Bangladesh HLP Initiative of Displacement Solutions and the Association of Climate Refugees intends to do.

Despite the considerable efforts of the Bangladeshi Government to combat and address the effects of climate change – including the adoption of the 2005 Bangladesh National Adaptation Programme of Action and the 2009 Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan – the Government has yet to propose clear or practical land-based solutions for addressing the plight of Bangladesh’s current and future climate displaced people.

Though one of the pillars of the Bangladesh Climate Change Action plan is to 'ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable in society are protected from climate change', it is clear that the climate displaced communities living on the embankment in Khulna province and indeed the many millions more across Bangladesh, have thus far received all too little protection, safe housing, or access to basic services from the Government.

Enter the Association for Climate Refugees

Some 200 community-based NGOs throughout the country have recently banded together to form the Association of Climate Refugees (ACR) and to actively find solutions for the citizens of Bangladesh who have already been displaced by climate change. ACR’s founder and director, Muhammad Abu Musa, has chosen for himself one of the world’s more difficult tasks. For this jolly and remarkably optimistic 52 year-old Bangladeshi activist has dedicated his life in recent years towards the gargantuan goal of finding permanent and sustainable residential solutions to the millions of climate displaced people across Bangladesh. If predictions by the IPCC and others are correct, the sprightly Abu Musa will need to find new homes for a further 30 million displaced people in the coming years.

The ACR is focusing on capacity building and empowerment at the local level – directly among the climate affected communities themselves. ACR relies on partner organisations - grassroots activists in 24 of the country’s 64 districts, often working out of a single room in the middle of affected communities, to promptly relay first hand information about any developments in climate affected communities.

Abu Musa believes that it is the affected communities themselves who have the best knowledge and resources for self-protection and adaptation. He also strongly believes that having local communities own the problem is the only way for the Government of Bangladesh to listen to their plight – 'If we showed up as an NGO describing this problem, the Government door would be immediately closed, it is essential that the local communities take action themselves', he says with conviction.

The ACR plans to continue its work of monitoring climate displacement across Bangladesh and in the near future to implement a system of both emergency and permanent relocation out of climate vulnerable locations together with their international partners, in particular Displacement Solutions. ACR is aware that some CDPs have relocated to the distant Chittagong Hill Tracts (some 600 kms from Khulna), and in January 2011, ACR acquired a small land plot of 1.65 acres in Kamarkhola Union in Khulna district, donated by a local landowner sympathetic to ACR’s aims.

The land represents the first such acquisition of land for climate affected communities, and will be transformed into a community land trust aptly named 'Community Land Trust for Climate Displacement Solutions in Bangladesh'. This symbolic gesture, which will provide land solutions for some twenty families, will surely not resolve climate displacement in the country, but will hopefully inspire other landowners to donate larger pieces of unused land to assist in finding solutions to the dismal displaced population of Bangladesh.

Abu Musa and many others believe that the climate displacement solution for Bangladesh will frequently lie in relocation to safer areas, and not solely on building higher and higher embankment walls. Many of the 60,000 people on the embankment in Khulna province expect that in the next monsoon season the entire embankment will be under water and that they will have to move again. Accessing new and viable land will be the secret to ACR’s success.

What will the Future Hold?

The work of ACR is admirable and essential, but alone it is unlikely to be able to find land-based solutions for the climate-displaced people of Bangladesh. Similar to popular movements in other climate affected countries such as Tulele Peisa in Papua New Guinea, path breaking groups like ACR need to be able to work with much more than their currently meagre, shoestring budget. Funds from the newly established Green Fund under the Cancun Adaptation Framework (meant to reach 100 billion USD in coming years) need to be earmarked for groups such as ACR and Tulele Peisa to enable them to resolve the displacement caused by climate change.

It is essential for these groups and governments to band together to develop and clarify land-based solutions as rapidly as possible, before the already drastic situation becomes exponentially worse as the effects of climate change become more severe and more frequent.

Importantly, it is increasingly clear that the imperative to resolve climate displacement in Bangladesh is not only a matter of human dignity and human rights, but also one of security. The marginalised communities most affected by climate change may also be the most susceptible to influence by extremists. As a country with a large Muslim population, thus far largely spared the fundamentalist-driven ravages now so commonplace in Pakistan and elsewhere, some analysts have noted that the most disenfranchised and affected communities could turn to Islamic militantism – and transform Bangladesh into another breeding ground for violent fundamentalism.

Unless climate displaced persons are treated as the rights-holders that they actually already are, and enabled to access new housing, land and property, this looming security threat may become ever more real.

The international community now has an opportunity to address the immediate and future climate displacement crisis in Bangladesh. The world needs to capture the momentum of recent positive developments at the 2010 United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Cancun, where national, regional and international coordination and cooperation was encouraged in implementing planned relocation of climate displaced communities and where it was stated that human rights should be fully respected in all climate change related actions.

States across the globe should take heed of the climate displacement nightmare that is unfolding in Bangladesh, and at the same time focus on the emerging dream of durable land solutions for all. Land-based solutions to climate displacement can and should be identified now, and excellent community led groups – such as the Association for Climate Refugees – need to be sufficiently well resourced to be able to implement emergency and permanent relocation strategies. The Government of Bangladesh should also be encouraged – through bilateral, regional and international advocacy – to do more to respect the human rights of all people in Bangladesh, including the 6.5 million people already displaced by climate change.

The development of a National Plan to Resolve Climate Displacement, prepared jointly with civil society groups such as ACR, could go a long way to ensure a brighter future for the displaced millions in this country. The situation in Bangladesh is as clear a demonstration to the world as any that contrary to what many people still think, climate displacement is not a problem for the future – for 2020, or 2030 or 2050 – it is a problem now, and one that urgently requires solutions.
For further news please look at http://displacementsolutions.org/ and The Ecologist at http://www.theecologist.org/

Another Time: Coming up Another Occasion to Displace People

2011-04-30T15:19:00.001+05:30

Geetisha Dasgupta

The Phulbari coal project in northwest Bangladesh is a proposed open pit coal mine and includes the construction of at least one 500-MW power plant. At full production about eight million tons of coal will be transported by rail and barges to an offshore reloading facility located in Akram Point. An additional four million tons will be exported to India via railway, and the remaining three million tons will be used for domestic energy consumption. Global Coal Management Resources plc. (GCM) operating through its wholly owned subsidiary, Asia Energy Corporation – Asia Energy Corporation is a single-purpose entity established to develop and implement the Phulbari coal project. On 31 December 2010, GCM stated that they will move forward with the Phublari project subject to the government’s approval of the Scheme of Development. The Bangladesh parliamentary Standing Committee on Power, Energy and mineral resources recommended that the country moves towards open cut mining methods of extraction. It was all good up until this.

The project will acquire almost 6,000 hectares of land (60 sq km) and, according to project documents and independent reports, will physically and economically displace between 50,000-220,000 people. This displacement will take place in one of the most densely populated countries in the world and will destroy a critical agricultural region in the country, threatening Bangladesh’s food supply. Over 80 percent of the land taken for this project will be fertile, agricultural land which will not be replaced, leaving farmers and families dependent on the land for their livelihoods with few options for employment. In short, the project would turn hundreds of thousands of farmers into land-less wage earners, competing for jobs in entirely different sectors.

In addition, if the project is implemented, the open-pit mine will destroy or displace: 1,577 ponds (used to earn income through sale of fish); 80,000 fruit and timber trees (plus many thousands of bamboo sticks); 928 businesses; 36,052 homes, barns, boundary walls and toilets; 106 schools; 48 health facilities; 138 mosques, temples and churches; 692 graveyards; and 2 ancient archaeological sites.
In order to keep the open-pit mine from flooding, the company will need to deplete the water table leading to water scarcity for communities around the mine area.

In addition to the impacts the project will have on water availability, it is likely that there will be significant contamination of land and rivers much beyond the mine area due to acid mine drainage. Hundreds of small rivers in the area are linked like a huge net, allowing polluted water to travel long beyond the mining footprint.

Another important environmental concern is that the project may lead to the degradation of the Sundarbans, a UNESCO protected mangrove forest because the coal will be transported through this area in barges. This forest is a habitat for the Bengal Tiger and many endangered species and also serves as a source of livelihood for fisherfolk and other communities dependent on the wetlands for sustenance. The Sundarbans also act as a natural barrier protecting the Bangladeshi people from the impacts of typhoons, floods and other natural disasters.

The grassroots resistance that has formed around the project has been met with egregious violations to human rights. In August 2006, the Bangladesh Rifles, a paramilitary force, opened fire on the 50,000 local people who were conducting a peaceful protest around the Phulbari project area. At least three people were killed, including a 14-year old boy, and over 100 people were wounded.
Following these protests, in January 2007, Bangladesh was put under emergency rule and a military-backed interim government took over in the country. In many ways, rule of law has been suspended in the country. Over the past 18 months, community leaders, individuals from non-governmental organizations, human rights defenders and others have been intimidated, threatened, arrested and tortured. As one example, in February 2007, Mr. S.M. Nuruzzaman, one of the leaders of the social movement in opposition to the project, was falsely arrested and subsequently tortured. The Bangladeshi ‘joint forces’ were reportedly directed by officials of Asia Energy, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Global Coal Management, to arrest Mr. Nuruzzaman.

In Bangladesh, fewer women than men work in formal paid employment (57.2% vs. 89.8%), more women than men work in the informal agricultural sector (67.8% vs. 59.4%), more women than men are illiterate (67% vs. 48%), women generally lack property rights due to patrilineal inheritance laws, and they perform the majority of domestic care work.

Thus, the Phulbari Coal Project’s potential displacement of over 100,000 people from prime agrarian land, plus its plan to de-water the mine area (appx. 314 sq km.), would produce the following effects:
•migrant women and girls would be pushed disproportionately into flexible, exploitative work, including forced prostitution and human trafficking;
•women’s relative economic inequity would deepen as male property owners alone receive financial compensation;
•women and girls’ time poverty would increase as they shoulder care responsibilities for family members exposed to environmental hazards;
•women themselves would face increased risks of disease, including HIV/AIDS, as they collect water contaminated with arsenic or engage in unprotected sex work; and finally,
•women would face increases in gender-based violence as civil unrest, police brutality and community dissolution all rise.

Recently, there was a Wikileaks release stating that US diplomats are, and have been, pressuring the Bangladesh government to reopen Phulbari coal mine negotiations, which was closed due to protest. Now the bulldozers are warming up once more: any moment now the coal mine could be approved that would displace tens of thousands of families, destroy vital farmland, and devastate mangrove forests that protect the climate-fragile country from rising sea levels.

For more information look at http://www.accountabilityproject.org/article.php?list=type&type=43

The Politics of Silence and ‘Invisibility’: Methodological Dilemmas of working with Undocumented Bangladeshi Migrants in Delhi

2011-04-30T15:11:00.005+05:30

Priyanca Mathur Velath

[a member of APRRN, IASFM and an alumni of the CRG Winter Course on Forced Migration, Velath is currently completing her doctoral thesis on the rights of development-induced displaced persons in India at CSLG/J.N.U, New Delhi]

Saba Hussain

[(an alumni of the CRG Winter Course on Forced Migration, Saba is currently working as a social development consultant with a Delhi based consulting firm TARU. She has studied Sociology at Delhi University and Development Studies at London School of Economics]

Informal Bangladeshi workers, living in Delhi and its suburbs, have had many tags attached to them – ‘poor’, ‘illegal’ and lately also ‘terrorists’. These adjectives refer to the debates on poverty, illegal migrant and remittance flows and securitization of migration that have been heaped onto the Bangladeshi migrant flows into Indian soil post 1971. Recently intolerance and xenophobia have been added to the debates. (Ramachandran, 2004; 2005, Ramachandran and Crush, 2009)

Moreover, the conflation of the migrants with illegality, crimes and terrorism coincides with the larger urban security paradigm of segregation of the poor This phenomenon is amply illustrated by the policing and surveillance drives culminating into ‘clean-up’ of the poor, mainly floating migrant populations, being conducted in the run up to the recently concluded Commonwealth Games (CWG) 2010 in Delhi. This article intends to revive the discourse on the fieldwork anxieties that emerge when research is attempted on them, by drawing upon the authors’ own experience of working with Bangladeshi migrants across slums in Delhi, before and after CWG.

Politics of ‘Silence’ and Inclusion

Undocumented population movements between Bangladesh and India have heightened the focus upon (in)security, and have forced most of the Bangladeshi workers to illegally acquire citizenship ‘proofs’ or documents. While all the members of the elder generation of Bangladeshis that had come into India post 1971 proudly showed the ‘ID Card’ that late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had issued to them, many in the younger generation claim to have been born on Indian soil. Majority of the Bangladeshi migrants encountered by the researchers had procured signifiers of citizenship such as – Voter ID Card, Ration Card and PAN Card that not only enabled them get certain state sponsored privileges but also the ability to contest claims of their ‘Bangladeshi-ness’. Seen in this way, the monolithic notion of being a citizen is being silently replaced by ideas of ‘becoming a citizen’ through not essentially formal or legal measures (i). The increasing demand for supply of cheap informal labour to the bourgeoning Indian middle class, in cities like Delhi and Mumbai, ensures a continuous ‘pull’ of their services as housemaids, rickshaw-pullers, people entrusted with recycling and garbage disposal, etc.

Number Politics

However, on an issue as commonly debated as this, the lack of any authentic data in terms of reliable numbers is striking for any social researcher. Putting a figure to the number of Bangladeshi migrants living in India is virtually an impossible task. The option of data sources available to the researchers range between the controversial figure of ‘20 million’ quoted by then Governor of Assam (Sinha, 1998, Indian Express 4th Oct 2009), 15 million (Dutta 2004) to a substantially lower 3 million (Census 2001 Report), 3.8 million (Buchenau 2008) to the other end of the spectrum where the Bangladesh government claims that “there is not a single Bangladeshi migrant in India” and maintains “India allowed the migrants to live in its territory for many years, even issued official documents, therefore, these migrants ought to be treated as Indian citizens” (Ramachandran, 2005). Besides, the number and inclusion game plays out when their ‘floating’ populations are used as pawns in vote-bank politics in states like West Bengal.

Working Amidst the Visible Symbols of ‘citizenship’

The problem of lack of data sets on undocumented Bangladeshi migrants in India is further complicated by the very dynamic of the relationship of the migrants with the Indian State. While transborder flows between India and Bangladesh question the idea of nationhood (Samaddar, 1999) and citizenship for the migrants, they also redefine the nature of encounters with the state.On one hand, the migrants themselves view the Indian state as the coercive force behind slum demolitions or periodic rounding-ups of young men for interrogation, and so on.On the other, the same state is seen as the protector or benefactor depending on how well it has been negotiated with.

The authors were constantly grappling responses that reflected the Indian-ness of the respondents. This often deflected the focus away from the areas of research interest around the myriad issues involving the process of ‘becoming Indian’--everyday encounters with the state, the moral economy of protection and patronage, (Chatterjee 2004) and their experience of living and working as migrant men, women and children. And in moments of covert national identity cementing exercises like the CWG in Delhi, the migrants and their groups develop an almost organic strategies to survive through strong information sharing networks, techniques of geographical segregation and camouflage including fake identities and names, adoptions of cultural symbols (like the bindi worn by the majority Hindu women), local dialects and so on. For a social researcher situation like these are equally both intriguing and challenging.

What was striking was that the first step towards inclusion invariably was a lie - on place of origin. The younger and newer migrants in Delhi insisted that their ‘home’ was in the districts of Malda, Nainital or the state of Assam in India. The older generation, resting on the confidence of their ‘Indira Gandhi I-cards’, were more open to revisit their memories of their ardous journey that had forced them to leave their homeland and seek a better life across its borders.

Politics of ‘Invisibility’ or Exclusion

Physical exclusion – pushed to the periphery
Ethnically dominated localities, usually mark all megacities, such as New York’s China Town or London’s South-Asian hub of South Hall. In case of Delhi also it wasn’t very difficult to broadly locate the areas inhabited by Bangladeshi migrants—Govindpuri slum, Nizamuddin Basti, Khadar Colony, Alisia Mor (in Gurgaon). These areas form the periphery of affluent urban (upper) middle class localities of South Delhi, Yamuna riverbank and the gated communities of Gurgaon, which are serviced by the workers from these peripheral localities-mostly slums. Within these slums too, many a times Bangladeshis were found to have been pushed to the outer margins, into lower class professions like waste-disposal e.g., the ‘kabaris’ in Khadar colony.(ii)

However, in the face of the challenges in separating ‘newer’ migrants from the older settled ‘refugees’ of 1971 and the challenges of handling the multiple dimensions of the undocumented-migrant experience, the process of identifying a correct sample became a herculean task. The migrant/settlers were eager to show us the receipts of their being interviewed by Census officials, as proof of their ‘Indian-ness’ but refused to divulge where their roots actually traced back to. Added to this was the anxiety of ‘security’ or ‘well being’ of the respondents (migrants or otherwise) given a heightened surveillance and policing around these locations. This further became agonizing when under state-induced duress they were all asked to shift away or ‘disappear’ from the city during the actual period of the CWG. Overnight guards and maids disappeared from households only to return once the games were over!

Summing up the field work anxieties
It was found that the traditional security perspectives do not offer much clues to understand the issue such as fragmented citizenship, constructed identities and the political economy of patronage and protection. Nor does it offer a humanitarian lens to understand the ‘human tragedy’ of undocumented migration. Based on the restricted experience of fieldwork with undocumented Bangladeshi migrants in Delhi, the authors feel that researchers can contribute towards a solution oriented discourse on undocumented migrants only by continuously deconstructing the politics behind the ‘voices’ and the ‘silences’, the ‘visible’ and the ‘invisible’.

*This article is part of a larger paper being written by the authors. It is based on field work conducted in 2010 that was part of a study of migrant remittance flows between India, Bangladesh and Nepal.

Notes

(i) This particularly effects people with questionable citizenship credentials or what is referred to as the ‘vernacular citizenship’ See Ajay Gandhi (2008), ‘Vernacular Citizenship and Everyday Governance amongst India’s Urban Poor’, Paper Prepared for Roundtable Discussion “Urban Planet: Collective Identities, Governance, and
Empowerment in Megacities”, sponsored by the Irmgard Coninx Foundation. For social researchers working with migrants populations particularly, these ‘vernacular citizenships’ lead to a wide range of methodological dilemmas.
(ii) For a larger study see Ankit Aggarwal, Ashish Singhmar, Mukul Kulshrestha, Atul K. Mittal (2004), ‘Municipal Solid Waste Recycling and associated markets in Delhi’ IIT Delhi.

References

Buchenau, J. (2008) ‘Migration, Remittances and Poverty Alleviation in Bangladesh – Report and Proposal’, UNDP Bangladesh.
Census of India 2001 - Report of the Technical Group on Population Projections Constituted by the National Commission on Population, May, (2006)
Chatterjee, P (2004) Politics of the Governed: Popular Politics in Most of the World, Columbia University Press.
Crush, J. and Ramchandran S. (2009) ‘Xenophobia, International Migration and Human Development’, Human Development Research Paper, UNDP.
Dutta, P. (2004) ‘Push-Pull Factors of Undocumented Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal” A Perception Study’, The Qualitative Report, Volume 9, No 2.
Ramachandran, S. (2005) Indifference, impotence, and intolerance: transnational Bangladeshis in India, Global Migration Perspectives, No. 42
Samaddar, R. (1999) The Marginal Nation: Transborder Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal, Sage Publications Ltd.
Sinha, S.K. (1998) ‘Illegal Migration into Assam’, Report on Illegal Migration into Assam Submitted to the President of India

Climate Change and Forced Migration: An Overview

2011-04-30T14:56:00.002+05:30

Mostafa Mahmud Naser

[is an Assistant Professor, Department of Law, University of Chittagong, Bangladesh and Ph.D. candidate, Macquarie Law School, Australia]

Introduction

Forced displacement for environmental reasons is not a phenomenon unique to the present day. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, such migration mainly took place due to natural environmental degradation or catastrophe; such as floods, storms, hurricanes; or owing to scarcity of land resources. In the twentieth century, however, environmental degradation due to global climate change caused by human interferences with the ecology has tremendously increased natural disasters and calamities. Now natural disasters are ‘more intense and frequent and the human impacts are more devastating’. 1 Over the past two decades, the number of major disasters per year has increase from 200 to 400 major. 2 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (hereinafter as IPCC), human-induced climate change will transform the ecological balance of the earth and lead to calamitous consequences for the human rights of millions of people all over the world. 3 The AR4 of the IPCC report concludes that climate change has already influenced ecological systems and this – with scientific certainty – is creating increased and frequency of natural events including floods, hurricanes, droughts, desertification, scarcity of water resources and unpredictability of seasons.4

Climate change induced displacement: no more prediction but a reality

Thus, the serious and rapid alteration of ecosystems by anthropogenic interference has direct and indirect impact on society which will ultimately lead to mass migration, both permanent and temporary. Human migration, forced or otherwise, will undoubtedly be one of the most significant consequences of environmental degradation due to climate change in decades to come. Many experts argue that large numbers of people are already on the move, with millions more expected to follow as evidence of climate change mounts.5 As early as in 1990 the IPCC argued that the greatest single impact of climate change could be on human migration.

Currently, there is no global assessment of the statistics of environmental displacement since no international organisation collects information on persons displaced by climate change. 6 Nor is there much capacity in developing and least developed countries (LDC) or the international community to gather this sort of data.7 So, the existence and the scope of the issue of climate displacement are often established by reference to the likely numbers of displaced people. Based on a plausible range of emission scenario, current estimates typically range from 50 million to 1 billion, but is usually estimated to be around 200-250 million people by 2050, either within their country or across borders, on a permanent or temporary basis owing to the direct impacts of climate change. 8 However, Professor Myers’ estimate of 200 million climate migrants by 2050 has become the generally accepted figure and is widely cited. 9 It would mean that by 2050 one in every 45 people in the world would have been displaced by climate change. 10 Thus, the number of future climate migration shows a terrifying figure, a ten-fold increase on today’s entire population of documented refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

However, numerous fundamental questions about numbers are being asked in scientific, policy and academic circles. 11 The available estimates, generally derived from the environmental academic Norman Myers, are massively contested. The key issue raised by the debate around the numbers of climate change displaced people is whether it is possible to predict with any degree of certainty the likely numbers and distribution of persons displaced by climate change. It is also criticised that such estimates have a large margin of error and mostly depend on underlying assumptions about population growth, economic development, temperature increase, or the degree and timing of climate change impacts such as sea-level rise. 12 The critics also argue that there is ‘no evidence that environmental change leads directly to mass refugee flows, especially flows to developed countries’.13 Migration researcher, Richard Black has criticised the ways of repeated presentation of numbers of environmental refugees by numerous authors as ‘without independent verification of its accuracy’. 14

Lack of international legal framework and importance of developing a new international framework

The climate change poses new challenges to international law. 15 With all the predicted dangers and future catastrophe, the existing international legal frameworks - including its laws and its institutions - do not adequately address the emerging crisis. The current international legal regime does not offer any concrete protection for the environmentally displaced people. There is no legally binding mechanism for protection of these persons. Even they are not yet recognised in international law as an identifiable group whose rights are expressly articulated, or as a formal legal category of people in need of special protection. Obviously this has important ramifications for assigning responsibility to appropriate domestic and international institutions and agencies to address the rights and duties concerned. Because the forced population displacement will induce very real legal, political, economic, human security, human rights, public health and conflict related concerns.16 The international community, specially the developed countries, are both legally and ethically responsible to ensure protection of human rights of this vulnerable section of people.

One solution to the current inadequacy of legal responses is to develop a new international agreement that specifically recognise the plight of individuals forced to leave their homes, families, friends, and livelihoods for environmental reasons. The Convention would establish an international regime for the status, treatment and protection of climate change displaced persons. The new independent convention would prioritise the large and emerging problem of climate change displacement. 17 It would also reflect the underlying issues raised by the climate change displacement problem and fill the legal gap with the specificity states and communities need. This instrument should ensure that climate change displaced persons receive adequate assistance in the form of human rights protections and humanitarian aid. It should also establish an administrative system to implement the elaborate regime in a fair and efficient manner.

Conclusion: Towards a New Legal Framework for Climate Induced Displacement

It is increasingly evident that the numbers of environmentally displaced people are growing at a rapid rate. This vast number of people is largely left unprotected in current refugee regime. States around the world have contributed to or have been affected by climate change. So, the displacement associated with it requires international attention. Since the nature of climate change is global and humans play a contributory role, the international community should accept responsibility for mitigating climate-induced displacement. 18 States should develop an innovative, international, and interdisciplinary approach that can be implemented before the situation reaches a crisis stage.

In recognizing the problem of climate change displacement, this paper has highlighted the present lacuna within the international legal system in terms of effectively recognising and responding to the needs of climate induced displacement. One solution to the current inadequacy of legal responses may be developing a new convention that provides both assistance and protection to environmentally displaced persons and creates affirmative obligations for states to prevent the environmental disasters that force displacement. The new instrument could help alleviate the emerging climate change displacement crisis.

Notes

1.António Guterres, ‘Climate Change could Become the Biggest Driver of Displacement’, (Speech delivered at the press conference at the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009, Copenhagen, Denmark, 16 December 2009. available at http://www.unhcr.org/4b2910239.html at 02 March 2009.
2.David Adam, ‘Food Prices Threaten Global Security – UN’ The Guardian, (United Kingdom), 09 April, 2008. < http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/apr/09/food.unitednations> at 03 March 2010.
3.See, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Summary for Policymakers (2007) 12. < http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm.> 12 September 2009.
4.See, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Climate Change 2007: Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Summary for Policymakers’, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report (2007).
5.Achim Steiner, ‘Foreword’, (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review, 4.
6.Vikram Odedra Kolmannskog, ‘Future Floods of Refugees: A Comment on Climate Change, Conflict and Forced Migration’ (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008) 13- 14.
7.Tess Burton and David Hodgkinson, Cliamte Change Migrants and Unicorns: A Discussion Note on Conceptualising Climate Change Displaced People, The Hodgknson Group – Climate Change and Aviation Advisors (Publications) 8 at 23 July 2009.
8.See generally, Norman Myers, ‘Environmental Refugees in a globally warmed world’, (1993) 43(11) BioScience 752.; Norman Myers, ‘Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue’, 13th Economic Forum, Prague, 23 – 27 May 2005; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Christian Aid, ‘Human Tide: The Real Migration Crisis’ (Christian Aid, 2007), 50.
9.Oli Brown, ‘The Numbers Game’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review, 8.
10.From a predicted global population of 9.075 billion in 2050 from 6.54 billion in at an annual growth rate of 1.1%
11.Camillo Boano, ‘FMO Research Guide on Climate Change and Displacement’ (FMO Research Guide, Forced Migration Online (FMO) 2008) 13.
12.For criticism of such estimates, see A. Suhrke, ‘Environmental Degradation and Population Flows’, (1994) 47(2) Journal of International Affairs, 478.; Stephen Castles, ‘Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense of the Debate’, (New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper No. 70, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2002) 2–3.; and Richard Black, ‘Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?’ (New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper No 34, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2002), 2–8.
13.Stephen Castles, ‘Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense of the Debate’, (New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper No. 70, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2002) 2.
14.Richard Black, ‘Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?’ (New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper No 34, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2002), 1.
15.The Legal Status of Environmental Refugees, available at http://www.gimun.org/en/2009/committees/6th/environmental-refugees
16.Displacement Solutions, Meeting Report on Climate Change, Human Rights and Forced Human Displacement (2008), 11.
17.Bonnie Docherty and Tyler Giannini, ‘Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees’ (2009) 33 Harvard Environmental Law Review, 349-403, 397 -- 401.
18.Ibid.

Nationalising Space: Coming to Terms with Rights of Migrants

2011-04-30T13:15:00.002+05:30

Vanita Banjan

[is at the Dept. of Politics, SIES College of Arts, Science and Commerce, Sion (W), Mumbai 400022]

The migration narrative unfolds the manner human development has transpired and mankind benefited. Migration is an age old phenomenon but the modernization paradigm hypothesized that it is the rise of industrialisation and thereby urbanisation which encouraged migration on a large scale. 1 Post industrialisation the world saw the rise of nation states and its territorial limits demarcated with rigid borders erected around ethnocultural communities residing within. Having created the territorial reality brought in tow the legal paraphernalia for naturalisation and immigration. But in this process it was forgotten that the decision to migrate was connected to the value of freedom, the right to choose where one wants to live or settle. Today all those who choose to move from one country to another are labelled as immigrants, though there is no agreement on the time one needs to spend in the other country to be identified as a migrant. Borders are today open for free flow of trade and capital but there is a barrier imposed on mobility of migrant labour, and that is the reason the matter has invoked so much deliberation world over. Though migration is a well researched topic in the North, it is only in the recent years that it is being discussed in the South, especially the South-South migration.

The nations in South Asia are comparatively young having won their independence in the 20th Century and are classified as developing nations. Comparatively India is territorially large and better off nation in the South Asian region and draws immigrants from the neighbouring states. Thus the paper focuses on the influx of illegal immigrants especially from Bangladesh. Considering the economic and environmental problems in their home country these immigrants hope to explore the opportunities in India and use their talents with the resources here and share the benefits of their labour with their families. Many of them receive patronage from political parties who use them as vote banks. Despite the media hype and mass movement against immigration there are no figures available with the Government or any other agencies on the exact number of Bangladeshi migrants in India. This ambiguity in identifying the migrants weakens the government’s position in tackling the issue. Today the matter is highly politicised and no political party is interested in resolving the matter but without fail each party tries to benefit from it either by supporting the migrants and generating a vote bank or sensitising the people against it and garnering vote on the basis of the fear so generated. Most nations treat immigrants as criminals, the paper tries to explore a golden mean between a humane approach to the undocumented migrants while maintaining the states responsibility of to its citizens and sovereignty.

Generally it is difficult to measure illegal migrants in a country but despite that it is estimated that it comprises of 10 per cent or greater of all migrants. Illegal or undocumented migration is a response to the legal restrictions at the borders, whenever the legal avenues of migration are constrained the illegal migration swells. 2 The demographic changes in the border districts of Assam and West Bengal and the corresponding clamour of various agencies including the media resulted into the much awaited action of the Central government on fencing of the border area. Crores of rupees were spent on the construction of the fences but certain areas still remain unfenced. Fencing might have reduced border crossing but has not stopped it completely. The cultural connectivity between the two nations and its citizens cannot be exterminated by artificially created fences or walls.

To understand the augmentation of undocumented Bangladeshi migrants and the violent reaction to them one has to glance in the past and trace the genesis of the problem. Since the days of partition, West Bengal and Assam has seen the onslaught of millions of refugees which aggravated during the creation of Bangladesh. India stoically sustained and supported the refugees with the hope that they would return once Bangladesh was created. . But under the Indra- Mujib treaty those who came to India before 25 March 1971(the day Bangladesh was created) were granted citizenship. 3 But the influx refused to stop that is when the borders started becoming rigid to the extent that most of it today stands fenced.

“People flee, primarily, not to wealth, but from poverty” 4. Global warning and the climate change is taking its toll in this country in the most ruthless manner. Every monsoon the flood in the Brahmaputra swallows up villages destroying homes and property creating ‘Mohfiz’. 5 Land is guzzled by the river rendering landowners as landless labourers. Thus the Bangladeshis are largely escaping from the environmental onslaught and find India as a viable alternative where land is fertile; there is a demand for cheap labour and if they manage to cross the border without getting caught they are assured of survival.

The instinct to survive forces a Bangladeshi to move but the immigration rules constitutes an obstacle. But if legal immigration is not possible there is always the alternative of entering illegally or overstaying and being harboured by relatives or friends who have come earlier. 6 As they develop entitlements in India, it becomes difficult to distinguish an immigrant from a citizen. Eventually when they start staking political claims it may undermine the legitimacy of the government and the sovereignty of the state. There are reports that few of these immigrants have won elections in some of the border districts of Assam. Secondly, most of these immigrants vote enbloc which plays a decisive role in the election of candidates to the legislative bodies.

The rise of nation state bought in tow the term of nationalism and nationality. In order to provide security it became essential to identify citizens and construct demographic regimes. Everyone was expected to have only one nationality and it would provide the individual with a measure of protection in a hostile anarchic world of nation-states. Under international law states are not required to admit aliens. But if they do, they are obliged to treat them in humane and civilized manner. Illegal migration puts the nation state in a quandary as they enter without documents or permission and once in, the receiving state is bound by the international norm of ‘non refoulement’. 7 India has no immigration policy whatsoever; hence there is much ambiguity in tackling the case of arrested migrants. When a few of those who are arrested while crossing the border with no authentic document are to be deported, Bangladesh refuses to admit them, forcing an inhuman modus operandi of ‘push back’. In case of Assam, the IMDT Act has failed to detect the illegal migrants, which is discernible by the frugal number of deportations. More over the police cannot be compelled to fritter their energy into the futile exercise of preparing cases against immigrants and on the issuance of the ‘Quit India’ notice they escape from their place of residence to unknown destinations, probably never to be caught again. The Indo-Bangla border is infested with touts, they arrange for the crossing of the borders for an amount, ensuring safe passage, in connivance with the BSF. Locals at the border area also indulge in providing hiding place for such immigrants for a day or two till it is safe for them to move on, for a cost. Over the years the network is well established and has become a matter of routine for all parties involved namely immigrants, locals, touts, BDR and the BSF.

Migration is a two way process it affects both the sending country and the receiving country. For the sending country it is less responsibility on the state to fend for the poor labourers who are a burden on the exchequer but it also means remittance in the long run. Remittance sent back to home country are a source of foreign exchange and important addition to gross national product . 8 This is especially true of the migrants from South Asia to the Gulf; there are instances of how states like Kerala have flourished due to petro-dollars. Though there may not be similar remittance for a Bangladeshi migrant working in India but nonetheless it is better than the starvation or destitution he faces at home. Moreover he has nothing to lose, if he manages to cross illegally he can earn enough to sustain himself and his family but if he gets caught even then he is well taken care of by the Indian jail authorities.

Migrants are often alleged of stealing the job from the locals and reduce the wage below acceptable level. While most of them are able to earn enough for a decent living they are assumed to take away the jobs of the local. These migrants have been forced out of their country for economic reasons and come with an understanding that they have to work hard to survive and do so, for this very reason they are preferred over the locals. Moreover locals haven’t been very enterprising but get jealous when the migrants do well. The resentment due to jealousy against the immigrants was experienced in the Nellie killings in Assam. 9

The ground reality is that if the locals could do the jobs then there would be no opportunity for migrants but because locals refuse to work as farm labourers, construction workers, or cycle rickshaw puller the immigrants are absorbed in. Moreover the immigrants are offered jobs, often knowingly, by locals for the lure of cheap labour. Immigrants have no option but to work hard and thus are ready to go an extra mile to ensure employment; this has been grudgingly acknowledged by locals themselves. Furthermore, since most of the immigrants would be absorbed in particular occupations it would get a social label as “immigrant’s job” resulting into a general denial by locals of taking it up. 10 Hence the liberal paradox: the economic logic of liberalism is one of openness, but the political and legal logic is one of closure.11

Conclusion

Migration is not a norm but a deviation and hence has to be treated accordingly. Taking residence abroad is an exception not a rule. It is estimated that around 175 million people around the world are international migrants, which is just 2.3 per cent of the world’s population. Furthermore, migration doesn’t occur in isolation but sprints parallel to movements of commodities and capital. Though the figure doesn’t necessitate the pressing of the panic button today, it is fitting to predict that the twenty first century is going to be the age of migration.12 Thus the norm prevalent in the modern age of nationalising space for citizens needs to be set right in the post modern era where walls are crumbling under the influence of globalisation and people prefer to be mobile. The phenomena of migration will continue as long as the difference in development and economic opportunities between nations remains as wide as it is. Migration in itself is not a crime, but they are victims of circumstances and in need of protection. 13

Rights conferred on citizens are product of their membership of the nation state. Citizenship is a privilege and denotes exclusivity of those who belong to a nation. The traditional nation state retains the primary powers to grant citizenship and as long as this exclusivity is maintained migrants will continue to remain at the periphery without rights. Citizenship is determined by decent and there are no criteria or task to be performed by a citizen to retain it. Pursuing the line of providing human security each nation facing the issue of migration has to undertake an obligation to share this privilege with migrants. Save for the rights of refugees’ recognised by International community there are no legal guidelines provided for migrants. But the recent development on international human rights law have helped to solidify the position of individuals vis-a-vis the nation-state, to the extent that individuals have acquired a sort of international legal personality, leading some analyst to speculate that we are entering a post national era characterised by universal personhood. 14 In this postnational model, universal personhood replaces nationhood; and a universal human right replaces national right. Thus the individual transcends the citizen 15.

As the Swiss novelist Max Frisch pointed out at, the European governments had ‘asked for workers, but human beings came’. Unlike goods or capital, migrants (qua human beings) can and do acquire rights, particularly under the aegis of the laws and constitutions of liberal states, which afford migrants a measure of due process and equal protection 16.

Notes

1.Christiane Harziq and Dirk Hoerder with Gabaccia Donna (2009) What is Migration History? Cambridge, Polity p.1.
2.Anthony M. Messina and Gallya Lahav (Ed) (2006), Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and Policies, Viva Books Private Limited, New Delhi, p.10.
3.The Indo-Bangladeshi Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace was a 25-year treaty that was signed on March 19, 1972 forging close bilateral relations between India and the newly-established state of Bangladesh.
4.An observation made by an interdepartmental study group set by the Swedish Ministry of Labour in 1990.
5.Mohfiz is the wretched of the earth. The term is taken from Sanjoy Hazarika (2000) Rites of Passage, Penguin Books, New Delhi.
6.Han Entzinger, Marco Matiniello and Catherine Wihtol De Wenden (Ed) (2004) Migration Between States and Markets, Aldershot, England, Ashgate Publishing Ltd. p. XV.
7.The principle of "refoulement" was officially enshrined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and is also contained in the 1967 Protocol and Art 3 of the 1984 Torture Convention.
8.Anthony M. Messina, Op. cit. p. 27.
9.In 1983 the political, economic and social foundation of Assamese society collapsed resulting into Bengali migrants being brutally massacred by the hundreds, sparing none women, children and men alike.
10.Anthony M. Messina, Op. cit. p. 49
11.Han Entzinger Op. cit. p. 4.
12.Castles Stephen and Miller Mark J. (1998) The Age of Migration, London, Macmillan Press Ltd., 2nd Edition. p. 5
13.Anthony M. Messina, Op. cit. p. 27.
14.Han Entzinger, Op.cit. p. 14.
15.Nash Kate (ed) (2000) Readings in Contemporary Political Sociology, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers. p. 269.
16.Han Entzinger, Op.cit. p. 11.

Protection and Prevention – of the Community & Child Migrants

2011-03-31T18:42:00.001+05:30

Priyanca Mathur Velath

The dilemma in forced migration studies, of whether refugees and IDPs are distinct and if the former is ‘more’ in need of protection, is perhaps jinxed to remain unresolved. But growing out of it are equally, if not more, pressing concerns like what is protection and who needs it. Who needs it most and who slips through the gaps? Can’t protection needs be minimised through preventive mechanisms? Can a community approach address refugee needs better? While refugees are entitled to rights as they ‘vote through their feet’ and flee into a country outside that of their nationality, IDPs continue to crave for rights within the borders of their own country. While their protection needs may get highlighted, often the R&R needs of those internally displaced by ‘developmental’ projects get neglected. Thus this issue of RWO tries to sew together a tapestry of four diverse key concepts - ‘child migrants’, ‘preventive mechanism’, ‘IDP policy’ and ‘community approach’.

Glebova’s article draws attention to the unfortunate plight of child migrants in the Caribbean who slip through the gaps in the legal protection framework and become ‘invisible’ to rights. They become doubly neglected as they reside in a region where low asylum numbers makes migration an issue of lesser national importance. She rightly highlights that “there is still very little research on measuring the impact of migration on families and their children, whether in the Caribbean or worldwide.” The tragic irony is that all Caribbean states have ratified the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) making it legally binding on their territory but its effective implementation is lagging behind. Issues crucial to these migrant children are access to education and health care, particularly the unaccompanied ones who are not just denied access to legal and practical assistance, but also at times detained in places of institutional care. What is of particular concern is that “unaccompanied children can be wrongly considered to be adult undocumented migrants, and deported without exercising their right to seek asylum, and without regard for the rights of the child”.

Jeyaprakash revives the importance of stressing on the preventive mechanism in displacement dynamics. Today when the world around us erupts sporadically with ‘new’ refugee situations like that arising out of Libya, Jeyaprakash’s attempt to push our attention to the need to look at ‘prevention’ has value in making us question if these conditions could have been averted. Despite the fact that recent research, as he notes, has shown that “conceptual fragility” and “internal inconsistencies” continues to plague the concept of prevention, leading it to even being termed as an “impractical idea”. He argues that the rise in the refugee trend and a worst voluntary repatriation scenario stress clearly the need and the importance of prevention policies. “We cannot deny the need for including prevention concerns in displacement dialectics because of the fact that each and every reality has an assignable cause. This causal knowledge leads to prevention.”

Dahal’s article revives the old argument that even though estimates of the number of IDPs are said to be controversial due to debates over definitions as well as methodological and practical problems in counting, it is widely held that because of new forms of conflict, among other reasons, estimates of IDPs are now greater than those associated with refugees. He focuses on the famous Deng UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and through that lens examines the IDP policy of the Himalayan state of Nepal, where conflict-induced displacement is relatively a new phenomenon. Quoting the UN, Dahal points out that human rights problems and violations faced by IDPs in Nepal are related to a number of factors, including poor security and protection; discrimination; inadequate food, shelter, health care or access to education for children; a lack of personal and property identification documents; and gender-based violence, sexual abuse and increased domestic violence. He also notes the deleterious impact such forced migration has on children in Nepal. Besides, crucial observations that emerge from his piece are that in Nepal the legal identity of every IDP and the integrated rehabilitation programs has not yet been specified. Moreover, displaced persons fear to go back to their place of origin without any guarantee of life or the ability to make a living. According to various sources, up to 70,000 IDPs in Nepal do not want to return to their native areas due to fears about security and discrimination as well as housing, land and property restitution. “This is a problem because IDP National Policy only provides support to those IDPs who are willing to return”.

The article sent by the UNHCR Office discusses the community based approach to refugee protection adopted by them in Delhi, one that is based on the principle of ‘helping refugees to help themselves’. Community building between refugees and the host population in the long run also encourages local integration as a possible durable solution. Such an approach supports refugees and asylum seekers in re-establishing familiar cultural patterns and support structures to work together in exercising and enjoying their human rights. (UNHCR: 2008) In fact the UNHCR’s 2009 policy on refugee protection and solutions in urban areas emphasises on community orientation as one of the key principles. “To ensure the best possible use of its limited resources, UNHCR has gradually shifted away from an individual assistance to a community based approach by targeting assistance to those refugees and asylum seekers most in need, including unaccompanied and separated children, single women, female headed households, the elderly, the infirm and persons with disabilities.” One does hope that in the end such a participatory model of refugee protection helps to build and restore a sense of ‘community’ among otherwise dispersed refugee groups in a complex urban setting like New Delhi.

Finally in our section on Reports, Nandakishor critically analyses the proceedings of a recently held conference on ‘Displacement and Rehabilitation: Solutions for the Future’. He puts forth the key discussion points that emerged on sessions that were held on varied issues like Displacement and Livelihood’, ‘Gender, Ethnicity Indigenous Communities and R& R issues’, ‘Rehabilitation Policy and Implementation Issues’,‘ Civil Society and Corporate Bodies’, and ‘Displacement and People’s Response’. Some commendable suggestions are that displaced families be resettled in the spirit of ‘community transplanted’ so that the displaced will fell less culturally alienated; wider dissemination of the land acquisition notices; formation of evaluation committees that should comprise of stakeholders, academia, civil society and government representatives; consultation and participation of affected groups/individuals; resettlement sites to be fully developed prior to relocation; compulsory employment for one member of every displaced family; and efforts to address ‘psychological’ trauma associated with displacement etc.

We shall look forward to your responses and further contributions.

2011-03-31T18:38:00.002+05:30

Call for papers: Labor in the Global South: A Search for Solutions-A global, interdisciplinary graduate student research conference
Venue – University of California, U.S.A. || Date - May 27-28, 2011
It is critical to reexamine the position of labor in the global South, in the context of momentous changes underway in the global economic and political order. Consider some of those changes: Newly rising powers, such as Brazil, China, and South Africa, are assuming greater roles. Increasing numbers of voices are questioning neoliberal prescriptions and market fundamentalist solutions, and pushing for a broader conception of development that includes social as well as economic dimensions. New movements for democracy are stirring in the Middle East, along with continuing struggles over the degree and nature of democracy across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. At the same time, informal and irregular employment continue to make up a huge proportion of jobs in the global South, and the fickleness of global capital flows undermines attempts to carry out sustainable development and upgrade job quality. The UN estimates that over 200 million people world-wide are international migrants (above all from poorer to richer countries), and migrant remittances constitute a major income strategy for families and indeed whole countries in the South.

In this context, it is important to take stock of the state of work and workers in the global South, and to share best practices and critiques of strategies to upgrade jobs and empower workers. This conference will bring together graduate students from the United States and around the world to bring their own research to bear on these issues. The goal is not just to exchange information, but to advance discussions about strategies and solutions. To this end, graduate student presentations, which will make up the bulk of conference content, will be supplemented by innovative labor-related practitioners from the South, in addition to senior academics from the United States. Also, to this end, we ask that paper submissions look toward solutions as well as analyzing current and historical conditions. We welcome submissions that look at a full range of issues involving labor, work, and employment, including formal employment, informal employment, and household and other uncompensated work. Possible topics include, but are not limited to the following themes on labor in the global South:
• Democracy and human rights
• Development
• Gender and family
• Race and ethnicity
• Migration
• Corporations and global commodity chains
• Public policies, labor movements and other social movements, NGOs

Submissions are welcome from graduate students in a variety of disciplines, including but not limited to: sociology, political science, history, geography, anthropology, economics, area studies, ethnic and gender studies, public policy, social welfare, and urban planning.

A limited number of travel scholarships (airplane fare only) are available to graduate students outside the United States. Participants from outside Los Angeles will be housed with UCLA graduate students and faculty at no cost.

Proposals (1 page) are due April 8, 2011. Include your name, institutional affiliation (including graduate program name), and country. Please indicate whether you wish to be considered for a travel scholarship. Send to laborintheglobalsouth@gmail.com

Questions? Contact Florentina Craciun at laborintheglobalsouth@gmail.compri

2011-03-31T18:32:00.002+05:30

Eviction Left 15 Refugee Families Homeless in Delhi

24 March 2011: Fifteen Chin refugee families, a total of 58 members, are camping out in makeshift shelters in an open space behind the UNHCR Office in Delhi, India after they were evicted from their quarters by the local Indian landlord yesterday.

The families, including children and elderly with health problems, were reportedly forced to move out after the neighbors make complaints to the manager of the flat, Mr. Babulo.

"We were told by the manager that the other neighbors didn't like the smell of our food which includes fish paste (Ngapih). Although we actually refrained from eating ngapih after their initial complaints, they still wanted us out of this area," said Mr. Joshua Hrang Lian Kap, one of the evicted family members.

"Most of the times, we felt that they were hostile to us. Our children got beaten up for no reasons and our properties stolen. We faced verbal and physical abuses. Their intention is clearly to drive us out from this location," continued Mr. Joshua.

The families are now camping out in an open space by the back entrance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees office, hoping to get assistance and protection from the UN refugee agency.

"They were informed to vacate the rooms on 15 March 2011 by the landlord, who threatened to take legal actions against them if they failed to comply. So, they had no choice but to move out as they couldn't find any other places that they could afford," added the Chin resident in Delhi.

Meanwhile, it has been reported that 42 Burmese refugees were arrested from their work places, including from local restaurants and factories in a police raid in Aizawl, Mizoram State of India on Tuesday.

At least as 100,000 Chins and other migrant workers from Burma, are estimated to be living in Mizoram State.

Refugee Girl Rescued from Attempted Sexual Assault

A Chin refugee girl, 14, was rescued by passers-by around 3pm Indian local time yesterday from an alleged attempted rape by a local Indian while she was washing clothes. Originally from Lingtui village in Matupi Township of Chin State, the girl was allegedly being approached by a naked neighbor identified as Mr. Waahid when passers-by intervened.

"Suddenly, the girl cried out loudly and the nearby people rushed to her help immediately. And the incident has already been reported to the police," said a Chin resident in the neighborhood.
The girl, who is looking after her mentally challenged mother, came to New Delhi in January 2007 and has been recognized as a mandated refugee by the UNHCR in April 2007.
Last year, at least 30 refugee women were reported to have been sexually assaulted or violently beaten by local Indian men during attempted sexual assaults.
http://chinlandguardian.com/news-2009/1245-eviction-left-15-refugee-families-homeless-in-delhi.html

The Libyan Refugee Crisis - Thousands of people are fleeing the violence in Libya every day, the U.N. refugee agency says.
March 25, 2011 |

Tunisia is receiving about 2,000 arrivals daily, most of them Sudanese and Bangladeshi, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees said in a statement. Between 1,500 and 2,000 others are crossing into Egypt each day, most of them Libyans and Egyptians but also a growing number from Chad. As of Wednesday, the total number who had fled the fighting stood at more than 351,000, the statement said. The UNHCR is also receiving reports from its partners of increasing displacement inside Libya. The Santa Monica-based International Medical Corps estimates that as many as 20,000 people have taken refuge in the small town of Butwen, east of the contested city of Ajdabiya, the statement said. The Libyan Red Crescent has told the UNHCR that some 5,000 people are displaced in the coastal town of Derna.

The UNHCR said it had sent two convoys with medical supplies to the rebel stronghold of Benghazi through the Egyptian Red Crescent and the Libyan Red Crescent. It has also sent thousands of blankets, sleeping mats and other relief items. But it said it did not have access to other parts of Libya.

Meanwhile, thousands of migrant workers escaping the violence in Libya, many of them Egyptian, are stranded in a makeshift camp on the border with Tunisia, and appeal for their governments to evacuate them. Franco Frattini, the foreign minister, said Italy was bracing for an exodus 10 times bigger than the number of Albanians who fled to Italy in the 1990s when the Balkan nation descended into anarchy. "We know what to expect when the Libyan national system falls – a wave of 200,000 to 300,000 immigrants," Mr Frattini said. "These are estimates, and on the low side ... It is a Biblical exodus. It's a problem that no Italian should underestimate." He said about a third of Libya's population, or 2.5 million people, are immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa who could flee if the popular revolt topples the government of Muammar Gaddafi. Those living in the eastern part of Libya might try to reach Greece, rather than Italy, because it is closer, he said.

Umberto Bossi, a minister in the government of Silvio Berlusconi and the leader of the Northern League party, threatened to dump the problem on other European countries. "If they arrive we'll send them to France and Germany," he said. The number of refugees and economic migrants reaching Italian islands like Lampedusa, which lies close to the coast of Tunisia, fell sharply after Silvio Berlusconi concluded a pact with Col. Gaddafi in 2008 under which the Libyan navy and coast guard intercepted boat loads of Africans. But the UN's agency for refugees appealed to Italy not to block migrants who may flee from Libya.

The UN’s refugee agency has reacted with understanding to Malta’s unwillingness to host any sub-Saharan refugees evacuated to Egypt and Tunisia Libya. The UNHCR had launched an appeal on behalf of thousands of Eritrean and Somali refugees, among others, who have fled the conflict in the embattled North African state but are unable to return home where they would be persecuted. The European Commission responded by trying to lobby member states to accept resettling some of these migrants but the Maltese government has made it clear it would not be part of such an effort. “At this stage, I think we are already carrying a much bigger burden than we can handle in terms of refugees and asylum seekers and so we won’t be making any offers,” Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi said.

However, the UNHCR, which had its fair share of diplomatic disputes with the Maltese government over immigration, told The Sunday Times that while all contributions were welcome it “would not expect that Malta would be among the main resettlement destinations for these refugees”. “Some 1,000 refugees have in recent years benefited from such programmes. The UNHCR considers that this support can provide opportunities for Malta to make further progress with improving the situation also for those who remain in the country,” a spokesman for the agency said. Malta hosts around 3,700 African migrants (79 in detention, 2,224 in open centres and 1,400 in the community) according to official statistics released in November – a far cry from over 10,000 immigrants who were estimated to be in Malta in 2008.However, the government is bracing itself for a possible exodus from Libya once the situation there settles down. Yesterday, the Armed Forces were monitoring a vessel reportedly carrying 300 migrants believed to have left Tripoli on Friday. Asked if Malta should take a symbolic number of migrants evacuated from Libya, a spokesman for the Justice Ministry said: “The EU has already made its position on the matter clear when it pledged its support to the southern member states during an extraordinary European Council held on March 11. “At present Malta is hosting around 4,000 African immigrants while at the same time having by far the highest rate of asylum applications in the EU. “Malta will continue to provide assistance to these people while keeping its size, limited resources and small population in sight. Malta has already proven that it assists and offers protection to those in need,” he said. Earlier this month, about 100 members of the Eritrean community in Malta held a demonstration in Valletta calling on the island and the international community to help evacuate asylum seekers stranded in Libya. They said the Eritreans could not return to their country because they would be prosecuted and as they were not part of the international evacuation effort, they were stranded without protection in Libya. Some were in danger of being shot, being mistaken for Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s mercenaries, they added.

The Jesuit Refugee Service had also appealed to the EU and the international community to take immediate and concrete action to provide resettlement opportunities for some the Eritrean asylum seekers stranded in Libya. When contacted, JRS laid stress on the need for northern Europe to help the south, but urged Malta to give special consideration to refugees whose close family members have already been granted international protection here. “While the Libyan crisis, unfolding so close to Malta, is bound to make additional demands on our structures and resources, the international community and EU member states in particular clearly share the moral obligation to come forward with offers of resettlement for refugees reaching Malta and other southern European states who receive a disproportionate numbers of asylum seekers in relation to their resources,” the JRS said.

Women and Children Aboard Refugee Boat from Libya

27/3/2011 - The first boat of refugees from Libya has arrived in Italy. Women and children are among the passengers.
Yesterday, the first boat of migrants fleeing Libya reached the shores of Italy. The boat carried 350 African migrants. Conditions on the boat are said to be very poor, with roughly ten children and 20 women on board. Most of the migrants aboard the ship are Eritreans, Ethiopians and Somalians. Two pregnant women were aboard the ship. Both were airlifted to hospitals on the shore – one on the island of Lampedusa, the other on the well-known island of Sicily. While the first woman's baby lived through the ordeal, the baby of the second woman did not survive, say medical staff.

The boat is reportedly taking on water, but is being assisted by a Canadian ship taking part in the NATO-enforced naval arms embargo on Libya. “We are monitoring the situation very closely and confidently,” said a NATO spokesperson. According to a spokesperson for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the only migrants to arrive on Lampedusa were Tunisians until yesterday's boat arrived.

Arriving mostly in small fishing boats, 15,000 Tunisian refugees have made their way to Lampedusa since January's ousting of former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. There are still about 250 Tunisian children on the island. Another 250 mostly teenaged children were taken to homes in other parts of Italy. Conditions on the island are said to be very crowded and unfit for children. This led to the transfer of 96 children to a US Coast Guard base elsewhere on the island. However, the Libyan migrants will not be taken to Lampedusa. Instead, they'll be taken to a refugee centre on the island of Linosa.

Earlier this month, one international child charity reported that the lives of one million children were endangered by the fighting between government and rebel forces in Libya. Children in capital city of Tripoli and the surrounding area were said to be particularly vulnerable. An estimated 700,000 children call Tripoli home, though many are becoming fearful for themselves, their family and their friends. Already, 100,000 people have fled to neighbouring countries Egypt and Tunisia. According to the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), there are 180 children and 149 women waiting to be evacuated by the Egyptian border. The number of women and children leaving the country is reported to have increased in recent weeks.

The UN authorized the implementation of a no-fly zone over Libya almost two weeks ago. Air strikes with the purpose of civilian protection were also authorized under UN Resolution 1973. Resolution 1973 passed in a 10-0 vote, with China, Russia, Brazil, Germany and India abstaining.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8343963/Libya-Italy-fears-300000-refugees.html
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110327/local/unhcr-understands-government-s-refusal-to-take-refugees-from-libya
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/03/libya-thousands-fleeing-every-day-un-refugee-agency-says.html
http://www.soschildrensvillages.ca/News/News/child-charity-news/Pages/Children-Refugee-Boat-Libya-661.aspx

‘Invisible’ Children of the Caribbean: Child Migrants fall through the Cracks of Legal Protection throughout the Region

2011-03-31T18:26:00.002+05:30

Ksenia Glebova

[works for UNICEF in Suriname, South America. Ksenia is a freelance journalist and Ph.D student interested in child rights, migration discourse, identity and borders]

The Caribbean is a region of extensive migration with currently the highest percentage of out-migration in the world (i). The region is a source, place of transit en route to the United States or Canada, and final destination for both forced and voluntary migrants coming from within the Caribbean, South and Central America, and more recently also from Africa and Asia.

The percentage of migrant population in the Caribbean states varies greatly from 0.1 in Cuba to 34% in Aruba and 53% in the US Virgin Islands whereas in terms of forced migration, the absolute majority of refugees from the region come from Haiti that over 24,000 persons left in 2010(ii). A total of 40 persons were recognized as convention refugees in the Caribbean itself.(iii) Due to the very low number of persons seeking asylum from the Caribbean, asylum issues are a low priority for most states focusing on migration from the national security perspective.

Caribbean societies were “largely formed through immigration, both forced and free” (iv), as a result of slave trade and colonial relationships, and in the recent decades as a strategy of economic survival. The region is characterized by complex and mixed migratory patterns including asylum seekers, refugees, economic and environmental migrants, and other vulnerable migrants such as victims of trafficking and unaccompanied minors.

Children (v) are often among the most vulnerable groups in these mobile societies that jeopardize the rights and well being of accompanied and unaccompanied child migrants as well as of children left behind by one or both parents who have migrated. The effects of migration can have a profound impact on the child’s development let alone safety and well being(vi). However, there is still very little research on measuring the impact of migration on families and their children, whether in the Caribbean or worldwide.

The Other Side of the Postcard

Against the postcard image of tropical tourist paradise, children are part of the little-known side of global migration. Migration trends in the Caribbean region are very similar to those of migration by sea routes from North Africa to Southern Europe. Similarly, the Caribbean is transit point for human traffickers and smugglers operating the route to the US and Canada. There is no reliable data on the number of people who perish due to natural hazards en route but every year several hundred men, women and children do not make it to the shore alive. Those who do are facing familiar discrimination and abuse in breach of the Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees. Yet the situation in the Caribbean receives far less public attention.

Eleven out of thirteen independent Caribbean states have acceded to the 1951 Geneva Convention, but only the Dominican Republic and Belize have adopted it into national legislation. Similarly, all Caribbean states have ratified the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)(vii) making it legally binding on their territory but its effective implementation is lagging behind. Refugee children have the full rights of children under the CRC and the full rights of refugees under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in the countries that ratified the Convention.

Article 2 of the CRC states that “State parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status”. Therefore, the CRC extends the obligations of the state to protect the rights of all children within its territory, including the rights of migrant children, regardless of their migration status. The “best interests of the child” principle (Article 3) should guide all procedures affecting the child.

However, despite the legal framework protection of child migrants in the Caribbean is more than often only de jure. The global key issues for refugee girls and boys are separation from families and caregivers, sexual exploitation, abuse and violence, access to education and specific concerns of adolescents or young people resonate in the Caribbean, although the absolute majority of migrant children are not forced migrants. In the region, migrant children and especially undocumented children face serious difficulties in securing their access to education and health care, both of which are basic rights guaranteed in the CRC. Even if they secure access to education, there are no special education support programmes tailored to child migrants in this multilingual region, where they may face considerable language challenges in school as do, for example, Guyanese English-speaking children in the Dutch-speaking Caribbean. Birth registration, another basic right enshrined in the CRC, is also problematic, especially for the thousands of Haitian children residing outside their country of origin.

Following the devastating earthquake in January 2010 thousands of Haitians, including unaccompanied children, moved to other Caribbean states that temporarily accepted migrants entering their territory legally and illegally. The island states in closest geographical proximity to Haiti hosted the majority of the migrants. In the Bahamas, the repatriation of Haitians who have entered the country illegally has been put on hold. The government of Dominica extended the stay of all Haitians already on the island for extra six months, regardless of their legal status. However, the Haiti momentum is over and the time has come to guarantee the rights of migrants beyond temporary emergency assistance.

Beyond Safety

Finding safety in the Caribbean is feasible but securing wider child rights, though guaranteed by the Geneva Convention, is more challenging. The asylum systems are weak and underdeveloped and the rates of recognition are uniformly low putting genuine refugees at life-threatening risk of deportation. Especially unaccompanied child migrants in the Caribbean are denied access to legal and practical assistance and at times detained in place of institutional care. Unaccompanied children can be wrongly considered to be adult undocumented migrants, and deported without exercising their right to seek asylum, and without regard for the rights of the child (viii).

The island of Aruba in the Caribbean Sea is a case in point of complex mixed migration, where authorities do not separate between economic migrants and asylum seekers under the Geneva Convention, but only between those who entered the country legally and illegally (ix). Many of those who arrived illegally in Aruba, and other Caribbean islands, may qualify for the Convention status having fled their countries as a result of genuine persecution.

Nevertheless, forced migrants are often taken for economic migrants, detained for illegal entry and promptly deported before they have a chance to submit an application for asylum. Public awareness of the differences between economic migrants and refugees is modest at best, reception facilities do not cater to the needs of migrants who spent weeks at sea, there is no specialised health care. Undocumented child migrants, both forced and voluntary, are consistently among the lowest performing students in schools across the region and have disproportionately high drop out rate (x).

Towards de Facto Child Protection

The discussion on the subject of child migration, both forced and voluntary, in the Caribbean is still relatively new and evolving. Despite their extensive migration experience, the countries in the region do not guarantee even basic protection of the rights of child migrants, let alone in accordance with the principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. As a result the host governments are failing those often most vulnerable.

The 2010 humanitarian crisis in Haiti demonstrated the capacity of the Caribbean states to respond with extraordinary temporary protection measures as opposed to providing consistent minimum standards of child protection, especially for unaccompanied minors. However, it is precisely the legal and social policy reform that is needed to translate the Convention on the Rights of the Child into national legislation and guarantee rights of all children irrespective of their country of origin and legal status.

Endnotes

i.UN ECLAC (2006) Migration in the Caribbean – What do we know? An overview of data, policies and programmes at the international and regional level to address critical issues.
ii.UNHCR North America and the Caribbean website at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45bc56.html
iii.Ibid..
iv.Elizabeth Thomas-Hope (2003) Irregular migration and asylum-seekers in the Caribbean, UNU Wider Discussion Paper no 2003/48.
v.Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) defines a ‘child’ as any human being under the age of 18.
vi.Bakker, C. et al. (2009) Impact of Migration on the Children in the Caribbean, UNICEF Barbados and Eastern Caribbean.
vii.UN (1989) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm
viii.OHCHR (2010) Study of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on challenges and best practices in the implementation of the international framework for the protection of the rights of the child in the context of migration.
ix.Ibid..
x.CRC Committee (2009) Concluding observations on the State Report of the Netherlands, including the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.

Renewing Dialectics of Prevention in Displacement

2011-03-31T18:22:00.002+05:30

M. Peter Jeyaprakash

[former Voluntary Repatriation Specialist UNHCR, Chennai. At present he is working as Individual Contractor for UNHCR, Chennai]

“I have good reason to believe that somewhere on my planet there is an old rat. I hear him in the night. You can judge this old rat. From time to time you will condemn him to death. Thus his life will depend on your justice. But you will pardon him on each occasion; for he must be treated thriftily. He is the only one we have”.

- The Little Prince by Antoine De Saint – Exupery.

For ages refugees have been kept in the situation like that of the old rat. We have condemned him from time to time and pardoned him on each occasion. And we have given him our deepest consideration that “he is the only one we have”. It is a status quo situation kept alive by denying ourselves the need for prevention mechanism. Migration and displacement has not been a stranger to the concept of prevention. As a matter of fact, it was kept in a limbo like situation all the time since it was introduced into the domain of migration and displacement.

The Rise and Fall of the Concept of Prevention in Displacement Dialectics

The concept of prevention in displacement dialectics was initially focused by J. Hope Simpson in a survey titled The Refugee Problem in the year 1939. He states that “prevention is better than cure and international action must be directed to prevent the emergence of new refugee movements by easing those tensions, political and economic which threaten to produce unplanned migration movements”. And after a long time the UN appointed study group in a Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on International Co-operation to Avert New Flows of Refugees (Note by the Secretary-General, A/41/324, 13 May 1986) brought out the close link between human rights violations and refugee problem in the context of prevention.

And after a long silence, and in an effort to dispel any confusion that could arise out of interests on prevention, UNHCR in a report in 1999 clarified that “Preventive action consists of initiatives which have the effect of averting the occurrence and recurrence of those conditions which force people to leave their usual place of residence. The notion of prevention should never be confused with efforts to obstruct the flight of threatened populations, to deter the departure of people who intend to seek refuge elsewhere or to undermine the institution of asylum”.

The concept, as applied to refugees, makes its appearance again in a UNHCR document in 2001, when one of the objectives of the Agenda for Protection was formulated as “addressing the root causes of refugee movements”. And in the year 2010 a UNHCR research paper fixes the concept of prevention in refugee situations as an inconsistency. The paper brings out only the conceptual fragility of the idea of prevention and examines the internal inconsistencies of the concept. At best it was a willful undermining of the concept of prevention in displacement dialectics.

Thus in the course of time we find that the well intended introduction of the concept of prevention in displacement dialectics in the year 1939 is reduced to an impractical idea in the year 2010.

The Need for Prevention Strategy

However, we find that the problem of migration and displacement has never shown any sign of decline. It has become a major cause for worry among international humanitarian agencies. UNHCR reports that the number of forcibly displaced rises to 43.3 million last year, the highest level since mid-1990s. It also states that the year 2009 has been the worst for voluntary repatriation. The rise in the refugee trend and a worst voluntary repatriation scenario speak loud and clear the need and the importance of prevention policies.

We cannot deny the need for including prevention concerns in displacement dialectics because of the fact that each and every reality has an assignable cause. This causal knowledge leads to prevention.

Logic Implications and Uniformity of Relations towards Prevention

Let me give you some examples. Some years ago I worked for the school drop-outs in the rural areas of Northern Tamil Nadu. These children go with their parents to Chennai to work as house maids and return as confused individuals. They are confused and lost in their heart and mind. You can see the effect of displacement through their borrowed artificial ways of interacting with their own kind as if they are different from them. It is a kind of glistening garb of self-alienation which they are reluctant to shed. Originality takes the backstage so much so that their interaction has a nostalgic sense of hatred for their own kind in their native place.

And just as I was making up my mind that migration and displacement towards an urban area alienates people there was a surprise waiting for me. One of the villages I was working on through PRA methods to enhance the rural women was undergoing a worst situation as a result of economic migration. Most of the men in the village go and stay in Chennai for making an earning in the famous ‘Koyambedu’ vegetable market and return once in a week or month. During their absence some of the miscreants in the village gradually lured the women into road side prostitution with the lorry drivers. This went on until the peek of the AIDS/ HIV campaigns and it waned. In these examples we find that each problem becomes the cause of the other.

We in turn helplessly shift the responsibility on big players in the field like UNHCR to do something about it. UNHCR works at the penultimate end of the problem and in India it merely makes a ghost presence. UNHCR is handicapped by the fact that India is a non-signatory of the 1951 convention. India is keeping it that way. Unaware of this fact many Sri Lankan refugees approach UNHCR in India as soon as they landed with the hope of getting some help from the Office and always returned with a broken heart which got trampled upon by those who were not aware of the refugee rights. They suffered doubly.

Tragic Optimism

These are examples of dominos effect of not going through a causal investigation which, if pursued diligently, would give rise to prevention strategies. Incidents in the Arab world and the tsunami in Japan have spewed out more displacement problems. Remember the little Dutch boy who could not hold off the sea water by plugging the hole on the wall? And I would say that we have come to a saturation point with regard to displacement problem.

Yes, we have learnt a lot from the refugee situations and many theoretical outbursts have streamlined the problem into a cohesive knowledge bank (causal knowledge). Alternately, exhaustive didactic tricks too played havoc with the lives of the migrants and the displaced. So far we have not figured out a way to strike at the root cause of the problem. Amidst this swampy feeling there is a sense of tragic optimism that we have a way of life that also says enough is enough and that we got to put a stop to something recurring and making a fool of us. After all in the end the old rat has to die and stop making noise in the night.

Rethinking Nepal’s IDP Policy with Reference to UN Guiding Principles

2011-03-31T18:17:00.002+05:30

Nir Prasad Dahal

[Research Analyst, Eureka Research, Kabul, Afghanistan]

UN Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Internal displacement, or forced migration of people within their own countries, is today a common international phenomenon. According to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, ‘in more than 50 countries and practically in every world region, more than 25 million people are actually considered as displaced people just as a result of violent conflicts and human rights violations.’ This number would increase by several million when those who have been uprooted by natural or manmade causes are included (HRWF, 2005).

Internal displacement – and in particular conflict-induced internal displacement – is emerging worldwide as a burning problem. Estimates of the number of IDPs are said to be controversial due to debates over definitions as well as methodological and practical problems in counting, but it is widely held that because of new forms of conflict, among other reasons, estimates of IDPs are now greater than those associated with refugees (i.e., forced migrants who cross national borders). A clear understanding of the causes of and most effective responses to displacement and forced migration has become all the more crucial in this century when incidences of war, violence and cruelty cause the internal displacement of large numbers of citizens, along with human trafficking and other violations of human rights that involve the internally displaced.

To address the issues of IDPs, the Representative of the UN Secretary General on IDPs in 1998 presented to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights a set of Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The Commission, in a unanimously adopted resolution, took note of these principles (for the full text cf. Chimni, 2000, among other sources). The Guiding Principles on Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) includes 30 principles to address the problems of IDPs divided into five sections: General Principles, Principles Relating to Protection from Displacement, Principles Relating to Protection during Displacement, Principles Relating to Humanitarian Assistance, and Principles Relating to Return, Resettlement and Reintegration. In particular, Principle 15 mentions the following four basic rights of IDPs:

a. The right to seek safety in another part of the country
b. The right to leave their country
c. The right to seek asylum in another country
d. The right to be protected against forcible return to or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk.

Similarly, Section Four of the Guiding Principles includes those relating to humanitarian assistance (Principles 24-27). These principles state that humanitarian assistance should be provided to the IDPs in accordance with the principles of humanity and impartiality and without discrimination, and that this assistance should not be diverted for political or military reasons. The government is primarily responsible for providing humanitarian assistance to the IDPs; however, international humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors also have the right to offer their services in support of the IDPs. The principles further state that persons engaged in humanitarian assistance, their transport, and supplies should be protected from attacks and other acts of violence. In turn, humanitarian organizations and actors are required to respect relevant international standards and codes of conduct.

The Guiding Principles are soft laws and they are not legally binding, but the 30 recommendations – which define who IDPs are, outline a large body of international law already in existence protecting a person’s basic rights, and the responsibility of states – were designed to help governments and humanitarian organizations in working with the displaced.

The IDP Situation in Nepal

Conflict-induced displacement is a relatively new phenomenon in Nepal. This form of displacement started in 1996 when the internal armed conflict between the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) and the Government of Nepal began. One estimate states that 12,865 people lost their lives in Nepal during these years due to the conflict between the Maoists and the government of Nepal (INSEC, 2006). Moreover, reports from various organizations over the last few years have quoted IDP figures that range from approximately 37,000 all the way to 400,000 – and these figures exclude those who may have crossed the border into India (SAFHR, 2005). The Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division (IDD) Mission to Nepal reported that the most reliable estimate of IDPs in Nepal who were internally displaced by the conflict should be upwards to 200,000 (cited in Aditya et al., 2006).

It is well-recognized that displaced people are highly vulnerable. They often suffer from discrimination, experience significant deprivation, and are frequently impoverished. The UN expert on IDPs mentioned in his mission report that human rights problems and violations faced by IDPs in Nepal are related to a number of factors, including poor security and protection; discrimination; inadequate food, shelter, health care or access to education for children; a lack of personal and property identification documents; and gender-based violence, sexual abuse and increased domestic violence (www.un.org/News/Press/Docs/2005/hr4830.doc.htm).

The impact of displacement in Nepal is also said to be unevenly distributed between men, women and children. Many recorded incidents have revealed that many children have been forced to associate with armed forces and armed groups as members of militia, porters, kitchen helpers, messengers/postmen and spies. According to Child Workers in Nepal Concerned Centre (CWIN)(http://www.cwin.org.np/press_room/factsheet/fact_cic.htm), around 40,000 children were displaced in Nepal due to the armed conflict. During this period (1996-2006) 419innocent children are said to have lost their lives; 454 were physically injured; a total of 29,244 children along with teachers have been ‘abducted’, while 230 children are said to have been arrested by the state security forces; 150 children are reported to have been exploited in the worst forms of child labour; and 224 children are said to be facing health problems after being displaced due to armed conflict. In addition, the youth were reported to have left home due to the threat of forced recruitment into the militia. Most of the youth are said to have stayed in the city centre, although some were reported to have fled to India and Gulf countries to seek employment. According to one report by Save the Children Norway, about 10,000 young people under the age of 14-18 crossed the border during the months of July and August 2004 alone. There is no doubt that forced migration has had a significant and deleterious effect on large numbers of children in Nepal.

After Nepal’s political change (Jana Andolan II) in 2006, a new paradigm for conflict and displacement emerged. Top level negotiations between the government and the Maoists were initiated and the two sides reached an agreement to end the insurgency. The Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) was signed on November 21, 2006. The former rebel party – the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) – is now part of the political mainstream, and it has formally committed itself to facilitating the IDPs’ return process, without any political prejudice, through the Comprehensive Peace Accord. Following the agreement that created the CPA, the return process gained momentum and the Government of Nepal (GoN) adopted an IDP National Policy in 2063 BS (2007) to assist IDP returnees.

However, the way in which the IDP National Policy has been implemented to date is still very problematic. The legal identity of every IDP and the integrated rehabilitation programs have not been specified yet. Moreover, displaced persons fear to go back to their place of origin without any guarantee of life or the ability to make a living. According to various sources, up to 70,000 IDPs do not want to return to their native areas due to fears about security and discrimination as well as housing, land and property restitution. This is a problem because IDP National Policy only provides support to those IDPs who are willing to return. This is also not helped by the fact that the IDPs who have already returned to their place of origin are also struggling to integrate (IDMC_NRC, 2010).

In sum, IDPs in Nepal are highly vulnerable and need much greater support in order to return and reintegrate. There is a need to address the problems of IDPs and make a separate mechanism and specific law with an effective system of implementation to provide the protection and care that IDPs in Nepal will require in order to meet even their basic needs.

For this, the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement can serve as a guide. The Guiding Principles can serve as an important part of the process of re-conceptualizing, and understanding in much greater depth, the IDPs’ situation and concerns in Nepal. This is particularly important in this critical phase of the ‘post-conflict’ reweaving of the social fabric and the reestablishing of community ties throughout the country.

References

Aditya, Anand, Bishnu Raj Upreti, and Poorna Kanta Adhikary, 2006, Countries in Conflict and Processing of Peace: Lessons for Nepal, Kathmandu: Friends for Peace (FFP).
Chimni, B. S., 2000, International Refugee Law: A Reader, New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London: Sage Publications.
Human Rights without Frontiers Int. (HRWF), 2005, Internally Displaced Persons in Nepal: The Forgotten Victims of the Conflict, Bruxelles: HRWF.
IDMC_NRC, 2010, Nepal: Failed Implementation of IDP policy leaves many assisted, Geneva: IDMC.
Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC), 2006, INSEC Annual Report 2006, Kathmandu: INSEC.
Ministry of Home, A National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 2063 (2007), Kathmandu: Ministry of Home, Government of Nepal.

Community Based Approach to Refugee Protection: UNHCR’s Experience in New Delhi

2011-03-31T18:09:00.002+05:30

UNHCR, New Delhi

Introduction

Refugee protection is gradually shifting away from individual case management to a community-based approach (UNHCR: 1996). Such an approach is rooted in the principle of helping refugees to help themselves and goes beyond the mere provision of material relief i.e. cash assistance, aiming to address the social, human, emotional and psychological needs of refugees.

In an urban context, the challenges of reaching out to individual refugees are manifold. The refugee population is widely dispersed and isolated in their host communities with whom they have no cultural, social or language ties. Poverty and lack of sustainable employment and income relegates many refugees to the socio-economic margins and exposes them to major protection risks.

Refugees in urban areas often suffer from lack of community identity and support. The process of community building can be assisted by creating structures and procedures to facilitate communication, dialogue and mutual support. Community building between refugees and the host population should also be actively encouraged, not only in the interests of good relations and public order, but also in the context of local integration as a possible durable solution.

What is a Community based Approach?

A community-based approach is a way of working in partnership with refugees and asylum seekers during all stages of UNHCR’s programme cycle. It recognises the resilience, capacities, skills and resources of persons of concern, builds on these to deliver protection and solutions, and supports the community’s own goals.

This approach can help communities work to prevent social problems and to deal directly with those that do arise, instead of having external actors step in and assume these responsibilities. It supports refugees and asylum seekers in re-establishing familiar cultural patterns and support structures to work together in exercising and enjoying their human rights. (UNHCR: 2008)

UNHCR’s 2009 policy on refugee protection and solutions in urban areas emphasises on community orientation as one of the key principles.

UNHCR’s approach in urban settings will be community-based. In accordance with this principle, the Office will strive to mobilize and capacitate the refugee population, so as to preserve and promote their dignity, self-esteem, productive and creative potential.

Need for a Community based Approach to Refugee Protection in New Delhi

Refugees face a number of problems living in an expensive urban environment like New Delhi. With rising costs and lack of employment opportunities, refugees suffer severe economic hardship. Poverty is a major constraint and impacts on all aspects of life in asylum. The increasing competition for scarce resources with local populations can put refugees at conflict with local populations and at risk of exploitation and discrimination.

Refugees and asylum seekers in India do not have a legal right to work and often live in poor socio economic conditions. However, many of them are able to find employment in the informal job market but often, work in exploitative conditions and are paid low wages. Most of them live in shared and overcrowded accommodation in unsanitary conditions. Instances of gender based violence, including domestic violence and substance abuse are commonly reported, resulting in deteriorating family and community relations.

The number of refugees and asylum seekers has been steadily increasing over the last few years without a proportionate increase in UNHCR’s resources. UNHCR has made significant changes to its programmes to address the evolving needs of the operation.

Given the excessively long waiting times for registration of asylum seekers, UNHCR outsourced registration to a legal implementing partner in mid-2009. As a result, asylum seekers are now registered within three weeks of approaching UNHCR. UNHCR has also streamlined its refugee status determination (RSD) processes to ensure quicker processing of asylum claims.

UNHCR has directed its efforts to narrow the gap in services between asylum seekers and refugees by providing increased access to all asylum seekers of its programmes (health, education, legal aid, counseling, local language lessons) except for those involving direct cash assistance and some livelihood programmes.

To ensure the best possible use of its limited resources, UNHCR has gradually shifted away from an individual assistance to a community based approach by targeting assistance to those refugees and asylum seekers most in need, including unaccompanied and separated children, single women, female headed households, the elderly, the infirm and persons with disabilities.

Some of the features of UNHCR’s community based approach are described as follows:

Protection Outreach

As the 2009 policy on urban refugees states:

UNHCR’s responsibility is to reach as many of those persons who are concern to the organization as possible, an approach that requires the Office to adopt a proactive approach to protection planning and implementation.

In New Delhi, UNHCR has strengthened its protection outreach activities, primarily through the Women’s Protection Centre (WPC) in West Delhi for refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar and by establishing regular UNHCR presence in partners’ centres in other areas where refugees and asylum seekers from other nationalities live. By reaching out to the community, UNHCR has better served its protection role through early identification and timely intervention to address protection needs and gaps in service delivery.

Fostering Better Relations with Communities

A key aspect of the community based approach is to treat refugees and asylum seekers as partners and not mere beneficiaries. UNHCR’s relationship with refugees in urban areas has sometimes been tense with some degree of mutual suspicion. The 2009 policy highlights the need for UNHCR to strengthen community outreach efforts to ‘establish a constructive dialogue and positive partnership with refugees in urban areas’.

In New Delhi, UNHCR holds regular dialogue with refugees and asylum seekers using a number of channels including refugee reception, protection outreach, open house meetings, participatory assessments and meetings with community representatives. Such direct, transparent and regular interaction has improved relations and fostered the spirit of partnership between UNHCR and the communities.

Open house meetings provide refugees and asylum seekers from each national group the opportunity to get together and present their concerns as a community to UNHCR. Such fora also allow UNHCR to share information, explain policies, clarify doubts and address concerns of the community.

Participatory assessments are another useful tool to build partnerships with refugee and asylum seeker men and women of all ages and backgrounds. What is special in these assessments is that they come together according to their nationality, gender and age group, in the understanding that beyond the commonalities of their situation in India, they have specific concerns which relate to their gender and age group. Together with UNHCR and its partners, they identify protection risks as well as solutions, including the capacities of the communities themselves. The findings of participatory assessments constitute some of the key elements in the planning and implementation of UNHCR’s programmes.

In addition, UNHCR holds regular meetings with community representatives to review issues of concern and discuss possible solutions.

These mechanisms assist UNHCR in reaching out to refugees and asylum seekers and create awareness of and receive feedback on existing services and opportunities.

Training and Income Generation: Towards a Path of Self-Reliance

Poverty and lack of sustainable income and employment continues to remain a major problem for refugees and asylum seekers in Delhi. UNHCR has expanded its livelihood and self-reliance programmes to help refugees and asylum seekers develop their coping mechanisms in a new environment and establish their livelihood. Refugees with specific needs i.e. those refugees who are able to work but would be at risk or have difficulties in find employment in the open job market, are prioritised for income generation activities.

Refugees are also provided with skills and language training which should eventually lead them towards self-reliance, whether they remain in India, return to their own countries or resettle to third countries. Livelihoods programmes are tailored as much as possible to meet the needs of refugees i.e. flexible working hours, home production, small business grants etc. Other livelihood activities include job placement in the informal sector.

Refugees and asylum seekers with young children are encouraged to avail of the crèche facilities provided by UNHCR and its partners near their homes or workplaces in order to engage in income generation and/or learning activities.

Concluding Remarks

It is hoped that such a participatory model of refugee protection will go a long way in building and restoring a sense of ‘community’ among otherwise dispersed refugee groups in a complex urban setting like New Delhi. Refugees and asylum seekers will be empowered to make informed choices about their future, take ownership and bear joint responsibility along with UNHCR and its partners, to implement programmes and policies that affect them both as individuals and as a community.

Displacement and Rehabilitation: Solutions for the Future

2011-03-31T18:04:00.002+05:30

Nanda Kishor M S

[Consultant, Centre for Energy, Environment, Urban Governance & Infrastructure Development, Administrative Staff College of India]

Recently in the month of November 2010, National Institute of Technology (NIT) Rourkela, Orissa, had organized an International Conference on “Displacement and Rehabilitation: Solutions for the Future”. The conference lasted for two days with some concrete discussions on the latest developments and trends in displacement and resettlement pattern.

There were sessions in which bureaucrats were of the opinion that the NGO’s and some civil society groups in the name of protecting the rights of the displaced and tribals are making money and hampering the growth of the country. This comment came from none other than Prof. A B Ota (IAS) Director SCSTRTI, Bhubaneswar. This came as a mere shock as he was addressing a gathering in an academic institution and in front of large number of academicians from all over the world. This approach was severely criticized by the speakers who were in the session held after the paper of A.B Ota. The gathering also took strong opposition such type of categorical statements, and unanimously agreed that being academicians and activists we should not conceive to the notion of the State in sensitive issues like displacement.

There were five sessions of which three sessions having 29 papers were deliberated on 13th Nov and two sessions having 13 papers were deliberated on 14th Nov, 2010. The papers centered around the themes like ‘Issues on Displacement and livelihood’; ‘Gender, Ethnicity Indigenous Communities and R& R issues’; ‘Rehabilitation Policy and Implementation Issues’ on 13th Nov and ; ‘ Civil Society and Corporate Bodies’; and ‘Displacement and People’s Response’ on 14th Nov 2010 followed by the valediction being chaired by Prof. Premananda Panda, a practicing anthropologist of Sambalpur University .

The theme oriented sessions of the conference were chaired by Prof R Siva Prasad, Prof. S.N.Tripathy, Prof in economics and Head , Centre for Exclusion Studies and Inclusive Policy, Gokhle Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, Prof. Premananda Panda and Prof Bhasakar Majumdar, Prof. in Economics, G.B.Panth Institute, Allahabad, D.P. Mishra, GM, Nilanchal Ispat, Odisha.

Penal members being authorized by the floor participants of the Conference recommended the following:

•Since most of the displaced are SC and ST and have the history of being marginalized, the displacement of people should be avoided as far as possible. In unavoidable situation the displaced families should be resettled in the spirit of ‘community transplanted’ so that the displaced will have less scope to feel alienated from their cultural ecology.
•The PESA Act be extended to all non-PESA Mineral belt rural and tribal; areas with spirit and words and non-coercive open discussion / public hearing be encouraged and in it the emergent consensus be put to action .
•The quality of existing human resources of the people are likely to be displaced due to forthcoming projects. So, it is need of the hour to make them the beneficiaries of the projects almost at par with the project personnel on pay roll
•Beside the usual compensation assessments made on tangible substances of the displaced, the intangibles like loss of indigenous social support system, the cost of culture, cost of loss of skill and techniques be assessed and accordingly compensation payment be extended.
•After duly rehabilitated and resettled a fixed share of the profit incurred by the organization be made available to the displaced for whom the project could grow and the government being the acquiring body take the responsibility in streamlining the benefits through effective loss of seepage of benefit to the affected people.
•CSR be mandatory and be a part of constant and continuous process to empower the affected families at least for two generations.
•The Panchayat (Extension to the Tribal Areas) Act 1996 is the Most Revolutionary legislation. Powers vested in the Gram Sabhas but the definition of Gram Sabhas is different and based on localities. Consultation with the Gram Sabhas at the appropriate levels before making acquisition for development projects should be a mandatory. It should be cross checked by a expert committee before any displacement.
•Amendment to the Land Acquisition Act in the following areas important- Most significant amendment to LA Act is doing away with Schedule II of the Act; land acquisition for the private companies will not be possible in the same manner as earlier;
-Public Purpose defined; exclusive and inclusive definition;
-Consultation with Gram Sabha mandatory for consensus before acquisition;
-Power of restoration of the alienated land very significant;

•The training different traits for entrepreneurship to the youth of the likely to be displaced families be given so as to get observed in the organizations for which they are displaced.
•Societal Cost Benefit Analysis of Project should be undertaken before expressing the intent of any project, and the result should be widely circulated in local language to affected families and general public.
•The formation of all evaluating committees should comprise of stakeholders, academia, civil society, and government representatives
•Notification should be widely circulated and publicized in local and language of the ethnic/tribal groups
•Compulsory Social Impact Assessment with respect to Cultivation and CPR Rights should be undertaken
•Compulsory Pre and Post - Environmental Impact Assessment with reference to Tribal Rights, CPR and Carrying Capacity should be undertaken
•Resettlement/Rehabilitation area should be identified in consultation with and with the participation of the people who would be affected.
•Gender participation should be integrated fully in all the processes, consultation, design, and implementation in achieving consensus.
•All the relocation should be in similar geographical terrain, without the loss of cultural and communitarian identity
•No minimum number of households should be laid down for qualification for compensation and R&R
•Resettlement areas should cover or include all sources of livelihood- such as agriculture, horticulture, livestock, fishing, forestry, artisans, CPR products, shops, SSIs, OAME-Own Account Manufacturing Enterprises, family enterprises
•Resettlement sites should be fully developed before any relocation or resettlement including houses, sanitation, schools, drainage, community hall, wells/drinking water, roads, health centers, Ration Shops, Common space- play ground, burial/ crematorium ground, spaces for cultural reproduction , green cover.
•While constructing houses size of the family, needs of the family and future expansion of the family should be taken into account. All the houses should designed in consultation with the affected communities. All houses should be accompanied by homestead land. Ownership right of the house including homestead should be in the names of the husband and wife, and solely in the name of women in the case of female headed house
•Compensation should include all economic and social aspects, including monetary, land, live stocks, CPRs- both priced and un-priced equipment, wells, trees, houses etc
•The resettled area should have full facilities interns of micro finance, SHGs, extension services, with subsidies being provided for all livelihood.
•There should be gender parity with regard to compensation irrespective of age and marital status
•Single window disbursement of beneficiary scheme should be adopted
•All self governance institutions such as Gram Sabhas should be constituted immediately after the rehabilitation with fifty percent gender representation
•All the rehabilitated areas should be declared as revenue villages with the power of PESA even if it is not in scheduled area and scheduled areas in respect of tribals.
•Compulsory employment for at least one member of the displaced community be made available
•Free vocational training and skill up gradation must be provided by new projects from day of MOU with Govt. till the organizations continues to survive
•Amount of compensation to landless should be based on man days and prevailing wages
•It should be made mandatory for the project authorities to sponsor the education of the deserving children from the displaced families.
•The Government should set up committees to look into the matters of resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced families of the old projects, (projects taken up during/after the 1950s and before 2006), where still many issues remain unsolved.
•Land pattas should be issued to the families in the resettlement colonies, (where it has still not been done) which are very essential for the future education of their children (for getting residential certificates).
•The different bodies under the national skill development programme should take up skill development initiatives in the resettlement colonies on a priority basis.
•Displacement has important psychological implications. Therefore, counseling centers should be there in the resettlement colonies which can help in finding out the psychological effects of displacement on children and how it affects their socialization process.
•The Government must make provisions for regular follow up actions, in order to ensure that the rehabilitation measures have been effective. The National R&R Policy 2007 should be made an Act and it should be enforced with uniform guidelines in all the states of India /The Orissa R&R policy should be made an Act so that strict compliance can be ensured.

2011-02-28T12:35:00.002+05:30

[This edition is compiled by Ishita Dey,Doctoral Student at Department of Sociology, Delhi University and Member of Calcutta Research Group]

Until January 2011, Tunisia was known for a repressive government headed by Mr. Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali who ruled the country for 23 years till the jasmine revolution when the anti- government protests forced him to resign. As the Prime Minister of the interim government in Tunisia also puts in his resignation, the neighboring state Libya witnesses a violent anti- government protests against the 41 year old rule of Colonel Gaddafi and there are reports of Libya’s border overrun with migrants, mostly Egyptians. According to UNHCR reports, almost close to 100,000 people (which includes Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans and third country nationals including Chinese and other Asians) have fled due to anti-government unrest in Libya. Mostly people are fleeing to Tunisia and Egypt- the states which are in a state of transition due to the recent political agitations. Under the given circumstances, UNHCR in a press release welcomed the positive approach of the two transitional states- Tunisia and Egypt to keep its borders open for people trying to flee from Libya. According to the press release, "Given the continued reports of violence and human rights abuses inside Libya, it is imperative that people fleeing the country are able to reach safety". Infact UNHCR in its web portal on 25 February mentions that “the interim government in Tunisia has declared that the country's borders are open for all nationalities attempting to flee Libya. According to their statistics, more than 22,000 people have crossed the border since last Sunday, mainly Tunisian nationals, with a number of Egyptians, Turks, Moroccans and Chinese”. While on one hand the political unrest has led to influx of people in Tunisia and Egypt; the reports indicate that both these countries will need the commitment and support from international humanitarian agencies. UNHCR has opened its operations in Tunisia and is supporting Tunisian Red Crescent and border community Ben Guardane whose volunteers are helping the new arrivals. The Tunisian military has set up a transit camp which can accommodate 400 people. UNHCR fears that they have received phone calls from refugees registered with UNHCR and living in Libya that they might be targeted as foreigners. Prior to conflict UNHCR had registered more than 8000 refugees and approximately 3000 asylum seekers have pending cases. While Tunisia has kept its borders open for people fleeing from Libya, Tunisians take recourse to high seas to reach Lampedusa, an Italian island midway between Tunisia and Malta. In a news report published in Financial Times (14 February 2011) approximately 4000 people had landed in this island over the past four days. They are mostly young Tunisians and apparently thousands have gathered in Tunisian ports to pay $ 2000 each to traffickers for the passage. The reasons for taking high seas are many. Some reportedly fled Tunisia were desperately looking for work, others were fleeing violence and disorder. Some even thought that they might be persecuted after the overthrow of the last regime. Under the present circumstances Italy is expecting more Tunisians to arrive and have opened the reopening of the transit centre at Lampedusa to take in migrants. For the past two years they had closed this transit centre and was intercepting migrants at high seas with the co-operation from Tunisian and Libyan governments- countries which have witnessed major anti-government protests. Italy has called for EU’s concerted response to the present situation. In this context, Geetisha Dasgupta in her article “When was the revolution?” gives us a status update of the peaceful struggles that people have launched across the Arab world. Refugees have also taken recourse to high seas in Asia as well and last year there were several media reports of Rohingyas taking to high seas to reach safer destinations. Rohingyas continue to be ill treated by the Thai Government as they were reportedly set adrift without food, water and even their engine was not working. Under the given circumstances, Human Rights Watch in a recently released press release urges the Thai Government to investigate the matter with deeper concerns. For details on the latest development please visit the section on News where we also bring to your attention that due to fresh military operations almost 90000 people in North West Pakistan will be displaced according to UN agencies.

Last year there has been a lot of discussion on stateless people and in this edition, Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury brings to our attention one such case- Chakmas in Arunachal Pradesh. Article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons defines that a ‘stateless person’ is someone who is not recognized as a national by any state under the operation of its law. They therefore have no nationality or citizenship and are unprotected by national legislation and left in the arc of vulnerability. Whether or not a person is stateless can be determined on the basis of an assessment of relevant nationality laws and how these laws are implemented by the state. Since nationality is generally acquired on the basis of an existing, factual link between the individual and the state – some kind of connection either with the territory (place of birth or residence) or with a national (descent, adoption or marriage) – it is important to look at the nationality legislation and relevant practice of states with which an individual enjoys a relevant factual link, to see if nationality is indeed attributed to the individual under any state’s law. If not, then he or she is stateless. Anasua gives us a ground report of the present situation of Chakmas in Arunachal Pradesh. In this section, Vandana in her article brings to our attention the gendered dimensions of displacement through the documentation of women’s voices; those affected due to developmental projects and in this case she chooses to the study the women whose lives get affected due to the construction of Tehri dam. Finally we bring to you the proceedings of a recently concluded workshop by Calcutta Resarch Group aimed for media practitioners.

27 February 2011. Libya unrest sparks refugee crisis at Tunisia border. Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12591935
25 February 2011. UNHCR urges support for Tunisia and Egypt as thousands flee Libya. Source : http://www.unhcr.org/4d67bbf89.html
23 February 2011. UNHCR says open borders imperative for people fleeing violence in Libya. Source : http://www.unhcr.org/4d653ee25.html
Dinmore, Guy and Byrne, Eileen. “ Italy appeals to EU for help over Tunisian Flotilla” in Financial Times, February 14, 2011