The UID Project in India: Should Non-Citizen Residents be Concerned?

Sahana Basavapatna

Introduction

This essay attempts to comprehend the potential implications of the Unique Identification project (UID) or “Aadhaar” on non-citizen residents in India, specifically, refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons and other “illegal” migrants who fall within the grey zones between citizens and non-citizens in India. The Aadhaar project poses a number of questions, including the constitutional right to privacy and issues of surveillance 1, on identity, the costs of the project, and many others. It gives an impression that only welfarist objectives animate the project but given the scale, costs and what it seeks to achieve in reality, it would be naïve to assume that such a system would leave non-citizens untouched especially in the context of the high degree of anxiety over issues of both internal and external national insecurity.

The unique identification number debate, it is argued needs to consider the possible impact it would have on non-citizen residents. They make up a small yet significant cross section of the resident population in India and find themselves in a society and polity that displays unique features in terms of how it regulates the presence and exit of foreigners in its territory. Further, the incoherence of the legal and administrative mechanism regulating asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons in India has the potential to translate the lack of or precarious legal identities in social life of these individuals in ways that may negatively impact them. At the same time, it would be worth thinking aloud whether, on the contrary, the UID project would benefit refugees in the Indian context given that their limited rights are not translated in reality in the existing social, economic and political institutional set up. Questions of identity, surveillance and the citizenship of refugees/stateless/asylum seekers are all the more relevant given the anxieties displayed by the Indian state in relation to them. It is in this specific context of resident non-citizens that this paper intends to comprehend the complexities of this project.

As the mechanism and institutional structures to implement the Unique Identity Project have been put in place only recently and few reports 2 evaluating the pilot projects are available, this paper would arguably run the risk of speculation vis-à-vis the impact it would have on “foreigners”. It would thus be important to note that the points flagged and conclusions arrived at are drawn from personal experience of working with refugees and asylum seekers in Delhi as well as in Mizoram and the existing primary and analytical literature on the Unique Identity project.

The Origins and Salient Features of the UID Project

A pan-India project to “identify” each resident was formally inaugurated in 2009, with the establishment of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) as an office attached to the Planning Commission. 3 Headed by Mr Nandan Nilekani, the Chairperson with powers equivalent to that of a Minister of a Cabinet Rank, the UIDAI has a mandate to ensure a “unique” number to every resident in India to facilitate easy access to government schemes, eliminate fraud such as duplication of identities resulting in significant savings to the state. The unique number would include an individual’s demographic and personal information and biometric information – finger prints as well as the scan of the iris. The Unique Identity numbers are proposed to be issued between August 2010 and February 2011 and over the next 5 years, it is expected to reach 600 million residents. 4

The UID “architecture” and the problems in the way the UID is visualized including its objective are well articulated in a recent article by Dr Usha Ramanathan. 5 Some points may be reiterated as they are relevant in the context of refugees and other immigrant whose legal status is precarious. The UID is not mandatory and is “demand driven” – meaning that the way the project is visualized is to lead to a situation where residents would voluntarily opt for the number because of the benefits that would accrue. 6 Considering that it is linked to services and benefits and the fact that the UIDAI has signed numerous Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with bodies, including banks, public sector agencies, private companies and civil society organizations, it is bound to compel an individual to apply for a number.

Though now projected as aiming to ensure better access to services and benefits for the poor by assigning and authenticating identity, the origins of the project can be traced to a series of events in the 1990s and after and debates within the government on the question of national security, terrorism and illegal immigration in India. 7 The Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan is considered to have triggered the idea of the need to ensure that “terrorists” are not allowed to enter the Indian territory. The Kargil Review Committee 8 in its recommendations among others, noted the “gross inadequacies in the nation’s surveillance capability…”.9 It further recommended that “…steps should be taken to issue ID Cards to border villagers in certain vulnerable areas on a priority basis, pending its extension to other or all parts of the State. Such a policy would also be relevant in the North-East, Sikkim and part of West Bengal”. 10 Several committees/bodies were set up in the 1990s 11 with a view to probe issues concerning internal security, border management, etc and evaluate the aspects of national security. The idea of the smart card system is not articulated explicitly anywhere excepting the Recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee but debates in the Lok Sabha between April and December 2001 see a number of questions being asked on smart cards system to be used for various services. 12 In 2006, the national e-governance plan of the Ministry of Information Technology listed the “National Citizens Database” 13 as one of the 27 Mission Mode Projects towards ushering in “era of e-governance” so that it improves “the delivery of public services and simplify the process of accessing them”. 14 Later in 2007, the Working Group on Development Policy in the Planning Commission came up with a report titled “Entitlement Reform for Empowering the Poor: The Integrated Smart Card Report (ISC)” 15 where the idea of the identity card was elaborated.

The National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 (hereafter called the UID Bill) which if passed, would regulate the UIDAI does not mention the government’s national security concerns. Only a passing reference is made in the confidential document published by UIDAI titled ‘Creating a Unique Identity Number for Every Resident in India” 16 where it notes that the inability to identify residents “complicates government efforts to account for residents during emergencies and security threats”.17 The UID Bill118 makes this clear in its Preamble where it notes that the objective is,
“to provide for the establishment of the National Identification Authority of India for the purpose of issuing identification numbers to individuals residing in India and to certain other classes of individuals and manner of authentication of such individuals to facilitate access to benefits and services 19 to such individuals to which they are entitled and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.”

Thus, the overarching character of the Aadhaar project appears to be “welfare”, which on a perfunctory reading may not amount to a red herring, but nevertheless relegates to the background several other crucial concerns. In giving the “welfare” hue to the Unique Identification numbering project, it makes what is clearly a simple, liner assumption of a direct link between an individual’s identity and access to benefits. The rationale is that the lack of identification results in the denial of services to those entitled to it. The document, ‘Creating a Unique Identity Number for Every Resident in India” 20 is relevant, for nowhere else among the UID documentation is this welfare argument explained in more detail. It notes,
“A crucial factor that determines an individual’s well-being in a country is whether their identity is recognized in the eyes of the government. Weak identity limits the power of the country’s residents when it comes to claiming basic political and economic rights. The lack of identity is especially detrimental for the poor and the underprivileged, the people who live in India’s “social, political and economic periphery”. Agencies in both the public and private sector in India usually require a clear proof of identity to provide services. Since the poor often lack such documentation, they face enormous barriers in accessing benefits and subsidies”.21

For a state that makes a very clear distinction between citizens and non-citizens and ensures that the latter are excluded as not entitled to be part of the membership of the political community, the reference to “residents” and their inability to access benefits is intriguing. Further, the link between a person’s identity and her access to benefits due to her is mediated through a variety of factors, including class, caste, gender, religion, race and access to information. Thus, to assert that the root cause of poverty and marginalization is solely an individual’s inability to identify to the satisfaction of the state is to refuse to acknowledge the role played by these factors in marginalizing individuals and creating an impoverished population. Second, identity itself is a fluid concept and cannot be easily frozen in rigid categories.

The Bill includes two other important points, on the question of surveillance, profiling and safeguarding of the information so that there is no misuse. Section 9 of the Bill states that, “The Authority shall not require any individual to give information pertaining to his race, religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity, language, income or health”. Among the features of the UID, it is noted is that it will not contain intelligence because “loading intelligence into identity numbers makes them susceptible to fraud and theft. The UID will be a random number” 22. Lastly, Section 30 of the Bill ensures security and confidentiality of identity information of individuals. Section 33 makes an exception where it states that information can be disclosed if required by an order of a competent court 23 or in the interests of national security.24


It has been argued that even though the Bill is silent and denies either profiling or centralizing information, “convergence is a predictable and inevitable consequence of the UID project”.25 Dr Ramanathan goes on to show how the UID along with other initiatives such as the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) makes it clear beyond doubt that surveillance is one of the key objectives of the project.26

The “Key that Opens all Doors” 27? What does the UID have in Store for Non-Citizen Residents?

As mentioned in the foregoing section, neither the UID Bill nor other related documents of the Authority make any mention of resident non-citizens, who include asylum seekers, refugees, stateless persons or “illegal” migrants or the likely implications the project may have on them given that it makes some strong assertions of the problems it seeks to remedy. It is thus logical to assume that the Bill is an innocent and innocuous piece of legislation with the sole purpose of assigning, verifying and authenticating “identity” with the aim to ensure better access to benefits for the poor. However, going by the history of the identity cards the world over 28, and India’s perennial anxiety over “terrorists” and “infiltrators”, it would be naïve to conclude that the project would exclude from its scope a small yet significant chunk of the population in India, which has continued to be seen as a “national security” concern for the state.

Should then this category of residents be concerned about the UID project? Will they benefit considering that they are easy targets for discrimination and exploitation in India or do the costs to them (in terms of monitoring, surveillance and profiling) outweigh the likely benefits? It would be pertinent to sketch in detail the nature and character of migration, their experiences and the broad framework under which they are regulated before an attempt is made to answer some of these questions.

Refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons and other “illegal migrants” form a broad category of residents with fluid identity in India. A large majority of them share some form of ties with India – historical, religious, ethnic, language. The legal basis for their stay is varied. For instance, Nepali nationals are allowed to live, own property and carry out economic activities 29 under the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1950. Refugees and asylum seekers usually have some form of identification 30 and are considered to live legally in India. This category includes nationals from the African continent (Somalis, Sudanese, Congolese, Ethiopians), those from within the South Asian region, including the Burmese, Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Afghans, and Tibetans and lastly others from outside of South Asia including the Palestinians, Iranians, and Iraqis. It is impossible to say with accuracy, atleast in case of those who share common ties with those of the North East India for instance, whether they are foreigners or part of Assam, Manipur, Mizoram or Arunachal. Some others such as stateless (for instance the Nepalis of Bhutanese origin who are unable to go back to Bhutan and are not recognized in India) and refugees who do not submit a claim for protection to UNHCR in New Delhi are “illegal foreigners” and if detected, are subject to deportation.

For the purposes of the law however, these are foreigners whose entry, stay and exit is regulated by a collective of legislations and orders passed under the Foreigners Act, 1946, the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939, the Passports Act and the Citizenship Act. As these legislations emerged in a specific context of history and therefore do not take into consideration the complexities of immigration in India, they are inadequate in dealing with this category of non-citizens. Be that as it may, experience suggests that this they are dealt with uniformly (as in, treating all of them as foreigners, as opposed to recognizing the differences between a recognized refugee, a stateless person or a migrant), without acknowledging the specificities of their presence.

Most, if not all immigrants falling within this category share some similarities with the local host population, as in case of Bangladeshis, the Burmese, Nepalis, Sri Lankan Tamils and Pakistanis. Although the government has managed to monitor its borders on the western front more successfully and shows visible hostility towards the citizens from Pakistan, migration from across Bangladesh 31 and Burma 32 is relatively easier due to easy permeability of the borders, and informal trade. Bangladeshi nationals in the current political and economic dispensation have also attracted immense hostility. 33

Immigration and immigration management is complex because under the broad framework of the Constitution and the laws applying to foreigners and citizens is a combination of mostly ad-hoc administrative policies, agreements and practices that reflect the nature of migration, the nationality of immigrants, India’s foreign policy and the political relations between the two countries. The powers of the Central government are plenary 34 and because they involve questions of “national security”, policies and regulations may be kept outside the purview of the citizen’s right to information. This information asymmetry has practical and adverse implications for refugees and asylum seekers and generally in understanding the framework within which this specific category of non-citizen residents are managed and regulated.

Furthermore, under the broad policy can be seen a network of institutions at the Central as well as State level that through various practices regulate and monitor the immigrant population in India. Important to name at the central level is the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) which is overall in charge of immigration and citizenship, the Foreigners Regional Registration Office, a body constituted under MHA which monitors and registers all foreigners entering India, including refugees, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which within a limited mandate in India carries out refugee status determination of individuals other than nationals from Sri Lanka and Tibet, the police and civil society groups. At the state level, similar bodies and authorities are mandated with powers in relation to immigration, citizenship and foreigners.

Ad-hocism in the existing broad immigration policy means that each refugee or immigrant community is dealt with separately in terms of its rights and entitlements. It may not always be detrimental for it offers space for refugees, in certain situations to use this ad-hocism to their advantage. A classic instance is the ease with which Burmese nationals who are recognized refugees in India are able to hold Indian passports.

Thus what is true of one refugee community may not necessarily apply to others. Two examples may be given as an illustration of the ad-hoc nature of the policy. Sri Lankan Tamil nationals and the Tibetans in India are recognized as refugees fleeing persecution and are accorded a legal status. This overt acknowledgment by the government of their status as refugees affords them opportunities for employment, education and health care. In case of the Sri Lankan Tamils, for example, the Government of Tamil Nadu is closely involved in monitoring and assistance. On the other hand, the Somalis and other refugees from the African region receive a minimal support in reality even though they are accorded refugee status by UNHCR. Most Somalis for instance, due to reasons of race, religion, absence of the knowledge of the local language etc are unable to access opportunities, social and economic protection and legal rights that is in theory open to them.

While differences in policy have a bearing on the practices of care, the geographic location of refugees/asylum seekers/stateless persons also assumes an important role and determines the response of various administrative bodies. Thus for instance, recognized Somali refugees living in Delhi and those living in Hyderabad get treated differently. Those in Delhi get a monetary assistance from UNHCR, those in Hyderabad are denied the same. This is due mainly to the inability of UNHCR to monitor refugees in Hyderabad.

The question of identity assumes importance in the context of refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons. For instance, the Burmese, especially the Chins, Kachins, Arakanese and the Burmans, are known to seek asylum in India. However, the fact that the Chins, Kachins, and Arakanese are also native of India (the Chins, Kachins and Arakanese were divided during the partition into two separate states of India and Burma) and live in Mizoram, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh makes it difficult to identity with accuracy an Indian from a Burmese. 35 The problems that this may create are not difficult to anticipate like the following example suggests.36 An article in Business World reported how Indian citizens were categorized as foreigners despite holding valid Voters Identity Card issued by the Election Commission of India because they identified Nepali as their mother tongue.

In yet another instance, Chin refugees (who mostly flee from Chin state and Sagaing Division in Burma) are most often indistinguishable from the Mizos in Mizoram. Additionally the informal trade and the political situation in Chin state has lead to a large number of Chins to live and work. This is recognized and allowed with the active knowledge of those in power. Informal conversations with UNHCR and unverified reports from the Burmese community in Delhi also suggest that Mizos have claimed refugee status pretending to be Chins as this community has benefited the most from resettlement initiatives. In responding to the large influx of Chins in Mizoram, a civil society group called the Young Mizo Association recently initiated a project of identifying each Chin in the entire state. Though conceived in earnestness with a view to deport those that engage in “criminal” activities, it has not been possible for such a mapping to succeed. 37

In a last example, the Kachin refugees from Burma, though small in number in comparison to the Chin refugees (approximately 1 per cent of the approximately 8000 Burmese refugees in India 38) share ethnic, religious and cultural similarities from the Kachins who are found to live in Arunachal Pradesh. What is being suggested is that events such as seasonal migration, and factors such as religious and ethnic ties call into question the assertion that identity can be frozen, verified and authenticated thereby resolving either issues of security or access to welfare measures. Likewise, the Afghans, Somalis and other nationalities who arrive in Delhi, Hyderabad or other cities in India are equally subject to fluid identities; some are students, others asylum seekers, and yet others stateless because neither government – the state of which the person is a national or the state in which he seeks asylum – recognizes him as a member of its community.39

The experience of refugees and asylum seekers in urban cities like Delhi in the way they relate to institutions and the society are mixed. There exists a high level of distrust with state institutions such as the Ministry of Home Affairs, the FRRO and the Police. 40 A sense of ineffectiveness with other institutions like the health care system and the educational system is also prevalent. Under the UNHCR policy and the informal understanding between the government and the UNCHR, refugees and asylum seekers are entitled to state support in areas of health care and education. Employment is legally not permitted but a large number of refugees and asylum seekers work in the informal sector. State support means that with the assistance of UNHCR and its Implementing partner agencies, refugees and asylum seekers have avenues for health care and education in state institutions. As several studies suggest, multiple factors such as lack of information, insufficient support structures, and absence of documents are responsible for the extent of success.41

This sketch of the non-citizen resident population brings the question of identity, surveillance and welfare to the centre stage. In a paradoxical situation, the institutional hold over the refugee in the existing scenario is immense but at the same time, there is enough opportunity to get past the institutional barriers. What is intended to be conveyed by the foregoing sketch of the situation of refugees and others is that they inhabit a zone of the excluded with attempts to take on the identity that is convenient to them to ensure that the law does not reach them merely because the political realities does not favour their presence within the territory. The exclusion is built into the political system; a clear instance of which is the absence of a refugee law but covert recognition of some refugee groups. 42 The UID then is a technology that assists in further excluding the already marginalized. The project asserts that it is only in the “identity business” 43 and that the “responsibility of tracking beneficiaries and the governance of service delivery will continue to remain with the respective agencies…”.44

Conclusion

If the basic assumptions made in the UID project is any indication, residents of India are unlikely to benefit from such a project. Access to benefits and schemes and detection and elimination of fraud are worthy goals and are not denied. However, there exists numerous ways in which residents’ identity is verified and sufficient documents that aid in authenticating the same. If the passports and ration cards run the risk of being misused, there is no guarantee, given the scale and the reach of technology in India, that the unique numbering project will be error free.

It is important to reiterate that the assumptions made are an oversimplification of a complex society that witnesses the interplay of caste, class, gender in relating to individuals and the society as a whole. To then assert that technology will play a role in overcoming all these barriers is to valorize technology at the cost of social, economic and political realities.

Earlier in this essay, while pointing out that the importance given to the welfare goal in the project may not be a red herring, I wish to indicate that given the experiences of individuals who find themselves in the margins of the political society, the over emphasis on welfare for the poor and the marginalized does deflect attention from the core issue – i.e., the use of this mechanism to monitor the movements of immigrant in India. Going by the track record of various identity card projects, it is safe to conclude that detection of and control of illegal immigration has been one of the important reasons for opting for such a mechanism.45 It is for the immigrant community, including those who are illegalized and criminalized in law to be aware of the ramifications of such an initiative.

Notes

1 See for instance Usha Ramanathan, A Unique Identity Bill, 24 July 2010, Vol XLV, No. 30, Economic and Political Weekly, pp. 10-14, Taha Mehmood, The Fuzzy Logic of National Frontiers or a Frontier Nation: Reflections on the Multi-Purpose National Identity Card Scheme in India, Sarai Reader 2007: Frontiers, pp. 144-158.
2 Surojit Mahalanobis, People count gaining smooth momentum, 23 July 2004, Times of India, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/788272.cms (last accessed 21 August 2010), Dipak Mishra, Bihar govt refuses to implement ID-Card Plan, 13 February 2003, Times of India, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/37306745.cms (last accessed 21 August 2010), Tusha Mittal, Falling between the barcodes, Vol.6, Issue 33, 22 August 2009, Tehelka, http://www.tehelka.com/story_main42.asp?filename=Ne220809falling_between.asp (last accessed 23 August 2010)
3 Unique Identification Authority of India, www.uidai.nic.in (accessed 5 August 2010)
4 Website of Unique Identification Authority of India, http://www.uidai.nic.in/ (accessed 5 August 2010).
5 Usha Ramanathan, A Unique Identity Bill, 24 July 2010, Vol XLV, No. 30, Economic and Political Weekly, pp. 10-14, See also an earlier article by Taha Mehmood, The Fuzzy Logic of National Frontiers or a Frontier Nation: Reflections on the Multi-Purpose National Identity Card Scheme in India, Sarai Reader, 2007, Frontiers, pp.144-158.
6 See the Executive Summary of the document titled, Creating a unique identity number for every resident in India, Unique Identification Authority of India”, Working Paper – version 1.1, November 2009, http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Confidential_plans_for_1.2_billion_ID_cards:_Creating_a_Unique_ID_for_every_resident_in_India,_Nov_2009 (last accessed 21 August 2010). A confidential document of the UIDAI, this is not available on the website of the UIDAI.
7 See Taha Mehmood, Multi-Purpose National Identity Card, 9 December 2009, South Asia Citizens Wire, http://www.sacw.net/article391.html (accessed 5 August 2010). This article is a comprehensive summary of the events and debates leading up to the proposal for the Unique Identification numbering project. It traces the political developments from the 1990s that initiated the debate on “national security”, “border management” and related issues of “illegal immigration” to the latest in 2007 where the Planning Commission proposed the idea of an integrated smart cards system in a report titled Entitlement Reform for Empowering the Poor: The Integrated Smart Card, http://planningcommission.gov.in/aboutus/committee/wrkgrp11/wg11_smtcard.pdf (accessed 21 August 2010)
8 The full report of the Kargil Review Committee was not made available to the public and some news reports also suggest that the Prime Minister (at that time) was also not aware of the full contents of the report. However the Executive Summary is available at the following site, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/KargilRCA.html (accessed August 2010)
9 ibid, See the Section on “Intelligence” in the Executive Summary.
10 Ibid. See Section on the Civil Military Liaison in the Executive Summary.
11 Taha Mehmood, Multi-Purpose National Identity Card, 9 December 2009, South Asia Citizens Wire, http://www.sacw.net/article391.html (accessed 5 August 2010).
12 Ibid. p.7.
13 http://india.gov.in/outerwin.php?id=http://mit.gov.in/default.aspx?id=115 (last accessed 22 August 2010)
14 See the webpage of the National e-Governance Plan, http://india.gov.in/outerwin.php?id=http://mit.gov.in/default.aspx?id=115 (last accessed 22 August 2010)
15 “Entitlement Reform for Empowering the Poor: The Integrated Smart Card Report (ISC)”, http://www.planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/11strindx.html (last accessed 22 August 2010)
16 Creating a unique identity number for every resident in India, Unique Identification Authority of India”, Working Paper – version 1.1, November 2009, http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Confidential_plans_for_1.2_billion_ID_cards:_Creating_a_Unique_ID_for_every_resident_in_India,_Nov_2009 (last accessed 21 August 2010).
17 Ibid. p.10
18 The Bill is available at http://www.uidai.nic.in/
19 Emphasis added.
20 Supra note 11
21 Ibid. p.10.
22 Supra note 8, p.7.
23 Section 33(a), UID Bill.
24 Section 33(b) UID Bill.
25 Usha Ramanathan, A Unique Identity Bill, 24 July 2010, Vol XLV, No. 30, Economic and Political Weekly, pp. 10-14, at p.11.
26 ibid.
27 See for instance, Training Module on UIDAI and Aadhaar, Module I, UIDAI, Unique Identification Authority of India, Undated, p.10, http://uidai.gov.in/documents/training/Module1-UID%20and%20AADHAR-Ver1.0.pdf (accessed 23 August 2010). In the context of explaining the benefits of Aadhaar for residents, it notes, “The large number of residents who currently don’t have any identity documents and are therefore “excluded” from beneficiary lists can also get an ‘identity’ through the ‘Introducer’ system. AADHAAR number (or the UID) will thus become the ‘key that opens all doors’ – especially for the deprived and marginalized”. (emphasis in original)
28 See for instance, Frequently Asked Questions put up on the website of the Privacy International, http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/idcard/idcard_faq.html (last accessed 20 August 2010), See also Identity Cards Scheme will be axed ‘within 100 days’, 27 May 2010, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8707355.stm (last accessed 25 August 2010)
29 Article 6 and 7 of the India Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1950 are relevant.
Article 6 states, “Each government undertakes, in token of the neighbourly friendship between India and Nepal, to give to the nationals of the other, in its territory, national treatment with regard to participation in industrial and economic development of such territory and to the grant of concessions and contracts relating to such development”.
Article 7 states, “The Governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and other privileges of a similar nature.” http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/3/9/00004432.pdf (accessed 23 August 2010)
30 They are required to register with UNHCR in Delhi and hold at least an Under Consideration Certificate, which is made infructuous until the decision on their refugee claim is made final.
31 Among the studies that look in detail at the Bangladeshi migration into India from a non-strategic studies perspective include, Ranabir Samaddar, The Marginal Nation: Transborder Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1999.
32 Literature on Burmese migration into India abounds. See for instance, Subir Bhaumik, The Returnees and the Refugees: Migration from Burma, in Ranabir Samaddar (Ed) Refugees and the State: Practices of Asylum and Care in India, 1947-2000, pg. 182-210, Sage Publications, 2003. Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhuri, Burma: Escape to Ordeal, in Banerjee, Ray Chaudhuri and Das, Internal Displacement in South Asia, Sage Publications, 2005. For news reports, see Khonumthung News, www.khonumthung.org, a print media in exile based in Aizawl, Mizoram.
33 See for instance the 175th Report of the Law Commission of India on the Foreigners (Amendment) Bill 2000, (available at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/175thReport.pdf). The report focused on the “illegal immigration” from “neighbouring countries” but refers almost exclusively to “infiltrators” from Bangladesh.
34 Immigration and citizenship falls under the Union List of the Constitution.
35 It is a different matter that individuals from the “North East” and the Burmese living in India are often called “Nepali”, a derogatory term disliked by both the North Easterners and the Burmese.
36 Jyothi Thapa Mani, Citizenship issues plague Nepali-speaking Indians too, 14 March 2008, Business World, http://www.businessworld.in/index.php/Miscellaneous/Identity-Crisis.html (last accessed 26 August 2010)
37 Sahana Basavapatna, Sanitized Society and Dangerous Interlopers II: Law and the Chins in Mizoram, pp. 31-49 at p. 38, in Anjuman Ara Begum, Chitra Ahanthem and Sahana Basavapatna, Endangered Lives on the Border: Women in the North East, Policies and Practices, No. 33, May 2010, Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group.
38 From UNHCR monthly brief for India - numbers
39 Shanta Thiagarajan, Palestinian refugee rendered stateless in India, Times of India, 19 August 2010, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/6333369.cms (accessed 19 August 2010).
40 See for instance, Battling to Survive: A Study of Burmese Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Delhi, 2010, The Other Media Publications.
41 An example of how ad-hoc the refugee policy in India is, relates to a case of a Burmese refugee who was able to undergo a heart surgery free of cost in a government hospital. The cost of the surgery was around Rs 40,000 which the refugee would not have been able to afford as he had practically no income. Sahana Basavapatna, Access to Health Care for Refugees in Delhi, March 2009, Refugee Watch Online, http://refugeewatchonline.blogspot.com/2009/03/access-to-health-care-for-refugees-in.html (accessed 26 August 2010)
42 An example are the Burmese refugees, who on recognition are entitled to the Residence Permits, issued by the FRRO. This under refugee law amount to covert recognition of the Burmese as refugees in India. On the other hand, other refugee groups such as the Somalis or the Iranians for instance are not given Residence Permits. For more on this aspect, see Basavapatna Sahana, (August 2009), Residence Permits for Refugees in India: Ad-hocism, Confusion and lack of clarity within the government, http://refugeewatchonline.blogspot.com/2009/08/residence-permits-for-refugees-in-india.html (last accessed 26 August 2010)
43 Creating a unique identity number for every resident in India, Unique Identification Authority of India”, Working Paper – version 1.1, November 2009, p.26, http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Confidential_plans_for_1.2_billion_ID_cards:_Creating_a_Unique_ID_for_every_resident_in_India,_Nov_2009 (last accessed 21 August 2010).
44 Ibid.
45 A useful explanation on the Privacy International website is on the main motivation behind the identity card project generally. See
http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/idcard/idcard_faq.html (last accessed 20 August 2010).

Care and Protection of Refugees and IDPs in Nepal

Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group (CRG) and Nepal Institute of Peace (NIP) in collaboration with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR), Kathmandu organised a three day orientation workshop on “Care and Protection of Refugees and IDPs” in Nepal from 21-23 November 2010 which attended by representatives from refugee groups (primarily Tibetans and Bhutanese), research scholars, advocates, social workers and students who are interested to learn and excel in the field of forced migration studies. The resource persons were practitioners and academics who had immense expertise on the field of forced migration as well as socio-political dynamics of Nepal and the region.

The lectures, roundtable discussions were organised under the following themes:-
•Gender dimensions of Displacement in South Asia
•Conflict and Forced Migration in Nepal
•Forced Migration and Protection Practices for Refugees in Nepal
•Resource Politics, Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Displacement.

The workshop started with the inaugural roundtable discussion on the theme Displaced Voices: Voices from the Camps on 21 November 2010. This was a public event and was attended by noted scholars, activists and university students. Shiva Kumar Dhungana, President, NIP in his inaugural remarks presented a historical background of Refugees and IDPs in Nepal which was followed by self introduction of the participants and guests of the session. The session was moderated by Lok Raj Baral, Professor of Political Science, Executive Chair of National Centre for Contemporary Studies (NCCR). Mr. Nar Bahadur Giri and Mr. Bishnu Magar, both Bhutanese Refugees, shared their experiences of camp life and the protection mechanisms initiated by humanitarian agencies and the Government of Nepal. Paula Banerjee, Senior Researcher, Calcutta Research Group highlighted the gendered experiences of camp life drawing experiences of her work in SriLanka, Nepal and India. She also highlighted the vulnerabilities and risks of women and children in the camps and how women are subject to double marginalization owing to the increasing domestic violence in camps which often goes unnoticed in such conflict situations. She also brought into the discussion the situation of IDP camps in Nepal. Following the three presentations, various other concerns were raised by the participants; primarily durable solutions of refugees problems especially Bhutanese refugees and Tibetan Refugees in Nepal, the issues of displacement, return of IDPs, UN Guiding Principles on IDPs, national IDPs policies, International refugees law, roles and responsibilities of UNHCR to protect refugees.

On 22 November 2010, in the inaugural lecture on “South Asian Experiences on Forced Migration: A feminist view point” Paula Banerjee highlighted the issues of women, children and other dependents, different layers of problem craters in Camp. Subhas Ranjan Chakraborty, noted historian and senior member, Calcutta Research Group chaired this session. This was followed by Amit Sen’s (Protection Officer, UNHCR, Nepal) lecture on “Relevance of National and International Instruments for Protection of Refugees and IDPs with special reference to 1951 Convention and UN Guiding Principles. In this lecture, the legal definitions of refugee, IDPs and the international instruments were examined and discussed. In the next roundtable session on “Practices and Challenges of Refugee Protection”, Diane Goodman (Deputy- Representative, UNHCR, Nepal) in her lucid presentation highlighted certain important and crucial ways of looking at protection mechanisms. She began her presentation by sharing with us the definition of International Protection referring to the series of ICRC conducted workshops. She also went to discuss the actors involved in the protection mechanisms available to refugees. Finally she emphasised on the invisible sections of population who are often left out in discussion on protection. She felt that youth, women and elderly population need special assistance. She concluded her presentation with a need for three kinds of safety mechanisms that any protection mechanism should achieve: physical safety, material safety and legal safety. After this presentation Stephane Jaquemet Hon’ble Representative of UNHCR Nepal engaged in an interactive session with participants where he addressed several concerns and issues relating to various refugee populations in Nepal. He addressed several interesting issues relating settlement and international refugee law, 1951 convention and discussed the status of certain refugee groups namely Bhutanese and Tibetans. Hari Sharma (Director, Social Science BAHA) the moderator of the session ended with a comment that refugee issues are primarily humanitarian issues and it is significant the group sees the inter linkages between humanitarian issues and political issues as both are interdependent on each other. This was followed by a discussion on the assignments that the participants had submitted during the course of the distance education segment. The participants were divided into two groups where they presented a summary of the assignments and they received feedback on their respective presentations.

The day ended with two interesting presentations on status of conflict induced IDPs in Nepal. Subodh Raj Pyakurel, (Human Rights Activists and chairperson of Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC)) highlighted the national policy on IDPs and INSEC’s contribution to protect the IDPs in Nepal. He began his presentation with a brief overview of the armed conflict in Nepal. He then went on to discuss the international framework for the protection of the IDPs and the national framework for the protection of the IDPs (under Interim Constitution 2006, National Policy for Internally Displaced People, 2007). Under National Policy for Internally Displaced People, 2007 the three main aims are: protection of human rights, regarding relief and rehabilitation. INSEC has practical experiences on working with internally displaced persons during conflict situation in Nepal. INSEC had started its working in the field of IDPs since 2005, during the phase of armed conflict itself. Most highlighted work during that phase was the successful returning of the IDPs in Jumla on June 27,2005 for the first time with the support of DFID. Total of 1173 persons were successfully returned to their respective homes from 2005-2006 with the support of various stakeholders namely, DFID, ActionAid, Luthron and Caritas. A project entitled "Advocating for Appropriate and Coordinated IDPs Return" was implemented in 5 districts (Morang, Dhanusha, Baglung, Surkhet and Kailali) in 5 development regions from February – May 2007, where large number of IDPs had been living. Monitoring and research, documentation, networking and coalition building, communication and information sharing were the modalities of the program implementation. The main objectives of the project were to return and reintegrate IDPs in their respective residences and to ease the environment for government to commit for providing short term relief support to the IDPs. INSEC implemented the project named "Assistance of IDP Returnees in Nepal" in 24 districts of Mid and Far-Western development regions from August 2007 to August 2008 with the financial support from USAID and technical support of SC/US and in co-ordination with NRCS. This project was aimed to make the environment favorable to return back the displaced people in their places of origin, INSEC conducted 35 events of district level interactions with the concerned stakeholders to share the findings of assessment as well ass to make then aware on the provisions in the CPA, the Interim Constitution and Policy and Directives on IDPs. Uma Joshi from National Human Rights Commission, Nepal in her report on “Conflict induced IDPs : Return and Reintegration” mentioned causes of forced displacement, human rights issues of IDPs, facts and figure and various aspects of IDPs policy Implications. In her discussion on way forward, she highlights the policy initiaves undertaken by the Nepal Government : Adoption IDP Policy 2063, Formation of local Peace Committees (LPCs), Return & Reintegration Package. She argues that Government has undertaken few initiatives and initiated interventions for addressing displacement problem in Nepal. Besides, various humanitarian agencies(national & international) also have been doing several IDP-focused programs as obligation of non-state actore stated in the UN Guiding Principles. The state initiatives and interventions should largely be complimented and supplemented by humanitarian agencies in coordinated manner. Similarly, some implementation gaps are identified that should be taken seriously by all actors for its mitigation. Effective implementation needs capacity, will power and determination among government agencies those agencies should be enhanced with some mechanisms for the documentation of the information related to the displaced people. Since we are in the post conflict situation, the relief is no longer required because it never helps to establish their rights for the durable solutions. All the activities being undertaken by various agencies focusing for relief should be transformed to right-based activities with the ultimate target of any durable solutions such as Return, integration and resettlement.

On 23 November, 2010, the session began with Sharad Ghimire’s(Martin Chautari) presentation on “Climate change and displacement; Learning from Koshi Flood” where he discussed the brief situation of Kosi flood disaster, displacement, management of relief camps, return and resettlement. His presentation basically pointed the effects of climate change, its effects, possible disasters, response and protection mechanism at the affected regions. This was followed by Roopshree Joshi’s (Lutheran World Foundation) presentation on “Tibetan Settlements in Thangboche and Jawalakhel”. The main objective of this essay is document the lives of people in these settlements, and how their available livelihood options has been responsible for their assimilation and generated employment opportunities for the Nepalese as well. Roopshree in her presentation discussed the life in urban settlements like Jawalakel, Lalitpur and compared it with rural settlement like Thangboche settlement in Rasuwa. Having lived in exile for more than 50 years, the settlements have been following various livelihood measures that are available to them, considering the setting of the settlements and the environment. The handicraft centre at Jawalakhel is a pioneer of carpet weaving business. It brought about the revolution in the sense that when the carpet factory was established, many Tibetans who had the traditional skills could take it forward as livelihood measures in exile and also many Nepalese were employed in the carpet factory. The handicraft centre soon became a flourishing business and the carpet movement spread through out the country not only in the other settlements but also through out the country where people starting being involved in the enterprises. Tibetan carpet factory brought lots of revenue to the state coffers and also generated employment for Nepalese and Tibetans. After her presentation, Dorjee Damdul presented the problems relating livelihood, expectation on durable solutions for Tibetan Refugees. He spoke briefly about the New Arrival Project where UNHCR facilitates their safe transit through Nepal to a third country. He thanked UNHCR for the cooperation they extended towards Tibetan refugees. According to him, there are some areas that needed immediate attention : particularly identity documents, and travel documents. In the roundtable session on “Challenges to current policies on Bhutanese Refugees and Urban Refugees, Nini Gurung(UNHCR Kathmandu) and Shiva Dhungana raised certain crucial questions of protection policies. The workshop concluded with an evaluation session where the participants felt the need to organise such workshops on an annual basis in Nepal.

The valedictory session began with a note by Shiva Dhungana on the proceedings of the workshop after which Ajit Acharya (Nepal Institute of Peace) presented a short report on the course. This was followed by certificate distribution ceremony. 25 participants received certificates and 10 participants from Kathmandu University received letters of participation. Stephane Jacquemet, Hon’ble Representative from UNHCR Nepal where he congratulated Calcutta Research Group’s initiative to collaborate with Nepal Institute of Peace in hosting a workshop which brought representatives from refugee communities and scholars and activists on the same platform. He encouraged the organisers and the participants to take such initiatives in the near future. The workshop concluded with a valedictory address by Ranabir Samaddar (Director, Calcutta Research Group) on “Ethics of Care and Protection of the Displaced”. In his address, he began with a significant question “Why should we care for and protect the victims of forced displacement?” The “we” he went on to argue refers to those who have not had experienced displacement themselves, yet harbour some form of an ethical commitment to the victims of forced displacement. The ethical language is a means of establishing some form of a connection between them and us – between those who are not forcibly displaced and those who are. Ethics in other words cannot but be dialogical. Its language in no way denies agency to the victims. Ethical language therefore is a language of universality that cuts across the given boundaries of the victims’ groups and communities. One can therefore say that while ethical language has to be universal, the phenomenon of forced displacement is not. It is true that the incidence of forced displacement has been alarmingly on the rise – thanks to the forces and processes of globalization. However their number is still considerably smaller than that of the world’s settled population. Much of what the settled population groups do for the displaced population in the framework of various linkages is not to be seen as ethical practice. Ethics is considered essentially about the self, which cares for and holds itself responsible to the other. Caring for the other is regarded as the means to care for the self. He also briefly summarised the arguments in justification of the advocacies for care and protection of the displaced: (i) the rights-based argument (ii) community based arguments and both of them have their own limitations. He urged the audience to re-think the implications of power and its linkages with ethics to understand the way protection policies are framed and implemented. The session concluded with a vote of thanks by Shiva Dhungana.

Compilation by Ishita Dey

Brasilia Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons in the Americas

Eighteen South American Countries adopted a declaration in Brasilia at the end of a meeting to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the sixtieth anniversary of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the fiftieth anniversary of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. The document is being seen as the first step towards a regional protection approach on displacement and protection of refugees. According to UNHCR statement the declaration is significant because of three reasons: respect for the principle of non-refoulement, including non-rejection at borders and non-penalization of illegal entry; support for the incorporation of gender, age and diversity considerations into national laws on refugees and the displaced; and the encouragement of States to adopt mechanisms to address new situations of displacement not foreseen by the 1951 Refugee Convention, the key legal document in defining who is a refugee, their rights and the legal obligations of States.

To read the Declaration: http://www.unhcr.org/4cdd3fac6.html; Accessed on 14 November 2010For more details: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=36741&Cr=refugee&Cr1; Accessed on 14 November 2010

Thatto Flood Victims: Badin Relief Camps Details

Thousands of people from different areas of Thatto are going to Karachi, Badin, Hyderabad, Tando Muhammad Khan and other parts of lower Sindh. So far the official registered figures by district Government Badin is in thousands but more people are expected to arrive.

Camps in Badin district
1.Taluka Badin : 400
2.Taluka Talhar: 88
3.Taluka Matli: 90
4.Taluka Tando Bago: 332
5.Taluka Golarchi 2002
6.Total: 2912



Source: http://groups.google.com/group/Pak-Youth-Forum


Violence in Kandhamal and National People’s Tribunal, Delhi

A.J. Philip in his article “Shame revisited: A relook at Kandhamal”, reports about the recently concluded National People’s Tribunal which was attended by sixty victims who travelled all the way from Kandhamal to New Delhi. The tribunal, a civil society initiative was headed by Justice A.P. Shah, a former Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court and other members present were eminent personalities from different works of life like Harsh Mander, Syeda Hameed and Mahesh Bhatt. One common problem that the victims faced was the non-cooperative attitude of the police and the administration. Most of them had a harrowing time to register FIRs (First Information Reports). And even when FIRs are registered, appropriate charges are not made against the accused, with a view to protecting them. What makes this article though provoking is the author’s comment on media coverage of “events far away”. Though the organizers had sent press notices to all media houses there was hardly any media coverage despite the event being held in Delhi. The author’s comment ponders us to rethink the way issues of violence, conflict and displacement in various regions are covered in national media. For details please visit the link below

Source: http://www.heraldofindia.com/article.php?id=540; Accessed on 10 September 2010.

USCRI Launches the Thailand Committee for Refugees

The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) is pleased to announce that our field office in Thailand has become an independent national organization: the Thailand Committee for Refugees (TCR). The new entity will focus on building local support for refugee rights under the leadership of Veerawit Tianchainan, who has served as the Country Director of USCRI Thailand since 2009. USCRI will continue operating in Bangkok through a partnership with Asylum Access to advocate for refugee rights throughout Southeast Asia.

USCRI is a Washington, D.C. area-based nonprofit organization dedicated to addressing the needs and rights of persons in forced or voluntary migration worldwide by advancing fair and humane public policy, facilitating and providing direct professional services, and promoting the full participation of refugees and immigrants in community life.

Southern Refugee Legal Aid Network

A useful resource for everyone concerned with protecting the rights of refugees, in particular those who are representing refugees seeking asylum in the global south. It is intended primarily to assist those involved in the provision of legal aid - lawyers, paralegals, NGOs - who are working from the global south, where access to information is often scarce.

For details visit :
http://www.srlan.org/beta/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=43&Itemid=28

Resource Centre on Forced Migration in South Asia

CRG has established a Resource Centre on Forced Migration in South Asia to enhance its research and training activities on forced migration and other related themes. The main objective is to develop first hand knowledge and experiences about forced migration and displacement in the neighbouring countries of South Asia. We have updated the website and details of our library and resource centre holdings are available online.

For details please register to access our holdings on forced migration:
@http://library.mcrg.ac.in/index.php.

Dilemma of Right to Property and IDPs in Nepal

Som Prasad Niroula

[Nepal Institute of Peace (NIP)]

During the period of these four years from April 2006 to present, the country has witnessed many political changes like abolition of monarchy, entry into the system of Republic, formation of constituent assembly by election and ongoing process of drafting new constitution but the major issue of transformation peace process is still in a weak position and the political crisis is continued till the date. The reintegration and rehabilitation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) is one of the major part of the peace process but very little works have been done to the people displaced during the period of conflict. Reintegration and Rehabilitation project of Nepal Peace Fund Trust of Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction has identified only 52,160 persons (14,031 families) till the date which is very small number. Also it has allocated only 4.92 percent of its resource on the category of Rehabilitation. 1 As the National IDP Policy has not been implemented properly and the Procedural Directives 2007 of National Policy Relating to Internally Displaced Persons, 2007 is still in pending, various issues are yet to resolve. The IDPs who want to resettle at the present place of living are unable to receive compensation as it is only for returnees although the National IDP Policy clearly entitles every displaced persons have right to integrate in their current place of displacement of resettle elsewhere in Nepal.

Capture of Land and Property and the Right to Property

During the conflict, a large number of people left home due to threat and harassment by conflicting parties. They also did not get chances of even taking the tangible properties their houses were captured as well as destroyed by the conflicting parties Nepal Communist Party of Maoists and security forces. Moreover, some for the houses got destroyed itself because of not staying for long year.

The laws of armed conflict prohibit the destruction and capture of property was breached by both sides. Also the distribution of compensation for reconstruction and repair was ignored at the beginning and it is still prolonged. More than 10,000 cases of claiming for compensation were recorded by taskforce formed in 2007, but till the date only some 419 families had received support to reconstruct their houses and 2,468 repair of damaged house. 2

The lack of housing in the place of origin is as one of the main factors preventing the IDPs return. A survey report claims that nearly half of those interviewed reported serious land housing and property problems. 3 Many of IDPs are willing to return but the Maoist Cadres at local level still making threaten to them.4 Thus most of the IDPs with non-Maoist political affiliations have been prevented from recovering land and property.

The property right is one of the basic rights of human being. According to the preamble of the interim constitution, it guarantees the basic human rights to every citizen of Nepal. "Right to Property" under Article 19(1) provides that all citizen of Nepal are guaranteed by the right to acquire, own, sell and otherwise dispose of property. 5 The state shall not except in the public interest, requisition, acquire or create any encumbrance, on the property of any person, and this should be just, fair and reasonable and not by arbitrary but rule of law or by law only. 6 Other provisions under the Constitution include the right to earn and use one’s property, and the right to choose one’s place of residence. Moreover, the constitution enshrines that the state has a responsibility to conduct programs to rehabilitate the displaced and provide relief for damaged private properties. 7

Returning of captured land and property is one of the necessary parts of rehabilitation. According to the International Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (IDPs), competent authorities have the duty and responsibility to assist returned and/or resettled internally displaced persons to recover, to the extent possible, their property and possessions which they left behind or were dispossessed of upon their displacement. When recovery of such property and possessions is not possible, competent authorities shall provide or assist these persons in obtaining appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation 8. It is clearly mentioned in the National IDP Policy also that the state shall make necessary arrangements to return such physical properties which were forcefully seized at the time of conflict 9. However, the commitment of the peace process has not been implemented on the issues of returning the properties to the IDPs.

The unequal access of land is also one of the major reasons of conflict. Most of the lands were captured with a purpose of distributing to the landless poor. But, it is still unknown how many poor people received the land illegally distributed by Nepal Communist Party of Maoist. Now, it is challenge for the Maoists as well as government to return the captured land and provide to land owners.

The High Level Scientific Land Reform Commission (HLSLR) which was formed to study the land situation has recently reported that there are 1.4 million landless people in Nepal and they require 421,770 hectare land to get rehabilitated and there is some 492,851 hectare land belonging to the government which is not being used productively and it can be used to enable 1.4 million squatters to enjoy access to land 10.

The government of Nepal should return the captured land to the owner. The practice of illegal encroachment of land may further exaggerate the present crisis. The government may bring a law and look for a legal space to take excessive land from owner. The government may give minimal compensation for the owner / IDPs.

The Present Context

The capturing of land is still continued by various armed groups and political parties in different parts of the country. Unified UCPN(Maoist) and its sister organizations are continuing to capture private and trust-owned land in various places even as months have elapsed since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord. 11 The rule of law is getting weaken and people are being unable to claim the right of land and property.



Source: INSEC, Human Rights Year Book 2010, p.7

The returning of captured land and property has become a political agenda at present. It has never been such a strongly raised. The returning of captured land and property is one of the major demands of the ruling government to end the deadlock of current crisis and initiate the formation of new government of consensus.

Conclusion

The right to property is widely debated topics. However, the Interim Constitution of Nepal – 2006 considers one of the fundamental rights. Moreover, the international documents recognized rights property is a basic rights of individual. In this regard, the government should ensure the rights to property to IDPs. The government and Nepal Communists Party of Maoists (CPN-M) may impose the land policy through legal amendment. The newly emerged groups also started to seize the property by following the precedent of CPN-M. The mutual solution has to be explore among the government and IDPs.

Notes

1.Four Monthly Progress Report, Report No.8, Nepal Peace Trust Fund, Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction
2.Four Monthly Progress Report, Report No. 8, NPTF, April 21, 2010, p.38
3.Nepal IDP Working Group, 15 June 2009, pp. 27-29
4.Rapid Assessment of Conflict Induced Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) for their Return, Resettlement and Reintegration, NHRC, December 2008, p. 81
5.The Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007, Article 19 (1)
6.Id, Article 19 (3)
7.Id, Article 33 (r)
8.UN OCHA, Guiding Principles on InternaL Displacement, Retrived from http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/idp_gp/idp.html
9.National Policies on Internally Displaced Persons, 2063(2007), 8.3.4
10.nepalnews.com, ‘1.4 million landless people need 421,770 hectares of land ‘, 15 May 2010
http://www.nepalnews.com/main/index.php/business-a-economy/6067-14-million-landless-people-need-421770-hectares-of-land.htm
11.nepalnews.com, Maoists continue to capture private land, 7 March, 2010
http://www.nepalnews.com/main/index.php/news-archive/2-political/4570-maoists-continue-to-capture-private-land.html

The IDPs of the “Madhesh Aandolan’

Suman Babu Poudel and Anita Ghimire

Although, the definition of Madhes and Madhesi on the present political and social context of Nepal is highly contested, Madhes as yet, is geographically defined as the “Terai”-a flat southern region of Nepal. It stretches from east to west as part of the Indo-Gangetic Plain. The people inhabiting it are mainly of three types- the indigenous people, the people of hilly origin (the Pahades 1) and local people who share cultural similarities and close ties with the cross border Indian parts (the Madhesi).

The Madhesh Aandolan

Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) a political party in the cabinet was against the interim constitution that was made by the coalition government led by the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN)-Maoist (Maoist hereafter) after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006. Their demonstration became the starting point of the conflict. It started in the two districts 2 eastern region of Siraha and Saptari and spread over the western region. It continued for 19 days and claimed the life of 29 Madhesi people. The major political demand was a regional autonomy with rights to self determination, proportional representation in constitutional assembly, provision of citizenship, and end to discrimination in hiring Madhesi in national administration, army, and bureaucracy.

However, the distressing part was that the conflict which started as a clearly political cause got mixed with unlawful activities like looting and kidnapping when other groups who were presumably taking benefit of the situation of loss of law and order joined it. However, they claimed it to be for the support of the conflict. Such activities were targeted towards particular groups who were forced to be displaced from the Madhesh. It is estimated that around 6000- 8000 people have been displaced due to the conflict (IDMC, 2008). However, as is the common case, the numbers are much more higher- in this case precisely because the agencies involved were led by the misconception that IDPs are only poor the people, so they enumerated only those who were living in forest or in tents and squatters. However a large number of people displaced by this conflict have settled in urban areas and are able to support themselves. This article describes the nature of the persons displaced internally due to the conflict. Their issue is crucial to the federal structure that Nepal is envisioned to take, yet they are neither recognized by the state and its policy procedures nor other national and international actors. These people can be classified into the following three broad types.

General Hill People

There are people who were living in Madhes but are of hilly origin and share language and most of their cultures with other people of hilly origin. Some of them had been living in Madhes for many generations and have no houses, property or immediate relatives outside the Madhes. Occupationally, most were involved in the business and agriculture and professions like law and teaching. At first, they were distinguished as Pahadi- thus not belonging to the place. They fled because they frequently faced threats of kidnapping, forced donations, unreasonable taxes and ransom, confiscation of the land and other forms of property and misbehavior and attacks on their women and children. These attacks came from different armed groups 3 that are claiming to support the conflict.

Besides these, the conflict has bred communal hatred. Purely personal issues of misunderstandings were interpreted as propaganda against the whole Madhesi community and revenge was taken on any available Pahadi. Similarly, non Madhesis living in Madhesi majority community were attacked if anything happened to any Madhesi living elsewhere. This made life insecure for the Pahadis also.

These groups are among the first to be displaced. A large number of these IDPs have settled along the northern part of the east west highway where there are communities with the majority of hill origin people. Others have moved deeper into the urban areas.

Government Employees

The displacement of government employees also started from the very beginning of the conflict. The leaders of the conflict propagated a sentiment that the government employees were the agents of the central hilly government, whom “the colonizers” sent to the Madhesi homelands to monitor and dominate the Madhesi people. Their displacement was seen as a victory by the Madhesi forces.

There are three kinds of displaced government employees based on their living in Madhes.

•Those local level government employees who are living in the Madhesh since many generations. They are permanent settlers of the place and employed by local government bodies. They shared a long relation and social and cultural understanding with the local Madhesi. These have no property elsewhere.

•Those who have been living in Madhesh since few years- after undertaking the job there. These mostly lived in and around district headquarters or amongst the Pahadi- majority community. They lived on the rent houses or had built their own houses in recent years. They have their relatives and extended families in different hilly parts of Nepal.

•The third group comprises of government employees like Chief District Officers, Local Development Officers, government engineers and lawyers who are in higher posts and are assigned to those districts for a shorter tenure. These are generally in constant fear of being attacked from both sides. The Madhesi activists attack them blaming them to be corrupt and insincere on Madhesi people. They get threats of kidnapping, killing and demands for ransom by people who call them from the Indian cell phone numbers but claim that they are Madhesi. Incidents of murder and extortions targeted to these groups have augmented considerably. Most of such employees of hilly origin now decline to get transferred to these areas.

However, these people do not have their land and property in those areas. Mostly they live in government quarters. Upon displacement, these people generally seek their transfers to the capital or to other hilly districts.

Industrialists, businessman and landlords

Another group of displaced people are the Madhesi elites themselves, landlords, industrialist and businessman. This kind of attack on industrialist, businessman and landlords are increasingly seen in Birgunj, Biratnagar and Janakpur. Interestingly these belong to the “Madhesi” group in the local understanding. These are people who have their extended families and marriage relations both within India and Nepal. Most of them have been living in Nepal since generations and have their investment and extended families settled mostly in the Terai region.

The displacement of such groups has no connection to their ethnicity or belonging to the place. They are victims of the criminal activities taking place in the name of the Madhesi conflict and the government’s inability to distinguish and deal with the problem. These people are under constant threat of kidnapping, asking for ransoms or donations by the armed groups.

On displacement they either move to the nearby urban cities, or to Kathmandu. A large numbers of these people have bought houses and land and shifted their business in India. However, they have their property and investment in the Terai and are unable to either sell their properties or get their investment back.

All the categories of the IDPs have been displaced together with their families in most cases. However if they have not been able to sell their property or procure their investment, the male head of the family have come back after arranging accommodation for their remaining family members.


Acknoweledgement: The research is embedded in the NCCR North-South (Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research North-South) and is funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation (SDC). The authors acknowledge the support of the centre.

Notes

1.The term “Phahadi’ and “Madheshi” used here is according to the understanding of the term by the local people as found in the fieldwork in Mahottari district by one of the authors.
2.Nepal is divided into 75 administrative parts, each called districts.
3.The home ministry of Nepal has identified over 109 armed groups, a vast majority of them formed after the Madhesh aandolan.

Contesting Statelessness: Comparative Perspectives of Tibetans and Rohingiyas in India and Bangladesh

by Nasreen Chowdhury,Assistant Professor in Asian University for Women, Chittagong, Bangladesh, 13 August 2010, Venue: CRG Seminar Room

[Report by Rajat Kanti Sur and Sucharita Sengupta]

Statelessness is a complicated issue and has serious impacts on human rights, liberty, job opportunity, and property rights of individuals who have been uprooted from the state. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, everyone has the right to nationality; no one shall be arbitrarily deprived from this. This has also been reinstated in the 1961 and 1964 convention on statelessness. Statelessness is therefore the denial of the link between individual community and the state. In this lecture she addressed a comparative study of the Tibetans and Rohingyas in India and Bangladesh. She argues that experiences of statelessness in postcolonial states of India and Bangladesh with multiple histories of partition and state-formation posits certain significant questions with particular reference to the need for regional protection mechanism, bi-lateral relations and importance of legal status and identification documents.

The statelessness of Tibetans is different from the Rohingyas. Her discussion geared around three vantage points, in the first section she sketched a brief historical context, in the second, a theoretical framework and finally, a variation between the two groups.

For instance, the Rohingyas are one of the major ethnic communities of the Northern Arakan region of Burma, which borders Bangladesh. With the end of the World War two, they suffered a history of abuse and faced their first exodus in 1962. In 1977, they again faced obstacle due to the new Government. A large number of refugees entered Bangladesh at that point of time. They were repatriated in 1977. But the situation again changed in 1991 &1992, following another exodus. It was during this time that, SLORC assumed power in Bangladesh and the Burmese policy towards the Rohingyas changed drastically. Most of the Burmese Muslim refugees took shelter in Coxbazar area within Bangladesh. They were a minority back then. They were repatriated in 1992. However it was involuntary and forceful repatriation, which ended in 1995.Whoever remained in Coxbajar are refugees but stateless. They are not treated well in terms of mobility, hygiene and live in camps. Around 21,000-30,000 Rohingyas live there and are now known as IDPs

The story of the Tibetan stateless persons is slightly different from the Rohingyas. They entered India in around 1950. They were able 2 gain political recognition which allowed them to be part and parcel of the Indian society. The Indian Government has recognized them as ‘refugees’. They are one of the most successful cases in India, where we have statelessness with a difference. They have made their own establishment, enjoy the freedom to practice religion of their choice and the freedom of speech and expression. They have also established their government on exile, in the Indian soil. The only condition Indian authorities seem to have set down is to do their activities peacefully.

The reason behind the contestation of the two different stories of statelessness is the different historical formation of states. The two basic ideas that deal with the attitude of the states towards the stateless persons in the postcolonial era are: culture and policies of citizenship. Culture of the state is very important regarding this issue. The policy of multiculturalism makes a state more sensitive towards those sentimental issues without denying the territorial integrity of the state.

[To listen to the full lecture text, please go to - http://www.mcrg.ac.in/pl.htm]

Ethnic Conflict: Heal the Victims of Conflict in Sri Lanka

Anuradha Gunarathne

Sri Lanka suffered from an ongoing conflict between the Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam for more than 30 years. It resulted in economic, social, cultural and political devastations. After two decades of fighting and three failed attempts of peace talks, on 19th May 2009, the Government declared victory and the protracted conflict ended.

Continuous displacement took place in the North and the East making at least 1 million displaced throughout the conflict history. It is to be noted that some of them are still living in camps or with friends and relatives waiting to be settled. It is progressing with settling the IDPs and bringing them back to normalcy and having provided them a life with dignity through resettlement, rehabilitation or reconstruction. According to reported incidents and reports of protection monitoring teams has proved that even after been settled in a permanent residence and even after fulfilled of their basic rights, the grievances of these displaced community is remaining.

In order to bring back to their normal life, the grievances that are swept under the carpet have to be addressed. Unless the grievances are handled properly, a durable solution for the displacement cannot be provided. Hence, it is strongly felt that “reconciliation” should be a compulsory component in the check list of durable solution for the displaced community.

Internally Displaced Persons in Sri Lanka: Catering for their Special Needs for Protection and Assistance

Ms. Wasantha Senavirathne

[Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka]

1. Introduction

Forced displacement of people is a human tragedy at the international, regional and domestic levels. When people are forced to flee from their homes many of them choose to remain within their own community and familiar surroundings, rather than crossing national borders to seek refuge in a foreign country. Persons who remain displaced within the boundaries of their State of origin are called internally displaced persons (IDPs). They prefer to remain in their home territory for numerous reasons. They are reluctant to abandon their familiar surroundings, and it is easier to return and resettle when conditions permit them to do so. Living in a foreign country is a relatively new experience, to which many of them have an aversion. They may also lack the means 1. Nevertheless, internal displacement may entail conditions of severe hardship and suffering; it may break up families, cut social and cultural ties, terminate stable employment relationships and disrupt educational opportunities. It also limits access to the basic necessities of life, and exposes the displaced to acts of violence such as armed attack, rape and killings 2. Especially in the context of armed conflict, IDPs are more vulnerable because they generally end up in camps or other places under the control of one of the parties to the conflict, and as a result become easy victims of the atrocities of war.

Originally, the problem of internal displacement was considered an entirely internal matter for sovereign States to handle, as the displaced persons were their citizens and continued to live within the national borders. However, because of its massive impact on international peace, security and stability the phenomenon of internal displacement has also become an issue of serious international concern. Unfortunately, the response of the international community and responsible sovereign authorities has on many occasions been inadequate. Francis Deng states, “While refugees have an established system of international protection and assistance, those who are displaced internally fall under the domestic jurisdiction and responsibility of the state, without there being specific legal or institutional bases for their protection and assistance. For the same reason, internal displacement poses a challenge to the international community to develop norms, institutions, and mechanisms for preventing it, addressing its consequences, and finding durable solutions, with the responsibility of sovereignty as the starting point 3.” IDPs are not included in and protected by the well-established refugee regime 4; they are only covered by general principles of international law and ad hoc measures. Therefore their need for protection and assistance at all stages of internal displacement, at both international and domestic levels, is absolutely essential.

2. Tragedy of Internal Displacement in Sri Lanka

During the last three decades, Sri Lanka saw a multiple waves of population displacements, due to the recently ended thirty years internal armed conflict broke out between the Government armed forces of the country and the resistant movement named Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); and the massive natural disaster, tsunami, occurred on the 26th of December 2004. Between October 2008 and June 2009, in Sri Lanka, more than 280,000 people fled to government-controlled territory, and as of October 2009, the vast majority of these IDPs remained in camps in the districts of Vavuniya, Mannar, Jaffna and Trincomalee. Camps, set up as temporary shelters for these IDPs in a short period of time are complained to be lack of amenities with severe overcrowding. The worst situation has been at Menik Farm camp which in June 2009 was holding 220,000 IDPs 5. There are also thousands of IDPs in Jaffna in the north and Trincomalee in the east who have been displaced since before 2008. Over 60,000 Muslim IDPs displaced by the LTTE from the North and North-West have been living in the town of Puttalam since 1990. However, now the situation is much better and the resettling these IDPs are processing. There are numerous practical problems still hindering the smooth resettlement of these vulnerable populations.


Throughout the conflict no Ministry has had overall responsibility for the welfare of IDPs and there are no comprehensive policies or guidelines on displacement. In 2004, the Government adopted a National Framework for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation (Triple R) to provide a common strategy for needs assessment, planning and delivery of assistance. The Triple R Framework adopted the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of 1998 as official policy for assisting IDPs affected by the conflict and required Ministries to bring their policies and programmes into alignment with these principles 6. Though, the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights is the nominated focal point in relation to the protection and assistance of IDPs in Sri Lanka, the overlapping mandates and responsibilities of Ministries and agencies have led to delays, poor coordination and duplication of activities. Legislators were drafting a national IDP law at the end of 2008, but it has not yet submitted to the parliament for adoption. The IDP Protection Unit of the National Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka is taking steps to promote IDPs’ rights, for example on forced returns. Over the past years, UN agencies also have taken the lead in providing protection and assistance to these vulnerable people but their activities are limited due restriction imposed by the Government limiting their access to IDPs and returnees in various parts of the country 7.


Due to the recently held Sri Lankan presidential elections on 26th January 2010, large numbers of IDPs from the north and the east are being returned to their districts of origin, where they face severe difficulties rebuilding their livelihoods. People’s original homes are still severely damaged, and many return areas have not yet been demined according to UN security standards, putting returnees at risk. As a result, many people have not been able to return to their precise places of origin and so remain displaced, staying with host families or in transition camps 8. Accordingly, finding durable solutions for Sri Lankan IDPs remains a daunting challenge for national authorities.

As observed above, the problem of internal displacement is still threatening to the peace, stability and sustainable development of the country in different forms. However, Sri Lankan government is working hard to achieve long lasting solutions for IDPs by resettling them in the most effective way. Further steps yet to be taken to reintegrate them into the society and to protect and promote their basic human rights needed to live a dignified life.

Notes

1.Francis M. Deng, The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, ‘Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms’, E/CN.4/1996/52/Add.2, 5 December 1995, para.9.
2.Ibid.
3.See Francis M. Deng, ‘Flocks without shepherds: The International Dilemma of Internal Displacement’ in Wendi Davis (eds), Rights have no Borders: Internal Displacement Worldwide, (Norwegian Refugee Council / Global IDP Survey, 1998), .
4.1951 UN Convention relating to Refugees and its Protocol of 1967 provide the legal framework for the protection of refugees, while the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has the direct mandate to look after their needs for protection and assistance.
5.See Sri Lanka: Continuing humanitarian concerns and obstacles to durable solutions for recent and longer-term IDPs, http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/srilanka, accessed on 18.02.2010.
6.Paula Banerjee, Putting IDPs on the map: achievements and challenges, Forced migration review, Special Volume,p.18 December 2006, p.
7.See Internal displacement in South and South-East Asia, p.55.
8.See Sri Lanka: Continuing humanitarian concerns and obstacles to durable solutions for recent and longer-term IDPs, http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/srilanka, accessed on 18.02.2010

“Pura Handa Kaluwara” (Death on a Full Moon Day) a film by Prasanna Vithanage

Anuradha Gunarathne 1

Sri Lanka is a country which has the experience with the three decades conflict between the Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam. The civilians both in the North and the South were suffered due to this protracted conflict. Thousands of civilians died. Fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, children, wives and relatives were suffered due to the lives of their sons, husbands, fathers and relations. No one was there to talk to the hearts of the suffered. Some of them were psychologically affected.

In 1997 the famous film producer Mr. Prasanna Vithanage produced a film named “Pura Hada Kaluwara” (Death on the full Moon Day). It explores collective life of the island the ethnic conflict that has engulfed Sri Lanka during conflict. The movie does not portray the conflict directly. Instead, it focuses on the trauma brought about in the lives of a few chosen people by the ethnic conflict.

The film tells the story of Vannihamy, an elderly blind farmer from one of the Sinhala villages in the northern dry zone of Sri Lanka. He has two daughters and a son. The elder daughter, Sumana has married and moved away from home. Sunanda, the younger daughter, lives with Vannihamy in expectation of her marriage. Vannihamy's only son Bandara has joined the army. Bandara, resolved to join the army with the aim of earning enough money to build a small house and take care of his sister's forthcoming wedding.

In the opening sequences it shows land purchased by a long drought, and the villagers, including Vannihamy, undergoing great hardship due to the scarcity of water. Vannihamy, even though he is blind, is an experienced farmer and predicts that rain can be expected within few days.

A few days later, on the Buddhist full moon poya day, the body of his soldier son's is returned by the Army in a sealed coffin. He refuses to recognize the fact that the sealed coffin bearing the body of his son was brought back and buried. The officers of the army had intimated to him the fact that his son was killed in battle. However, he stubbornly believes that his son will return alive. The contrast between the father's unshakable faith in the return of the son from the battlefield and the brutal realities of life fuels the narrative.

Sunanda, the younger daughter, silently accepts her father's decision and finds a job in a garment factory. But her boyfriend Somay, her elder, married sister and the local Government officer pressure Vannihami to sign the papers which will entitle the family to the Government's compensation payment for his son's death in action. They thought that, that is the only way to earn for decent living. The customary alms giving period of three months, after bandara's death is fast approaching and money has to be found to pay for the food. The local Buddhist monk wants to construct a memorial in the name of the valiant son of the soil who gave his life for his country.

Faced with this pressure from villagers and relatives blinded by desperate poverty, day to day hardships and empty glories of being nothing more than canon fodder, Vannihami retains the clarity of vision, which gives him the wisdom that reaches far beyond what the eye can see.

He pick up the mammoty (hoe) to dig up and open his son's sealed coffin by doing this he knows he will invalidate the compensation claim, but his greater purpose is to believe that the war cannot kill his son. This is the most emotionally powerful moment in the film. A young woman who comes to the village tank to fetch water sees Vannihamy and informs the villagers. They rush to the scene and take on the job of unearthing the coffin themselves clearly with the intent of laying to rest the doubts assailing Vannihamy. They retrieve the coffin, break the seal and open it. Vannihamy, who is alert to everything going on, eagerly fingers the contents. All that is in the coffin are some pieces of wood and a large stone nothing that could prove the death of Vannihamy's son. As he leaves the graveyard Vannihamy is neither a defeated man nor spiritually broken. It is clear that he still believes his son is alive.

The old man's refusal to believe in his son's death becomes completely plausible only when it is viewed as the result of an unconscious protective mechanism operating against the unbearable reality of his son's death.

In the final sequences of the film Vannihamy as confident man as he was at the beginning comes to the village tank to fetch water, and listens eagerly to a ripple of laughter coming from the children bathing in the river. A scarcely perceptible smile comes to his lips perhaps he remembers how his son used to play in the river.

In this film face of Vannihamy represents the soul of a nation suffering 30 years of civil strife as the state and Tamil fighters continue their war of attrition. It's an observational realist movie which uses a spare medium concerning the grievances of the poor due to the civil conflict.

Notes
1.The author works as a National Coordinator of the National Projection and Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Unit of National Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka and independent consultant for several human rights events.

Resettlement of IDPs and Challenging Road to Peace and Economic Recovery, 14 April, 2010, by Dr. Palitha T. B. Kohona , (Asian Tribune. com).

Comment by : Sucharita Sengupta

There are so many disasters that result into catastrophes in our lives, and displacement in itself is one such instance. Sri Lanka has remained a hapless witness and victim of a number of displacements till now, stemming out of a varied number of reasons. In the editorial column of the Asian Tribune, dated April 14 2010, Dr. Palitha T.B Kohona, ambassador and representative to the United Nations, traces briefly how despite several displacements, the state of Sri Lanka has recovered its economy and overcome other grave challenges with a fair amount of success. The article is an appraisal of the efforts by the government in rendering aid to the internally displaced and provide basic amenities to the camps where the evicted took shelter.

Starting from December 2004, when Tsunami has wiped away more than a million lives and displaced so many more, to 2007, when almost 187,000 people were displaced from the Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka in process of combating the LTTE, the country has faced tremendous devastation. The victims post 2007, were accommodated to camps with food, water and health care. The UNHCR, ICRC and WFP along with some other international organizations have played active roles in providing aid, specifically, in terms of resettlement of the internally displacement persons (IDPs). The government has been able to provide the people with food, shelter and also medical assistance in the camps. Even after Tsunami, most of the victims have been able to either return or reconstruct their houses. The article mentions that in some areas reconstruction has exceeded 110%.

The author claims that this post displacement situation is in exact contrast to the western countries. The way Sri Lanka has been able to ride over the traumas caused after the Tsunami had lashed out, has not been exemplified there. Similarly, people who were evicted from the Eastern Province after the bitter battle that ensued between the government and the LTTE, most of the victims have returned back to their respective homes. The abandoned villages have been reconstructed, roads have been repaired and the economic progress has also been remarkably well. Those displaced from Vanni have also started coming back.

The challenges ahead for Sri Lanka would be to ensure peace and security for its citizens. Since the defeat of the LTTE in May, 2009, the government has promised a speedy recovery of the losses which have accounted from a conflict spanning over twenty seven years. The return of all the displaced persons to their homes and restoration of the economy are the major priority of the government. Right to return of the people to a normal life again has also been mandatory for the government since providing relief to the displaced in the camps is costing the government millions. The author expresses his hope of a ‘nation building’ and further development of Sri Lanka, now that the LTTE has been uprooted. It has to be well equipped in order to combat tragedies like Tsunami so that the plight of displacement can be avoided. It would pursue its policy of non- alignment and remain committed to dealing with global concerns like terrorism.

Link

http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2010/04/14/sri-lanka-resettlement-idps-and-challenging-road-peace-and-economic-recovery

Local Initiatives in Bridging & Strengthening Relationship among IDPS and the Host in the District of Puttalam, Sri Lanka

Fathima Azmiya Badurdeen 1

This article highlights the conflict transformation and peace building initiatives in the District of Puttalam, where local initiatives have facilitated the building up of relationships among existing communities as well as facilitating the process of integration of the Northern Muslim IDPs in Puttalam. Even though the District of Puttalam remained somewhat away from the main macro conflict area, the issues of forced migration of IDPs from the North in 1990 as a result of the conflict, and the Muslim political issues in this context were constantly highlighted in the Sri Lankan conflict related literature. Existence of this long term IDPs have resulted in a complex situation between the IDPs and the host community. Competition for limited resources as well as political differences has brought about tensions in the IDPs and host relationships2.Integration as a durable solution has posed varied issues resulting in conflicts, especially between the IDPs and the host community3. The area has been prone for conflicts. The article grounds on the art of peacebuilding as propounded by Lederach. This includes conflict transformation and peacebuilding initiatives that had an impact at all levels of the society through individual or group initiatives that have been a part of the process of transforming conflicts into positive relationships. These initiatives may be small, but have had an immense impact on the longer run. Most of the initiatives are initiatives that took root within the communities, nurtured by the community and remained a part of the community as Lederach emphasized as ‘moral imaginations’- based on imagining new possibilities, creativeness and being developed within particular contexts.

Local initiatives have been in existence throughout the District of Puttalam and have played a key role in addressing conflicts/tensions within their respective communities. Some of these initiatives have been facilitated by NGOs and INGOs in trying to respond to conflict/tension situations thereby easing out such situations which could otherwise have escalated into higher levels. NGOs and INGOs led initiatives have been implemented through the creation of peace committees, forums for discussions and multi-ethnic development projects for peacebuilding within communities.

Local Interventions in Facilitating Relationship Building among Communities

Conflicts in the district of Puttalam were understood in the context of; i) conflicts between the locals and the IDPs. ii) conflict between different ethnic/religious groups within the local communities. iii) intra-family conflicts, and iv) intra-group conflicts.

Conflicts were bridged through local informal dispute resolution mechanisms. The motivation to seek redress for their issues or conflicts depended on the informal dispute resolution mechanisms available. The factors that determine which mechanisms aggrieved parties approach for redress depended on the type of disputes, mandate and strength of the peace committees or village committees, ethnicity and religion of disputants, access to law enforcement and judicial authorities and the impact of the conflict on the local socio-political environment4.

Religion and the ethnicity are factors that determine to a larger extent on the mechanisms used to resolve conflicts. In Kalpitiya, the Grand Mosque played a key role in resolving disputes. Kalpitiya had the most of the IDP influxes since 1990. As most of the community members belonged to the Muslim community, the Mosque played a vital role.

Development initiatives formed to uplift the community have been an integral part in the development of the Puttalam District. These initiatives that are conflict sensitive, which take into account the multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition of the communities and gender, have been more successful in bridging communities.

Local initiatives were also dependent on local leaders. The local leaders played a dominant role in an individual capacity or as members of community base committees5. Usually these leaders were prominent, educated, wealthy, or are religious members. They are usually elected by the committees on the acceptance of their status in the communities that they served in.

In many instances political influences have impeded the work of local initiatives. These influences have prolonged the conflict resolution process. When local initiatives have been unsuccessful, resolving conflicts have gone beyond the local level mechanisms and turned to the state justice systems.

Issues such as the mandate, impact and sustainability remain key issues in donor driven village or peace committees. This does not mean that donor driven initiatives are unsuccessful. Many of such initiatives have been successful, where initiatives were emerging within the communities that they serve in. In some cases such issues posed challenges in the community. Donor driven initiatives with a specific mandate limits the activities of the initiatives. It may limit to the process while not focussing to the impact into the society. There is also the lack of sustainability. With the project ending, the committees formed too can end. Hence this requires a proper assessment of the local needs, available local resources such as knowledge and skills, coupled with realistic peacebuilding expectations. Hence there is a need to strengthen local development initiatives that are already in existence and proven (Mosque committees/village committees), which can have a greater impact in bridging communities). These initiatives are not only cost effective but also long lasting and sustainable.

Notes

1.The article is based on the paper, ‘In the pursuit of peace in Sri Lanka - through conflict transformation and peace building initiatives: A study on the role of local initiatives in bridging and strengthening relationships among different communities in the District of Puttalam’. The paper was prepared to be presented at the conference, ‘Enmity and Amity in South Asia’, The Centre for South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge (23rd-24th June, 2010). The author works as an Independent Consultant for Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding Projects in Sri Lanka.
2.An insightful analysis on the Northern Muslim IDPs in the District of Puttalam is elaborated by Hasbulla (2001), Thiranagama (2007) and Brun (2008).
3.For an analysis on the provisions of durable solutions to end displacement, see: Badurdeen (2010), ‘Ending internal displacement: the long term displaced persons in Sri Lanka’, Paper presented at Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford for an analysis on the provisions of durable solutions to end displacement.
4.See the study on Informal Dispute Resolution in North East and Puttalam for a more elaborated study on mechanisms used for redress by community members.
5.Cejka And Bamat (2003), ‘Artisans of Peace: Grassroot Peacemaking among Christian Communities’, Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York, USA.