New Economic Spaces, Displacement and Right to Life

Ishita Dey

Studies on SEZ have focused on the social conflict, discourses of development paradigm but rarely have tried to understand the recent resistance movements against SEZ in Nandigram in Midnapur District of West Bengal in the context of de- peasantisation and re- industrialisation. The age-old conflict of modernization through industrialisation has been debated widely across social science. While studies have managed to capture the dilemma of development discourse; there has been little emphasis on the how under the various schemes of urbanization fails to address the social tensions that have emerged and continues to emerge in case of land acquisition in West Bengal. These “modernization” processes have contributed to the shifting patterns of global labour but failed to address how female labour fails to capture the attention of policy makers in the innumerable rehabilitation policies that the Indian state has framed.

The fact sheet on SEZs in http://sezindia.nic.in/HTMLS/Factsheet-on-SEZs.pdf states that of the total land in India which is about 2973190 sq km; 54.5% (1620388 sq km) land mass could be used for agricultural purpose. The quantification of landmass available for agricultural activities leaves no room for the people who will be displaced. The new “technology of governmentality through its policy exercise has created an avenue of Resettlement and rehabilitation policy 2007 where it has been suggested that it is important to “manufacture consent” for development. The ways and tools of manufacturing consent have taken violent forms in the recent times.

The notion of SEZ needs to be contextualised within the broader understanding of the global economic restructuring of the world in general and post liberalization of the Indian economy in particular. While governance and policy exercises since independence is inclined towards industrialization; recent policy exercises is an attempt to re- industrialise to facilitate “transnational production networks” through cooption and manufacturing of consent among the agrarian workforce to create new segregated economic spaces which will be autonomous self sufficient not only in its “economic sense” but also in its civic and political sense. The legal provisions of the SEZs as some argue is a way to create “sovereign city states” ruled by corporates. It is against this background that we need to understand that the process of selective “governance” mechanisms has created and produced “social conflict” and often a never-ending one between the people and state has been the case in Nandigram.In the case of Nandigram, though the government has constantly assured the local population that it will not acquire land, the place has been transformed into a violent site of contestation between the CPI (M) supporters and the Bhumi Uchched Pratirodh Committee. The task of reclaiming territorial authority on certain areas has produced social tensions that are never ending. The horrific images of neo- colonial ways of land grabbing the country witnessed on March 14 2008 reflect the contradictory ways of “modern governance”.

While on one side, the new governance mechanisms are bound to create quasi-sovereign city-states with its own governance strategies, these zones will also be responsible for changing landscapes which will affect the livelihood of people and eco diversity of the area. As some argue the SEZ will pave the way of privation of governance with the Development Commissioner, three officers of the Central government and two representatives of the private development. The rationale of such a governing body within an “electoral democratic space” needs special attention. Any economic activity within the jurisdiction of the SEZ will be exempted from tax; under the garb of “public utility services”; while a similar infrastructure will be regulated through the laws of the electoral democracy in a different topographical context. These divisive measures will re-produce satellite towns which will be in constant conflict with the already existing juridical spaces of satellite – periphery of the city.

While SEZs on one hand is paving way for building alternative forms of governance the very selective methods it is deploying is reminiscent of a welfare politics of the state that is bound to create a divisive “politics of citizenship”. The state through its discriminatory measures is creating “citizens of exception” and the lives of the people are being promised to be safeguarded through a single dictum of National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy 2007. India has a long drawn history of policy exercises as one of the modes of governance to combat the claim making processes that the displaced have long demanded. As we all know “policies” suffer from the limitation of going unchallenged in any court of law. Thus the efficacy of such policy exercises is farcical to some extent.

Secondly, with the number of SEZ on the rise we need to give legal recognition to the Internally displaced person. Our experiences with Indian modernity, be it the Bhakra Nangal Project, Narmada or even the SEZ resistance movements have been responsible and continues to be responsible for creating rising figures internally displaced persons. When one tries to delineate “justification of displacement” as Peter Penz in his essay “Development, Displacement and international Ethics” points out, displacement is seen as inevitable and it is there the dialectical nature of displacement and development regarding its ethical character gets far more explicit. The three perspectives are public- interest perspective, self -determination perspective which treats freedom and choice as central and equal-sharing perspective which sees development as reducing inequalities. Self -determination perspective and equal-sharing perspective treats the rights of individual and community as central and it is this prioritization that creates a unique approach to development which will minimize displacement and provide adequate resettlement and rehabilitation to those displaced.

Those displaced due to construction of Bhakra Nangal dam have been forced to resettle in areas where they do not enjoy basic drinking water facility. Bhakra is one of the many cases in a country which has been witness to many a policy exercises of resettlement and rehabilitation. The recent NRP 2007 which primarily addresses the issue of development induced displacement speaks of people’s involvement in the R&R process post land acquisition and not when the land is been acquired which reflects the accountability of the state. It is only when the state will be accountable towards its citizens can we talk of the “moral responsibility” of the foreign business houses as Penz proposes. In case of resistance movements against the recent move to acquire land for SEZ in Bengal, Maharashtra and Orissa one of the primary concerns of the protesters was the question of alternative livelihood, home and land. In case of mining projects it is the tribals who are the worst affected. Kudremukh Mining project made it to the news when the Government decided to extend the lease to KIOCL despite the repeated protests by the environmental groups and locals. The tribals are reportedly being killed under the garb of the Naxalites. These instances are some food for thought to reflect on whether or not it is ethical to displace people for reasons of development. Most of the cases of recently proposed land acquisitions in Orissa be it by POSCO or Vedanta the nation- state to attract FDI has chosen to take sides of the foreign actors. Under such conditions one is quite skeptical regarding the “cosmopolitan approach” as it is finally through the “language of rights” that one can “empower the local/ host communities” to redefine their nature of “hospitality and shelter” which opens up another dimension as far as the “ethics” of moral responsibility is concerned. The “ethics” of “moral responsibility” is best put into practice when the concerns of those displaced are seen within the purview of the “language of rights” or “right to life” rather than as a notion of “moral responsibility” without any legal binding.

What we legally owe to those affected should be decided by the “language of rights” as our experience with the past and the resistance movements against proposed land acquisitions for development in West Bengal, Maharashtra, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh have shown.

Riverbank Erosion and Displacement of Women in West Bengal

Debdatta Chowdhury

The report on the hearing of thousands of erosion victim’s cases in a single day, in The Telegraph (Monday 31 March 2008) was definitely assuring, of a legal system that is often accused of being ill-equipped to handle the rights of the people, specially the poor and the vulnerable. Thousands of people who lost their lands and livelihood to erosion, caused by River Ganga in the past two decades had their cases heard at Malda College acting as the venue for the Lok Adalat. This surely goes to show that dispensation of justice is, after all, not as difficult as is often made out to be by the legal system.

Not that this event comes without its share of dialogues and campaigns. Calcutta Research Group has been one of the most important dialogue bodies working towards the rights of the erosion victims. Through its numerous conferences and workshops on the causes and consequences of river erosion and ways to resettle and render justice to the erosion-victims and through the field studies of the erosion-prone river banks of Malda, CRG has been an active platform for the vulnerable lot.

Though this event of justice dispersion goes to the credit of the legal system and the ministry in-charge of land rights, organizations like CRG deserve their share of appreciation for at least keeping these neglected yet pressing issues active and ‘in discussion’.

Infantilising Refugees Amidst Manufactured Multiculturalism

Debdatta Chowdhury

Oishik Sarkar’s article on ‘Infantilising Refugees Amidst Manufactured Multiculturalism’ is his take on the lack of a cohesive refugee policy, regionally or nationally, that only means derogatory stereotyping of not just the refugees themselves but also their home countries. Movement from one country to another, either voluntarily or forcefully, forces a person into loss of citizenship and refugeehood. In the process of forming a nation-state, the state excludes a chunk of its population on the basis of caste, class, gender, ethnicity, language and other such features that a person cannot help identifying himself/herself with. Those who cannot fit themselves into the uniformity imposed on them by the state are forced to leave. The Chakmas in Bangladesh, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Muslims in India, Rohingyas in Burma are some examples of such forced migration. Oishik deals with the causes and consequences of these refugees in some details. Though not entirely fresh in his thought, Oishik presents a comprehensive picture of what goes to make a refugee out of a person and what are the general consequences they face once they loose their land and are forced into a completely new set-up to fend for themselves. The second part, ‘Limiting Legalities’ is also something widely discussed and debated in studying the refugee situation around the world. It deals with the laws regarding refugees, which makes a complete destitute out of those people who attain the status of a refugee. With no binding principles on the host countries, the host countries are free to deal with the refugees according to their own sweet will. Most of the countries, including India, not being signatories to 1951 Convention, are left to handle the refugees the way they find suitable. That the legalities associated with the refugee crisis are limiting by their very characteristic of not being binding or even being modifiable, form the crux of Oishik’s argument in this part. The third part, dealing with ‘Notion of Nation’ throws light on the way the refugees’ home countries are derogated as places of threat. The worser the situation in the home countries are, the better is the possibility of the migrating people to attain ‘refugee status’ in the host country. The notion or perception of a nation is decided by the host country, receiving the refugees. The last part ‘Red Herring’ deals with how in some countries, including India, Bangladesh, refugee laws have taken a backseat. Not being signatories to 1951 UN Convention on Refugees is the biggest failure of the UN. These countries interpret refugee laws according to their suits and needs, thus making the refugees mere tools of realpolitik. Things need to improve, immediately and vastly, in order not to make complete destitute out of refugees, forced to an uncertainty by the very state regime that was to take them under its shelter.

For the full article “Infantilising refugees amidst manufactured multiculturalism”
By : Oishik Sircar
click here: http://himalmag.com/2008/april/essay_refugees.htm

Refugee Access to Citizenship in the UK

Elizabeth Williams

There are two main routes for a refugee to acquire citizenship in the UK. The first is to be accepted onto a resettlement programme before arriving in the UK. The second is to arrive in the UK and to be recognised as a refugee or a person requiring international protection, to then be awarded indefinite leave to remain and then to make an application for citizenship after the required time period. I examine each of these routes in turn.

1. Citizenship by Resettlement

In 2002 the UK Government announced the Gateway Protection Programme in conjunction with the UNHCR to resettle 500 refugees every year with indefinite leave to remain. Persons with indefinite leave to remain can apply for citizenship after one year. Candidates for resettlement to the UK will have been classified by UNHCR field offices as refugees and selected on the basis that they have urgent humanitarian or security needs, are not able to return to their countries of origin and cannot integrate locally. The UK Home Office then makes the decision on who to accept under the UK programme. Despite this annual target of 500 refugees, as of February 2007, only 764 refugees in total had been resettled. Attaining UK citizenship through resettlement is therefore extremely unlikely. To put it in the global context, only around 1% of the world’s refugees are resettled each year.

2. Citizenship by Grant of Asylum or Temporary Protection

In 2005, the UK Government announced the New Asylum Model which consisted of a series of largely procedural changes that fundamentally altered how the Home Office processed asylum claims. Prior to the introduction of this model, successful asylum applicants were granted permanent refugee status with indefinite leave to remain. However, the New Asylum Model stipulates that refugees are now subject to a minimum five-year residency requirement and a successful review of their case before becoming eligible for permanent settlement. Given that the first reviews are expected in 2010, there is limited understanding of the implication of this new temporary refugee status, or it’s effect on refugee access to citizenship. What is clear however, is the fact that refugees have to live through a 5 year period of uncertainty before the Government confirms that they can reside in the UK permanently. Given that applicants must have indefinite leave to remain for one year before they can apply for citizenship, the requirement of residing in the UK for 5 years as a refugee prior to receiving indefinite leave to remain greatly increases the length and insecurity of the whole process.

It must be pointed out that unsuccessful asylum applicants may still be eligible for a grant of humanitarian protection or discretionary leave. Both grants are for temporary leave to remain (for 5 years and 3 years respectively). Whilst it is possible to apply for indefinite leave to remain and citizenship under these statuses, both are subject to active review before a person is eligible to apply for consideration for settlement.

3. Current Attitude to Awarding Refugee Status

It is important at this point to recognise the current attitude towards granting refugee status in the UK. Since the ratification of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees there has been a dramatic shift in the reception of refugees in the UK. Whilst refugees were welcomed to the UK in the aftermath of World War II, the current climate is so restrictive that the region has been termed ‘Fortress Europe.” Whilst I don’t intend analyse the reasons for this shift in any detail, suffice to say that the issue of refugee protection and awarding of citizenship status has always been predicated on a delicate balance between humanitarianism, states’ interests and political ideology.

The 1980s saw the beginning of regional European policy to establish a common regime for asylum seekers, refugees and migrants. The European harmonization process points to an emphasis on policing borders and limiting entry, rather that an attempt to establish a just and fair protection regime. Practices of deterring asylum seekers include visa restrictions, increased powers for border police, the imposition of carrier sanctions, detention, reduction in legal aid for asylum seekers, and the inability to appeal asylum decisions in the country of claiming asylum. The non-entrée measures fail to distinguish those migrants who are in need of international protection from those who are seeking economic opportunities. Moreover the measures have displaced the ‘refugee problem’ through moving activity underground. This has resulted in the proliferation of people smuggling by trafficking rings, which in turn has led to the criminalization of the asylum seeker.

Since the September 11th terrorist attacks, domestic and foreign policy has been focussed on strengthening security to prevent terrorists entering Europe though the asylum system. Despite the fact that none of the terrorists involved had used asylum entry, fear of the ‘other’ and the rhetoric of national security have led to the perception of asylum seekers as potential terror suspects. This is also been reflected in the media portrayal of asylum seekers, which has served to homogenise and criminalise all immigrants, regardless of their motivation to flee their homeland. For example in 2005 the UK daily tabloid newspaper the Daily Mail ran with the headline ‘1 in 4 Asylum Seekers are Terror Suspects.’ As one commentator points out ‘through mass media, information influences consciousness and is at the core of individual and collective identity formation.’

All these factors have succeeded in restricting asylum seekers from entering the UK, effectively barring significant numbers from the attainment of full citizenship status. Moreover, the tougher reception of refugees in the UK and the increase in border and immigration controls instil the idea that refugees are a national ‘problem’ or that asylum seekers are ‘bogus’ or ‘illegal’ and can be seen to institutionalise racism. It is not unrelated that the UK has experienced an increase in violence against ethnic minorities and immigrants in recent years.

4. The UK Citizenship Test

Indeed, for those that manage to reach the UK in order to claim asylum, the route to receiving full citizenship rights is far from straightforward. In addition to the revocation of automatic indefinite leave to remain for refugees, 2005 also saw the introduction of a new five-year plan on asylum and immigration entitled ‘Controlling our borders: Making migration work for Britain’. The strategy included the proposal to introduce English language and knowledge of British life tests, which applicants granted limited leave should be required to pass before qualifying for indefinite leave to remain. These are the same tests that must be passed in order to qualify for naturalization as a British citizen, but only need to be taken once.

The introduction of ‘British Life Tests’ or ‘Citizenship Test’ has been extremely controversial and has called into question the very concept of ‘Britishness.’ Whilst advocates of the citizenship test emphasise its focus on civic nationalism over ethnic nationalism, critics have called for the debate around Britishness to move away from the abstract notions of identity and focus more on its practical application. Critics argue that there is no ‘essential Britishness’ and any attempt to define it in terms of characteristics or knowledge possessed is to resort to in the words of Benedict Anderson, an imagined community. Others have referred to Britishness as an active, participatory identity, rather than consisting of certain knowledge that must be learned and tested.

Furthermore the introduction of a citizenship test with a 75% pass mark implies that there will be people that fail. That is, the introduction of the citizenship test suggests a level of cultural knowledge that must be known, or at least learnt to pass as ‘British.’ Given that the citizenship test will only apply to new applicants, it appears that the test is not attempting to address what British people think Britishness is, least of all what immigrants feel Britishness is, but an attempt to make foreigners more like an imagined Brit, that is an attempt to culturally assimilate the ‘other.’

The glaring irony in all of this is the fact that if all British citizens were required to sit the test there would be a huge amount of people who would not pass. The handout includes some examples of questions on the test. Out of interest I only got 3 questions correct, which would suggest that despite being British born citizen, I am not quite British enough. The issue of current British citizens not being able to pass the test not only points to an issue with the types of questions asked, or to the very attempt to define Britishness, but to why only new applicants for Citizenship are required to sit the test. This points to another model of social exclusion for the refugee.

In my opinion, at best the Citizenship test is another barrier to the attainment of settlement and citizenship for refugees and other foreigners. At worst, the Citizenship test is an attempt to assert cultural superiority and is therefore imbued with racism.

Reports from Marraiguda Salwa Judum Camp

JP Rao

I had an opportunity to visit Marraiguda Salwa Judum camp on the 25thFebruary 2008,exactly one year after I visited the camp earlier when it was setup. When the camp was set up in February 2007 there were around 3000 persons in the camp. Today there are around 250 families living in the camp. More then half of the people left the camp and migrated to the villages across the border. I was informed that the Chhattisgharh Government has decided to suspend supply of free rations (Rice, Dal, oil, potatoes and onions etc) to the inmates of Salwa Judum camps in both Dantewra and Bijapur districts and boards have been put up in Konta, Vinjaram and other camps stating that people will be provided rice at Rs.3 per kg and free rations would be suspended. The supply of free rations had become erratic in Konta, Vinjaram, Errabore and Marraiguda camps since the beginning of December 2007. Reports trickling in from Bijapur state that people are deserting the camps as the supply of rations have become erratic there also. When I asked the police personal 'how many people will stay in the camp if the Government asks them to return to their villages' they said 100% of people will go back to their villages. The Salwa Judum leaders present there were shock to hear this answer from the police. In the informal chat they also told us that because of the atrocities committed by the Salwa Judum peoples support to the Maoists has increased.

The Salwa Judum leader of Marraiguda camp in a tribal of Gollapalli village works as a village assistant whose salary is Rs.1000 per month. However, he owns a Bolero Jeep, which he bought after the camp was setup last year and visits Bhadrachalm daily along with his dozen cronies. I was also informed that most of the Salwa Judum leaders of all these camps in Konta division have bought properties in Jagdalpur and other towns besides purchasing gold and jewelry worth laks of rupees. This alone is proof of rampant corruption that is prevailing in Salwa Judum camps. The camp dwellers informed us that these Salwa Judum activists sleep in different houses daily out of fear. The Salwa Judum activists in Konta sleep in the police station out of fear of being killed by the people. If the government suspends free supply of rations to the camp inmates Salwa Judum will die its natural death and its activists would become sitting ducks for the Maoists and the people who suffered at their hands. I was also informed that some time back before the Naga police was withdrawn the Naga police killed every one present in a village in Bejji forest as retaliation to the killing of 12 policemen.

Goldhap Bhutanese Refugee Camp in Nepal Gutted

Som Prasad Nirula

Out of 1300 huts over 1000 huts inhabited by Bhutanese refugees were gutted by a fire in the Goldhap refugee camp in eastern part of Nepal's Jhapa District on Saturday evening. As a result around 8000 refugees have been displaced from the camps.
The fire started at around 6:30 p.m. in the evening, and later engulfed the entire camp. As per the reports from the camps seven persons have been injured with minor burns and casualty were rushed to Mechi Zonal Hospital, Bhadrapur for treatment.
According to police, the fire had started from the godown of the UN World Food Program (WFP) inside the camp and spread out toward the residential site. As the fire engines from Bhadrapur, Mechi Municipality and Damak Municipality could not control the flames, fire engines from Biratnagar and Dharan had to be called.
Fire brigades and around 500 security personnel from Nepal Police, Armed Police Force, Nepal Army and locals were mobilized to rescue the people and put the fire out till late at night. The exact extent of the damage is yet to be assessed
After the inferno, the victims are in the terrible situation and are forced to live under the open sky near by the refugee camps
Nepal Institute of Peace (NIP) call upon all the stakeholders for immediate assistance for the Bhutanese refugees

Third CRG Workshop on Internal Displacement in India: Causes, Linkages, Responses and Durable Solutions

Debdatta Chowdhury

The workshop opened on 3rd September, 2007 with the release of the report on ‘Development Induced Displacement and Deprivation in West Bengal 1947-2000: A Quantitative and Qualitative Database on its Extent and Impact’. The report prepared by Walter Fernandes, Shanti Chetry, Sherry Joseph and Satyen Lama dealt with the genesis and evolution of the development programme in West Bengal over a time frame of fifty years, from 1947 till 2000. Starting from the recent uproar in Nandigram and Singur, the 1st chapter goes back to explaining why the report came about in the first place. The glaring gap that was found to exist between the provision of Right to Live(Article 21) in the Constitution and the actual scenario, acted as the founding stone for this study and eventually the report. The finding that the development programmes undertaken in West Bengal hardly abide by this Constitutional provision in dealing with displacements and rehabilitation, prompted the researchers to go deep into the matter and eventually come up with a report that was also an eye-opener than just a mere collection of facts and figures.

Beginning with a brief introduction to the various types of displacements, as conflict-induced, natural-disaster induced and development-induced displacements, the chapter moves on to trace the beginning of development programmes and land acquisition system in the state right from colonial times. With its genesis in the Permanent Settlement (1793), the land acquisition programme moved through the draconian Land Acquisition Act(1894), the Welfare State Programme of the 1947 era and finally the Mixed Economy policy of the post independence profit-making economic set-up. Post independence saw the gradual rise of private and public sectors and human utility programmes as Dams.

The report clearly states that the absence of reliable database on the actual number of displaced people made the work difficult for the researchers. Government Gazettes, District land records, archives of various institutions and individual studies of researchers were the main sources of this report. Interviews with the displaced people also helped in the process, though there was dearth of proper representation among the interviewees.

The report gives an insight into the state of West Bengal in terms of its population, area, sex ratio,land holding and land acquisition over a period of 50 years. With details of figures, the report states that though West Bengal has seen prosperous days of land reforms and agricultural advancements during the early years of left rule, the present situation is clearly in a mess. The fact that WB does not have a proper rehabilitation policy makes the already awful condition of rehabilitation all the more painful.

Chapter 2 of the report deals with the ‘Extent and Type of Land Used 1947-2000’, whereby it attempts to specify the amount of land acquired for various purposes in WB within the given timeframe. Land acquiring started with the influx of refugees after the 1947 Partition of Bengal followed by more influx during the Sino-India War (1962) and Bangladesh War (1971). Land was fast acquired for resettling these refugees. Coupled with this was the call for liberalization of economy that included acquiring land for industries and foreign investments.

Water resources including Dams as the DVC, Maithan, Farakka saw a steady growth from 1970s. Agricultural advancements of the 1990s meant better irrigation facilities with more number of dams. In the process of building dams, the tribal areas of Bankura, Bardhaman, Purulia and Midnapore were the worst hit.

Public and private sectors as pharmaceuticals, engineering units, automobiles, chemical units, jute and textile mills, tea factories, printing presses, rice, paper and other large and medium units took up a considerable amount of land from 1950s till 1990s.

Underground coal mining and later open-cast mining together with dolomite, clay and sand mining also took up a fair share of lands, mostly in Bardhaman, Malda and Purulia.Thermal plants, transmission and distribution systems also contributes to the land use.

Land used for environment preservation in the form of Afforestation drives, flood prevention and embankments also take up a huge amount of land, mostly private lands. People are displaced without being properly resettled for the sake of conservation of nature.

West Bengal witnessed the interesting phenomenon of ‘displacement for resettlement’, whereby private lands were taken away by the Refugee Rehabilitation Act of 1948 to resettle the incoming refugees, thus displacing thousands of others. Government organized refugee camps and colonies were mostly built on private lands, displacing a huge number of people.

Human resource development as educational and research institutions, sports facilities also account for large shares of the acquired land.Health sector like hospitals, hygienic facilities, waste disposal facilities also displace a lot of people in order to create good facilities for a few others. The irony being that thousands are denied basic health facilities, like clean drinking water to make way for others.

Transport facilities like bus roads, highways, railway lines, airports, border roads are mostly built by acquiring private lands.’ Defense purpose’ is another easy way of acquiring land by the government. Apart from the land used for police and paramilitary use like training camps, outfits, cantonments and airbases, another huge lot of land is acquired under the very vague term of ‘defense purpose’, the meaning of which mostly remains ambiguous.

Increasing number of districts, expanding offices of the zilla parishads and new staff quarters are also built on private lands.
Social welfare projects like homes for the physically/mentally challenged or land distribution among the landless also use up mostly private lands.

Tourism forms an important factor as far as land acquisition is concerned. Huge plots of private lands are often acquired for building tourist destinations. But often the projects for which land is acquired remains unfinished. Other miscellaneous projects like building temples go unnoticed in land acquisition figures. Absence of a proper definition for the term ‘public purpose’ often makes land acquisition easy for the government and unclear for the displaced ones. Almost 10% of the total acquired land fall under the ‘public purpose’ scheme. People loose their land for ‘purposes’they do not know.official records show that the total land acquired in WB for the above mentioned purposes between 1947 and 1990 is about 36,56,326 hectares.

The 3rd chapter deals with the ‘type and extent of the deprivation’ that the development projects in WB have brought about. This chapter too points to the dearth of proper database. The chapter separately deals with the loss of livelihood that each of the projects bring about, as water resources, non-hydro projects, industry, mining, refugee rehabilitation, human resourse development, health, transport, government administration, farms, fisheries, urban development and social welfare.official records put the total number of displaced people over the given timeframe to 69,44,492. detailed figures of the amount of compensation received by these displaced families have also been provided, detailed analysis of which points to the variation in compensation from ‘advanced’ to ‘backward’ states. The partiality is glaring.

Chapter 4 mainly deals with the impact of the displacements. The researchers tried to get responses from a varied background from tribals, dalits to OBCs and women. Women had the least representation among the respondents due to various reasons. Interaction with the displaced people showed that only the medium-yield farmers could make a profit out of the compensation that they received. Otherwise, compensation in the form of cash hardly helped the displaced lot. Access to education was denied to those displaced, resulting in increasing illiteracy. The development projects naturally brought a change in the occupation of the people displaced. In most cases, they lost their main source of income, lost their land and assets, that led to complete impoverishment. The nature of work also changed, with a shift from agricultural work to that of a daily wage earner as a semi-skilled worker, for example as a bicycle mechanic or agricultural tools mechanic etc. most of these works were of a temporary nature. Loss of land also meant fewer livestock, though in some places, substituting land with livestock, in fact, increased the number of livestock.

The study of the process of land acquisition also brings forth the fact that most of the people who loose their land remain unaware of the acquisition policies and purposes of the government. This is because of lack of government initiative as well as due to illiteracy.

One of the major impacts of land acquisition is seen to be a last minute attempt on the part of the land loosers to grab as much asset as possible, often stealing each other’s assets. Finally, agony and fear results in a feeling of betrayal and complete disillusionment among the displaced lot.

Compensation could have been of use if it was properly and timely paid. Most compensation packages remain mere pen-and-paper contracts that never see the light of the day. Even if they are discharged, they often fail to reach the actual people and get lost somewhere in between. Those that finally reach the people are often so late in coming that by then the people are impoverished to the extent, never to be able to start life afresh. The ones displaced are often unskilled agriculturalists, who can hardly make use of the job prospects that the development projects create, since the industries mostly want skilled people.

Women are the worst victims, who bear the brunt of sexual assault. Lack of proper sanitation is a regular feature in the resettlement camps. Children’s education is hampered.
Chapter 5 ends with a question as to whether it is possible to have development with a humanitarian touch. This chapter suggests alternatives that can be taken into consideration while putting the development projects into force. It suggests that mere cash compensation is not enough. Rehabilitation is necessary. The socio-cultural identity of the displaced people, mostly tribals, should not be allowed to be hampered as that would mean a loss of national integrity. Not just creating jobs but building training centres for the jobs should also form an integral part of the rehabilitation package. Finally, it ends with a demand for new and better rehabilitation schemes and least-displacing projects.

Is there A Tendency to Associate Illegal Migrants with Terrorists? What are the Implications for Human Rights and Politics of Such Association?

Tarangini Sriraman

The UK government (Tony Blair’s government) has for the last few years been working on a project that will record the detailed identities of residents…the project involves storing such delicate information in a national database. This will be backed by the distribution of identity cards to all residents. The overwhelming concern of the UK government is to check the entry of illegal migrants and to keep a check on possible terrorist movement. Successive Indian governments have similarly been preoccupied with a national identity card that captures the identities of residents, both citizens and non-citizens: the preoccupation again being the need to weed out migrants and crack down on terrorists. The US government is planning through the Real ID Act to upgrade existing identity cards with biometric technology as a means to secure identities from terrorists and make it difficult for migrants to stay without these cards. Israel has issued identity cards marking out card-holders to be Arab, Jew or other. Those who do not possess these cards are either migrants or terrorists.

In all these cases, governments though they officially drive a wedge between the categories of migrant and terrorist, there is a tendency in bureaucratic thinking and policy-making above all to confuse these two, to associate migrant with terrorist and vice-versa. I intend to provide illustrations of this in this paper through select examples taken from countries like India, Israel and Russia.

Indian experience of equating migration with terrorism: The National Identification System Home Affairs Network (NISHAN) project in India can be traced to the successive governments’ need to check illegal migration which is described often in officialese as infiltration. The Congress government led by Narasimha Rao sought to do something about the unmanageable numbers of Bangladeshi migrants pouring into the states of Assam, Bengal, Delhi and Maharashtra. No less a site than Wikipedia reports that there has been a tendency to link the rise of terrorism with the presence of illegal Bangladeshi migrants. Both intelligence sources and media reports (both print and web media) corroborate these claims. The strategy employed by these reports is like this…they carry out surveys and interview residents to establish the number of illegal migrants who have been able to procure voters ID cards and other identity cards. And every time a terrorist attack happens, they lose no time publicizing these statistics, thereby indirectly suggesting to the government that a crackdown on migrants is imperative for the fight against terrorism. Sometimes state governments carry out these studies by themselves: the Assam government spent Rs.1.7 billion between January 2001 and September 2006, which resulted in identification of 9,149 foreigners, most of whom were Bangladeshis. S.P.Sinha, a scholar on the North-East writes that most of the insurgencies taking place there were owing entirely to the influx of illegal migrants into India’s borders. The Chittagong Hill Tracts of erstwhile East Pakistan and current-day Bangladesh account for nearly all the insurgent groups of India's northeast. In Tripura, the large influx of refugees from East Pakistan and the unlawful transfer of tribal lands incited anti-Bengali militancy, S.P.Sinha claims. Sinha concludes his many claims by suggesting that for India to breathe easier in the North-East, it must have efficient administrators and curb illegal migration. Other reports suggest that the increasing numbers of Bangladeshis in the North-East is to the effect of changing the demographic profile. Even if such claims about Bangladeshis being involved in terrorist activities may be true, there is little debate about how much of it is in response to ethnic nationalism, regional genocide resorted to by Bodo rebels, ULFA activists so on.

Examples from the Russian Federation: Russia has regarded Chechnya as a rogue state ever since the disintegration of the USSR. When the Chechen National Congress broke away from Soviet Russia, the new Russian Federation denounced the new Chechen government. Successive Russian governments have wanted Chechnya to be part of the Russian Federation, they have done everything to alienate Chechen IDPs. Russian authorities, namely the Kremlin, immigration authorities and Russian policemen have used the rhetoric of terrorism to deny human rights of housing, employment and the right to travel to Chechen IDPs. Where camps for IDPs were set up, Russian migration authorities compelled approximately 20,000 displaced people to leave the tent camps and return to Chechnya. Kate Desormeau who writes on Chechen IDPs records that Chechen IDPs were denied many rights by bureaucratic coercion, having officially prejudiced residents against these IDPs as potential terrorists. This is justified by the Russians’ policy of ‘securitization of migration’, where migrants are bureaucratically made out to be security risks.Human Rights Watch specifies that officials have constantly harassed displaced persons by threatening them with arrest on false charges and withdrawal of food allowances. They have predominantly threatened IDPs with cutting of gas and electricity supplies during winter months. What is more, Russian authorities have barred international agencies from distributing relief to Chechen IDPs who lacked documentation. Such threats are to effect of forcing Chechens to return to their homes: in all this Russia has blatantly violated obligations under international law. Constantly, it has taken refuge under the claim that its crackdown on Chechen IDPs contributes to the international campaign against terrorism.

Israeli treatment of migrants: Much of the politics surrounding Isreal’s terror campaign against Palestine in occupied territories like West Bank and Gaza is far too well-documented to be cited in detail here. However, less well-known is the drive to clean its own mainland of Palestinian workers. Though Israel used to rely excessively on Palestinian workers to work on farms and construction sites, after an uprising in West Bank in 2000, it brought in foreign workers to replace such migrants, regarding the Palestinians in Israel as a security risk. Owing to such drives, illegal migrants have lost whatever minimal housing and employment rights, seeking sanctuary in makeshift churches. Israel instead of being accountable to international law for all the deportations it is carrying out, is conducting voluntary repatriation programmes for Palestinians.

The fallouts of equating migrants with terrorists, laying down policies and releasing statistics that amounts to doing so has been largely in the nature of human rights violations. States have had a variety of agendas to fulfill by such association of migration with terrorism: be it protectionism, ethnic nationalism, security so on. Parties in countries like Israel and Russia are impelled by local prejudices to contest elections by promising tough action against such migration (not simply immigration). By fuelling the opinion that migrants apart from being a drain on states’ resources, a threat to the local labour forces and the cause of increased incidence of terrorism, such an association (of illegal migration with terrorism), vitiates politics and takes away human rights of migrants. What Kate Desormeau terms securitization of migration is something that turns the discourse of illegal migration into a discourse of security and terrorism and this is common across countries.

Migrant South Asian Women in the Middle East; Right Bearing Citizens?

Sanam Roohi

South Asia, home to almost 2 billion people, comprises of seven countries: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Maldives. The status and conditions of women in all the countries is not at par with men in society, with the exception of Sri Lanka and Maldives where the social indicators are better than the rest of the subcontinent. This is manifest in the gender gap in education, economic activity and employment, the subordination of women, and in the negative sex ratio of 940 females for every 1000 males. Female labour force participation in South Asia between1995-2001 was 33.5 percent as compared to 42 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 44.5 percent in East Asia and Pacific. Similarly the gender gap in literacy over the same period in South Asia as a whole is 33 percent. With such a dismal condition, many such migrant women opt to work as housemaids and wage-earners (often sole bread earner) for the family. Middle east provides an easy gateway for such women to earn a meagre wage as help hands.

In this era of Globalisation, some fundamental forms of capital movement takes place throughout the global economy. An important category of capital flow is human capital, which includes the category of migrants. The flow of women migrants in the gulf region from South Asia has been on the increase in the last 2 decades, which can be directly linked to the liberalisation of the economy in the latter region. They are a small but important source of foreign revenue earner for their states. Women migrants’ account for about 20 to 40 per cent of the growing migrant workforce in the various Gulf States. They come primarily from South and Southeast Asia, as well as other countries, to earn enough money to support their families back home. Statistics show that the proportion of women migrants has increased significantly over the past 20 years — from 33 per cent in 1986 to 79 in 1994 and 59 now. The phenomenon began in 1976, following a sharp escalation in oil prices in the oil-rich Gulf countries.

But the benefits they receive from such employment can come at a heavy price. In all these gulf countries, women domestic workers are deprived of a wide range of their fundamental human rights. They have no protection under labour laws as domestic work is not covered by such legislation. Often, their identity documents are confiscated by their employers and their pay is delayed or withheld. They also face the possibility of rape and other forms of violence by their employers. However, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have signed up to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which calls on state parties to condemn discrimination against women in all its forms and take appropriate measures to eliminate it.

Example of Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is an important destination for these impoverished women, as are the other nations of Oman, Kuwait and other gulf countries. It is important to take the example of Saudi Arabia as non-Saudis make up 35 percent of Saudi Arabia's labor force. An estimated 2 million workers are from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Rampant human rights abuses fail to get the attention of the migrants’ home country. Human rights Watch publishes a 135 page report “Bad Dreams: Exploitation and Abuse of Migrant Workers in Saudi Arabia“, which depicts how many of the immigrant workers are abused and treated as slaves, most of whom are women migrant workers.

Some of the frightening and troubling findings of the reports are:
· Sexual abuse and rape of women migrant workers, both in the workplace and in Saudi prisons by Saudi male employers.
· Migrant workers from Bangladesh, India and Phillipines were forced to work ten to eighteen hours a day, and sometimes throughout the night without overtime pay.
· The pay is very meager (e.g. $133 for a month and 16 hours of work daily)
Hundreds of low-paid Asian women who cleaned hospitals in Jeddah worked twelve-hour days, without food or a break, and were confined to locked dormitories during their time off.
· Migrant workers experienced shocking treatment in Saudi Arabia's criminal justice system.

Example of the Sri Lankan migrant Women in the Middle East
Sri Lankan women migrants constitute an important segment of the women labour force emplyed as domestic help in the gulf region. As demand for male construction workers decreased in the 1980s, a growing percentage of Sri Lankan women migrated to West Asia to work as domestic workers. In the 1990s, 84 per cent of all migrants from Sri Lanka to West Asia were women, most them domestic workers. Pension scheme Taking note of the important reforms by the Sri Lankan government to alleviate the sufferings of migrant labourers, including introduction of a pension scheme and free medical care, the HRW has urged it to further streamline the systems. It has asked the Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion to provide the workers training and information about their rights before they migrate, and to monitor and regulate labour agents and their sub-agents.

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should improve services to domestic workers at Embassies in times of crisis. The government also should improve complaint mechanisms and services provided to domestic workers after they return home,” the report said. The HRW urged the governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon and the UAE to extend standard labour protection to domestic workers, change immigration laws that make it difficult for workers to change employers, and ensure compensation to workers who suffer abuse. The report lamented that the government failed to adequately monitor and regulate abusive practices by recruiting agents and sub-agents in Sri Lanka. Consular officials often provided little or no assistance to the domestic workers who approached them with complaints of unpaid wages or abuse. Those returning home had to confront obstacles while filing complaints and received minimal services at a government-run shelter located near the international airport.

Promotion of Women's Migration
To promote labour exports, Asian governments have played a very active role. Female labour migration is a demand-driven, rather than a supply-driven, phenomenon. The volume and type of demand for migrant workers is determined within the context of the international and sexual division of labour. To respond to demand patterns in the host countries, labour-exporting countries have to promote female, and not just male, overseas contract work. In fact, demand from labour-importing countries for women migrants is often more stable than that for men, so that women migrants often represent a more reliable source of foreign exchange remittances than men. But sending countries have come under increasing pressure to protect their women migrants. More sending countries have entered the labour export market, fuelling competition among themselves, and providing wider choices and cheaper sources of labour to receiving countries. In the increased competition for a market share or in the attempt to carve out a market niche for themselves, sending countries could sacrifice the protection or interests of their nationals.


Towards More Effective Protection of Migrant Women
It has often been said that the most critical period in the migration process is prior to departure. At the community level, it is critical for women to receive accurate and realistic information about the economic and social costs and benefits of overseas employment before the decision to migrate. Governments should shift part of their focus to disseminating information at an earlier stage through mass media.

Efforts to reduce the volume of illegal migration and trafficking have been recognised as vital. To achieve that goal, lowering the costs of migration and simplifying administrative procedures can be viable and cost-effective options. The role of different social actors in protecting women migrant workers should be strengthened as much as the role of the respective states which send these migrant workers to earn vital revenues for the government treasury, yet fail to protect their basic fundamental rights.

UK Takes Further Initiatives to Securities Borders with the New-Points System and A Hike in Immigration Fees

Ishita Dey

On 31 January 2008, UK Home Office announced a hike in its immigration fees as one of its measures to improve border security over the next twelve months. It is not the first measure that UK has adopted to control its borders. In the recent past there has been many an attempts to close its borders or rather to make space for those whom Britain needs. A month back on 5 December 2007, UK Home Secretary Jacqui Smith outlined the forthcoming new immigration system for the United Kingdom during a speech at the London School of Economics. She spoke on the new immigration rules coming next year, including English requirements for prospective migrants, mandatory ID cards for foreign nationals living in the UK, stricter rules on bringing foreign spouses to the country, and details of the new points based system. The very systematic demarcation of citizens and non-citizens is an age-old phenomenon and in the recent times especially after the recent civilian atrocities in USA and to combat terrorism one of the basic areas of intervention that the state has chose is to classify and categorise through different surveillance mechanisms in the name of human security. Securitisation of borders in the recent times has been schematized with the global human capital in mind.

Global labour movements are being controlled in a systematic fashion. On 5 December 2007, the new points systems introduced by the UK home office was another initiative aimed at ensuring only workers with skills who could enhance UK’s GDP would be encouraged. The new points system is clearly an attempt to attract global labour to meet the demand of Britain’s needs rather than securitisation of the human capital. This initiative is an incessant attempt to securitise the European Union from encroachers. While in most of the international summits many a declarations are being adopted without being cynical One really wonders at what kind of human security are we really looking forward to. Are we heading for a “human security” that implies militarisation and control of borders rather than livelihood security?

Do questions of livelihood security figure in the agenda of the policy makers of immigration policy? Under the newly introduced new-points system, the application category has been devised according to five tiers. Tier 1, for highly skilled migrants, will has been broken into four sub-categories, including general highly skilled migrants, entrepreneurs, investors, and foreign graduate students of UK educational institutions. Tier 2 will be applicable for skilled workers who have a job offer. Tier 3 will be for a limited numbers of lower skilled workers to fill temporary shortages in the labour market and with this the low skilled category of workers will be suspended. Tier 4 for students and Tier 5 will be for youth mobility and temporary workers, such as those who come under Working Holiday agreements with other countries. Migrants coming under Tiers 1 & 2 need to have proficiency in English. Currently, migrants are only required to show knowledge of English when applying for permanent residence or citizenship. There is also a move to make basic knowledge of the English Language for international spouses.
UK Home Secretary Jacqui Smith in her address in London School of economics, observed that around 50,000 people were allowed entry to UK as spouse or fiancé and there should be some expectation as she stated, "I think it's fair that we should now set out our expectation that they're able to speak English before they come here."

This in way reinstates that the very process of securitisation of borders moves beyond mere territorial understanding of a geographic locale; rather it is a way to create secure stratified spaces with limited access to livelihood opportunities for people on the move.

Sources

www.workpermit.com
www.ibnlive.com

Nehru University, Progressive Students & Our Civil Society

Rafique Wassan

Recently, I got an opportunity to present a paper on the subject of ‘health and social inequities’ in an international conference titled ‘Spheres of Justice’ organized by CRG, the policy research organization of Kolkata, India. I deem myself responsible to share with the highly reputed educational standard of the JNU of India, progressive active politics and civil society role of the students and professors and the research activism of civil society and policy research organizations in India. Especially when we look at the work of our institutions/organizations, education and research quality in universities, and positive progressive student politics in Pakistan it seems that we not only lag behind to our neighbor country but we don’t have an understanding of aforementioned positive democratic trends.

The research domain of CRG is of an international level. This policy research organization in India organizes workshops, seminars, courses, conferences, public lectures and discussions and produce research papers and reports of a qualitative standard at different times on the national & regional South Asian issues like forced migration, social justice, issues of socially marginalized groups, issues of the victims of forced displacement due to state and international development aid projects and poverty issues. This time in the conference on the subject of social justice, scholars and social scientists from Germany, Finland, Australia, France, Croatia, Argentine, Algeria, Nepal, Pakistan and participants from different states of India participated and presented their papers on the conference theme.

The international level and nature of the conference in terms of the scholarly discussions on the policy issues made me realize that NGOs are playing a role of civil society activism in India. On the contrary, in Pakistan, the same role is overlooked and the NGOs have not got the real essence of civil society in terms of its work and responsibility. Even, we see a very little role of civil society organizations in the situation of the dysfunction of the democratic institutions of the state at the hands of the military regime.

The educational and research quality of Indian universities is better than ours. In the conference, two young girls who were studying law in India also presented their papers. But, we don’t have such culture of producing research papers at universities level. Most importantly, social scientists are doing much work on policy issues in India, while we still lag behind in the social science subjects especially anthropology, political Science and Sociology in terms of the their utility. CRG also organized a public lecture by a French scholar Etienne Balibar. A large number of students and civil society members participated in the public lecture, which indicted the responsible and active civil society role.


In India, the state of West Bengal is one among the three states wherein Communist Party of India has a stronghold. The Kolkata region has a great importance at the national as well as international level in India. Historically, Kolkata has remained the capital of British India. Kolkata was the trade center in the British era.

During the three-day conference, various scholars presented their papers on the issues like gender justice, forced displacement & role of state, global justice, liberalism, Dalit question etc. Shritha, an Indian participant, presented an interesting paper on the women’s social space and gender discrimination.

After participating in the conference, I went back to my Sindhi friend who is studying in JNU Delhi. It was a nice experience visiting JNU with my friend in India. Like QAU Islamabad in Pakistan, JNU is very famous for its reputed quality education and research in India. Including India’s different states, large number of foreign students comes to JNU for higher education studies. JNU seems different compared to our universities in terms of the progressive role of students and teachers. The students play a very advance role and influence the national and international policy agendas of the state. The professors of JNU also play responsible role of civil society actors for the social change and democratization in different state spheres. On the contrary, in Pakistan, student political organizations and teachers in universities are sidelined to play the same role.

Accessing Rights as Citizens: The Camp-based Urdu Speaking Community in Bangladesh

Report from Refugee And Migratory Movements Research Unit

Edited by Shabnoor Sultana

Policy Brief I

Coping with Riverbank Erosion Induced Displacement
This policy brief is based on a study titled Coping with Displacement: Riverbank Erosion in Northwest Bangladesh by C R Abrar and S N Azad. The study was commissioned by RDRS, Bangladesh and was supported by the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation, Dhaka.
Background
Each year tens of thousands of people in Bangladesh are made internally displaced through riverbank erosion. The northwest region is particularly prone to such erosion. Riverbank erosion contributes immensely to the process of marginalisation of a large number of people, displacing households and adversely affecting their social and material circumstances.
Defining Characteristics of Displaced people
The Abrar and Azad research (2003) was based on in-depth interviews with 200 respondents who had the experience of displacement in the preceding 6 months. The majority were illiterate with large families.
Impact of Displacement: Gains and Losses
Some lost family members; others lost homes, crops, land, trees, poultary and livestock.Displacement increased violence within families and this led to increased divorce.In many cases, however, there was improved access to clean water, health care and education after movement and some experienced an improvement in income and livelihood.
Coping Mechanisms and Survival Strategies
Riverbank erosion is very unpredictable. It can cause vast and rapid destruction or at times can be deceptively slow process contributing to state of denial. This hinders strategizing for movement.
Short term coping mechanisms
The households experiencing riverbank erosion first send away their women members and children to safely. Those that had access to boats and manpower could move their belongings while others would lose everything. Households in most cases extended help to one another
Long term survival strategies
Credit and loans played a vital role in the communityu during distress situations. Many took loans from neighbours or relatives. Credit from banks was not easily accessible for most of the affected people as the ownership of land was a precondition for loans.
Impact on Women
The ultimate burden of managing housrholds through the many phases associated with riverbank erosion fell disproportionately on women. Food insecurity, lack of access to safe drinking water and health affected the women in gender specific ways. Female-specific problems included meeting demands for dowry that led to early marriage, lack of privacy, sexual abuse and abandonment. Empowerment processes were also at work for the displaced women. Women gained more say in decision making at home and move to public sphere.
Institutional Responses

Government: The government programmes are often inadequate, disorganized, ineffective and adhoc.
NGOs : Very few national NGOs have specific programmes targeting those affected by riverbank erosion.

Policy and Programme Recommendations
The government of Bangladesh should include riverbank erosion in its five year plan and in its framing of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.
Needs Based Policy Recommendations

Phase 1: Preparations
Early Warning System
Phase 2: Disaster Management
Phase 3: Rehabilitation
Phase 4: Livelihood Management
NGOs should:
1. Reorient their activities to target men, women and children in education and skills development.
2. Support community counselling on womens rights.
Rights Based Policy Recommendations
Affected people should be encouraged to demand access to education, health care, water, sanitation, and work opportunities as a matter of right, not as charity by the state. Institutions need to begin seeing the mitigation process as a matter of right of the affected people. They need to be viewed as agents rather than simply subjects of rehabilitation programmes. Only by constant promotion of their rights, can their interests be protected.

Policy Brief II

This policy brief is based on a study entitled Identity, Rights and Citizenship: The Camp Based Urdu Speaking Community in Bangladesh by CR Abrar and Victoria Redcliff. It identifies some of the present barriers to effective citizenship, examining the community hopes, fears, and aspirations, and recommends the steps that need to be taken to finally address a situation that has been ignored far too long.
Background
With the liberation of Bangladesh in 1972, the majority of the Urdu-speakers in the country applied for so-called repatriation to Pakistan trough the ICRC. But in the last 36 years, Pakistan has made no move to take in them in, so that these people have become forced migrants in Bangladesh, with no access to citizenship rights there.
Camp Conditions
The 116 Bihari settlements are located largely in urban areas in 13 districts across the country, all under conditions of severe overcrowding, poor sanitation, and lacking basic facilities.
Current Barriers to Effective Citizenship
The Abrar-Redcliff study found that an overwhelming 90% of camp-residents in Saidpur and the capital now desire Bangladeshi citizenship. This desire is 100% amongst 18-25 year olds. However, despite legal pronouncements by the Supreme Court, they remain unable to access many of the opportunities associated with citizenship.
Employment
Not only are they denied all government positions but due to their camp address and unidentified status, wider discrimination in the job market remains a prime concern.
Education
Camp address together with the lack of resources for school fees or materials, educational facilities thus remain inaccessible to the majority.
Security
Without legal support the Urdu-speaking community remains vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.
Healthcare
Camp residents report Bengalis being given priority in hospital waiting lines or Biharis being made to pay speed money in government clinics.
Voting Rights
Urdu-speakers now established outside of the camps have largely gained access to voting rights. Camp residents, however remain skeptical about actually being able to vote
Property Rental/Bank Accounts/Passports
Access to Property Rental/Bank Accounts/Passports is difficult for Urdu-speakers.
Constant Threat of Eviction
Despite the overwhelming desire for Bangladeshi citizenship, fear of eviction from the camp if citizenship is formally announced is a very real concern among many residents, and an issue that generates a good deal of confusion among the community.
Facilitating Future Progress
Effective citizenship accompanied with rehabilitation and integration is important to counter discrimination.
Social Responsibility
It is not only the state, but the entire framework of Bangladeshi society which needs to be held responsible for the Urdu-speaking community marginalization, as illustrated below.
NGOs
NGOs have so far remained unconnected with the Bihari issue.
Mainstream Civil Society
Neglect on the part of mainstream civil society has increased the widespread ignorance of the plight of this disenfranchised group.
Media
As the future success of the community is dependent on acceptance from the public at large, the role of the media is key.
Recommendations
The study concludes that the following measures need to be taken if current obstacles to community development are to be addressed:
1. Community mobilization and information /awareness-raising
2. Mobilizing Bengali Society
3. Public Announcements of Status
4. Reintegration with dignity
The above activities will provide some of the short-term momentum necessary to mobilize public opinion. The associated activities will contribute towards generating further debate and discussion, ultimately contributing to the process.

CRG’ s Initiatives to Engage NHRC in the Series of Workshops on Displacement in India

Ishita Dey

Thousands of dalits from across the country reportedly reached Delhi on foot after walking for 26 days. As I pen down my reflections on the recently concluded workshops organized by CRG, one is left to ponder why so many people had to come down on the streets claiming right to land after 60 years of independence. The right to food, water, land and employment continues to haunt the dispossessed and displaced till date. Despite the policy exercises by the National and state governments and the institutionalization of the quasi-autonomous institutions like NHRC and State Human Rights Commissions it is time we reflect about the people’s movements and responsibility to protect – the onus and its dynamics?
In the recently concluded CRG workshop, we pondered on these issues with a range of civil society organizations, independent social activists, academics and lawyers. While all of us agreed on the systematic pattern of displacement and the way it has been naturalized through a rebuilding of populist consensus under the garb of the policy exercise; we tried to engage with NHRC and State Human Rights representative in the course of the three workshops. In the first workshop we had the pleasure to interact with the three NHRC representatives who were involved in various rescue operations against trafficking of women and children. There was a concern among the participants that the issues affecting the grassroots are often subtle and fails to grab attention. Dr. K. M. Parivelan from UNDP pointed out that the Chennai airport expansion will displace thousands and one of the questions raised was whether or NHRC could intervene in such cases. Even Dr. Ranabir Samaddar, Director,CRG felt that the catastrophic things grab more attention than the endemic things. He cited that humanitarian agencies in the recent past have conducted public hearings, which have been instrumental in mobilizing people and meeting the requirements of the people. He felt that NHRC should conduct public hearings and that could be an effective way to address people’s issues rather than wait for redressal of complaints. One of the main concerns raised by the activists, media persons and academics was the process of addressing the problems. Most of the people felt that mere redressal of complaints cannot be an effective way of addressing the concerns. Participants were also critical of NHRC’s role in the framing of the NRP 2006. The interaction and dialogue with NHRC participants was only restricted to the Bangalore workshop. Unfortunately the participants in the Bhubaneshwar and Kolkata dialogue could not interact with the NHRC personnel. Thorough this forum we want to draw attention to some of the problems raised in the Kolkata Workshop.
1.One of the main concerns of the Kolkata workshop was to understand the policy exercise. CRG had organized a one-day deliberation in Delhi to develop a critique of the R&R policy. The meeting was attended by a select group of academicians, lawyers and activists. In this meeting, we came to a consensus that NRP2006 should be read with the communal violence bill to understand one concern whether or not the proliferation of policy exercise actually reflects the state responsibility to protect or is it a way of copying with developmental strategies. The details of the proceedings are available in our publication. (For details of the report contact us at mcrg@mcrg.ac.in)
2.Another concern voiced by participants from Ganga Bhangan Pratirodh Action Nagorik Committee, Panchanandapur, Bangitola, Malda was the enormous displacement caused by the construction of Farakka Barrage. Prior to the construction of the Farakka Barrage the river erosion was restricted to a limited area in Malda District. Since the construction of the Barrage, the erosion has been on the eastern bank and resulted in displacing thousand of people living on the east bank in the district of Malda. Currently the residents of the Malda town, NH43 and the railway tracks will be affected due to the massive erosion. The details are available in a book written by Dr. Kalyan Rudra , Ganga Bhangan Katha.
Gangetic erosion has displaced 5 lakh people. 14 high schools and Madrasas as well as more than a hundred primary schools along with many private educational institutes and I.C.D.S. centers have been destroyed. The schools have been rebuilt at locations, which are not easily accessible to the children of the locality resulting in increase in dropout rates.
About 125 thousand people are forced to live on alluvial deposited land in the middle of the river (locally they are called “charvari”). They are not recognized as “inhabitants” of the Malda West Bengal Government.
The only ray of hope for the victims of erosion amidst all of these lay in Section II of W.B. L.R. Act which guaranteed that the land eroded by any river would belong to its previous owner if it submerged as alleviated land within 20 years from the year of its being eroded. The government of West Bengal through the amendment in 2000 abolished this section. This amendment has taken way their right to land eroded by the river. This amendment has been done without any prior notice and information or warding compensation as it reads, “ Any land gained by- gradual accession to a plot of land, within from the recess of a river or of the sea, shall vest in the state Government and the raiyat who owns the plot of land shall not be entitled to retain such land as an accretion there to”.

NGOs Public Statement on the Security Situation of Iraqi Refugees in Lebanon

We, the undersigned, note with growing concern the worsening security situation of Iraqi refugees in Lebanon.
Random and targeted arrests and detention of Iraqi refugees have increased recently solely on grounds of illegal entry and/or illegal stay.
According to reports, 432 Iraqis were in detention in July, of whom 150 were arrested in the first week of July only. The majority of them had been registered with UNHCR and hold Refugee Status Certificate. The refugee certificate issued by UNHCR is not being respected by the arresting authorities, nor by the judges, prosecutors, or the Lebanese General Security Office.
Many are kept in detention after the expiry of their sentences as a coercive measure to force them to agree to be sent back to Iraq. IOM is reportedly assisting for these “voluntary return” convoys. This is contrary to UNHCR advising against returns to Iraq. By acting contrary to UNHCR guidelines and without its prior consultation, IOM seriously undermined the protection role and responsibility of the UN Refugee Agency.
The arrest and detention and threat of “deportation” under the cover of “voluntary return” is a flagrant violation of the right to seek asylum enshrined in the Preamble of the Lebanese Constitution and the international customary principle of non-refoulement which is embodied in Art 3 of the Convention Against Torture ratified by Lebanon.
We call on the Lebanese authorities to:
- Acknowledge the UNHCR guidelines regarding the refugees from Iraq and to establish a mechanism to receive and protect refugees from Iraq fleeing the generalised violence in their country.
- Grant the refugees from Iraq temporary residencies on humanitarian grounds.
- Ensure that arrest of refugees from Iraq is limited to identification of identity and for security reasons or other criminal charges.
We call on IOM to:
- Halt assistance to convoys and adhere to UNHCR guidelines and advisory concerning the non-returnability of refugees from Iraq to Iraq.
Jordan held a Conference on July 26 to look at assistance to countries hosting refugees from Iraq in the region, we call all stakeholders to:
- Remind the Lebanese government of its oligation as a member of the international community to recognize and protect the basic and fundamental human rights of refugees from Iraq during their stay in the country.
- Assist the Lebanese government and national NGOs in order to grant the refugees from Iraq refugees access to basic services such as health and education, and allow self-reliance opportunities.

Background

On 18 December 2006, UNHCR issued an advisory return for Iraqis1 in which it recommended that states and UNHCR should declare Iraqis as refugees on a prima facie basis except for those who were residing in Iraqi Kurdistan and those who fall under the exclusion clauses of the 1951 Convention. UNHCR Advisory was issued following the serious deterioration of the security situation in Iraq that was characterized by the generalized violence, massive targeted violations of human rights, and the lack of government protection. According to the advisory, “Iraqi” refers to both Iraqi nationals as well as former habitual residents of Iraq, in particular Palestinian refugees. The Advisory called the countries in the region hosting Iraqis and which do not have refugee legal framework to allow Iraqis from Southern and Central Iraq to enter and remain, “even if on a temporary basis.’

Signatures

Lebanese NGOs
Frontiers Ruwad Association
Lebanese Center for Human Rights
Nahwa Al-Muwatiniyya
Arab NGO Network for Development
Union of Democratic Youth

Arab NGO
Comité pour le Respect des Libertés et des droits de l’Homme en Tunisie, Tunisia
Fédération des Tunisiens pour une Citoyennete des deux Rives, Tunisia
Association Tunisiennes des Femmes, Tunisia

International NGOs
Médecins du Monde–France (Lebanon)
International Coalition on the Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers
Italian Council for Refugees
Refugees International
The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
Euromediterranean Human Rights New Work
Episcopal Migration Ministries
Chaldean Federation of America
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
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1. UNHCR Return Advisory and Position on International Protection Needs of Iraqis Outside Iraq, UNHCR, 18 December.

Appeal Against the Imminent “ Voluntary Returns” of Iraqi Detainees to Iraq

We, the undersigned, are concerned about the “voluntary return” operations of Iraqi refugees in detention in Lebanon to Iraq. Such returns are contrary to the principle of non-refoulement and to the UN position on non-returnability to Iraq of the Iraqi refugees from Southern and Central Iraq.
The Iraqi Embassy in collaboration with the Internal Organization for Migration (IOM), and the Lebanese authorities are currently preparing the necessary arrangements for the upcoming “voluntary return” of approximately 250 Iraqis from Lebanese detention centers to Iraq.
Refugees and asylum seekers are arrested solely on grounds of illegal entry and/or illegal stay and kept in detention for long periods after the expiry of their judicial sentences. Most Iraqis, if not all, see their return to Iraq as the only way out of prison: faced with indefinite imprisonment with no or little hope to be released by the Lebanese General Security Office – despite of UNHCR’s intervention on behalf of detainees known to them. This explains why some Iraqi detainees sign on their return to Iraq with the hope to leave Iraq again.
It is our opinion that such “voluntary returns” are in fact refoulement of Iraqi refugees.
UNHCR defines “voluntary” as the absence of any physical, psychological, or material pressure and considers that choosing to return when the legal status and rights of refugees are not recognized in the country of asylum is not an act of free will.
As prolonged detention after the expiry of the sentence is considered a physical, psychological and material pressure against refugees and as most refugees lack legal status in Lebanon, the voluntariness to return to Iraq expressed by Iraqis in detention is seriously flawed.
IOM and UNHCR have repeatedly stated that today they do not promote “voluntary return” of Iraqis. Yet, IOM in collaboration with the Iraqi Embassy are organizing what they call “voluntary return” operations on an ad-hoc basis.
UNHCR’s role in these operations is limited to counselling the detainees prior to their return. Yet, it seems that in reality UNHCR is viewed as approving such returns. Upon receiving the list of Iraqi detainees from the Iraqi Embassy, UNHCR conducts a counselling session stressing that it does not support the return to Iraq, that as Iraqis, they are considered as refugee by UNHCR and that they have the right to seek international protection in Lebanon. In the course of counselling, refugees are asked whether or not they want to seek asylum or maintain their refugee status. In case of a refusal, UNHCR makes sure that the person does not wish to seek asylum and intends to return to Iraq. It is our opinion that by participating in the process of these operations, UNHCR is allowing other actors to undermine its protection role.
We are further concerned that IOM and, the Lebanese authorities are putting the lives of Iraqi refugees in danger by returning them to war-torn Iraq without providing any guarantees for their security, any assistance or rehabilitation and without monitoring the situation of returnees inside Iraq.
We call on UNHCR, IOM and the Lebanese authorities to:
- halt the up-coming and all future so called “voluntary return” of Iraqi detainees to Iraq in compliance with the UN Return Advisory on Iraq.
We call on the Lebanese authorities to:
- put an end to the practice of prolonged arbitrary detention of refugees and asylum-seekers
- respect the fundamental principle of non-refoulement of refugees and asylum-seekers
- acknowledge the serious deterioration of the security situation in Iraq and grant a temporary residency on humanitarian grounds for Iraqi refugees.

Legal Background

Lebanon is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and does not have a national legislation to protect refugees. Also, Lebanese authorities do not recognize the refugee certificates issued by UNHCR. Therefore, the majority of refugees in Lebanon lack legal status and are treated as illegal immigrants.
In December 2006, UNHCR issued a Return Advisory on Iraqis in which it stated that “[n]o Iraqi from Southern or Central Iraq should be forcibly returned to Iraq until such time as there is substantial improvement in the security and human rights situation in the country”.
UNHCR Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation considers that “voluntary” refers to the “absence of any physical, psychological, or material pressure” and that [o]one of the most important elements in the verification of voluntariness is the legal status of the refugees in the country of asylum. If refugees are legally recognized as such, their rights are protected and if they are allowed to settle, their choice to repatriate is likely to be truly free and voluntary. If, however, their rights are not recognized, if they are subjected to pressures and restrictions and confined to closed camps, they may choose to return, but this is not an act of free will”.
Article 1(1)(d) of IOM Constitution also stresses on the requirement of voluntariness in order to provide its services for voluntary repatriation.

Signatories

American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Michigan
Association Justice Et Misericorde)
Dr. Barbara E. Harrell-Bond, OBE
Church World Service, Immigration and Refugee Program
Comite pour le Respect des Libertes et des Droits de l’Homme
Episcopal Migration Ministries
Ecuromediterranean Human Rights Network
Federation des Tunisiens pour une Citoyennete des deux Rives
Federation Internationale des ligues des Droits de l’Homme
French Human Rights League
Frontiers Ruwad Association
International Coalition on the Detention of Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Migrants
National Council for liberties in Tunisia
Medecins du Monde – France (Lebanon)

Third CRG Workshop in Kolkata Reveals Interesting Facts and Figures Regarding Development Induced Displacement in West Bengal

CRG has been instrumental in organizing three workshops in Bangalore, Bhubaneshwar and Kolkata, to generate a dialogue among activists, academics and independent researchers on the displacement situation. In Kolkata CRG hosted the Third of the series of workshops. This workshop was inaugurated by Hon’ble Justice Shyamal Kumar Sen, Chairperson, West Bengal State Human Rights Commission on 3 September 2007. On this occasion he released the report prepared by Dr. Walter Fernandes and others on “Development induced Displacement in West Bengal 1947-2000”. In an article by Subash Mohapatra, “ India: Development-induced Displacement on rise” he sums up the report findings and details of the workshop. The link is as follows:

http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/7288

SAFHR's Appeal to the Bhutanese Refugees and the International Community

(In the recent times, Bhutanese refugees have become the object of violence again. While constantly the right to return is being debated amongst the organisations / countries working on refugee rights we are yet to see any concrete action. Bhutanese refugees have been living a life of exile for 17 long years. The Royal Government of Bhutan resorted to nothing but ethnic cleansing in the way it evicted citizens of Nepali origin. In its appeal to the international community SAFHR condemns the violence, and urges the international fraternity to intervene.)

An Appeal to agitating Bhutanese Refugees to shun violence and urging the International community to immediately intervene to secure the Bhutanese Refugees their Rights under the UN Convention Concerning Refugees and the UDHR

South Asia Forum for Human Rights (SAFHR) condemns the violence and the attacks on refugees living in the camps in Jhapa, particularly in Beldangi II, by a section of the refugee youth reportedly belonging to the Revolutionary Youth Organisation and the Revolutionary Students Organisation affiliated to Bhutan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist). It seems that the rampaging mob of youth were also encouraged by some 'leaders' of the National Front for Democracy in Bhutan in exile. These persons were opposed to the proposal of settling the Bhutanese refugees in a third country. They want all the Bhutanese to return to Bhutan.

SAFHR also expresses deep regret at the tragic death of two refugee youth in the recent violence in Beldangi camp I and II. We are saddened by the report of the death of another Bhutanese youth in Mechi where they were confronting Indian security forces in their attempt to enter India. We extend our condolences to their families.

SAFHR has been closely associated with the various groups in the seven camps in East Nepal. We believe that every refugee has a right to return to his/her own country. At the same time, we are committed to provide to every refugee the opportunity to freely examine all the three options available to him or her under the UN Convention concerning Refugees and decide about his or her future in an atmosphere of freedom. We have always opposed any attempt to force the refugees to accept a particular option/solution though any kind of force whether reduction of relief supplies, closure of camps and intimidation. We have also opposed the use of the refugee camps for any kind of militant activities by sections of the refugees themselves.

The refugees from Bhutan have been living in exile in Nepal for nearly 17 years. It was not their choice to become refugees. They were forced to becoming refugees when the Royal Government of Bhutan threw them out of the country. Bhutan's eviction of a section of its citizens of Nepalese ethnicity was a blatant act of ethnic cleansing. It is sad that the international community has so far done little to force Bhuatn to take back these hapless people.

While we welcome the kind offer by the government of the United States of America, Canada, Denmark and countries to resettle a large number of the Bhutanese refugees in their countries, we urge all these governments to engage in serious dialogue on this issue and make Bhutan realise that they can not just brutally uproot people from their homes and throw them out into the wilderness.

SAFHR also strongly condemns the violent action taken by the Indian security forces against a group of people whose only wish is to peacefully march back to their own country. In no words has this group ever indicated that they wish to create any problems on Indian soil. Bhutan and India have a special agreement that allows their people to travel back and forth between the two countries without visa requirements, therefore it is totally unacceptable that the Indian government bar these people from entering India. Bhutan is separated from Nepal by a strip of Indian territory. Therefore, there is no other passage overland into Bhutan from Nepal, unless one passes through India.

Clearly, a section of the refugees, however wrong they might have been in the choice of the manner of expressing their frustration and anger, at the total denial of their right to return to their homeland, have most vividly expressed their rejection of the option of settlement in a third country. Also, they were justifiably unhappy at the international community's tacit approval of the exercise of sham democracy initiated in Bhutan by the ruling Wangcuk dynasty and their cohorts. Understandably the holding of the so-called 'mock election exercise' in Bhutan, at this time, added fuel to the fire.

SAFHR appeals to the Government of India to uphold the democratic values it claims to espouse and to stop using force in obstructing the group of refugees from Bhutan from exercising their democratic rights and freedoms. We also urge the international community to respect the sentiment of those refugees who want to return to their homeland, which is just and fair right.

We also call upon the agitating refugee youth and their leaders to immediately desist from use of all forms of violence which they have been directing against a section of their compatriots who wanted to explore the option of settlement in a third country.

The Other Side of 1857 Revolt – Journey from United Province to Malegaon and Mauritius

Comment

There are two historical explanations regarding 1857 revolt. For some historians, 1857 marked the first war of independence, while for others it is known as the year of Sepoy mutiny. In this small note I am not going to analyse whether it was the first war of freedom struggle or only a Sepoy mutiny. As we commemorate the 150 years of 1857 through various government and media initiatives; it is interesting to see how this mutiny by the Indians and the consequent suppression by the British Raj forced many people to migrate from several areas of the country. Most of the urban centers of India witnessed rural urban migration in various phases. In this context, it is important to recognize that displacement and migration can happen at any historical juncture. In the transnational world of today, we need to understand that often under the garb of voluntary migration; forced migration has occurred in the past too that had gone undocumented. As we celebrate the 150 years of 1857, it is important to take a close look at the mass displacement movement had brought about.

The Times of India has tried to unravel some interesting facts, which paves way for further research. The revolt opened up new destinations for people who were forced to flee. Destinations were as varied as Singapore, Mauritius and Jabalpur. Various powerloom corners of Mumbai (Malegaon and Bhiwandi) and two Muslim quarters Mominpura and Madanpura in Bombay also witnessed mass influx of people from Northern India. The suppression in the wake of the Mutiny or the First War of Independence was responsible for uprooting thousands in various corners of Northern India, the then United Provinces.

Community leaders of Malegaon recall tales that have gone undocumented and need to be told (Hafeez, “1857 Malegaon Story” Times of India, 10 May 2007). Residents of today’s Malegaon are descendants of the migrant populace who were force to flee from Meerut, Awadh and Lucknow. Interestingly as Hafeez points the residents of United Provinces used railway services to flee certain areas. Hafeez refers to Basheer Adeeb who has written a book on the history of Malegaon. Basheer Adeeb’s grandfather and other members used bullock carts and trains as the means of transport to reach Burhanpur (in Madhya Pradesh) and after that they had to walk. While many chose to stay in Buhranpur, Adeeb recalled that many migrants moved to various places like Jabalpur, Nagpur, Kampti, Shahda, Dhule, Malegaon, Yeola, Bhiwandi and Mominpura and Madanpura in Bombay. Most of the people, who were forced to migrate, chose areas that were nearby Agra Highway. Apart from Bombay, the other destinations were Maheshwar, on the banks of the Narmada and a seat of power for the Holkar dynasty, followed by various places in Maharashtra as mentioned above. In fact, the very place Mominpura gets its name from Momin weavers of U.P. (“Malegaon to Mauritius: On the trail of 1857” Times of India, 10 May 2007)

Malegaon is interesting because it did exist pre 1857, though there are no archival records to suggest the influx of people from Northern parts of the country. What is crucial to note here is that the pattern of migration is spread over a huge time. Kinship ties were responsible for spreading news about the economic prospects of Malegaon. Malegaon recently made it to the news because of the blasts around September. This place is home to the descendants of the migrants from various northern states primarily Awadh. Most of them were weavers. After they migrated to Malegaon they continued in the same profession. The dramatic event that changed their lives was the introduction of power looms in 1936. Most of 80% percent of the city’s population is dependent on these power looms.

Apart from the Deccan states, the British plantations in Mauritius witnessed a rise in the number of indentured labourers post revolt. According to newspaper report, a Mauritian family has records that a ship crammed with more than 500 Bhojpuris, embarking from the Kerala coast. The article also refers to Amaresh Misra’s soon-to-be-published book War of Civilisations: India 1857 where he has discussed in detail how the Bhojpuri language has influenced the popular culture of Mauritius. “"The local language in Mauritius, Creole, is a patois of French with notes of Bhojpuri — for example, in the song 'Hamre avion mein chal jo' or the other common usage for 'I love you', 'Je t'aime va', where a 'va' is added in the way that Bhojpuri speakers say riskva or chalva," he says”.

These instances show how migration patterns are interesting and how the push-pull factor of migration analysis needs to move beyond the economic factors. 1857 revolt sparked internal migration and outward migration. This shows that there is much need to document the nuances that underlie the very notion of “forced migration”. At various historical junctures there have been cases of mass displacement. While the modern historiography around partition literature has attempted to capture the experiences of people who were forced to migrate to Pakistan and Bangladesh; revolt of 1857 has not received due attention.

The journey from United Province to Malegaon and Mauritius is significant because most of the migrants to Maleagon belonged to the minority community and were subject to routine violence by the Zamindars. They had no right to name their own children. On the other hand, it will be an interesting subject to explore the reasons that were responsible for the Bhojpuri migrants to migrate to Mauritius which was then a French colony. Who were these migrants? These migrants were from Eastern U.P. and Bihar. They were skilled at growing sugarcane. The British had managed to destroy the rural agrarian enterprises, which was instrumental in creating a huge surplus of labour. Eventually, they were shipped off to Surinam, Mauritius and Caribbean islands. What could be an interesting domain of research is how the popular culture of Mauritius is influenced by the Bhojpuri culture and how this separation has brought about a unique folk tradition called the kaharwa, a folksong sung in the Kahar community that narrates the pain of separation from a wife or beloved as a result of migration; the chamraudha dance of the Chamar caste, the songs of which cover the same theme; the barahmasa narrations, which detail the different emotions that each month of the year brings; and the nautanki popular theatre, performed during festivals and weddings. These folk traditions are known as Bidesia. Bidesia is a Bhojpuri term for those who left for overseas. These living traditions speak about the experience and pain of migration. These living traditions speak about the agony of separation from “home”. The notions of “home”, “nation” and memory are crucial to understand the Mauritian case. The migration to Malegaon is further intriguing. Even though the migration is limited within the boundaries of nation, people were forced to flee from their “homes”. In the transnational context, when people are constantly on the move and boundaries have blurred can we erase the pain of displacement the weavers of various places in UP might faced some 150 years back?

         ------------Ishita Dey