The Causes And The Impact Of Domestic Violence Among Bhutanese Refugee Women In Sanischare Refugee Camp

Experiences from the field - Compiled by Gobardhan Niroula

“Domestic violence is not simply an argument. It is a pattern of coercive
control that one person exercises over another. Abusers use physical and
sexual violence, threats, emotional insults and economic deprivation as
a way to dominate their victims and get their way” (Scheter 2008).

Domestic Violence (DV) is a dilemma for many refugee women among the Bhutanese communities of Sanischare camp. In domestic violence, one person (usually the man) controls and dominates the other (usually the woman) precisely by virtue of a series of gender privileges (usually male privileges) which he has at a societal level. A specific characteristic of domestic violence is the victim’s fear of the abuser. Moreover, the abuser is often perceived as all-powerful and all-knowing.The result of DV is a clash, with reciprocal emotions and/or physical abuse, in a continuous fight for dominance among one another.

In the Bhutanese refugee community, women have faced the some form of different domestic violence in their life time. Some women despite facing domestic violence, do not consider violence seriously nor do they report to the authorities. This is mainly because some women think that if they bring their family issues to the public’s attention, it would mess up their social status because society might blame the victim along with the perpetrator. Similarly some women think that it is their destiny that brings violence in their lives and it is the result of their sins committed in their previous life.

Domestic violence also represents a hidden obstacle to economic and social development. By sapping women’s energy, undermining their confidence, and compromising their health, domestic violence deprives society of women’s full participation. Bhutanese women who experienced domestic violence in the family may develop serious emotional, behavioral and developmental problems. They are likely to: use violence at community in response to perceived threats, attempt suicide, to use drugs, commit crimes, especially sexual assault, use violence to enhance their reputation and self esteem, become abusers in later life, easily give up and have low self esteem.

The Main Causes of Domestic Violence Seen in the Sanischare Refugee Camp

Alcoholic family member: Majority of the Bhutanese refugees of Sanischare camp do not have work. Middle aged and school dropout refugee members remain idle inside the camp. Due to the alcoholic habit of a male member, refugee women of Sanischare camps are exposed to domestic violence. UNHCR protection unit and Bhutanese refugee women forum have several worse case scenarios on aforementioned issue. There is no proper monitoring for selling alchohol in Nepal. Due to the uncontrolled alchohalic habit of refugees of Sanischare camp there are several DV cases.

Mixed marriages: In Bhutanese refugee community of Saniscahre camp there are 7% cases of mix marriage. It is the marriage between Bhutanese refugee male and Nepali/Indian female. Resettlment option is pending for the people who did mix marriage after the resettlement program started. BRWF (Bhutanese Refugee Women Forum) Deputy Secretary states that there are couple of cases of domestic violence in mix marriages of sanischare camp where the family members beat and ignore the non refugee spouse because due to ‘her’ the cases of entire family members are on hold for RST process. The victim women does not want to report the DV to the protection unit because she is scared that this can result in divorce with her husband ad she may loose her children and resettlement opportunities.

Dowry related violence: Dowry has become an expected part of the marriage transaction in India and Nepal, with future husband demanding ever-increasing dowry both before and after marriage. Dowry demands can escalate into harassment, threat and abuse. Refugee community of the Sanischare camp is also effected by it. Family members of Nepali male married to the refugee girls is the most significant examples of such violence. Nepali family blames the daughter-in-law that she lacks the status quo and identity in society because she belongs from a refugee family. She cannot be a good mother because she lacks culture, tradition and customs. 40% of the refugee women who were divorced were married to a Nepal male and were victim of domestic violence in her life time due to dowry.

Sex workers: Due to the obligation and to adopt modern life style it is reported that some refugee women work as a sex worker. When she returns to camp she is harassed by her own family members and even sexually harassed by her own community male members.

Trafficking: Back in 2012, two refugee women (who were siblings) were rescued from Brothel from Mumbai, India with the help of local Indian NGO that has been working in human rights sector. When she was brought to the camp many local male men approached them and abused them verbally and sexually. Due to the help of protection unit and BRWF, those two siblings were able to establish their life.

Psychological violence: It is the repeated verbal abuse, harassment, confinement and deprivation of physical, financial and personal resources. Undermining an individual's sense of self esteem can have serious mental and physical health consequences and has been identified as a major reason for suicide. Head of the household giving small amount of money to the female members in order to run a family is the best example seen in the Bhutanese refugee community of Sanischare camp. Or Abusive husband limits the movement of wife inside the camp or imposing strict rule to the wife to make only recoomended friend is another cases seen in the Sanischare camp.

Polygamy: In Sanischare camp it is very common to see the practice of polygamy. During interviews we found both active and inactive polygamy cases. In active polygamy cases of Sanischare camp there are many cases of domestic violence.

Conclusion

Domestic violence has always been a challenge in the refugee community of Sanichare camp. The major issue in DV is the unwillingness of women to report incidents of violence. There were several reasons associated to this: this includes the assumption of masculinity in men. In the Bhutanese refugee context, where men have the provider role, can succumb to violence if this role is taken away. Alcohol use have contributed to domestic violence in Sanischare camps.

Ending domestic violence requires long-term commitment and strategy involving all parts of society. Community based strategies can focus on empowering women, reaching out to men and changing the beliefs and attitude that permit abusive behavior. Addressing the immediate practical needs of women experiencing abuse; providing long-term follow up and assistance; and focusing on changing those cultural norms, attitudes and legal provisions that promote the acceptance of and even encourage violence against women, and undermine women's enjoyment of their full human rights and freedoms.

The Enduring ‘Problem ‘ of Refugee Protection in Hong Kong

Luke Marsh

The HKSAR stands unique in the world as a post-industrialized state which is not subject to the terms of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Refugee Convention”) despite both its former colonial (the United Kingdom) and current (the PRC) superstructures having ratified and implemented its provisions in turn. Nonetheless, the Hong Kong government has very recently introduced a unified screening mechanism (USM) that will evaluate claims under the Torture Convention, the ICCPR and Refugee Convention. This new system arose, not from government initiative, rather the effects of government inertia with unmanageable backlogs of claimants reaching into the several thousands.

Space precludes a detailed examination of the weaknesses of the refugee protection system the USM replaced (for further, see Ramsden and Marsh). It remains to be seen whether the USM is able to improve matters for those on the ground who are subject to its revised procedures. Needless to say, the difficult personal circumstances experienced by refugees recognized under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) in Hong Kong, and those of torture claimants screened-in by the Administration pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) are unlikely to improve due to the concerning low levels of welfare support on offer through the government.

Refugee protection presents a very specific set of issues to the SAR vis-à-vis the status of the socio-economic rights of these individuals. In particular, Hong Kong has a firm policy of not absorbing those who achieve refugee status or are successful torture applicants. Instead, those mandated refugees are required to wait for inordinately long periods of time, sometimes spanning half-decades in poor living conditions with further limits of food, health, education and employment.

Bearing in mind the long delays experienced in re-settling mandated refugees, the insufficiency of socio-economic provision for this marginalized group has been increasingly voiced by interested parties including NGOs set up to fill the ‘welfare gap’ left by government (state support available to these persons has been known to consist of no more than a bag of uncooked rice). The problem of insufficient provision has been exacerbated by the unwillingness of the Hong Kong government to allow successful claimants the right to work. The administration’s current policy on permitting refugees the right to work is a draconian one. The circumstances in which the Director of immigration will permit a refugee to work amounts to a de facto ban on the refugee population seeking paid employment in Hong Kong (in effect, only in cases where the restriction can induce intense mental and physical suffering or humiliation of a degree sufficient to constitute inhuman or degrading treatment under the terms of the CAT).

This governmental stance ignores that the fundamental right of refugees to work in gainful employment is not only embedded in articles 17, 18 and 19 the Convention itself, but also beyond the borders of this framework, it is now well recognized that refugees and those seeking subsidiary protection enjoy inalienable economic rights as human rights under various international instruments, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Civil Rights (“ICCPR”), the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and various provisions of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, with seminal guidance on the subject offered by Michigan Guidelines on the Right to Work (2010).

Nevertheless, a recent decision of the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong (GA v Director of Immigration [2014]) shot down any remaining hope that the right to work would be extended beyond its current restriction. Instead the exclusion clause contained in article 39(1) of the Bill of Rights Ordinance (“BORO”) was relied on by the Court of Final Appeal, which isolates non-nationals from the full enjoyment of their rights under international law in order, it is said, to protect the Region’s fragile territorial boundaries. The judgment is a very disappointing outcome for genuine claimants who face years ahead with no other option but the indignity of reliance on meagre welfare provision with no real opportunity to provide for themselves and any family members they may have with them. The CFA decision has resulted in the unsustainable destitution of asylum seekers, refugees and torture claimants, who must inevitably survive on the charity of others both before and after a historically inefficient and chronically slow administrative system delivers a decision on their case.

The Rohingya Scenario: Role of Bangladesh and India in Myanmar’s Concealed Tragedy

Kruthika N.S.

In Myanmar around June 2012, a Buddhist woman was raped and killed by three Muslim men. In a revenge attack following the incident, ten Muslim men were killed, and the rest of the story has been hidden from the rest of the world. This was only the story that seemed to be the last straw of the ongoing crisis between the two ethnic groups: the Buddhist majority and the Muslim minority. It soon created a domino effect, with the Rohingya Muslims toppling over in a tragic game of life and death, which led to them getting internally displaced. Further tension caused some of the 140,000 internally displaced to attempt to flee across the border.

Who are the Rohingya?

The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic minority of Myanmar living in northern Arakan/ Rakhine State in the western part of the country. There are approximately 1.33 million Rohingya in Myanmar, but the country's 1982 Citizenship Law denies them citizenship, despite the fact that Rohingya have lived in Myanmar for generations. The Burmese President Thein Sein blatantly has denied the existence of the Rohingya as an ethnic group of Myanmar, and instead, has called them ‘Bengali’, which in that region is a discriminatory, racist term used to imply that Rohingya are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, which however, is false.

The Unspoken Crisis in Bangladesh:

In April 2011, the Rohingya were trapped between serious constraint in their country and ill-use in neighboring nations. Bangladesh had facilitated a huge number of Rohingya people escaping mistreatment for more than three decades, yet no less than 200,000 Rohingya refugees had any legitimate rights there. Even now, they live in griminess, get extremely constrained support and are liable to capture, blackmail and confinement. Unregistered exiled women and young girls are especially defenceless against sexual and physical strike. The global group must urge the Bangladeshi government to enrol undocumented refugees and enhance insurance for all defenceless Rohingyas. Contributor governments should likewise work to restart and expansion resettlement of displaced people to a third nation and increment help for groups facilitating these refugees.

Treatment of the Rohingya in Bangladesh:

Even after decades of the Burmese Rohingya escaping mistreatment and acquiring shelter in Bangladesh, tension was unwavering. Inter communal viciousness in Myanmar's Rakhine State, and ensuing state-supported mistreatment and focused on ambushes against Muslim populaces, have thrown a global focus on this disregarded populace, and offered an open door to resolution the status of both stateless Rohingya inside Myanmar and those Rohingya who are outcasts in neighboring nations. This could have been an open door for Bangladesh to seize the issue and create a much required refugee arrangement. However, the country is mobilizing against the Rohingya by declining entry to the refugees and confining philanthropic help. This reaction, other than speaking to a break of global law, will debilitate Bangladesh's capacity to secure universal backing as exchanges of the Rohingya's situation increase. The legislatures of Bangladesh and Myanmar ought to be participating in reciprocal - and maybe multilateral - examinations about how to ensure the privileges of the Rohingya group, which is clearly not being carried out.

India’s Role:

The role of India in the issue has been heavily debated. The 2013 blasts in Bodh Gaya triggered suspicions of terrorist linkages to the Rohingya. Responding to the incident in 2013, “Blasts like this have the dual purpose of attacking Buddhist shrines, and attacking India,” Ajai Sahni of the South Asia Terrorism Portal said.

So, caught between the Buddhist-dominated Myanmar and Muslim-dominated Bangladesh, the Rohingyas are entering India through the northeast, say officials. But this is not considered good news for the Indian Home Ministry. The refugees who have been detained under the Foreigners Act, 1946 are to be sent to the Tihar Jail, Delhi, the only place where the UNHCR has jurisdiction. After acquiring refugee status, they will be sent to the refugee camp in Jammu. However, there is a problem of plenty as India does not have the resources to house such a large number which is anticipated.

Their Plight Today:

Myanmar has about 800,000 stateless Rohingyas, without access to basic healthcare or education. About 30,000 Rohingya outcasts formally live in Bangladeshi camps today. Informally, there are more are 200,000 unregistered Rohingya there. The enrolled ones are given help and backing by The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Bangladesh government. Unregistered refugees are entitled to nothing. Bangkok-based UNHCR agent Vivian Tan portrayed this as an extremely “dire situation.”

A Place for the Poor: Slum Dwelling in Dhaka City

Annemiek Prins

A wall between the rich and poor is being built, so that poverty does not annoy the powerful and the poor are obliged to die in the silence of history - Pablo Richard
In August 2012 I started my fieldwork Dhaka’s largest squatter settlement: Korail bosti. During my six months of research I witnessed a rather peculiar construction project evolve: a large wall was being erected to separate the shacks at the fringes of the slum from the main road. Tea-stalls that were previously directly located at roadside were now all at once separated from their customers by a blind wall. Moreover, many of the narrow goli’s that meander through Korail suddenly found themselves destined toward a dead end.

While the wall gradually gained height, I wondered what kind of physical and symbolical division this boundary was expected to realize? Fort his rather insignificant construction project seemed to hint at a bigger question, namely: ‘What place do the urban poor have within the landscape of megacities such as Dhaka?’

Slums have existed in Dhaka for over 200 years, but became a prominent element of the city’s landscape after Bangladesh gained independence in 1971. From the early-1970s onwards landlessness, unemployment and natural disasters in rural areas instigated many people to resettle in urban areas. The continuous influx of migrants makes Dhaka currently the fastest growing city in the world. The capital of Bangladesh counts over 13.5 million inhabitants, of which one-third is estimated to livein squatter settlements.

From the city’s point of view the constant influx of (poor) urban migrants is generally perceived as a nuisance, as their arrival is adding to the already severe population pressure. In addition, many property developers are aiming for the hectares of land that are now ‘illegally’ occupied by slum dwellers. For, although the inhabitants of Korail monthly rent (approximately 2,000 Taka) to local landlords, they are paradoxically not legally entitled to their houses. Ongoing disputes over land ownership have resulted in highly informal and insecure land-tenure arrangements, which in combination with the unreliability of public services- such as drainage and water supply – underscore people’s second-class position within the city.

Slum dwellers themselves are all too aware of their precarious position within the city. When discussing the construction of the wall around Korail, a male shopkeeper expressed his fear that the wall would be a forebode of eviction and forced displacement. For rumor had it that a multiple story building would be constructed on the grounds next to the wall. The reality has proved that fear of displacement is all but unfounded. In April 2012a large part of Korail was forcibly evicted, leaving an estimated 2,000 families homeless. Many saw their houses being destroyed by bulldozers and were forced to seek shelter under pieces of plastic during the days of rainfall that succeeded the eviction.

Although eviction is probably the most violent form of displacement that slum dwellers are faced with, there are also more subtle threats that coincide with living in a squatter settlement; forms of displacement that are characterized by neglect rather than by orchestrated force. The non-durable housing structures within Korail, for example, coincide with the ever-simmering possibility of collapse. This threat is especially salient for families whose houses have been built over the nearby lake. Since land is a scarce resource, local landlords have resorted to building houses directly over the surface of the lake, using bamboo poles for support. The damp and fumes that rise up from the polluted water make the bamboo floors moist and consequently result in a constant threat of collapse.

The risk of fire outbreaks is another danger that has the capacity for drastically uprooting the community and is inherent to living in an overpopulated and largely unplanned squatter settlement. A community leader that I spoke to in Korail emphasized the need for more fire extinguishers within the locality. He explained that the improvised way in which the gas-lines have been set up results in a constant threat of fire outbreaks. Moreover, the congested roads and the walls surrounding Korail make it impossible for fire trucks to enter in case of an emergency, and similarly, obstruct people from leaving.

At the start of this article I raised the question what place the urban poor have within the landscape of Dhaka. My brief case-study portrays Korail slum as a place that is characterized by a certain frailty of structures and where the risk of displacement is simmering beneath the surface of everyday life, either in the form of eviction or in the more subtle form of institutional neglect. Hackenbroch (2012) has introduced the term ‘spatial injustice’ to make sense of the ways in which poor people are excluded from the city’s landscape and its services. This exclusion, for example, manifests itself in the deliberate construction of the wall that separates Korail slum from the rest of the city and in the institutional unwillingness to view slums as sites for proper urban planning and development. These exclusionary politics are underpinned by the idea that poor people have no rightful claim to the city, as “elite perceptions remain focused on rural areas as the rightful home of the poor, and this is exacerbated by negative images of crime and squalor” (Banks et al. 2011).

However, despite popular opinion the poor actually are an indispensable part of city’s economy and landscape. For how would Dhaka function without the many day-laborers, rickshaw pullers and garment workers that live in slums? How would dustbins be emptied and drains be unclogged? Who would build the flats and houses for Dhaka’s ever increasing population? In fact, the landscape of the city would look completely different without the labor of the poor. It therefore seems to me that they have earned the right to a more permanent place within the city. Fortunately there is hope… For in February 2013 the inhabitants of Korail, after years of advocacy from the local NGO ‘Dushtha Shasthya Kendra’, got access to legal water supply. Let us hope that this gesture will be a forebode of further infrastructural progress in slums in Dhaka.

Q&A Session with Meghna Guhathakurta

This report is prepared by Shreya Ghosh. She was a participant of the Eleventh Annual Orientation Course on Forced Migration, 2013

[Meghna Guhathakurta is the Executive Director of Research Initiatives, Bangladesh, a research organization working with marginalized communities. Formerly she was Professor of International Relations at the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. She was the speaker of an interactive sessionat Eleventh Annual Orientation Course on Forced Migration, organized by Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group on December 8, 2013]

Meghna Guhathakurta initiated the discussion through sharing her work on family histories and how family can be a crucial site of investigation to understand the ways in which decisions related to migration are taken and to unravel the different gender roles in negotiating migration. She further spoke on the idea of 'violence', 'fear' and migration. She spoke of instances where violence does not necessarily demonstrate itself explicitly, but results in a sense of (psychological) fear. The idea of perceived 'fear' is important in understanding forced migration and, according to her, family is again an institution that negotiates with such fear and looking at family narratives can become critical in understanding fear driven migration.

Q.Can you speak on the experience of environment driven migration in Bangladesh and whether looking at 'family' can be used as a 'method' of investigation in such cases.

A.Bangladesh is among the countries that are prone to environmental disasters and related migration. This is especially so in case of south-west Bangladesh, which is also where the Sunderbans are located. Here, drastic changes take place in the environment due to siltation and erosion of soil which leads to large migration of mostly agricultural laborers. Another cause of forced migration remains the frequent change of river course in Bangladesh.

One has not used family narratives as a method for looking at environmental migrations. But there remains a possibility. Such environment driven migration often leads to men in the effected villages migrating for work, while women are left behind. There are villages now that only consists of women. Abandoned women become vulnerable. There are instances were seasonal laborers, who come into new areas, marry women who have once been abandoned and then they too leave after a while, at the end of the season.

An important aspect about cross border migration is that successive migrations take place through same border passes and areas, using the networks that are established. There is also a continuous negotiation with border guards and state institutions.

Q.Has there been any significant migration, specially of any minority community, due to recent political crisis in Bangladesh (Shahbag movement)?

A.One specific instance is that of migration among the Buddhist community in Bangladesh. There were some rumors and panic related to mob violence which led to migratory trends among the aforementioned group to other Buddhist majority states. Such migration can be momentary or cyclical.

Also there are other deeper issues that need to be highlighted here. In Bangladesh, there is a tendency towards land grabbing within the influential political and elite classes. Minorities and the land belonging to the migrants are especially susceptible. There is a systematic structure of laws and norms that has been devised to effect such land grabbing. The Enemy Property Act was a legislation of such kind. In more recent times, this has been followed by legislation to try and control temple land or property held by communities for religious purposes (devatya property).

Also there are times when the state encourages migration for remittances. Equally, it is true that migration happens because people want to live a better life. For instance people go out on dangerous and uncertain ventures, traveling long distances, in anticipation of better livelihood and living conditions. Some such travels even become fatal for few migrants.

Q.Is there any change in perception of self-identity among new generation of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh? Does the new generation recognize a change from being refugees to being stateless?

A.Protracted refugee-hood can become a condition of statelessness. UNHCR has introduced the category of statelessness but the Bangladesh state does not consider Rohingyas as stateless. They consider Myanmar as responsible for them.

On part of the Rohingya refugees, the older generation is very conscious of their Myanmarese belonging and cultural and linguistic roots. They are also very conscious of ensuring a certain continuation of the same among their next generation. While teaching them language skills and education in camps, the mothers of the Rohingya refugee children often complained about the teaching medium not being the Burmese language and the fear of losing the language among the new generation. Hence while teaching at the camps, one had to develop teaching programmes in the Burmese language.

Q.Has there been any case of displacement due to the Rampal power plant project?

A.This again is a project in the south-western part of Bangladesh. The construction of the said project was stopped due to protests. But the rate of displacement due to large construction projects in Bangladesh is high. The displaced also receive very less or often no compensation. The displaced from the Jamuna bridge project have not received due compensation. Also there are gas explosion related disasters. The displaced and victims of Magurchara gas explosion have not yet received compensation. The Kaptai dam in Bangladesh has been the source of one of the largest refugee population group.

Q.On the nature of work by Research Initiative Bangladesh (RIB) in the Rohingya refugee camps?

A.RIB does not follow the top down developmental model of forcing change from above. In its efforts it negotiates with existing community conventions in order to make change participatory. Over the time, we have seen the relevance of working with and breaking the cultural codes.

Q.Is it not that working through existing cultural norms of communities re-enforces prevailing patriarchal norms. How does it foresee change?

A.Yes, but it is important to work with existing cultural norms in order to make change acceptable. It is like walking on a thin line. Negotiating with community conventions is also important for legitimizing change and in guise work towards women empowerment. Another important aspect is of protection. In case of negotiating through community conventions it helps to gain the confidence of the community and hence one is better placed to protect them. Losing the confidence of the community leadership might lead to loosing access to the community all-together. It is important to remember here that one is dealing with multiple stake-holders – the Bangladesh government on the one hand and the UNHCR on the other – who might not like very much interference. In such a scenario one always has to retain the confidence of the community. The question one always has to keep in mind, over and above everything else, is the responsibility to protect the community. Hence the perspective of refugees is crucial, it is important to understand what people want.

“Shaping Technology” for the Protection of Refugees

Marko Szilveszter MACSKOVICH

The incorporation of innovation into the humanitarian workflow, striving to find new solutions, especially from outside of the sector and to express willingness to embrace novelty is an emerging tendency in the behavior of humanitarian agencies. Solutionsthat enter through the humanitarian gateway can have minor, complementary as well as major paradigm shift causing attributes.

The innovation culture wherein the decision is being made on novel solutions has the rigorous task to ensure that the choice will serve the intended output. For technology-based solutions, especially the ones that are affecting and even defining identity, the threshold of acceptance must be set proportionally to the strictness of privacy safeguards and the purpose envisaged. Further, the understanding of the technology behind the solution to grasp its potential, its risks, limitations and life span is pivotal.

The rationale for reaching out to technology is that it has an inherent potential to expand protection space against contracting tendencies. To discover the spaces where it can deliver these outputs, refugee protection is being placed in the notion of social shaping processes where innovative ideas may enter and materialize in technological artifacts.

Only being aware of the capability of a technology to produce an output is not enough to capture its full potential. Technology needs to be understood from the outside, as much as from the inside: what are the shaping forces, how they are interconnected, how control can be employed, what are the limits, the risks and through what modalities can they be resolved and mitigated in the short- as well as in the long term. While the decision is being negotiated on the use of a particular solution, the knowledge-base and methodology of the organizational innovation culture should take note of the solution’s inherent attributes. Not just its impact but also the shaping forces of the solution,from the inside and from the outside.

These considerations are even more focal in the humanitarian context where funding, and thus room to maneuver in choices, is limited and the target population is highly sensitive to risks. Humanitarian organizations ought to endeavor for a thorough understanding of the envisaged technology’s holistic posture, especially in reference to the expected output as it rests at the core of the decision-making process. The “black-box” of technology needs to be opened and its composing elements need to be looked at with the requirement of transparency.

Space is present within the refugee protection realm to employ novel ways to positively impact the life of this particular social group. In this article I focus on how this space can be cultivated and consciously developed. It remains conscious of positive expectations generally connected to the employment of technologies, and although acknowledging the potential of benefits, it simultaneously endorses a cautious approach. Technology cannot be expected as the ultimate solution, rather a tool of complementarity. The solution it delivers – especially in the refugee context – is highly time sensitive and susceptible to all environmental variables. Technology’s deployment should be accompanied with the tool’s thorough understanding, including its potential benefits balanced with cautious expectations in light of realities in the field.

The “social shaping of technology” (SST) approach (Williams & Edge, 1996)argues that a technology to be perceived and looked at with the impetus purely on its impact and outcomes does not allow for a deep understanding of the “technology artifact”, and does not broaden the corresponding technology policy agenda. Instead of the linear, traditional approach the SST argues for the opening of the black-box of technology to make visible the socio-economic patterns embedded in the content of technology and the process of innovation(Bijker & Law, 1994; Ruth Schwartz Cowan, 1985). It implies that there is a particular process behind the shaping, design and implementation of technology, impacted by organizational, political, economic and cultural factors and not only an inner technical logic. Understanding these factors and their role and impact has a positive effect on the apprehension of the relationship between scientific excellence, technological innovation and economic and social well-being.

The argument of social shaping also implies the existence of shaping forces with the existence of a set of choices made at every stage in the generation and implementation of technology-based solutions, not just resting on purely technology attribute focused considerations but in pair with technology content influencing social factors. Choices can be made on various levels including design, systems, and trajectory of innovation processes leading to potentially different technological outcomes, ultimately impacting the implication towards society and towards a particular social group. The choices that can be made over technology and with consideration of the position of those who make these choices and their relationships with other actors, agents in the same or adjoining issue areas, create the setting for the politics of technology. Such a setting renders technology as non-neutral, subjecting it to the interest of particular actor(s) or (social) group(s) to preserve or alter social relations. Ultimately technology therewith becomes a platform for/of politics (Bruno Latour, 1988; Hård, 1993; Winner, 1978,1980).


In thecontext of forced migration, and zooming-in further on refugee protection, the agents that are exercising protection mandates are the ones who make the ultimate choices on technology. These choices are envisaged to be democratic to allow for a constructive technology assessment, involving therewith primarily the refugees – as the ultimate beneficiaries – to participate. Yet due to their“exposed” beneficiary position, the shaping and the control of the process what leads to the final choice on technology remains incomplete. (Rip, Misa, & Schot, 1995; Schot, 1992)

In this article’s scope, the technological artifact forming social processes are clustered into three categories: (1) general social processes, (2) refugee initiated processes, and (3) refugee targeted, through UNHCR, and other humanitarian agents. The interpretative sequence in each case differs. This classification takes note of the linkage between user and consumer and implies the use of the SST model. In the wave of economic dynamics and profit-oriented entrepreneurism the greater bulk of the population, across all social groups, are subject to a general socialization process through which they are able to access technological artifacts designed for the general population. These artifacts are stipulated to be accessible by its envisaged target groups.

The particular attributes of the refugee domain, such as the area covering the ultra-vulnerable refugee population, have its own dedicated social interpretative and shaping dynamics. Refugees, through the general social processes, are able to access and take advantage of the global market produced technological artifacts, such as mobile phones and the internet. To a minuscule degree they also contribute to the shaping of these products. Owing to the particularities of this – ultra-vulnerable – social group they can genuinely perceive and can also become suppliers of technological artifact to their own need. These solutions are not to be understood here as high-end products; rather solutions adapted or compiled from the general market but with the insider’s advantage to market its sub-version.


The category centre to this article is the social process that manifests between the suppliers and the refugees, with the inclusion of the humanitarian agents. The linkage that then impacts the development and control of the technological artifact creation and deployment rests on the humanitarian agents’ interpretation of the refugees’ needs, expectations. The thereby silhouetted humanitarian goals will formulate the baseline information that will define the choice and employment of the solution. The attention of this article is directed on the segment where the humanitarian agent interacts with the technology-based solution and its supplier; to what extent the SST model’s attributes are being manifested – in policy development (a technology-aware innovation policy and innovation cycle) and the understanding and choice of solution (based on an technology-aware assessment scheme).

Defining the needs of the population of concern is an initial step to embark on finding corresponding technology-based solutions. Most of the applied solutions are building on already invented formulas and being adapted to particular needs. Yet to ensure that the right mainstreamed solution is being employed or a new potential solution is being endeavored, an out-and-out apprehension is innate in reference to the interpreted value-needs/gaps of the displaced persons.

This social shaping discourse intends to direct attention to the social processes that the refugee protection domain similarly witnesses. Refugee protection practices also employ technology. Moreover, technology is even being used not just through the deployment of humanitarian actors, but by way of the general social processes the refugees are subject to. Practices of agencies and entities within the refugee domain can be also interpreted within the linear and the SST models.

This article emphasizes the need that technology-based solutions should be looked at beyond the linear perception. Proper technology-aware policies need to be developed that capture the need to understand what shapes technology, and the potential ways of how envisaged impacts can be achieved and their processes controlled. Policies are stipulated to include a scheme or mechanism that ensures such insights.

Being Minority, Being Migrant: A Note on the Muslims of West Bengal, 1947-1950

Anwesha Sengupta

On August 15, 1947 Calcutta and West Bengal was in a festive mood. Slogans like Bande Mataram, Jai Hind, Hindu-Musalman ek Ho, Allah ho Akbar, were raised in the streets of the city and its suburbs. People of different faiths embraced each other, distributed sweets and thus celebrated the much awaited independence.1 It seemed for a moment that the cloud of communalism had finally passed. It was a momentary relief though. Soon, the Muslims would realize that their lives were no longer safe in this city and in West Bengal. Within a year of independence, the communal situation started deteriorating. On the day of Muharram, 1948 the procession was obstructed near Maniktalla (Calcutta), brickbats and acid bulbs were thrown and on the following day there were chilling reports of Muslims being stabbed in some of the streets of Calcutta. It was also reported that the refugees from East Pakistan played a leading role in this.2

The scene outside Calcutta was no better. Nadia, a border district, for instance, was one of the majorly disturbed areas. Particularly notorious were the villages within the Shantipur Police Station of this district. The Muslims, mostly poor agriculturalists, were often harassed by the local Hindus. Their properties were looted, crops produced in their fields were forcefully taken away, and houses were occupied.3 As early as in July 1948, a riotous situation developed in Shantipur. It started when some Muslims allegedly attempted to molest some Hindu school girls. Whether this was a rumour or not4 is difficult to ascertain. But this (alleged) incident became the excuse for damaging the mosques, attacking the local Muslims and even killing them. Of course, incidents like this forced many Muslims to migrate. The following extract from the secret report on the situation of East Bengal for the first half of July 1948 will give an idea of the situation in Shantipur and the plight of the Muslims:

a serious outbreak of communal fury against Muslims occurred in the Shantipur thana of Nadia district on 19-20 July. Information in the possession of government shows that Hindu mobs with the connivance and sometimes active assistance of the police, attacked mosques and houses. At least 10 Muslims were killed, and scores injured. It is also reported that medical aid was denied to the injured by the Hindu doctors of the area. As a result of these disturbances many Muslims have migrated from Shantipur to Rajshahi, Jessore, Kushtia and Pabna districts of this province and their accounts of oppression endured by the Nadia Muslims has had an exciting effect on the minds of their hearers.5

Nadia, being a border district, received massive refugee influx from East Pakistan. By a warped logic of retribution, the refugees often took leading roles in torturing the Muslims. If they could not stay in Pakistan, they would not let the Muslims stay in India, perhaps, was their idea. The police and the local administration too often were a party to these assaults, either directly or by being mute spectators. The violence of Calcutta, Noakhali and Bihar riots, the reports and rumours about Hindu oppression in East Bengal and the general understanding of partition, made the majority of the people respond to the politics of the time in religious terms. So, in January 10, 1949 when a group of 30 refugees from East Bengal led by Debendra Nath Mandal, assaulted the Muslims of Haldipara village (Hanskhali police station, Nadia), the police did not take action. The same group, encouraged by the indifference of the police, again created trouble on 14 and 15th of the same month and even tried to kidnap a Muslim woman. Even then, the police allegedly refused to register any complaint lodged by the Muslims.6

The refugees needed lands to cultivate and homes to stay. They often forcibly occupied the houses of the Muslims, as well as their mosques and desecrated their graveyards.7 Often the Government of West Bengal had a more direct role in displacing the Muslims. For instance, on December 1, 1948, the West Bengal Government issued a notification to acquire land in twenty two villages of 24 Parganas district for rehabilitating the Hindu refugees. These villages, situated very near Indo-East Pakistan border, were populated primarily by the Muslims. Such a measure made them anxious and was seen as a deliberate attempt to “clean” the border areas off the Muslims.8

Being a refugee was also an equally difficult experience for the poor Muslim migrants. First and foremost, being uprooted from one’s home had deep psychological impact. Settling down in a new place required necessary capital, which the refugees often lacked. So they expected some help from the Government. Muhinuddin Ahmed from a village under Shantipur Police Station wrote the following letter to the District Magistrate of Jessore:

…Lands for construction of thatched roofing houses and lands for cultivation and weaving machines are urgently required for the refugees of Santipore. The refugees of Santipore who came here they left all things in Santipore. We do not want to be a burden on our Government and as such if facilities are offered to equip ourselves with necessary implements for cultivation and weaving, immediately people can start on work and earning. … at present arrangement for the 500 evacuees may kindly be made. For our help your honour kindly arrange for two tube wells in Jadavpore at a very early date and will kindly arrange for C.I. sheets of 10’-0 at controlled rate at a date when available. [sic.]9

There is an absolute lack of any research on the politics and process of relief and rehabilitation of the refugees in East Bengal. The refugee pressure increased in 1950 when there was an outbreak of communal riots in both East and West Bengal. Many, who initially thought of staying put in India, were forced to leave. This article does not have the scope to discuss the anatomy of this violence in great detail. But a quotation from the diary of Tajuddin Ahmed, who later became the first Prime Minister of independent Bangladesh, would give an idea of the flow of the Muslims from India to East Pakistan. He wrote on February 28, 1950:

After two and a half years of Pakistan’s independence, Dhaka is witnessing communal riot. The riot has affected the suburbs and interior villages as well. Dhaka is also witnessing a massive influx of Muslim refugees from West Bengal [because the communal riots have affected that province as well]. Dhaka for the first time is facing acute pressure of the refugees. A large section of the Hindus are also leaving East Bengal.10

Being a Muslim in West Bengal was a difficult experience during the ‘partitioned times’. This paper tried to shed some light on the woes of being a minority and a migrant, by focusing on the Muslims of West Bengal. Through the study of the condition of the Muslims in West Bengal after partition, it revealed the limitations of the “secular” Nehruvian India in safeguarding the interests of its religious minority.

Notes and References

1 Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, Decolonization in South Asia: Meanings of freedom in post-independence West Bengal, 1947-52, Routledge, London and New York, 2009, p-10.
2 Letter to the Editor from Abdul Majid, Azad, 14.11.1948.
3 F.No K.W. 19-199/48, Pol (C.R.);Bundle No 1, ‘B’ Proceedings, List 119, Archives and National Library (ANL), Dhaka.
4 Letter dated 27.9.1948 from the Deputy Secretary, Government of East Bengal to the Secreatry, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, F.no- C.R.19-199/48, Bundle No 1, ‘B’ Proceedings, List 119, Bangladesh National Library and Archives, Dhaka.
5 F.No- C.R.19-199/48, Bundle No 1, Pol (C.R.); ‘B’ Proceedings, List 119, Archives and National Library (ANL), Dhaka.
6 From the Secretary to the Deputy High Commissioner for Pakistan in India to the Chief Secretary to the Govt. of East Bengal, Date 29.3.1949, F.No – 3C1-6/49, Bundle No 2, ‘B’ Proceedings, List 119, ANL.
7 Ibid. Also see, Joya Chatterji, ‘Of Graveyards and Ghettoes: Muslims in Partitioned West Bengal 1947-67,’ in M .Hasan and Asim Roy(eds), Living Together Separately: Cultural India in History and Politics, O.U.P., New Delhi, 2005.
8 F.No CR 5M-1/50 Pol (C.R.); Bundle No 2, ‘B’ Proceedings, List 119, ANL.
9 Letter to D.M, Jessore dated 22/8/1948 from Muhinuddin Ahmed ‘on behalf of refugees’, F.no- C.R.19-199/48, Bundle -1, List-119, ‘B’ Proceedings, ANL.
10 Tajuddin Ahmed, Tajuddin Ahmeder Diary, vol 2, Pratibhas, Dhaka, 2007 (second edition), p-87

The Inhabitants of Bangladeshi Chhitmahals in India

Atig Ghosh

Approximately 200 Indo-Bangladesh enclaves, which are sprinkled along the international border of Rajshahi state, Bangladesh, and Cooch Behar district, West Bengal, are collectively known as chhitmahal or chhit mohol in Bengali and constitute a bizarre political geography. A simple rendition of the chhit mohol as enclaves obfuscates the myriad spatial configurations and strategies that have emerged in the area over 60-odd years since partition. There are, for starters, counter-enclaves; that is, enclaves completely enclosed by another enclave. Shalbari, the second largest Indian enclave, for instance, encloses four Bangladeshi exclaves. There is also a globally-unique counter-counter enclave; the largest Indian exclave, Balapara Khagrabari, embodies one Bangladeshi exclave, Upanchowki Bhajni, which itself embodies an Indian exclave called Dahala Khagrabari, thus making the last one a counter-counter enclave. Then, there existed until very recently arguably the world’s only part-time enclave, Dahagram-Angarpota, which was connected to Bangladesh by the one-acre or tin-bigha corridor. The corridor used to remain open every alternate hour during day and completely closed during night. The Singh-Haseena agreement of September, 2011, however, has opened the corridor permanently, thus conferring the dubious character of a pene-enclave on Dahagram-Angarpota. Pene-enclaves are, however, not unknown to the residents of the area, though they have curiously escaped academic as well as journalistic scrutiny. Kalsi para or simply Kalsi, the Muslim-majority Indian proruption into Bangladesh, for instance, is a pene-enclave of sorts located in Kuchlibari. Though all our respondents pointed out that it is not a chhit or enclave technically, they unanimously concurred that the life conditions there best represented what is normally considered to be life conditions in an enclave. The observation, of course, begs the question whether there are tangible conditions which actually mark out life in an enclave or is it merely a stereotypical reification, imbibed over time and regurgitated conveniently. This study pays special attention to this critical concern.

During colonial times, the people of the enclaves did not face any difficulty graver than those experienced by their mainland counterparts. Sovereignty was not expressed in terms of territorial contiguity as in terms of jurisdiction and tax flows. Even after partition, for some years the old arrangement limped along, though gradual tightening of national territoriality was becoming evident. The apical moment of this territorial closure came in 1952, when the two governments of India and Pakistan agreed to introduce the passport regime. The agreement made no mention of the inhabitants of the enclaves and, as such, they were pushed into a curious situation of government-enforced statelessness. That is, if a person of, say, an Indian enclave in Bangladesh wanted to obtain passport and visa for free movement, she had to illegally trespass into Bangladeshi territory; if the person managed to reach a border outpost undetected, she had to be admitted illegally into Indian territory, for she carried no identification proof, and then travel hundreds of kilometres to the nearest consulate. If all this resulted in the issuance of a passport and a visa, then the person could return to the enclave only till the visa expired. Then she had to repeat the illegal procedure all over again.

The Indian and the Pakistan (later Bangladesh) governments came to a series of understandings to effect the exchange of enclaves. But none ever got beyond paperwork and diplomatic pleasantries. In the meanwhile, the people in the enclaves were confronted with a slew of identity-related options; none of them felicific, but such were the choices. William Van Schendel has identified at least three such self-reckoning strategies of the stateless people of the enclaves. Two of them, he argues, are transterritorial: the enclave-dweller could think of herself as a citizen of the patron state. Conversely, a Bangladeshi Hindu could identify with India and an Indian Muslim could identify with Bangladesh. This he calls ‘proxy citizenship’ which was often induced by the ideological goading of the mainland nation-states. This latter claim however does not fit neatly with evidence collected over time. In fact, Van Schendel himself finds a Muslim interviewee residing in an Indian enclave, Md. Bokhtaruddin, who describes how Pakistan had disowned him and his community after 1947. Suspended in this stateless void, the third available identity-related option was, of course, one of belonging to the enclaves. This is not trans-territorial but locally rooted. However, identity as a claim-making device can only be effective when it has numerical, economic and political teeth. The residents of the enclaves, separated by swathes of foreign, often hostile, territory, with no health, education, civic and administrative guarantees, could hardly make such identity claims effectively.

Add to this the atmosphere of coiled tension that often erupts into violent engagements. It is inarguable that the quantum of violence has dwindled since Bangladesh came into being. However, it has hardly disappeared. For example, in May 2000, a Hindu girl from India eloped with a Muslim youth from South Moshaldanga, a Bangladeshi enclave in India. On May 11, a crowd of Indians entered the enclave and looted five houses. A week later, the enclave was once more invaded by hundreds of Indians who set fire to fifty-five houses, wounded ten people and abducted four, and looted cattle and valuables. The 65-year-old Jitendra Nath Roy of Balapara Khagrabari, the largest Indian enclave in Bangladesh, on the other hand reports, “Bangladeshis used to loot our grain silos and rob our cattle by day. When night fell, we would all go and hide in the forests. When they came to rob us during night, they beat up the men and tortured the women.”

From all accounts, it seems that the quotient of violence perpetrated against the residents of the enclaves was evenly matched in both countries. However, some fieldworkers have told that the Bangladeshis are harsher in their treatment of the stateless population than their Indian counterparts. Now, this is a very dangerous argument to make. But one sees why otherwise perceptive researchers would draw such conclusions. When our researcher reached Kuchlibari in Mekhliganj block, Cooch Behar, prima facie what struck him was the ease and comfort the people of the enclaves radiated. They were very happy in India, they said unanimously. Shambhunath Chowdhury, a resident of the Dhabalsuti Chhit Mirgipur of Bangladesh, declared that if the exchange of enclaves took place following the Singh-Haseena agreement, he will not leave for Bangladesh. He is a shop-owner. Our researcher insisted that they could not be that happy after all, what with statelessness and disenfranchisement. But he would not be budged. “All of us have Indian voter identification cards and ration cards. We are happy here,” he argued. Muhammad Belal Hussain, who has all his land in a Bangladeshi enclave, too echoed Mr Chowdhury. He would not leave.

The examples of xenophobic violence detailed above militate against such jolly instances of belonging. Accepted prima facie and outside their historical context, they may be misguiding. In the case of Dhabalsuti Chhit Mirgipur, for instance, a violent history of forcible expulsion in 1955, one could suggest, may have left only those who wanted to remain, to belong unconditionally. A horde of mainland Hindus had, in 1955, demanded “the blood of Muslims” and driven almost all dissenters into Bangladesh.

The respondents, nevertheless, fear that “those in the Indian enclaves in Bangladesh would come if the exchange happens. The government has promised to settle them. Where will the government settle them? There is no land but that of ours.” The tenuous belonging and wilful oblivion was slipping in face of the proximate possibility of dislocation when suddenly the group as if collectively snapped back into confidence. “But these governments will never reach an agreement; they never have,” they chuckled in self-assurance. Indeed, perhaps their confidence is not irrational. For India, the historical jingoism of the right-wing apart, recently another factor has cropped up to collude against an amicable exchange: the growth of tea gardens in the area. The enclaves, and their attendant instability in national space, have meant that land has been sold dirt cheap here, sometimes at as little as 8000 rupees per acre. Major players like Roshanlal Aggarwal, the Goels and NutriTea have bought land and started plantations. An eco-tourism resort of the GBC Enterprises Limited has come up a stone’s throw away from the Tin-Bigha Corridor which offers leisure walks through tea gardens, a modern saloon and massage parlour! If one provisionally accepts Giorgio Agamben’s (The Coming Community and Means without End: Notes on Politics) contention that attributes a determined character to the state and a determining power to the economic forces of capitalism that conditions particular forms of the state, then the Indian state is unlikely to rip through the tightening tangles of big investment. But, we offer this only as a possible outcome. Who knows, the nation-state may still surprise us.

Questions of statist ambition and quotidian statelessness, global processes and local exigencies, identity and the anamorphic ‘other’, get crosshatched in the fastnesses of the North-Bengal frontier; considerations of borders-in-the-mud get transformed into concern for the boundaries-in-the-mind. The story of statelessness in South Asia ultimately becomes a saga of survival techniques, self-making and, sometimes, strategies of status-quoist solidarity.

Wolf’s Warning, will the ‘Sheep’ Listen or Kowtow again to ‘Dragon’

Tashi Dhundup

(Tashi is a Tibetan in exile, and an independent researcher.)

Keeping in mind the increasingly kowtowing behavior of the Nepalese polity in terms of its treatment towards the Tibetans in Nepal, the recent remark by the US lawmaker Frank Wolf ( For Details refer to the press release in the News Section of this edition) to cut off aid to Nepal will surely be welcomed by the Tibetans and their supporters with great hoopla. But even though it is an encouraging remark nonetheless, it might prove imperative to greet it with guarded enthusiasm. It is urgent to understand or to question in that regard, what outcome such a caveat will receive.

If we were to look back, beginning 2008, despite intense pressure from the International diplomatic communities and media outcry, the Nepalese Government went on nonchalantly to break the skulls of the Tibetan protestors and in between orchestrated the closure of two important and indispensible Tibetan community related offices vis-à-vis Tibetan Reception Center and the Tibetan Welfare Office that has been in existence for the last several decades. Not to mention the spree of clandestine and arbitrary house arrest that followed. These were already in addition to the deportation of around fifteen Tibetans in 2003 which was another milestone of easing up to the Chinese by the Nepalese Government. Despite such an outpour of public brick batting, if the Nepalese Government had wittingly continued to do the status quo, to what consequence this latest ultimatum of Representative Wolf will bear fruit remains fanciful.

The important thing to consider would be what such an ultimatum would do to the already deteriorating situations of the Tibetans in Nepal, both the residents and the ones fleeing through Nepal for that matter. For one, instead of easing up the situation it might prove otherwise, resulting in the already emaciated but now provoked law enforcers of Nepal to wield their batons upon the Tibetan recipients more forcefully. Another point to consider would be what effect it will have on the general psyche of the ordinary Nepalese citizens who are either ill-informed or unaware of the Tibetan issue in general. There is a possibility that their lackadaisical understanding of the Tibetan situation might simply turn into hate. Add to that the reaction of the Nepalese officials, who even though might portray a benign face officially, but in private might simply make the procurement of any kind of official documents by the Tibetans even more harder.

Let’s now turn to Representative Frank Wolf. Is the congressman serious or is it just a lone man’s cry with the rest of the legislators shrugging their shoulders in non-commitment, for unlike the Chinese where there are no two opinions in dealing with the Tibet situation, the American policy does not enjoy such a unified stand. And even if Congressman Wolf is serious, keeping in mind the divided opinions among the American Congressmen regarding the Tibet situation, this warning might not amount to much. In such disparity, wouldn’t it be more effective if the pressure were induced from the Indian front, keeping in mind the ‘erstwhile unacknowledged influential sway’ the Indian polity has on the Nepalese domestic politics. And wouldn’t it make even more sense, if the purpose is to aid the Tibetans in Nepal, to play the hardballs with the Chinese directly by employing the age old diplomatic card of ‘carrot and stick’.

But all these might not necessarily call for Nepal to be complacent. Even though the Nepalese Government has quickly forgotten the role Tibet as a country played in their admission into the United Nations, it is high time that Nepal should for their own good begin to stand upon their own mettle. It should begin to resist the bullying from both from the Chinese and the Indian side. Even though maintaining friendly diplomatic relation is important, it doesn’t call for the Nepalese Government’s complete prostration to the Chinese. Even though this warning might not prove in the flow of the funds from the U.S. to be deficient, the Nepalese Government should not take this warning on face value nonetheless. With the declining image of Nepal in their treatment of the Tibetans, it is a bad news already that such an ultimatum came from the US and it might do good for the Nepalese Government to stop their tomfoolery and straighten up their act, especially, when so much of a hullabaloo has been created for the attainment of a Republic, where freedom of speech, assembly and expression are the guiding principles.

Attaining Trishanku’s Heaven: Bhutanese Refugee Resettlement in the United States

Sreeja Balarajan

‘Bhutanese refugees’ will elicit you a result, unimaginable, a couple of decades ago. Even in the late 1990s, Bhutanese refugees did not generate the kind of results, they do today. This explosion of ‘knowledge’ regarding the Bhutanese refugees has coincided with one of the largest refugee resettlement process in recent years. It is unlike any focus and attention that the Bhutanese refugees have faced since their flight from Southern Bhutan.

Initially, the issue of Bhutanese refugees was to be resolved by a joint verification process between Nepal and Bhutan. This long drawn-out process ended in a stalemate but repatriation to Bhutan was never achieved. While technically contained within the camps, the Nepali-speaking Bhutanese refugees had the dubious distinction of being refugees in a region ethnically similar to their own community and in many senses, moved freely in the larger sub-continent. Refugees travelled to India and throughout Nepal to meet their relatives, for education, employment, business, and some visited southern Bhutan clandestinely.

Within its uneasy birth and legacy, the Bhutanese refugee activism went through several phases, ranging from peaceful advocacy for repatriation, militancy, political front groups, and parties of all shades, splintering, coalescing, disappearing and coming together. The refugees were not immune to the larger socio-political movement in Nepal and the surrounding region of India. Not allowed access to legal employment and higher education, frustrated at their situation and lack of will by the international community, they were easy targets as recruits for political movements in the region.1

South Asian states, with their cross-cutting ethnic communities, have a history of internal conflict and intra-state conflict and tension as well. The increasing militancy among the refugee youth, Bhutan’s refusal to accept them back, coincided with the interests of the Core Working Group2 of countries, and pushed the third country resettlement concept as a ‘durable solution’ the Bhutanese refugee issue. Many refugees look back to the defining incident of 9/11 a decade ago.3They point towards the international community and the west, which felt compelled to choose one refugee population over another.4 Hence the advocacy of the resettlement process, which gradually came to the forefront, was dogged with a lack of transparency, secrecy, and misinformation.5

The first batch of refugees started coming to the United States in early 2008. By end of June 2011, there were around 47,843 Bhutanese refugees resettled into the United States.6 Nearly 50,000 refugees have been resettled abroad to all the countries; with a Bhutanese refugee who was resettled into the United States in South Dakota.7

In an age, where the South Asian youth aspires to go abroad, the educated and savvy Bhutanese refugee finds his/her golden opportunity in the third country resettlement process. Many such refugees will follow the expected path of other immigrants in the US. For others, it is less than robust. The refugees face the hard realities of the ‘American Dream’ in the time of economic stress and overburdened resettlement system. The Bhutanese refugees have the highest suicide rate among the re-settled refugees in the United States. A study done by the IOM, finds that suicide rate in the camps has increased from 20.3 percent per 100,000 to 27.3, post-resettlement, to 31 per 100,000 among those resettled in the US.8 An IOM study reported 12 cases of Bhutanese refugee suicides upon resettlement to a third country from 2007 until present, but it is acknowledged that this information is incomplete and, moreover, that there is no information on suicide attempts.9

The well intentioned but inherently asymmetrical power relations in the resettlement process has been debilitating for the refugees. The prospects of unemployment, stress on the traditional family and gender roles, isolation, and culture shock has affected the refugee population. Everything is not ‘as close to heaven as possible’ and ‘the necessity to adapt in a very short period to a new cultural and socioeconomic context can threaten the refugees’ self-concepts and creates disorientation’.10

In most cases, the younger refugees, with middle-aged parents are the primary wage earners for their families. The resettlement process has put majority of the Bhutanese refugees in the traditional employment path of newly arrived refugees in the US. These are predominantly entry level jobs. The younger age group and women (from all age levels) have been largely absorbed into the hospitality and retail industry. Food processing sectors like meat-packing factories have has absorbed the low skilled refugees from all age groups.11 Middle-aged and elderly refugees, forced to supplement their incomes, find work in less–than-desirable scenarios. Though the resettlement agencies are not ‘employment agencies’; they do facilitate employment opportunities. These agencies usually provide orientation services, follow-up and support services for employment.12 However, preliminary surveys and media reports indicate that there is no process to verify the effectiveness of such support services. Mostly, Bhutanese refugees (particularly new-arrivals) have to rely on kin-networks for employment opportunities.

The elderly refugees tend to be isolated due to language, and employment barriers and the changing family hierarchies. This generation has resigned themselves to the reality of never regaining what they lost. Parents with inadequate English language abilities are compelled to seek employment and are often held ransom by their school-going children as they can adapt to the language and other skills in the new environment.

An important question, often left unaddressed in this discourse is the role evangelical and proselytizing groups in the resettlement process. These groups often work alongside the resettlement agencies, stepping in to fill the gaps in the system, which the resettlement agencies are unable to meet. The unequal power relations of culture, social and economic status and perceptions of religion, combined with the burden of obligation, also contributes to the process of racial stereotyping.

During the initial phase, the reality of ‘the business of living’ has overshadowed the political aspects of their cause. A plethora of community organizations have mushroomed in the U.S.A. Many are cautious about the perception of any political activity/allegiance. For those who were born in Bhutan and were young adults in the camps, the frustrations, downward mobility and rigors of life in the U.S. are more real. Given the reality of geo-political interests in the region, these aspirants might well find themselves as pawns in the larger power politics of South Asia.

The Bhutanese refugee networks, by way of online forums, news agencies and communication have also given rise to a vibrant discourse on the issues that concern the refugees. Increasingly these networks have allowed the Bhutanese refugees to take ownership, and become active participants on the questions and narratives of their identity, belonging and citizenship.

The unequal power structures in the resettlement system, will offer complex challenges for the Bhutanese refugees straddling the thin line between ‘orientation’ and ‘assimilation’. For the Nepali-Bhutanese, the flight from southern Bhutan challenging the State’s ‘invisible’ and ‘unwritten’ legacy might seem to end in a distant geographical arc with this resettlement process. However, the important question would be, whether this would quench their quest for a stable and undisputed identity or not? Or will it remain as Trishanku’s heaven?

Notes and References

1 Interviews with refugee youth in Beldangi I, II, III and Goldhap, April-May 2001. Follow up interviews from 2009 till the present. See also, Sreeja C T, Ethnicity in South Asia: A Study of the Nepali-Bhutanese Refugees, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis submitted to the University of Hyderabad, India, 2006.
2 The Core Working Group was formed in 2005. It consisted of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and U.S.A. The European Commission was an observer. The aim, was to ensure that Bhutan and Nepal work together towards a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem. http://www.international.gc.ca/genev/new-nouveau/20070516.aspx?view=d
3 Interviews with Balaram Poudel, R K Dorji, 23 July 2011, Kathmandu. Interview with Tek Nath Rizal, 25 July 2011, Kathmandu and Dr. Bhampa Rai, 6 August 2011, Damak. Interview with a cross-section of refugees from the Camps of Beldangi-I,II, nd III, Timai, Sanischare, and refugees from the Goldhap The camp was relocated into Beldangi in July-August, 2011 Nepal.
4 In the wake of 9/11, the US and the western countries were reluctant to accept refugees from the Middle East. In order to fulfill their refugee quotas, these countries focused on the largely Hindu, Buddhist (and increasingly Christian) Bhutanese refugees. See also, Susan Banki’s analysis, Resettlement of the Bhutanese from Nepal: The Durable Solution Discourse, in Howard Adelman, ed., Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home [Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2008], p.49. Apart from that this is based on interviews with Bhutanese Refugees since 2006, Nepalese journalists from July to August 2011 and refugee leaders on July 2011 in Kathmandu.
5 From the standpoint of the refugees, the less-than-straightforward process of advocacy for re-settlement encompassed various incidents in the camps that brought the re-settlement option to the forefront, to serve the ‘vested interests’ in the refugee community, the relief agencies themselves, the governments of Bhutan and Nepal, and the Core Working Group. This is based on series of interviews with Bhutanese Refugees since 2006. Apart from that I have also interviewed Nepalese journalists (July –August 2011, Nepal), and refugee leaders in Kathmandu (July 2011). Interview with Beldangi-I, II and III refugees, July 2011. See also Susan Banki, pp.48-49. See also Shiva Dhungana, Refugee Watch.
6 UNHCR figures provided by the UNHCR Office, Kathmandu Nepal. July 2011.
7 http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/media/press-briefing-notes/pbnAS/cache/offonce/cache/offonce?entryId=30386
8 Guglielmo Schininà, Sonali Sharma, Olga Gorbacheva, Anit Kumar Mishra, Who am I? : Assessment Of Psychosocial Needs And Suicide Risk Factors Among Bhutanese Refugees In Nepal And After Third Country Resettlement, IOM Migration Health Division Mental Health, Psychosocial Response and Intercultural Communication Section and Mission in Nepal, 201. Accessed at:
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/studies_and_reports/Bhutanese-Mental-Health-Assessment-Nepal-23-March.pdf
9 Ibid, p.7
10 R.K. Papdopoulos (2002) Refugees, home and trauma. In 'Therapeutic Care for Refugees.
No Place Like Home', edited by author. London: Karnac. Tavistock Clinic Series quoted in Ibid, p.5 http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/studies_and_reports/Bhutanese-Mental-Health-Assessment-Nepal-23-March.pdf
11 For example Bhutanese refugees re-settled in Pennsylvania and North Carolina work in these factories. Bhutanese refugees also travel from Virginia to work in these factories. For example in Central VA, semi-skilled refugees (different age groups) have also been employed in wood factories, farms and seasonal jobs.
12 List of National Volunteer Agencies, known as VOLAGs and their affiliated agencies which work with the State. Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration’s, Reception and Placement Program, are given here: http://www.unrefugees.org/site/c.lfIQKSOwFqG/b.5067997/k.25D5/National_Resettlement_Agencies.htm

The Demise of the Malaysian Solution

Savitri Taylor

[Associate Professor in the School of Law at La Trobe University]

(This article has been reproduced from La Trobe University News, posted 7 September 2011,
http://www.latrobe.edu.au/news/articles/2011/opinion/the-demise-of-the-malaysian-solution)

On 25 July 2011, Australia and Malaysia entered into a legally non-binding Arrangement, which provided for the transfer to Malaysia of up to 800 people arriving irregularly in Australia by boat after the date of signing. The Gillard government attempted to implement this arrangement by using the legal machinery which the Howard government had inserted into the Migration Act to enable execution of the Pacific Strategy. The High Court of Australia has just ruled by a six to one majority that the legal machinery does not work in the way that the Gillard government (and the Howard government before it) thought it did.

Section 198A(3) of the Migration Act gives the Minister for Immigration the power to declare in writing that a specified country provides asylum seekers with access “to effective procedures for assessing their need for protection” and protection pending determination of their refugee status; that it provides protection to refugees pending their voluntary repatriation or resettlement; and that it “meets relevant human rights standards in providing that protection.” Section 198A(1) provides that the class of persons into which most unauthorized boat arrivals fall may be taken to such a declared country. On 25 July 2011, Minister Bowen made a declaration in respect of Malaysia just as Minister Ruddock before him had made declarations in respect of Nauru and PNG. The government’s understanding of the law was that what the Minister declares does not have to be true as long as the Minister believes it to be true. The High Court found to the contrary. Moreover, according to the majority, what has to be true, at a minimum, in order for a section 198A(3) declaration to be valid is that the country in respect of which the declaration is made is bound under international law or its own national law to provide the protections specified to asylum seekers and refugees. The government conceded (as it had to) that Malaysia did not meet this minimum. It followed that the 25 July 2011 declaration was invalid.

Short of a change to Malaysian law, which the Gillard government has said it will not seek, or to Australian law, which the Gillard government is impotent to achieve on its own, the Malaysian arrangement no longer offers a solution to its border control problem. So what happens now? The government might choose to test whether the existing declaration or a new one in respect of PNG would stand up to High Court scrutiny. The outcome is by no means certain, because in the case just decided the High Court left open the answers to some key questions bearing on the matter. If the government were prepared to accept the political humiliation of a return to Nauru in order to avoid the greater political damage of continuing boat arrivals, it could perhaps convince the opposition to support passage of legislation which would put beyond doubt the domestic legal validity of transfers to that country. Depending on the moral depths to which the government is prepared to sink in its fight for political survival, the deterrence options available to it are many and varied. If implemented, they may even result in a significant reduction of boat arrivals in Australia at least until the next election. But here is what they will not do. They will not resolve the underlying problem, which is human insecurity in the countries which asylum seekers flee from and in most of the countries they flee through.

Between 2007 and 2009, Professor Sandra Gifford and I led a research project which involved, among other things, interviewing asylum seekers and refugees living in Indonesia. Indonesia is the last country of departure of most arriving here by boat. What we discovered was this. Asylum seekers and refugees do not necessarily want to make Australia their home. They just want to have a home: a place where they can live in safety, support themselves with dignity, give their children a future through education, and belong. If these basic human needs could be fulfilled in Indonesia, they would have been happy to remain there. If they knew that they had a realistic prospect of obtaining a resettlement place in another country which would fulfill these needs, the assurance of future security would have been enough to enable them to bear present insecurity. Unfortunately, neither a home in its true meaning nor the hope of one in the future is to be found in Indonesia or most other countries in our region. Australia acting alone cannot turn this situation around. Regional cooperation is needed.

In his press conference on 31 August, 2011, the Minister said he was proud of the regional cooperation framework that the government had achieved at the Bali Process Ministerial Conference in March this year. And so he should be. The regional cooperation framework was a first step towards the possibility of improved refugee protection throughout our region. The Malaysia deal, though purportedly a practical implementation of that framework, had at the heart of it a backward step which has now been undone. However, there is another element of the Arrangement which is protection enhancing and can still be implemented. That element is the promise made by Australia to resettle over 4,000 of the over 80,000 UNHCR recognized refugees living in Malaysia at the time of signing. These 4,000 resettlement places were to be made available over four years and to be additional to Australia’s regular humanitarian resettlement program. If the government follows through on this promise, it may be able to convince its regional neighbours that when it talks about regional cooperation it does not just mean that the rest of the region should cooperate to help Australia avoid its own protection obligations. Disappointingly, it appears that the government might now decide to provide the 4,000 resettlement places promised to Malaysia within the regular resettlement program. In other words, it might rob Peter to pay Paul. This would, of course, enable the government counter the opposition charge that the Malaysian solution is not just a policy failure, but a very expensive one. However, it would also reveal to the region that Australia’s protection talk is no more than talk and, if that happens, the regional cooperation framework of which the government is so proud will never become more than words on paper.

Youths; Participants and Victims of War

Chulanee Attanayake

[Programme Officer, National Protection and Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons Project, HRCSL]

In this article I examine the impact of conflict on youth in Allaipiddy, a return village in Jaffna. Considering a significant section of Srilanka’s population has grown up witnessing war and conflict, it is important to look into the problems younger generation has faced as victims and participants of war and the ways in which their grievances could be incorporated in peace building efforts.

Background: Allaippiddy

Allaipiddy in Velani DS Division in Jaffna is situated in the High Security Zone(HSZ) spreading across 144 sq.km. The villagers of Allaipiddy were the first victims of displacement in 1990. Many of the villagers are fishermen from coastal areas such as Kankesanthurai, Keerimalai while others are interior farmers of Tellipalai. The Sri Lankan security forces moved into Allaipiddy in 1990 in order to establish a camp to facilitate troop movement and supply lines to the Jaffna Fort, which was at that time under the control of the Sri Lanka government. The villagers were forced to vacate the village. By the time of displacement, there had been more than 400 families with approximately 1400 persons. It is reported that 22 people have disappeared during the cause of military campaign.

Allaipiddy remained a contentious spot because of its strategic location. As long as the LTTE retained its base at Pooneryan, the navy needed Allaipiddy to control LTTE sea movements between its base and the government facilities at Kankensanthurai. Secondly the place also served as a supply line for troops in Jaffna.

After Sri Lankan Army established its rule in Jaffna district on 12th April 1996, the displaced community in the district was resettled, yet, villagers of Allaipiddy were prevented to go back to their residences as it was situated in the HSZ. After 2002 following the Ceasefire Agreement between the Government and LTTE; they were resettled.

On 19th May 2006, Allaipiddy villagers faced the Second major displacement following a series of security threats, including the murder of 13 Tamil civilians. They were forced and threatened to leave the village immediately. The posters threatening their lives have been supposedly distributed by a group called “Makkal Padai” (People’s Force), which was doubted to be affiliated with LTTE. By the time of this Second Displacement, there had been 450 families and 250 houses constructed by the World Bank Housing Development Project.

However, majority of the villagers returned to Allaipiddy during the period of 20th May 2006 and 11th August 2006 until they were warned to vacate the area immediately. On 11th August 2006, Voice of Tigers; the official radio station of LTTE, issued an announcement warning the residents of Gurunagar, Passaiyoor, St. Rocks and Columbuthurai of imminent attacks and telling them to vacate the area. With the fear of been caught amidst hostilities between Sri Lanka Army and LTTE, villagers who returned from previous displacement left.

Under the Government’s resettlement programmes, 182 families returned in 2008 and another 160 families returned in June 2009. Currently, there are 350 families in the village.

There are different stories about the incident which caused the displacement in May 2006. 13 Tamil civilians were killed including two women and two children. Whilst the Government accused LTTE for the massacre, many reports have mentioned that the massacre was done by “personnel in civilians alleged to be from the Sri Lanka Navy and carders from Ealam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP).

Youth: Participants and Victims

Participation of youth in conflict situations is critical to understand the impact of conflict as they play a dominant role either as a rebel or as a victim. The participation of youth in conflict is inevitable when they are increasing in numbers and the opportunities for education and employment are limited.

SriLanka has been witness to youth involvement in conflicts throughout the recent history. The two armed youth insurrections in the South led by Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in 1971 and 1988-89, and violence in North and East which lasted for nearly three decades stand as the best evidence for youth involvement in the rebellious movements in the country.

As per available evidences it is said that, in the Sinhalese segment of the population, active participants in each of the insurgencies of 1971 and 1986-89 never exceeded 20,000 young men and women. Whereas participation of Tamil youth in LTTE insurrection in the North and East was about 3000 youths by the time of the arrival of Indian Peace-Keeping Army in 1987, and it increased to about 10,000 at the time of their retreat from Jaffna in 1995. Considering reports of large scale recruitment occurred during the past few years, this number might have increased at the time of end of the conflict.

Youth involvement in conflicts is influenced by several factors; lack of economic opportunities, increase in grievances, deprivation of development and blocked transition to adulthood. Of all, lack of economic opportunities, deprivation of development and increase in grievances acted as driving forces of violent insurrection in North and East. Though certain conflict resolution theories highlights the fact that youth being the “drivers of conflict” it is to be noted that they are the most vulnerable victims of a conflict. They play a role as offenders or perpetrators, yet, at the same time, opportunities available for development are not accessible to them as a result of the conflict. The large proportion of combatant group is aged between 15 and 30 years, on the other hand majority of the youth population in the country has grown up only witnessing war throughout their life time.

Having taken part as combatants in the conflict, youth have become direct victims. Researchers have proved that the majority in both government military troops and LTTE carders had been between the ages of 15-30 years. Though the Government military group recruited those who are above 18 years of age, LTTE carders consisted of adolescents of 14 years of age. Their recruitment may be either voluntary or forced. Speaking of LTTE, youths were compelled to join the conflict through conscription or abduction.

Findings of the Study

The study conducted in Allaipiddy, Jaffna revealed that, whether or not the youth was directly involved in conflict, they have become direct victims of social, economic, political, psychological and cultural dimensions of conflict. Either victims or perpetrators, it is the future generation of the country who have been most victimized.

The conflict has affected education, social welfare, economic development and as a result it has aggravated unemployment. Concerning the age group of the youths interviewed in Allaipiddy, most of them have dropped out of school due to poverty. Their parents have lost means of income each time they fled home. Allaipiddy is a Fisheries Community and with the increase in hostilities, the fishermen faced restrictions on fishing by Sri Lanka Navy due to security reasons. They were forced to work as day-labourers. They largely depended on dry ration and supports from NGOs.

In most of the families, the children’s education was affected. They dropped out of school and engaged in odd jobs to support their families. There were instances where the elder brothers had to quit school to educate his younger siblings. This situation has a direct impact on today’s youth unemployment. Lack of proper education at their adolescence, lost of family property due to displacement and in certain circumstances, loss of caretakers at young age have affected their current status to find themselves jobs post conflict.

A young mother, speaking of her economic condition explained that she sometimes has to sell dry ration in order to fulfill the daily needs. There are young women who suffer due to lack of a dowry as no man is willing to take their hand without a presentable dowry. Lack of sound educational background prevents them from enjoying available employment opportunities. Though private and public sector offers employment for qualified youth, since most of them could not complete their education they lose a chance in this job sector.

Most of the male members in Allaipiddy were forced to take family responsibilities at a very young age. They could not afford to enjoy the freedom of youth. There are reports where young groups have become victims of substance abuse during (addicted to drug and alcohol).

Subsequently, female youths have sometimes been forced to early marriages and bare children. One girl who spoke to the interviewer regarding her current situation said that she is 21 years old and a widow with two children.

Lack of guardian/caretakers is one of the major social issues seen among the youth groups interviewed. Most of them have lost either both or one of their parents.

Youth is the transition period from childhood to adulthood. It is also a period where young people come across many physical and psychological changes. Therefore, advices and guidance of a responsible adult at this age is mandatory. When parents are killed or disappear due to war, the youth does not have anyone to guide them during their transition.

There are young girls in marriageable age in Allaipiddy who are unable to marry because of lack of the dowry. At the same time, their lack of education prevents them from finding employment with substantial salary.

Lack of shelter is another social issue identified at Allaipiddy. A young woman who explained her experiences mentioned that although she has a piece of land she does not have a house. She is living with her brother. There were few others who lived with friends or relatives due to lack of shelter. They are forced to depend on others.

Young widows and mothers of young children who do not have their own houses are highly vulnerable. Their personal security is at a threat. They could become victims of sexual abuses. Even though they live with friends or relatives, they are still vulnerable to such exploitations.

Those who have been injured due to bombing and shelling are permanently disabled. Some who have been treated for a long time, still face side effects of shelling as the metal pieces cannot be completely removed from their bodies. Permanent disabilities interrupt the economic activities and further, there are some who need the help of a third party to conduct day to day activities.

Having lived in Welfare Centers for a long time, they have not had proper health and sanitary facilities. Hence, they have been victims of epidemic diseases. Unavailability of nutritious food too is a threat to the health of these people. There is a high risk of being a prey of sexual assaults and such victims may encounter social diseases.

Youth of Allaipiddy, as many other youths in North and East, has often been victims of political issues which came about with the conflict. They were often forced to join the LTTE in one hand and on the other they were often looked upon as suspects by the Sri Lanka military forces. One young person, participating in our discussion said that his sister was arrested as a suspect of LTTE and was released after a month’s detention. Yet, the effect of the experience did not fade away even after she was declared her as non-LTTE by Courts. Further, there are incidents where young persons were abducted or where they disappeared.

Of all, the serious damage caused to youth through war is experiences of horror they witnessed since their childhood. It is obvious; the youth have experienced violence and horror than any other aspect in their lives. Post traumatic stress disorders, depression, phobias, personality disorders, illusions and delusions, and abnormal behavior are seen among the youth.

Conclusion

While the government and non-government actors have been taken initiatives to re-build people’s livelihoods, housing etc there remains a question whether the state and non-state actors are giving adequate attention to the youth victims as the findings of the young generation in Allaipiddy indicate. The war has had effect on the youth and this is despite their direct involvement as participants or as indirect victims of physical and emotional violence they have faced in the ongoing years. To add to that experience of forced political involvement during the conflict period and witnessing abduction and disappearances have resulted in lack of trust of society. Therefore there is an urgent need to look into the needs of the youth.

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