Thursday, June 30, 2011


In this issue of the Refugee Watch Online, we decided not to focus on the experience of any particular country. Instead, the accent in this issue is on mixed experiences of forced migration and several causative and resultant factors. We have two articles under the Perspective section. One concerns the environment and politics of displacement; the other displaced women’s adjustments to situations post return.

Dilip Gogoi in his article talks about the way construction of dams has been presented as the national development agendas despite the fact that such an agenda systematically excluded others who did not subscribe to the Nehruvian model. The he takes a glance at how big dams will have serious implication on the cultural bonds that the Arunachali tribes maintain. But, the challenge towards contesting such vehement resource use lies in understanding how marginal landscapes are integrated into a nationalist dream of integrating frontier space. The logic of resource exploration to propel the national economy is linked to the very process of the production of capital. Beyond the ecological consequences of mega projects, question of displacement of local communities, the cultural diversity of the local region presents unique challenge to the production of capital. Thus the latter would have a ruinous effect on the very societal bases of the region.

The second article, by Pakkeer Mohideen Mohamed Feroz, a human rights worker in Sri Lanka, talks about the post return challenges faced by women in the erstwhile conflict zones. The women who were living in camps or return areas, their position in Sri Lankan society is extremely vulnerable because they are dependent on the state and humanitarian agencies, with little ability to determine the course of their own lives. He lists all the different reasons due to which adjustment becomes difficult and shows that the root often lies in the reason of displacement itself. Each new causative factor shapes its victims in a way much different from other factors.

The News section has entries on HIV/AIDS, and armed non state actors in Burma and their roles in society. For the Reports section we have excerpts from reportage by Bhavani Fonseka and Mirak Rahim on settlement of the land question in the eastern province of Sri Lanka.

On our part, we hope the issue is worthwhile. We heartily welcome comments and suggestions.


To Deal with HIV/AIDS

Sangbida Lahiri
[Calcutta Research Group]

It is often questioned why the risks of HIV transmissions are increasing among the forced migrant communities, especially in the third world countries like India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri-Lanka, Burma or the countries in Central and Southeast Asia? Several scholars and field researchers point out a few significant things which played an important epidemiological role in transmission of HIV among the migrants of these regions. Since the period of decolonization, these countries were the poor victim of partition. After partition they had dealt several civil wars or insurgencies within their territory. The partitions, civil wars, and insurgencies—all such social and political turmoil created a huge number of refugees and internally displaced persons across the region.

According to Nafis Sadik, some types of conflict or displacement have brought much more particular risks of HIV infection. For example, long years of refugee camp life and lack of employment or recreational opportunities have contributed to intravenous drug use in Afghanistan and Pakistan border areas; this is a driving factor in the epidemic in these countries just as it is in Central Asia. The destitution of Burmese refugees in Thailand has led to widespread ‘survival sex’ which has driven the infection in that sub-region. The sexual violence used as a weapon of war in Timor Leste, Central Asia, Sri Lanka and other conflicts has undoubtedly increased HIV risks. And although it is often not considered an armed political conflict, the horrific levels of social and interpersonal violence in Papua New Guinea are also thought to be important factors in the epidemic there.

The Asian region is a natural disaster-prone zone; especially floods and earthquakes occur frequently here. In many places, such as Pakistan, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, populations have suffered both conflict- and disaster-related devastation. In addition to the trauma of the disaster and the difficulties of living in temporary shelter, the loss of livelihoods and assets accompanying natural disasters can affect families and communities for years, leaving them destitute and vulnerable to sexual exploitation or even trafficking. The provision of HIV education and basic prevention measures, including condom distribution, are part of the minimum standards for humanitarian response which cannot be implemented due to resource constraints, or stigmatisation, or both.

Thailand and India were among the first countries to recognise the need to provide comprehensive HIV prevention programmes within the security sector (national militaries, police and other uniformed services). The Thais, as in so many other aspects of HIV prevention, pioneered peer education and condom distribution programmes for uniformed services. The MAITRI programme in India was one of the first programmes established to support military families and dependents, not just individual members of the military, with comprehensive health and HIV education and counselling as well as other social support.

With the support of UNAIDs, UNFPA and others over recent years, there has been good progress in the region among national uniformed services, groups. Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1308 on HIV/AIDS in 2000, the UN has established HIV prevention programmes in all peacekeeping missions. Pakistan, India and Bangladesh have taken a major role in the HIV prevention programmes of peacekeeping missions.

For further information refer to http://www.fmreview.org/AIDS/Sadik.htm

Armed Non-State Actors, Conflict and Displacement

Sangbida Lahiri

It is well known to us that Burma has been a ground for conflicts and insurgencies since the intervention of British into it. Once started, the situation in Burma never became completely peaceful even after the country attained independence. Conflict remained among the myriad ethnic tribes and it produced a huge displacement of people. A large number of people displaced internally, many sought refuge in the neighbouring countries. Experts believe the government of Burma is not at all concerned about the affected civilians.

As a result, Burma’s ethnic non-state armed groups (NSAGs) – believed to hold territory covering a quarter of the country’s landmass – play a crucial role as protectors and providers of humanitarian aid. The approach to governance taken by different NSAGs varies greatly, as does the level of willing support given to them by their respective populations. In these traditional cultures, hierarchical leadership structures have evolved over time, often based largely on loyalty to those who provide support and protection.

Areas under the governance of NSAGs in Burma can be divided into what are known as the ‘black areas’ of active armed groups and the ‘ceasefire territories’ of those who made agreements with the national government over 15 years ago. These areas are collectively home to millions of civilians, many of whom fled areas of conflict or martial law to find refuge and humanitarian support. In many of these areas, education, healthcare, support for youth and women as well as emergency relief are provided by the NSAGs’ civil sectors, in most cases to a much higher standard than that provided by the state in nearby regions. Community workers supporting these projects, however, are heavily restricted and regularly attacked and arrested by Burma Army soldiers. Internally Displaced Persons who have fled to the ‘black areas’ are typically considered by the state to be supporters of the rebels and are under continuous threat of violence.

The elections held in November 2010 were as corrupt as most people expected and set continued military rule in stone. However, parallel to this, many foreign donors and governments have noted the military loosening its grip on civil society, opening up an unprecedented amount of space for humanitarian support and development. Parallel to this, however, all NSAGs have been ordered to incorporate their members into the Burma Army as ‘border-guard forces’, triggering a new series of threats to civilian communities and little hope for reconciliation between the military and NSAGs or their civil sectors.

There is a glimmer of hope in that there are some NSAG civil society groups that have been able to operate in government territory in recent years. The education branch of at least one of the more responsible ceasefire groups now provides support for primary schools in government-controlled areas through the monasteries. Ominously, offices of the Kachin Independence Organisation and the New Mon State Party have already been shut down in government territory and in early 2010 numerous youth workers of the former organisation were arrested, supposedly as part of a search for terrorist bombers.

NSAGs will remain critical to the provision of support to considerable numbers of IDPs in Burma, unless the government changes its approach to governance in these regions. Most IDPs and other civilians will continue to choose to live under the governance of NSAGs; and will remain dependent on international support. Steps to encourage a convergence of ideas and resources among legitimate civil society and groups linked to NSAGs should be, and could become, critical to the future peace and development of these regions, yet offer few solutions to the current displacement crisis.

For further information, refer to http://www.fmreview.org/non-state/Jolliffe.html

A Deportee I am, should I DREAM?

Geetisha Dasgupta
[Binghamton University]

Along the bundles of international borders that surround us, a wave of fear is ceaselessly circulated. It is called the fear of deportation. Not all people are able to remain in their own countries. Not all people that migrate have papers that prove their credentials to check posts. Not all papers are equal.

Every year a few hundred thousand people of South American origin are deported from the United States of America. Of them, many are children, termed in the immigration registers as alien minors. Needless to mention, to steer clear of being deported, countless numbers stay in anonymity, change their addresses several times over, and most dangerously, live inside the territory of the USA without any substantial social security papers, which means not having access to any security, health, education and financial services.

In 2001 a legislative proposal was introduced in the US Senate in order to address the issue of so called illegal minor aliens kept away from the basic provisions of life required for attaining adulthood; and not getting absorbed into the allies of darkness that underline the colour boundaries within the territory of a country. This proposal is called the DREAM Act. DREAM is the acronym for Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors. This bill would provide conditional permanent residency to certain illegal alien students who graduate from US high schools, who are of good moral character, arrived in the U.S. legally or illegally as minors, and have been in the country continuously for at least five years prior to the bill's enactment. If they were to complete two years in the military or two years at a four year institution of higher learning, the students would obtain temporary residency for a six year period.

Questions do arise from the way the proposal has been defined. But what becomes most interesting is that, the proposal has been revived again in 2011 after being repeatedly silenced for a decade. This needs to be contextualized, and the big economic crisis becomes the necessary pinch of salt. Under pressure to find out ways of augmenting the state revenue the illegal now look like a resource hitherto untapped by taxation. In a December 2010 report, the Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the November 30th, 2010 version of the DREAM act would "reduce deficits by about $1.4 billion over the 2011-2020 period and increase government revenues by $2.3 billion over the next 10 years." The same report, however, stresses that the Act '"would increase projected deficits by more than $5 billion in at least one of the four consecutive 10-year periods starting in 2021.”

Potential deportees were hopeful till the Act was defeated in the Senate in December 2010. Several felt that their dreams have been upended. In an interview to the New York Times, Isabel Castillo says, “At least now, I can mention my full name to a reporter and not ask her to pardon my anonymity…I can afford to publish a full frontal photograph and not plead to be photographed only from a certain angle that does not reveal my identity….” She has stood face to face with several Virginia politicians who want to see an immigration crackdown and told them her status, and yet no one has turned her in. Indeed, they’ve been respectful and friendly. Last summer, at a town-hall-style meeting, she had a long exchange with the governor of Virginia, Bob McDonnell, and a Republican pushing for tougher deportation policies. In January 2011, she testified before a House of Delegates subcommittee full of legislators who wanted to expand police power to round up illegal immigrants. Castillo was brought to Virginia at the age of six years and then went on to attend college. She says she cried when the motion was defeated. She graduated with very high grades, yet must work as a waitress because the absence of social security papers disallow her from applying to jobs that she thinks herself better suited for. She, like thousands of her comrades, keeps pushing the envelope, trying to bring about a big change by stringing together small twists and turns and can be possible every day.

She has reason to be hopeful again: the act has been reintroduced in May 2011.
For further reading, refer to http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/education/21winerip.html?_r=1&ref=politics

Political Ecology of Big Dams in India’s North-East Frontier: Emerging Critical Issues and Environmental Concerns

Dilip Gogoi
[Is an Assistant Professor in Political Science, Cotton College, Guwahati]

Dams, development and nationalism have historically evolved as potential agendas for nation building since 1950. The Nehruvian modernization dream was to transform agrarian India into a powerful industrialised nation based on scientific temperament. In the post 1990, these dreams have been more enthusiastically pursued to engulf our frontiers and borderlands as potential sites for the experimentation of modernity. Sanjib Baruah in one of his papers terms this as a process of ‘nationalizing frontier space’. The era of protected regime till the 1980 had a strong policy towards restricting mega structures to the core or mainland. The obvious reflection can be seen in Punjab, J&K and the North Eastern part of the country where big dams and heavy industries were not planned because of the regions proximity to hostile neighbours. In the post 1990 period one of the single determinant of India’s growth has been dragged by an acute power shortage. The growth of Indian economy is dependent on harnessing power from all potential sources. Hydro-power in this regards has emerged as a viable compliment to hydrocarbons, Coal, as a clean energy source and the Brahmaputra River basin its largest repository. Before the liberalization era power prospecting and harnessing was monopolised by public sector companies, however with the deregulation of this sector private players have conglomerated to harness more and more power. There is a spate of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with different hill states. In the North East India, Arunachal Pradesh has the most vibrant potential to generate hydro power. However, the innumerable network of dams that are proposed for the different river basins in Arunachal Pradesh, do not only threaten displacement that are projected to be small as compared to their counterparts in Narmada and Tehri, but will have more complex outcomes as the communities in the states are innumerable, small in size and heterogeneous.

Big dams will have serious implication on the cultural bonds that the Arunachali tribes maintain. But, the challenge towards contesting such vehement resource use lies in understanding how marginal landscapes are integrated into a nationalist dream of integrating frontier space. The logic of resource exploration to propel the national economy is linked to the very process of the production of capital. Beyond the ecological consequences of mega projects, question of displacement of local communities, the cultural diversity of the local region presents unique challenge to the production of capital. Dam construction in recent years has invited lot of controversy. Lack of comprehensive EIA and project planning threatens local biodiversity and has tremendous downstream and upstream upheaval affecting livelihood and aquatic life. Poor EIA appraisal has already led to unwanted deluge in the lower riparian areas of Assam. Beyond these obvious imperatives of damming fast flowing Himalayan tributaries, the location of these dams in highly sensitive seismic zone hinges the danger of flash floods in the event of a dam burst triggered by earthquake tremors. Underscoring the geo-ecological sensitiveness of the region, dam building is promoted as the most important developmental goal for the Himalayan state and the north-eastern region in particular. The Power Grid Corporation of India is one power sector player that has integrated the regions power potential with the nation. This mean the power produced here will be transmitted to other parts of the country to server the deficit regions. It strongly permeates the philosophy, the Nehruvian idea of development that marginal communities should pay for the development of a nation. Big Dams do not only represent states resourcefulness they also generate a sense of nationalism. This paper looks into not only the traditional challenges posed by big dams and but also tries to look into the other challenges, posed by ideas of modernization, developmentalities and privatization of resource use. What are the stakes of the local community? Here it will also be interesting to see how the neo-Nehruvian dream of calling to duty the marginalised people of the periphery are negotiated by local elites who act as brokers in bridging nexus with corporate interest in power projects.

State of Northeast Today

The north eastern region, which comprises eight Indian states , is connected with mainland India through a narrow corridor of land and , it has some unique features which sets it apart from the rest of the Indian landmass. The geo-strategic location of the North east region is also unique as it is surrounded by China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. The contemporary NE India is witnessing grave challenges: from within – contested ethnicities and complex historicity, from external environment – especially from Bangladesh, China and Myanmar and finally from the Indian state in context of not granting sufficient autonomy, regional underdevelopment and disparity which is responsible for the instability in present day NE India. There is a growing tension between the center and the people of the periphery regions due to the predominance of the center in certain matters and also due to the negligence towards the region which resulted in widespread unrest and insurgency and people’s discontent in the region.

The area has a rich natural resource base and the potential to emerge as a developed region. However due to the lack of effective strategies and will on the part of the Indian state and the on-going armed insurgency, the region has lagged behind the rest of the developed areas of the country. among the people there is a perceived notion that New Delhi is treating NE India as a “neo-colony” within India the way the British did with the region. There are several popular uprisings against this attitude of the center the most recent being in the context of the anti-dam uprisings hugely protesting against the construction of mega dams in ecologically and seismologically sensitive zone.

Projecting NE as India’s Future Power House

As India has a highly centralized planning process which is a conventional top down model, it identifies north east India as future power house considering its vast potential of hydroelectricity generation. India in order to keep up the development pace and growth India needs power. As India is witnessing several resistance movements against dams in various parts of India, northeastern region is an easy catch because of its —strategic location, vast potential for power generation and relatively low level of population density in comparison to other parts of India. In 2001 the Central Electricity Authority has done a preliminary study of the hydroelectric potential of the various Indian rivers. It has identified 168 prospective projects in the Brahmaputra Basin alone, which could generate more than 60,000 mw of hydel power.

On the basis of this report, GOI and Arunachal Pradesh Govt decided to initiate both medium and large dams through memorandums with the both Public Sector Power Company as well as private sector power companies. Accordingly, large dams are being constructed in many parts of ecologically sensitive zones of Arunachal Pradesh including 2000 MW Lower Subansiri Dam without addressing the serious people’s concerns and proper downstream impact assessment. It generate considerable debates and invites popular resistance movement from the local people and the civil society specially in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh by the students bodies Such as AASU and KMSS. The expert committee, consist of IIT, Guwahati, Gauhati University and Dibrugarh University , in its reports raised serious concerns and faulty design of the lower Subansiri project .The Assam Assembly House committee report also showed similar view and suggested without comprehensive downstream impact assessment study and addressing the genuine grievances of people , there should not be construction of large dam , particularly lower Subansiri dam.

However, GOI is continuing the same stand without addressing the genuine apprehensions and risks involved in the mega dam construction in the region in the name of national interest. Recent debates and reports also suggest that while initiating the project, the concerned authorities have overlooked the probable impacts and did not conduct any comprehensive study including that on the downstream impacts as well on the ecological consequences. This raises the serious flaw of mega-project execution and brings to the forefront the ulterior motives behind the construction of mega dams, which goes against the people and the environment.

Social and Environmental Cost

In India, construction of hydroelectric projects needs mandatory environmental clearances from the Ministry of Environment and the Forest, GOI, to review the feasibility on environmental and social grounds. Based on their specific locations they could also require other permissions such as – forest clearance from MoEF and approval from the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL) if protected areas (PAs) are involved. An important part of the clearance process is Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Report which is a very crucial document in terms of decision making. However, EIA reports revealed insufficient and faulty study in the context of mega hydel projects specially – Kameng. Lower Subansiri, Middle Siang, Tipaimukh and Dibang. All of them without exception, very poorly highlighted the area of conservation of wildlife and critical ecology of the region .This is particularly very important as two out of three bio-diversity hotspots of India pass through the north east – the Himalayas and the Indo- Burma region. However quite interestingly this area is poorly documented and in the recent years biologists have discovered many new species as well as range extension of existing ones in the region.

In specific context of the Lower Subansiri Hydel Project it needs to be realized that it is situated at a highly susceptible environmental location, which has an extremely sensitive ecosystem and above all this it is a part of the Tally Valley Wildlife Sanctuary, known for inter-border diversity. It is also one of the 25 richest bio-diversity hotspots of the world. The region is also affluent in terms of ornithology as the Bird Life International has identified two Endemic Bird Areas in this region.

The region is immensely rich in terms of forest cover as it experiences a very high average rainfall rate which is conducive for the growth of thick vegetation. Besides sporting thick forest and a wide range of bird this area also houses an assortment of animals which are endangered. Examples of such species would be – Great Pied Hornbill, Himalayan Black Bear, Golden Cat, Hill Mayna, Flying Squirrels, and Wild Hog etc. certain varieties of flora and fauna have already been marked as risk species. The National Forest Policy of the country also states that forest which clothes steep slopes, catchments of rivers, lakes and reservoirs and geologically unstable terrain and other such ecologically sensitive areas should be severely restricted. Tropical rain/moist forests particularly in areas such as Arunachal Pradesh, Kerela, and Andaman & Nicobar Islands should be totally safeguarded.

Field survey has revealed that the large scale mining and construction work has had a serious impact on the river flow by increasing the sedimentation. Muddy water and wide-ranging deforestation has resulted in acute land, water and air pollution in this ecologically sensitive zone located at the foothills of the Himalayas in the backdrop of an inadequate knowledge base. Critical concerns such as land degradation, forest land acquisition, generation of muck, increase in turbidity of water, water pollution due to various project activities and sewage disposal, cutting of trees, destruction of wildlife habitat, increased air pollution and most importantly displacement of local village people are witnessed from the project area. Besides all this one most imperative feature which totally goes against the construction of dams in this part of the country is that, this area is a seismic zone as it falls in Seismic Zone – V and thus is highly prone to destructive earthquakes like that of 1950 and periodic occurrence of earthquake in the region. Environmentalists, experts stressed on this vulnerability of the region and its devastative consequences. High pressure of water or a massive earthquake or even a major landslide could increase the flow of the river during monsoon and thus cause a havoc in the lower part of the project area which has thickly populated towns and villages. And this might also have adverse effects on the world heritage site Kaziranga and the much prized possession of the region, the largest river island of the world, Majuli.

Another serious concern is the displacement of the indigenous people, in the downstream area, the violation of their community rights and their livelihood and the issue of their resettlement and rehabilitation. These issues are perceived as grave because community rights are linked to the sources of livelihood of these people living in the lap of nature, specially the Mising community in Assam. The river and its resources are an integral part of the lives of these people living in and around the river; hence inaccessibility to the river and its resources poses as a hindrance in the running of their daily lives. Apart from the downstream people’s livelihood is also at stake, because they primarily rely on natural ecology for their agriculture and other livelihood sources. Hence, probable apprehensions such as large-scale displacement as well as sense of insecurity and environmental consequences cannot be ignored.

Politics behind the Mega Dams in the North East

There is a lot going on in as far as the construction of dams is concerned. The issue is not just one, but many matters entangled with one another. Within this major issue there are many sub-issues which are a matter of concern. The Government of India had adopted a neo liberal policy which is capital intensive and people insensitive. Thus this development through dams is regarded by many as anti-people which is solely focused on benefiting the government. The issue becomes further more crucial because it deals with the northeastern part of India. The northeast is projected as potential power house due to the fact that the GOI is offered strong counter resistance for its development projects in other parts of the country. It has also a strategic dimension as China frequently claims Arunachal as a part of Chinese territory and also China is building a dam in the upstream area. The origin of the Brahmaputra and most other rivers is in the Chinese territory and they flow through Arunachal and Assam of India and finally touch Bangladesh. Hence three countries are involved, thus the strategic importance of the rivers is by large enhanced. Inside India again these rivers by and large pass through two or more states and hence can be characterised as inter-state rivers. And thus unfortunately, the downstream states like Assam are completely ignored in the context of both policy making and shared benefits.

In the context of the proposed mega power project, the plans are also perceived by the local people as essentially neo-colonial in nature because GOI is not addressing local genuine concerns and is bypassing the people’s interests in the name of national growth. Hence critics argue that it ignores the very foundation of equitable justice. The proposed power distribution centre for the project has been fixed outside the region which also causes centre-periphery dilemma as the people at the periphery perceive that the GOI is pursuing a neo-colonial policy bypassing local interests. Also, because of the popular resistance movements spear headed by AASU and KMSS, are fully supported by the civil society including eminent activists like Medha Patkar, the movement is gaining momentum but GOI seems adamant and is sticking to it neo-liberal agenda.

Towards Environmental Security and Sustainable Development

To come to a solution on this issue is a rather critical exercise, as it would require a reconciliation of many critical dimensions of the issue. What is required as of now, that is in the immediate context of mega dam construction is --- identifying the critical environmental concerns through a comprehensive environmental impact study covering all the proposed dams in the region including the Lower Subansiri Hydel Project. As a mere project specific study does not suffice and does not provide a holistic picture of anticipated impacts, hence a comprehensive study is the need of the hour. Secondly it is equally important to address the people’s concerns in a more apposite manner. The Government should keep in mind that development is definitely a priority; we need development for sure, but development for whom? Are the people right? Hence if a development project itself becomes the cause of anxiety for a people that what good is such development?

Thirdly, there should be Permanent Liability Act, back by proper rule of law in order to effectively address the people’s genuine concerns like alternate livelihood, resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaces in case of construction of such big dams. Such an act is imperative because only then will the misery and the woes of the displacees and the sufferers be properly addressed. Projects like mega dams can seriously alter and affect the lives as well as the patterns and sources of livelihood of the indigenous communities who rely to a great extent on community resources like river, land etc. only a Parliamentary legislation can protect their indigenous and human rights and put an end to such grievances of the lot who suffer in the name of such parochial development. Fourthly, there should be initiatives on behalf of the Regional water resource authority for utilizing natural water of north east India with a sustainable approach as these are interstate rivers. This can also provide some kind of a gradual solution to the proper use of water for power generation etc.

What is needed is a coming together of development, sustainability and people’s progress. In brief we need development which is sustainable and people sensitive. An approach which brings development parallel to environment and which also does not overlook the convenience of the people concerned. Therefore the linking of local needs with nation building needs a more amicable cooperative federal approach rather than absolutist central approach.

We as people of the 21st century should be foresighted. We need to think not only about our survival and development but also about the sustainability and development of the future generations, of the people who are yet to come. Hence our approach should be one which is based on --moving ahead on the pattern of -- thinking globally acting locally and living ecologically. Sustainable development, that is, accessing nature sustainably without destroying the needs of the future generations, should be our goal.

Post Return Vulnerabilities among the Displaced Women in Sri Lanka

Pakkeer Mohideen Mohamed Feroz
[Works at the Human Rights Centre for Social Justice, Sri Lanka]

Introduction

The protracted armed conflict in Sri Lanka between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ended in May 2009. The massive displacement of the population in the north of the country which took place in the final stages of the war, nearly 684,276 people have experience in displacement as IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers. Significant numbers of the people who were allowed to return to their areas of origin in late 2009 from the IDP camps in north and east. In western Sri Lanka, over 70,000 Muslim IDPs remained in displacement in Puttalam. 20 years after being forced out of the north and north-west by the LTTE in 1990. According to the government between 8,000 and 10,000 have returned; Many still faced poverty and difficult living conditions. With the end of conflict, the older generation of IDPs was keen to return but the younger generation, which had not known life outside the camps and the region, was uncertain about this option. The women who were living in IDP’s camps or return areas, their position in Sri Lankan society is extremely vulnerable because they are dependent on the state and humanitarian agencies, with little ability to determine the course of their own lives.

Causes and Consequences of Vulnerabilities

Armed Conflict: The armed conflict affected women and men differently. Men were the main casualties of the war. Of the survivors, women were the most affected by the loss of family members, death and disappearance of income earners, migration of young men and displacement. All women were affected by the conflict though they experienced different effects based on their ethnicity, location, class and socio-economic status.

Women’s physical mobility was restricted during the conflict. And the war has resulted in large numbers of female-headed households where women have to carry out the farming and fishing activities and support parents and children. Poverty and hardship have been increased among the women.

Displacement: A large majority of the women were living in camps and return villages in Sri Lanka have lived in displacement for 10 years or more under conditions in which basic dignity and fundamental rights are merely ideals. Also the ability of women to freely make decisions about their own best interests has been curtailed nearly completely. Privacy is difficult to obtain even for toileting and bathing even after the return. The Muslims evicted from the North were living as displaced persons in other parts of the country, some on their own and some in welfare camps, some were returned to their place of origin after 20 years. Sinhalese women and their families fled the conflict areas to the South, all of the displaced either having lost their spouses or children or livelihoods; Women’s responsibilities increased in the absence of income sources. Poverty, unemployment, alcoholism, sexual abuse, and domestic violence are widespread in the return areas. Due to cultural and social factors the victims are fear to report it or hide the abuses; it makes them more vulnerable even in post conflict situations. Even though, there are lacks of data available in this regard, it could be observed that more number of victims get treatment from the hospital in case of serious (for instant it could be observed in Batticaloa Teaching Hospital). The Refugees who returned Sri Lanka from India are helpless to rebuild their life after return beyond the end of war. The refugee women are more vulnerable while they lost their spouse, family members during flee by sea.

Loss of Income Source: Rural women’s lives are tied to the natural resource base. Collapse of the agricultural sector during the conflict impoverished rural women and their families.

For instant the people from Keerisuddan return village of Mannar District had half acre land which was provided by the government with land permit, under the settlement programme in 1977/78. It was highland crop lands and the people were engaging in crop cultivation, livestock activities and poultry, home gardening and wage laboring during the harvesting in suburb villages before the displacement. After the return, they lost all the income resources, now depending on dry ration for food for survival. Each family of the 35 families who are presently living in the village were provided Rs. 35,000.00 valuable livelihoods supportive items such as sewing machine, water pump, knife and axe by a NGO function under the Madhu Church. The women headed families mentioned that the dry ration will be stopped in coming end of April 2011, after that they will face difficulties getting food for their survival.

Women have limited livelihood options in return villages. Although their main occupation was home gardening and high land crop cultivation, inadequate profits and risk of crop failure made livestock rearing preferable. Except for preparation of cooked food and a few other income-generating activities such as dress making, women had few skills for self-employment activities. Lack of employment opportunities compel many women to depend on government and nongovernmental relief while Muslim women, especially from the welfare camps, increasingly looked to overseas contract employment as a survival strategy. Further, it could be seen that presently women were engaged in domestic workers for low wage.

The women were paid less than men for equal work and experienced difficulty in rising to supervisory positions. For instant, the women farmers who were engaged in paddy harvesting in Chenkalady and Kiran DS division of Batticaloa district have been paid half of the wage of male workers during the last harvesting. The reason was gender perception. The women farmers were paid 2000 LKR per acre while men received 4000LKR for same work.

On the other hand, it is obvious in print and electronic media about the abuses and hardship faced by the housemaid who went to Middle East for the foreign employment and domestic workers within the country ( there is a need to have a study on this issues).

Domestic violence: Physical and psychological abuse within the home resulted from increased incidences of alcoholism in return villages. There are some individual incidents took place in the return villages in Batticaloa district that the male family head used to have alcohol after selling dry ration given by the state or NGO. It caused to create domestic violence against women in return villages. Due to the cultural and social factors the women family members not interested in reporting to the law enforcement mechanisms. This kind of activities makes women more vulnerable in post return situations.

According to a field study carried out by a university student in Eastern Province, the women are under mental stress due to domestic violence, difficult living conditions and the burden of household management, loss of family members, displacement and loss of assets. In Vavunatheevu Division of Batticaloa district women identified men’s alcoholism as a major issue.

Women Headed Families: Women who became heads of households with the loss of their spouses are the most visible victims of the conflict. Abandonment, separa¬tion and divorce also resulted in female-headed households. The inability of the spouse to engage in income generation pushed women to become principal income earners.

For example there are 10.52% of population is women headed families in Keerisuddan return village of Madhu division of Mannar District. The 04 women headed families consisting 06 members are living in this village. Out of these families 75% of families do not have income resources. Only one young widow (27 years old) engages as a preschool teacher for a sum of 3500.00LKR monthly remuneration, others living with relatives and surviving by getting dry ration. There is no any income generating opportunity in this village. Because they lost their all income generation sources such as live stock, home gardening, poultry due to war and displacement. Also there is no paddy cultivation done due to displacement. Due to cultural / traditional habits no widows got married in second time. 02 young widow families out of 04 widow families (50%) do not have legal document for their land. Also all the widows do not have permanent shelters. But these families were given temporary shelters by a NGO.

Poor Access to the State Mechanism: Gradual subside of public service systems due to conflict and displacement and migration aggravate women’s problems. Government services are limited and there is acute shortage of public servants and medical officers in return areas. Local representatives are ineffective. The women had no legal protection against discrimination in the private sector, where they sometimes were paid less than men for equal work and experienced difficulty in rising to supervisory positions.

According to the returnee women in Mannar District, after the return they do not suffer any attacks, harassment or any other form of punitive actions. And all the returnees who were staying at village were given temporary shelters and they enjoying by getting this without discrimination. An adequate standard of food /dry ration were providing for all the returnees families even for short period after the return. And all the returnee persons have been able to reunite with family members if they choose to do so. They are able to exercise the right to participate fully and equally in public affairs in the villages.

Although, people in remote village do not have full and non discriminatory access to national and divisional protection mechanisms, such as services from Assistant District /Divisional Registrar, Social Service Officers and Medical Officer of Public Health. Further, children who born during the displacement at the security zone which were declared by the government in the LTTE control area in the time last war do not have access to personal documentation, which typically is needed to access public services.

Lack of Commitment of Public servants: The domestic violence, spousal abuses were prohibited by the law but it was not effectively enforced. The systematic violence, discrimination during the public service was also thought to be widespread. However, enforcement of the law was not effective. While the protective measures taken by the State party for women who migrate from Sri Lanka, these women remain vulnerable to illegal employment agencies, and that many work in exploitative situations and experience violence and abuse at the hands of their employers.

Lack of knowledge among the Women : Most of the return areas were under controlled of the LTTE for two to three decades, thus there are bare about available legal protection systems in the country among the women in return area. There is a need to make aware the women & men on gender awareness, rights based approaches, legal protection systems. There is a requirement to work toward women’s participation in local governance and local level representatives to ensure attention by political leaders and government officers.

Conclusion

Overall, the conflict changed women’s circumstances by they have assumed roles in sharp contrast to notions of femininity and cultural values by becoming of the breadwinner of the family. Although, they are negatively affected by the poor condition of access roads, minimal transport facilities, inadequate housing, poor water supply and sanitation and limited access to health care services. The rehabilitation of infrastructure facilities and restoration of services will enable women and their families to improve their quality of life. And all programmes and projects in returnee area should include mandatory provision for a gender responsive strategy to mobilize women, overcome constraints that limit their participation and improve their capacity.

Land in the Eastern Province: Politics, Policies and Conflict

Excerpts from a Report by Bhavani Fonseka and Mirak Rahim (Centre for Policy Alternatives)


Most individuals in Sri Lanka will identify land as a fundamental element that defines their life. Ownership and control of land, including the location of and the extent of land owned indicate a person’s wealth and social status. The respect that flows from this has a number of other repercussions including access to schools and marriage prospects. Secure land rights imply economic security and provide surety for loans and thereby facilitate income generation and improve livelihoods. In Sri Lanka, land has been a critical factor in the ethnic conflict that intensified and resulted in the outbreak of a war that spanned over two decades. State aided land settlement projects under development and irrigation schemes, the failure in addressing key land and development related issues, violence against particular communities that resulted in the abandonment of properties, and the establishment of ad hoc security restrictions in areas all contributed to the increasing tensions that ultimately led to the outbreak of war in Sri Lanka. Over the course of the war, the land problem was exacerbated by increased displacement of entire communities from their land, occupation of land belonging to private individuals by the military and LTTE, arbitrary seizure of land belonging to Muslims by the LTTE in the North and East, the establishment of High Security Zones (HSZ), Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and the loss of documentation. Although discussions on land and related issues and attempts to resolve disputes at a community level did run concurrent to the conflict and heightened during the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and post-tsunami period, there were no concrete steps taken by the State or any other actor to fully address the root causes of grievances, provide sustainable alternatives and introduce modalities that could have reduced some of the underlying problems and disputes.

In a post-war context, with the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, the Government, political parties, civil society and citizens at large are faced with an unprecedented opportunity to address the root causes of the ethnic conflict and long-term grievances faced by different communities. Although there is an opportunity to address a fundamental issue such as land through looking at both the constitutional, legal and policy framework and the problems on the ground, very few initiatives have been put forward by the different actors. Nearly a year after the end of the war, with two national elections held and the current Government enjoying an overwhelming majority in Parliament, this is clearly the moment to unveil concrete proposals for constitutional and political reform and a roadmap that introduces changes to the current set up. There are, however, unconfirmed reports of impending constitutional reform including changes to the Thirteenth Amendment and the role and powers of the Provincial Councils. Whether such a framework will guarantee the rights of all citizens or only a certain group or none at all, are yet to be seen. What is noteworthy is that though a significant time period has passed since the end of the conflict, there has been little public information, discussion or debate on Government proposals for possible ways forward. In the current post-war climate, there is no information as to whether the numerous HSZs will be dismantled; whether all IDPs will be able to return to their land; and furthermore, whether there would be a restitution and compensation policy. The lack of transparency and due process with regard to Government procedure into the post-war context are issues of grave concern and need to be reversed.

The present report explores the complex web of land issues in the Eastern Province. At the outset, CPA states that this report only highlights key land issues in the Eastern Province in the post war context and is not a historic study of the use, management and control of land in the area. The specific time period in focus spans 2007-2010. It provides an overview of the situation soon after the Eastern Liberation to that of the post war context in Sri Lanka and the status of land within a three year period. The Eastern Province was militarily liberated by government forces in 2007, following which the region has seen a host of developments related to land. The military liberation of the East and the resulting process of normalization have provided the context for the return of the displaced and land reclamation, the provision of resettlement, reconstruction and development assistance by humanitarian agencies, donors and the Government. This has had a dramatic impact on the quality of life for civilians, even while they continue to deal with the long-term repercussions of the war, including the loss of lives, destruction and damage to property, the loss of livelihoods and incomes, and the disruption of community ties. Some of the critical land issues and problems in the Eastern Province and their impact on larger political and governance issues are highlighted in the report. For instance, access to land is a critical aspect to land use and control. In the East, security restrictions and military occupation have somewhat curtailed full enjoyment of land rights. Furthermore, obstacles to accessing land have resulted in disputes and grievances which if left unresolved can lead to a multitude of problems. Another complicating factor is the manner in which the subject of land has been approached by both state and non-state actors to fuel as well as mitigate ethnic tensions, to facilitate development projects and economic growth, to develop particular communities, dispossess and displace others, establish new administrative divisions and settlements and change ethnic demographics - all of which have had long term implications.

Land as a highly politicised and ethnicised issue was an underlying cause of the war. The report examines the post-war context of new land settlements and land grabbing, landlessness, encroachment on state land, illegal land sales and the implications of the loss or destruction of land documentation in the East. These have all aggravated issues of ownership, access and control of land between land users/owners. There have been reports of communal violence breaking out as a result of land disputes. There are also sporadic reports of intimidation and even assaults, indicating the real potential for violence over land disputes. A number of land disputes were reported to CPA some of which were described as land colonization, but these are claims that CPA could not verify, even though there was a significant level of political and military involvement in some of these cases. Nonetheless, CPA repeatedly encountered a strong perception among many of the interviewees at the community, district and administrative levels of State actors being partial to particular ethnic communities when dealing with land. Hence even when the State is acting in good faith in advocating particular policies there is strong mistrust and fear on the ground. Rather than ignoring these fears the Government needs to ensure greater transparency, information and participation in order to address these perceptions.

The present report also explores the constitutional, legal and policy framework that governs land in the region. The issue of land is further compounded by the different levels of government involved - the Centre, province and district and the powers vested in them. Although the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution was introduced with the goal of devolving powers to the Provincial Councils including in the area of land, as discussed in the report, the Central Government overrides provincial council decision-making and policy implementation on land and continues to be the major actor. Even though the number of ministries, including those dealing with land, has been cut in the current cabinet, there continue to be multiple actors at the different levels of administration, especially in the case of the Centre with several departments and authorities overseeing various issues related to land. The lack of progress made in resolving land disputes and the inability to introduce and amend much needed laws and policies demonstrates the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of a bureaucracy and a multiplicity of actors with some overlapping functions. Though CPA has met several government officials who within their limited mandates are attempting to address the grievances of the communities and land conflicts, a common problem documented by the CPA team is the inertia and lack of initiative among some senior political appointees and the disturbing trend of the high levels of politicisation. Though this is not a new phenomenon regarding land and the Eastern Province, the provision of secure land entitlements and development requires that this systematic problem is addressed without delay. A fundamental problem is the lack of political will and political imagination to address the ground realities and grievances of the affected communities and to engage in policy reform. The report recommends possible solutions to the problems and gaps highlighted. It calls for reform at the constitutional, legal and policy levels. While the issue of power sharing and a political solution needs to be addressed and any solution has to grapple with the subject of land, there are areas which the Government can move on without delay, including the strengthening of the powers of the Eastern Provincial Council (EPC) and consulting the EPC on key land related issues. Despite the twenty year lag, it is not too late to constitute the National Land Commission (NLC) which would strengthen the process of establishing a fair land policy. Developing a policy framework on land could be advantageous for long term development provided that it ensures greater transparency and inclusiveness in decision making and formulation of policies. Existing land related legislation has to be amended, including the Land Development Ordinance and Prescription Ordinance. Specific initiatives to provide land for the landless as discussed in this report or compensation and restitution to those whose land and property has been affected by the war, need to be strengthened, taking into consideration the issues on the ground which are set out in the following chapters.

In responding to the problems on the ground, CPA recommends a two-track approach of developing a policy framework and establishing/strengthening community-oriented mechanisms and processes. Land disputes and conflicts which have intensified in the post-war context, probably in relation to an increased feeling of personal security, improved freedom of movement and a greater number of returns, need to be addressed through clarification of the legal status of individual cases. This also requires community-oriented and mediated solutions, be they land kachcheris, land task forces or mediation boards/committees.

The Government, political parties and bureaucrats also need to ensure that governance is made more effective and sensitive to community needs. Existing issues such as the confusion over divisional boundaries for instance need to be clarified so as to improve administration. In dealing with issues of military restrictions such as high security zones and occupation of individual properties that obstruct civilian access, there has to be a commitment to review security requirements in the post-war context, and accordingly provide a time line for withdrawal. There should be rent schemes for continuing occupation and compensation/restitution in the case of permanent occupation which should be kept to a minimum. While the cases and issues discussed in the report are very specific to the Eastern Province, these are not isolated issues and trends peculiar to the East alone. These issues and trends have resonance in other parts of the country, but more so in other conflict affected areas such as the North. The latter is presently going through a phase of rebuilding and development and will face similar as well as unique problems with land. If ‘the Eastern model’ is to be used in the North, best practices and solutions in the East need first to be developed and implemented before they can be replicated elsewhere. For Sri Lanka to move forward in a post war context, where fundamental grievances including land issues are addressed there needs to be larger political and constitutional reform. An underlying theme in the report is that this and the policies and programmes it produces must be underpinned by a people-centric approach – one that is pivotally representative of the needs of the people in the area. Such a shift will not only addresses grievances of the affected communities but could also mitigate conflict and ethnic tensions.

Monday, May 30, 2011

Sahana Basavapatna
[Lawyer, New Delhi]

The question of a legal framework for refugee care in South Asia has long occupied academics, activists and lawyers in the South Asian sub-continent. While the discussion and debates in the highest circles have lead to very little in terms of a tangible legal framework, a number of developments, within the South Asian sub-continent have equally lead to or is very likely to lead to far reaching changes in the way refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons and “illegal” immigrants are viewed, cared for and managed. Some of these include the UNHCR’s Urban Refugee Policy of 2009 that will have far reaching implications in the possibilities it offers and the limitations in its application in countries in South Asia, the Unique Identity Project, now renamed as “Aadhar” in India, and some other lesser known executive orders that impact refugees on a daily basis.

Yet, the combination of the absence of refugee law, ad-hoc administrative policies and diversity among refugees provides a veritable landscape to understand why such a law is yet to be passed by Parliaments in South Asia, what dictates such an ad-hoc policy, the space available for refugee groups protect themselves by remaining “illegal” and yet deal on a constant basis with the inadequacies in the law.

Towards this end, this edition of Refugee Watch Online brings together diverse contributions, significant news articles and legal developments which reflect the complexities of forced migration in South Asia.

While 2011 was marked by commemorating the 60th anniversary of the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (July 28) and the 50th anniversary of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (August 30), as the contributions in the May edition of Refugee Watch Online show, there was not much by the way to celebrate for refugees. While one appreciates that the international refugee protection regime has withstood the test of time, politics and contexts, for a large number of people on the run, these instruments of protection have not alleviated their situation.

The first contribution in the May edition is a short note written by Somali refugees protesting before UNHCR in Delhi in the second week of May 2011, reiterating their concerns that for a large number of Somalis in India, much has remained the same, in terms of protection. Pertinent to mention in this context, is that the demands of the Somalis is unfortunately not new. The Somali refugees in Delhi continue to face insecurity and lack of protection, despite some of them living in India for over a decade. This protest is yet another reminder that Somalis, like the African refugee community, remains a forgotten people, in India.

The second contribution is an article titled “Untangling Nepal-China ties: The politics of Tibetan refugees in Nepal” written by Boris Markhampa and Susan Appleyard and is an analysis of the treatment of Tibetan nationals seeking asylum in Nepal in the context of Nepal – China relationship. It seeks to show how the Tibetan community in exile in Nepal has been used as a bargaining chip in Nepal’s relations with China and what the ramification of this unstated policy for Tibetan nationals have been.

The third article is a contribution by Prof. Tricia Redeker Hepner, Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University of Tennesee that focuses on how migration from Eritrea in contemporary times needs to be understood in the context of the existing regime of refugee protection. In making clear links between the political situation in Eritria and the exodus of a large number of people who see migration to the “West” as the only way to find a way out of the political turmoil, Prof. Redeker Hepner calls into question the effectiveness of the refugee protection mechanism. RWO has taken permission to re-publish this article, which was initially published in Counter Punch on April 22, 2011. This seemed to us to be an apt article for this edition, given that it makes very pertinent observations about the forced migration policy and its inability to deal with questions relating to protection of refugees. Prof. Redeker Hepner notes in conclusion that through the Eritrean example, she seeks to “illustrate the complexity and global scope of human rights dilemmas that structure refugees’ lives, and the failures of institutions, policies and laws designed to manage them as technical problems rather than protect them as human beings”. It cannot be gainsaid that South Asia offers adequate examples of this complexity and therefore the uniqueness of forced migration in the sub-continent needs to be studied for the answers it may provide for better understanding of the phenomenon.

Followers of developments in forced migration in South Asia would be aware of around 64 Pakistani citizens who protested in Jantar Mantar, in New Delhi in 2008 by burning their passports and claimed refugee status in India for fear of persecution on religious grounds. The Pakistani nationals belong to the Mehdi Foundation International, the followers of which have reportedly been persecuted for their religious beliefs. The Pakistani nationals approached the judicial system in India and filed a Writ Petition seeking directions from the Delhi High Court that their application for asylum be taken up by the Government of India. In November 2009/January 2010, the Government of India rejected their application for refugee status and by an order dated December 2010, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, headed by the Hon’ble Chief Justice Deepak Mishra directed that UNHCR process the applications and until the UNHCR decides the applications, none of the asylum seekers be deported. The Order of the Delhi High Court dated December 2, 2010 is reproduced in this edition and a few remarks may be made in giving a context to this case. The December 2010 order is illustrative of the number of aspects of refugee protection and processes that is significant to India. This case follows many others decisions where the Judiciary has shown consideration to refugees arriving in India, in the absence of which, refugees normally find themselves confronting the government which oftentimes makes arbitrary and ad-hoc decisions. Having been rejected refugee status by the Government of India in November 2009, the Pakistani Nationals sought directions that they be allowed to apply to UNHCR for refugee status. The Court observed that this should be allowed, given that the Government of India rejected refugee status by a non-speaking and general order “passed in violation of principles of natural justice”. Applications were subsequently made to UNHCR, who has granted them refugee status. However, the 64 Pakistani nationals will be resettled in the next three months as they do not have the right to live in India as refugees. While the settlement to a third country is processed, RWO is informed that any assistance for the 19 women, 11 children and the elderly among the 64 individuals would be appreciated.

In the section on News, two news articles are reproduced in keeping with the theme of this edition. The first news clipping is about Assamese of Chinese origin, who face a unique situation in India. Chinese nationals who originally were brought to work in the tea plantations in Assam at the beginning of the 18th century eventually settled down in Assam and married local Assamese residents. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 lead to a large number of these people were arrested and sent off to a camp in Deoli, Rajasthan, from where they were eventually deported to China. One of the few people who has conducted extensive research on this issue is Dr. Rita Chowdhury, an Assamese author and the recipient of the Sahitya Academy Award. RWO intends to follow up on this issue in the forthcoming editions of RWO.

The second news article, in contrast to the first, information that is now too common in the mainstream media and yet, in the context of the law – or the lack of it and the historical connections of India with its neighbours, telling of how borders make people with an identity in law. This news article talks about Ramesh Gayen and many others like him, who “don’t have any sort of recognition even after living in a country for over 40 years are not “qualified enough” to discuss politics”. The context for this news article is the recently concluded Assembly elections in West Bengal. The article states that people like Gayen who migrated from Bangladesh in the 1970s are “yet to be recognized as refugees or granted citizenship”. That India’s obsession with the Bangladeshi immigration and “infiltration” is alive is reflected yet again in the experiences of people like Gayen who continue to be non-citizens in the nations imagination.

The section on Reports includes a summary report of a workshop and a conference held in March 2011.

A workshop on Borders and Forced Migration was jointly organized by the Centre for Refugee Studies, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University and the Calcutta Research Group on March 29, 2011 and focused on statelessness, migration due to resource crisis and the ramifications of forced migration on women. A conference titled “Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons in India and her Neighbours” was organized by The Other Media in Delhi on March 30th and 31st 2011. It sought to examine the status of refugees in India in the context of the existing legal regime – both national and international. Both the forums, interestingly, focused, among other issues, on the question of statelessness and the risks, dangers and dilemmas that people face in falling under the category of “stateless” in India.

The May edition of RWO ends with an announcement of the Koshish contest, currently being organized by UNHCR in Delhi, under the “Do 1 thing for Refugees” as part of the commemoration of World Refugee Day, in June 2011.

We hope you enjoy reading this edition of RWO. Please feel free to send us comments, critiques or get in touch at refugeewatchonline@gmail.com

Somali Refugees Protest before UNHCR Delhi May 2011

[The following is a note sent by representatives of Somali refugee community in Delhi in the context of their protests before the UNHCR office in Delhi. The note is carried here with minimal grammatical and formatting editing; no changes have been made in the language of the text]

Somalia is a country located in east Africa. It is a country where there is no functioning government for the last two decades .There is 100 thousands of Somali refugees who flee to the neighboring countries like Kenya and Yemen, a fraction of those refugees came to India.

On the other hand Somali refugees living in New Delhi are the third largest community registered from the UNHCR after Afghani’s and Burmese.

Some of the Somali refugees who live here are staying 20 years while some stays 10 years, remaining arrives last five years.

The UNHCR provides for refugees three durable solutions which are as follows.
1.Local Integration
2.Voluntary repatriation
3.Resettlement in third country

The Somali Refugees don’t receive the above solutions.

1.The UNHCR officers told us integration is not possible for us that is why we can’t get resident permits and work permits .All of us are having UNHCR certificates and recognized as refugees but no rights and no benefits. The UNHCR used to give monthly payment to the neediest people of our community and recently they stop it. Those people were elders and widow women with children.

2.There is a lot of people who face difficult situation’s and request from the UNHCR voluntarily repatriation to go back to their country and face persecution there. The UNHCR reply was we didn’t bring you to India so we can’t return you back.

3.The third and the last option is resettlement in a third country. The UNHCR considers few cases of our community compared to the number of Somali refugees living in India. We know resettlement is limited but we were requesting from the UNHCR for the last years to have number of resettlement quota proportionally compared to the number of Somali refugees.

4.The Question we are asking the international community, India, donor countries and UNHCR office in Geneva is.

Since we are living in India for a long period without rights and assistance and now the senior officers of the UNHCR tell us to be prepared to stay here for the coming 15 years without rights and assistance. How it is possible for us to survive in such kind of situation.

Untangling Nepal-China Ties: The politics of Tibetan refugees in Nepal

Boris Markhampa and Susan Appleyard

The legitimacy of Nepal’s Peoples’ Movement stemmed from the Movement’s demand for the return of democratic rights which had been destroyed by the then-king of Nepal, Gyanendra. For more than one year human rights groups, political parties and a large portion of the general population took to the streets using human rights slogans to demand regime change in Nepal. Memories of their trampled banners reading “Restore Democracy” or “Return Freedom of Expression” left behind as they were brutally detained by the Nepal security forces are easily recalled. By the end of April 2006, their struggle had succeeded and many civil and political rights were soon restored in the country.

On March 10, 2011, Tibetans living in Nepal were once again beaten and arbitrarily detained when they attempted to peacefully gather to mark Uprising Day, the anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan rebellion against China’s rule in Tibet. Some Tibetans were arrested from protests, others from the streets near Boudha; more still were denied freedom of movement as they attempted to reach prayer meetings. Ten days later, the Tibetan community was denied the right to take part in the election of the new Kalon Tripa, Prime Minister of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, with Nepal’s security forces seizing the ballot boxes just hours before the poll was due to close.

This begs the question – was the People’s Movement seeking to restore rights for all in Nepal? Since March 2008, at the behest of the Chinese Government, each of Nepal’s three major political parties, Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the UML, have successively flouted the rights they struggled so hard for by repeatedly cracking down on Nepal’s Tibetan community. These political actors who struggled for a return of democracy and civil and political rights to Nepal during the People’s Movement should question if the Nepal they struggled for is a country that so easily gives up constitutionally protected rights at the request of a powerful neighbor.

The Chinese Government’s interference in Nepal’s treatment of Tibetan refugees can be demonstrated over decades of Nepal’s political history. The last decade has seen a steady escalation in the Chinese Government’s successful attempts to buy Nepal’s suppression of Tibetan’s rights. Since 2008, this has increased, as is demonstrated by the recent visit of China’s Army Chief, General Chen Bingde, to Nepal and the granting of military aid valued at 20 million dollars to the Nepal Army. The Chinese Government is investing heavily in numerous countries around the world, however, in Nepal this investment has unique impacts. The Nepali Government appears to feel obliged to repay the Chinese Government’s aid and investment with the suppression of Tibetans in Nepal and the effective denial of entry to Tibetans attempting to leave China. As the Chinese Government becomes increasingly fearful of even the slightest expression of dissent within Tibet, the Tibetans in Nepal will feel a corresponding squeeze on their rights and freedoms.

Intersections of Tibetan and Nepali History and Culture

As Tibet shares a vast border with Nepal along the greater Himalayan range to the immediate north, it is only natural that the two countries share many cultural practices and traditions. Almost all of Nepal’s ethnic communities along this border practice Tibetan Buddhism, wear traditional Tibetan costumes and speak languages that could be considered Tibetan dialects. Many of their forefathers are from Tibet; for example, the grandfather of one of the author’s relatives currently living in Nepal’s Namche Bazar, Solukhumbu District is from Tibet. Among Nepal’s many World Heritage sites are several holy Buddhist shrines including Boudhanath and Swayambunath Stupas. Kathmandu Valley has hundreds of Buddhist temples and Tibetans believe that great guru Padmasambhava meditated in Pharping, in western Kathmandu. Relations go as far back as the seventh century, when the Tibetan king Songtsen Gampo married Nepali princess Bhrikuti.

The Recent Arrival of Tibetans in Nepal

Due to the entrenched and extensive geographical and cultural ties, many Tibetans chose to travel to Nepal during the 1959 exodus from Tibet in the early years of the Chinese occupation. Many of the 100,000 Tibetans who fled the country, used Nepal as transit point and soon continued their journey on to India, to where His Holiness the Dalai Lama had fled, and where the Indian Government assisted them, granting them permission to stay and political space to establish the Tibetan government-in-exile. However, due to the cultural and historic ties between Nepal and Tibet many of those who fled Tibet decided to stay in Nepal, settling in various parts of the country including foreign assisted settlements such as in Jalsa, Kathmandu, and Pokhara. Donors supported the newly arrived Tibetan communities to establish Tibetan carpet factories in their settlements to sustain their livelihood. The carpet industry has had a significant impact on Nepal’s economy and in the following decades became a top industry.

In parallel to the Tibetan refugee community establishing themselves in Kathmandu and elsewhere, a Tibetan resistance movement comprising of voluntary members of the then Chushi Gangdruk resistance force and other young volunteers, with support from the CIA, established a resistance army force in Mustang District of Nepal and operated for almost 14 years. Around 1974, they were finally dissolved as a result of suppression by the Nepali Government under pressure from the Chinese Government and the sudden cutting of CIA support due to the formal establishment of US-China relations. While many of the resistance force were resettled in parts of Nepal, some refused to surrender to Nepali forces and were imprisoned; others committed suicide and some went to India. This history feeds a misguided fear that Tibetans may return to violent means of resistance against the Chinese Government.

Since the large influx of Tibetans in the 1960s, around 3,000 Tibetans per year seek security from Chinese-dominated Tibet by undertaking the dangerous and expensive journey over the mountains and into Nepal, from where most travel on to Dharamsala. For example, in October 2006, a group of 41 Tibetan refugees including two guides arrived safely at the Tibetan Refugee Transit Center in Kathmandu after escaping shootings by Chinese Border Security forces on the morning of 30th September 2006. According to an eye witness, Kelsang Namtso, a 17 year old nun from Driru County of Tibet was shot dead just before the Nangpa La Pass and Kunsang Namgyal, a 20 year old boy from Kandze was hit by bullets on his leg and he could not escape. He and 30 other Tibetans including 14 boys under the age of 18 were arrested by soldiers wearing camouflage uniforms. In addition to this case, there are hundreds of confirmed reports of arrests, looting, beating and deportation at the border as Tibetans trying to flee Tibet both by Chinese and Nepali Police.

Life for Tibetans in Nepal

The nearly 20,000 Tibetans living in Nepal have suffered decades of state imposed restrictions on some political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights including limits on state-provided education and health care and also employment restrictions. Their freedom of movement within the country is also restricted. Despite many of them being born in Nepal they are constitutionally not entitled to citizenship and cannot vote. They are one of Nepal’s many vulnerable minority communities. Within the 20,000 strong community, approximately 6,000 are not officially recognized and hold no legal papers. As a result their situation is even more precarious, as they are vulnerable to being viewed as illegal immigrants, potentially prosecuted as such and deported to China. This situation is a result of the Nepal Government’s decision in 1989 to stop issuing refugee identify cards to Tibetans, though allowing Tibetans to continue to enter the country and live in Nepal, effectively denying Tibetan asylum seekers a safe refuge. The fear of deportation is not without basis; in May 2003 Nepal deported 18 Tibetans to China without regard for due process on charges of travelling without valid documents.

Fear of confrontation with Nepali authorities and potential deportation is a constant source of trauma underlying the daily lives of Tibetans in Nepal. The Nepal authorities used this to their advantage during protests by Tibetans in March 2008, when they began to threaten even those holding refugee identity cards with deportation. For example, the Kathmandu Chief District Officer summoned and interrogated a Tibetan monk Tenzin Jamphel of Drubthok/Saraswati Monastery in Swayambhu, who was born in Nepal to Tibetan refugee parents and holds a Tibetan refugee identity card. He was forced to sign a paper and threatened that his Refugee Identity Card would be taken away and he would be returned to Tibet if he took part in any future demonstrations.

The Rights of Tibetans in Nepal

Tibetans, like everyone else have the fundamental right to seek asylum from persecution and the corresponding right, to not be returned to a country where they are likely to be persecuted. Furthermore, Tibetans living in Nepal, like all who reside inside Nepal, are guaranteed the rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, among many other rights. Nepal’s own constitution guarantees freedom of expression and peaceful assembly to all persons and these rights are clearly spelled out in internationally agreed laws on civil and political rights and refugee rights and in customary law. Derogation of these rights can only take place under extreme circumstances and where an imminent, specific and serious threat can be linked to the speech that is being restricted. The Nepal Government has never demonstrated such a threat exists and the Supreme Court of Nepal has on more than one occasion found no grounds for restrictions on or arrests of Tibetans. By not guaranteeing safe sanctuary to Tibetans seeking asylum, Nepal is in violation of its own Constitution and its international legal obligations.

Given that the Government of Nepal is unwilling to grant Tibetans in Nepal the usual rights afforded to refugees, it could be viewed as surprising that the Government of Nepal has not allowed the Tibetan community to take advantage of the US Government offer made in September 2005 to resettle 5,000 Tibetan refugees. This denial of settlement in a third country, forces one to question what motivates the Nepal Government to essentially keep the Tibetan community prisoner within Nepal’s boarders?

Nepal-China Ties

Successive Governments of Nepal have always maintained a “pro-China” position, stating that “anti-China” activities would not be carried out on Nepali soil. This position deepened during the rule of former king Gyanendra. For example, immediately preceding king Gyanendra's assumption of direct control of Nepal in February 2005, the Office of the Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama was closed by the Nepal Government. On the following day the Chinese Government welcomed the closure. When the king assumed directly control of the country, the Chinese Government stated that it was an internal matter for Nepal. The king was using Nepal’s Tibetan community as a bargaining chip in the hope that the Chinese Government would protect him from international condemnation. As his regime continued to falter and India’s support swung clearly in the direction of an alliance between Nepal’s political parties and the Community Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M), in October 2005 the king made a further gesture to China by halting the issuing of exit permits to Tibetan refugees, bring a complete halt to the “gentleman’s agreement” that had for decades allowed Tibetans to transit Nepal on their way to Dharamsala and third countries for permanent resettlement. This significant decision by the King of Nepal, immediately followed the United States offer to resettle 5,000 Tibetan refugees from Nepal.

The king’s hope that an alliance with the Chinese Government would help him to maintain a position of direct rule within Nepal was short lived. By May 2006, the Seven Party Alliance was leading an All Party Government, which was broadly accepted as democratic and by the end of the year, Nepal was a republic and the majority of civil and political rights denied under the king’s regime were reinstated. These same rights however, were not to be granted to Nepal’s Tibetan refugees. While the All Party Government did resume the issuing of exit permits, it did not allow the resettlement of the 5,000 refugees proposed by the US. The role of the Chinese Government in this is clear; in July 2006 during a visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister, he stated that some serious thinking needed to be undertaken by the Nepali authorities in regard to their decision to provide travel documents to the 5,000 Tibetan refugees at the same time and indicated that the Chinese Government would increase its aid to Nepal by 50 percent. Despite democratic elections in Nepal in 2008, the 5,000 refugees remain in Nepal, denied their basic rights in a country they are not allowed to leave.

In 2007, the All Party Government took the unprecedented step of deregistering the Bhota Welfare Office, a local organization assisting Tibetans living in Nepal. The organization challenged its deregistration in the Supreme Court of Nepal and during the final hearing on the case in February 2008, the government attorney handed a confidential file to the judge, to which the organization's lawyers were denied access. The Supreme Court then issued an oral judgment that the organization could not be re-registered.

Deepening China-Nepal Ties and Intensified Repression of Tibetan’s in Nepal

In March 2008 as the Olympic torch was greeted globally by protests as it made its way around the world to its final destination in Beijing, the repression of Tibetans in Nepal reach a climax. The dramatic civil unrest across the Tibetan plateau around the same time further inflamed Chinese Government fear and subsequently lead to increased repression of Tibetans in Nepal. Many eye witness accounts of the bloody crackdown that followed the protests in Tibet have been widely reported. It was considered one of the largest uprisings by Tibetans against Chinese occupation since 1959 when His Holiness the Dalai Lama fled Tibet.

In response to the protests in Tibet the Chinese Government has significantly increased its pressure on Nepal to suppress Tibetan dissent. This increase is evidenced by the increase in statements by the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal in 2008, documented evidence of direct behind the scenes pressure of Chinese diplomats for the detention of Tibetans in early 2008, the presence of Chinese security officials operating on along the Nepal side of the border and the restriction on access to areas around Mount Everest base camp prior to the assent of the Olympic torch. As a result the treatment of Tibetans by Nepali authorities has taken a more sinister turn toward what could be described as persecution of a minority. On 10 March 2008, Tibetans around the world exercised their right to freedom of assembly and expression by gathering to mark “Uprising Day”, the anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan rebellion against rule of the Chinese Government in Tibet. In most countries their rights were respected and their protests went off without a hitch. In Nepal over 150 arrests were made, many using unnecessary force, and around 15 Tibetans were beaten inside Boudha Police Station in Kathmandu.

What began as a normal celebration of Uprising Day in Nepal developed in the days that followed into regular mass protests by Tibetans who said they were compelled to continue to speak out for the protection of their brothers and sisters inside Tibet. It is very natural for a human to cry for help when a family member is in danger. Most of the Tibetans living in Nepal have relatives or a family member still inside Tibet, as such via direct links many were receiving firsthand information of the bloody suppression in Tibet. As the Nepal police failed to sufficiently suppress the protests, or perhaps because of their violent attempt to suppress, the protests appeared across the world’s media. The Chinese Government was embarrassed not only by the world attention but also by the protesters “knocking” on the door of the Chinese Embassy in Nepal every day over a month of continuous protests. Despite continuing suggestions by the Chinese Government and even by Tibet analysts, that these protests were part of an organized mass dissent, the authors who observed every protest over a six week period firmly believe they were witnessing an unorganized expression of grief and concern by the many Tibetans living in Nepal who had relatives in Tibet who saw no other way to protect their loved ones. Allegations that Tibetan leaders of the various organizations such as the Tibetan Youth Congress, also known as the Tibetan Youth Club, or the Tibetan Women’s Association were organizing and leading the protests have no basis, except in the case of the two or three specific protests that took place among the dozens of protests in early 2008.

Between 10 March and 18 July 2008 over 8,350 arbitrary arrests of Tibetans were made by the Nepal Police and the Armed Police Force. Many people were arrested on multiple occasions. Excessive and unnecessary use of force during arrest was extremely common. Accompanying these arrests was a pattern of injuries resulting from beatings during arrest by the Nepal Police and Armed Police Force combined with restrictions on medical treatment to detainees, sexual assault of Tibetan women during arrest, various forms of ill treatment in detention and the use of threats, intimidation and harassment to instill fear in the community. Restrictions on movement of Tibetans within Kathmandu were also imposed. The threat of deportation was so widespread during this period that it was difficult to not view it as a state sponsored method of creating fear within the Tibetan community.

Small groups of Tibetans also found themselves detained and facing charges under Nepal’s Public Security Act (PSA) – a law previously used by the former-king to detain many of the political leaders now in power in Nepal. The argument that Nepal’s “one China” policy could be used as grounds for detention has been rejected by the Supreme Court. Nepal’s Supreme Court has ruled that the detention of Tibetans under the PSA was illegal and ordered them released immediately. Thus the continued detention of Tibetan’s by Nepali authorities places the Government in clear breach of the orders of its own Supreme Court.

This pattern of restrictions, arrests and beatings has continued in Nepal since 2008 and has heightened at moments of cultural importance such as the Dalai Lama’s birthday and Tibetan National Uprising Day. For example, during celebrations of the Dalai Lama’s birthday in July 2010, over 250 Tibetans were arrested by the Nepali authorities. The continuing arrests and intimidation of Nepal’s Tibetan community are illegal actions by the Government of Nepal and are in breach of Nepal’s obligations under international law.

Life inside Tibet

Chinese Government suppression of any sort of Tibetan unrest in Tibet goes unabated; news of arrests, detention, torture and deaths of Tibetans appear regularly in media. This direct and aggressive suppression adds to the already complex and difficult situation in which Tibetans live their daily lives under Chinese Government rule. Tibetans reaching Nepal report restrictions on their freedom to practice their own culture, livelihood and religion and to use their own language; the continued destruction of Tibet’s natural environment to extract natural resources; discrimination in education, employment, and labour standards; and restrictions on reproductive rights and health care. As a direct result Tibetans continue to be forced to leave their home and seek a more secure life elsewhere.

The Chinese Government’s significant tightening of Tibet’s border with Nepal and pressure on the Nepali Government to do the same since 2008 has seriously impinged on Tibetans’ right to seek asylum. In March 2008, during a visit to the Zhangmu border one of the author’s directly witnessed several Chinese people in plain clothes on Nepali soil in the presence of uniformed Nepali security officials following their news crew. One of the Chinese people later stood in front of the camera lens when their photographer was trying to take video footage of the Friendship Bridge. A reliable local source from Zhangmu, Tibet has confirmed that the Chinese Government provides financial incentives to local Tibetans on the Tibet side of border for vigilant reporting of fleeing Tibetans and bounties for the capture of a Tibetan attempting to flee. The Chinese Government also reportedly provides bounties to Nepali policemen when they hand over a fleeing Tibetan to Chinese officials. Despite the risk involved in crossing the border, Tibetans continue to attempt to enter Nepal with 770 reaching the safety of the UN-run Tibetan Refugee Transit Center in Kathmandu in 2010.

Untangling China-Nepal Ties

Pressure from the Chinese Government on the Government of Nepal is very clear. In May 2008, amid the protests by Tibetans in Nepal the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal said: “We want the Nepali establishment to take severe penal actions against those involved in anti-China activities in Nepal”. If you consider the financial aid the Chinese Government provides to Nepal, it is difficult to imagine the Government of Nepal not following these clear instructions of their powerful neighbor.

One would be forgiven for thinking the Nepali Government is in a difficult position trying to manage a complex relationship with a hugely powerful neighboring country, this line of thinking may generate some tolerance for the Nepal Government’s suppression of Tibetan’s rights. However, when given the opportunity to begin to rid itself of this problematic refugee population via the US Government’s offer to take 5,000 of the refugees, the Nepal government denied them permission to leave the country. Why would the Nepal Government not take advantage of this offer?

The answer lies in the complex web of political and economic benefits Nepal stands to gain while it can leverage control of Tibetans in Nepal against economic and political support from the Chinese Government. As such, the Chinese Government appears to continue to buy the effective sealing of the Nepal-Tibet border, the effective imprisonment of Tibetans within their encampments on significant Tibetan holidays and the daily uncertainty of a secure life for Tibetans in Nepal. For the Nepal Government, it is profit for minimal investment. Suppression of the Tibetan community economically costs Nepal little. Politically there is also little cost to Nepal as there has been minimal significant protest by either Nepalis or the United Nations and rights respecting countries in regard to the treatment of Tibetans. Thus we are reminded of the old Nepali saying ‘punji nabahe ko bepar’, meaning “Business without investment”.

Moving Forward

In depth monitoring and reports like “Appeasing China: Restricting the rights of Tibetans in Nepal” published in July 2008 by New York based Human Rights Watch details the peaceful nature of all protests by Tibetans in early 2008 in Nepal, finding no evidence of violent activity by the Tibetan protesters. However, Peter Lee’s recent article in Asia Times, “China tests Nepal's loyalty over Tibet” demonstrates the Chinese Government’s fear of Nepal’s Tibetan population. This brings to mind a Tibetan saying, “Gya thogpe phung, bhod rewae phung” meaning “Chinese lose by suspicion and Tibetans lose by hope”. Misguided suspicion within the Chinese Government of a possible Tibetan rebellion, combined with fear of a weakened Beijing resulting from a possible future “Jasmine Revolution” may prove to be a blessing in disguise for Tibetans. If the legitimate leaders of Tibet, including His Holiness the Dalai Lama, play their cards right it may lead to a path of genuine negotiation between the Chinese Government and the de facto holder of the Tibetan snow lion stamp in Dharamsala. The impact of each and every decision made in Dharamsala has often shown that the decibels of the Dharamsala gongs are high enough to reach as far as Taktser in far eastern Tibet, the birthplace of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

Many western voices, including some individuals within the United Nations, and some within the Tibetan community itself have suggested that Tibetans in Nepal should sacrifice some of their rights for the greater good of the Tibetan community. They alleged that peaceful protests, which are often no more than quiet cultural or religious gatherings within temple grounds, should be sacrificed to stop drawing the attention of the Chinese Government to Nepal’s policy in regard to Tibetan’s transiting through Nepal. Once we begin a negotiation of rights, such as whose rights and which rights are more important, we step onto a slippery slope of justifying abuses of human rights. As more world leaders bow down to the Chinese Government for economic and political reasons, sustaining the Tibetan way of life becomes increasingly precarious. The international community should instead actively defend the rights of all Tibetans regardless of where they live and pray. If the international community were to make Nepal’s suppression of Tibetans more costly politically, and even financially, there may be some shift in Nepal’s treatment of Tibetans.

Regardless of the financial and political incentives provided by either the Chinese Government or the international community, the political leaders of Nepal should think back to their own struggle for civil and political rights during the Peoples’ Movement and find within themselves a genuine commitment to democratic principles and values. It is on this basis, that these leaders should then decide if they will protect or persecute Tibetans who seek refuge in Nepal.